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Introduction
Søren Dosenrode
The Great War belongs to modern world history’s most important periods, 
only rivaled by the Thirty Years’ War and its peace agreement in Westphalia 
in 1648. The Great War lasted – according to common history writing – 
from August 1914 until November 1918, but it arguably lasted until the im-
plosion of the Soviet Empire in November 1989, with the 1920s and 1930s 
only being perceived as a fragile and unruly truce before war broke out 
again in 1939 (lasting until 1945), and the Cold War, with its proxy wars, 
broke out in 1947 (lasting until 1989). 
The people fighting in the trenches of Flanders came from America, Africa, 
Asia, Oceania and Europe. Those who fell left their families and friends 
in their home countries in those continents, and those coming back were 
marked for life by their experiences. At the macro level, the results of the 
War impacted on the whole world: from the rise of Japan, the move of eco-
nomic power from Europe to the United States of America, the construction 
of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the transferal of 
German colonies to the victorious powers via the League of Nations, not to 
mention the Russian Revolution and the developments in inter alia Germany 
smoothing the path for World War 2 and the Cold War. As the analysis in the 
coming chapters will show, not only the twentieth century was marked by 
the War: the traces can be followed into the twenty-first century, too. 
George F. Kennan described World War 1 as “The greatest seminal ca-
tastrophe of this century”, but the real understanding of the War first occurs 
in the German translation, which calls the War Urkatastrophe, as Sørensen 
(2005) reminds us. Urkatastrophe means the beginning, the mother of the 
catastrophes which were to come and which were to define the largest part 
of the twentieth century.
Winston Churchill wrote of the War (1938: 2): 
 “The Great War through which we have passed differed from all 
ancient wars in the immense power of the combatants and their fear-
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ful agencies of destruction, and from all modern wars in the utter 
ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the horrors of all the ages 
were brought together, and not only armies but whole populations 
were thrust into the midst of them.”
One of several reasons why the War left such an impact was that it was 
not expected. Since the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), there had not been 
war in core-Europe. There had been crisis like the First Moroccan Crisis 
(Tangier Crisis) in 1905 and the Second Moroccan Crisis (Agadir Crisis) in 
1911, and then the two Balkan Wars 1912 and 1913 respectively but not in 
Mainland Europe1. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, war 
was not seen as a possibility, humankind had turned too civilized. Churchill 
captures this well when describing the British government, of which he was 
himself at times a member, during the ten years leading up to the War (1938: 
13): “The British Government and the Parliament out of which it sprang, did 
not believe in the approach of a great war, and were determined to prevent 
it; but at the same time the sinister hypothesis [of a war] was continually 
present in their thoughts”.
As will be repeated over and over in this book, is it hard to overestimate 
the importance of World War 1 on our present day world. It is hardly nec-
essary to note that interest in World War 1 is still very much alive, as has 
been manifested in a number of publications commemorating the centenary 
of the outbreak of the War: the centenary of the Battle of Passchendaele in 
2017.2 A short survey on the internet in autumn 2018 (the centenary of the 
armistice on 11 November 1918) displayed a host of events in the form of 
parades, church services, concerts, and exhibitions especially in Belgium, 
France, and the United Kingdom, showing that the memory and the impor-
tance of the Great War is still very much alive. 
In this book, we will analyze the War itself and trace its impacts. This will 
be done using an interdisciplinary approach, which is the best way to get a 
broad understanding of the War, as the aim is to do a comprehensive ‘360 
degree’ analysis of the impacts, finding them in culture, economy, politics, 
and technology.
The interdisciplinary approach is the hallmark of Aalborg University, and 
thus it has been obvious to find contributors there among scholars who are 
experts within the various fields covered and who also are used to the inter-
disciplinary approach. In this sense, one might describe this anthology as 
an Aalborg book.
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The book is divided into three major parts. In the first one, the frame and 
raison d’etre of the book is presented: the prelude, the course, and the end 
of the War are analyzed. In the second part, the book turns to analyzing the 
impact of the War; the War’s impact on literature, technology, economy, 
and foreign relations is concretely analyzed. The third part consists of one 
chapter integrating the previous analysis, tracing the impacts of World War 
1. Having this structure, the book aims at giving a comprehensive introduc-
tion to World War 1.
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Chapter 1
An age of security?
Søren Dosenrode
“The first world war was a watershed, not only in 
people’s lives, but also in politics and culture, even
when a façade of normalcy was restored after the war.” 
(Mosse 1986: 492)
A. J. P. Taylor introduces his famous book “From Sarajevo to Potsdam” 
(1966: 9) with the following description of Europe: 
“In 1914 Europe was a single civilized community, more so even 
than at the height of the European Empire. A man could travel across 
the length and breadth of the Continent without a passport until he 
reached the frontiers of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. He could 
settle in a foreign country for work or leisure without legal formali-
ties except, occasionally, some health requirements. Every currency 
was as good as gold, though this security rested ultimately on the 
skill of financiers in the City of London.” 
And he goes on, stressing the similarities which prevailed. 
A general war did not seem likely, and was unwanted. Norman Angell at-
tempted to “prove” a European war’s impossibility in his pamphlet “The 
Great Illusion” from 1909 (and extended it into a book of the same name 
in 1912). In his analysis, he argues that the economic integration of the 
European countries had grown to such a degree that war between them 
would be entirely futile, thus making militarism obsolete. Norman Angell 
sums up his thesis in the following words (1913: ix):
“What are the fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry 
of arma ments in Europe, notably the Anglo-German? Each nation 
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pleads the need for defence; but this implies that someone is likely to 
attack, and has therefore a presumed interest in so doing. What are 
the motives which each State thus fears its neighbors may obey?”
The motives, according to Angell (1913), are based on the idea that a nation 
has to follow a territorial expansionist policy to create the best situa tion for 
itself. And he goes on, (1913: x):
“The author challenges this whole doctrine. He attempts to show that 
it belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed; 
that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon 
the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation’s political and 
economic frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military 
power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation 
to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for 
one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another – to enrich 
itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that, 
in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those 
aims for which peoples strive.”
In his famous novel “Die welt von Gestern” (The World of Yesterday) of 
1947, Stefan Zweig described the previous two decades before the outbreak 
of World War 1 as an era of “security” where no one really believed in the 
possibility of a larger, general war. Yes, there had been smaller wars on the 
outskirts of Europe, but not in “core Europe”; man had become too civilized 
for that (Zweig 1947: 13):1
“When I attempted to find a simple formula for the period in which I 
grew up, prior to the First World War I hope that I convey its fullness 
by calling it the Golden Age of Security. Everything in our almost 
thousand year-old Austrian monarchy seemed based on permanen-
cy, and the State itself was the chief guarantor of this stability. […] In 
this vast empire [Austria-Hungary] everything stood firmly and im-
movably in its appointed place, and at its head was the aged emper-
or; and were he to die, one knew (or believed) another would come 
to take his place, and nothing would change in the well-regulated 
order. No one thought of wars, of revolutions, or revolts. All that was 
radical, all violence, seemed impossible in an age of reason.”
Norman Angell and others like him recognized that there is an old  logic 
concerning “territorial expansion” and the “exercise of political force 
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against others”, although he finds it “futile”. The wish for peace prevails. 
This love for peace is also described by General Friedrich von Bernhardi, 
who wrote “Deutschland und die nächste Krieg” (Germany and the Next 
War) in 1912… and he dislikes it (1914: 9):
“The value of war for the political and moral development of man-
kind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized 
world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of 
States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas 
are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation 
seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the great-
ness of its history.”
Bernhardi himself adheres to the old territorial logic (1914: 11):2
“Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations [the 
wish for peace], we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching 
which once the old German Empire received with “astonishment 
and indignation” from Frederick the Great, that “the rights of States 
can only be asserted by the living power”; that what was won in war 
can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, cramped as we are 
by political and geographical conditions, require the greatest efforts 
to hold and to increase what we have won. […]. We are accustomed 
to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it as the greatest 
factor in the furtherance of culture and power.”
The texts just quoted describe the feeling of security which prevailed in the 
majority of the population in Europe, although not in the military elites and 
parts of the diplomacy. An arms race had been going on for years among the 
countries of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Social Darwinism 
inspired some politicians, officers, and groups of nationalists to pursue ag-
gressive rearmament and to further nationalism. However, as late as the 
summer of 1914, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had in-
structed his private secretary to make confidential enquiries in Berlin so 
as to explore the possibility of an  Anglo-German rapprochement (Neilson 
2014). No one wanted a general war (cf. Knudsen, Chapter 3, this book), and 
it could have been avoided.
MacMillan also describes the disbelief and shock which followed the out-
break of war in her important 2013 monograph (xxvii):
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“The coming of war took most Europeans by surprise and their ini-
tial  reaction was disbelief and shock. They had grown used to peace; 
the century since the end of the Napoleonic Wars had been the most 
peaceful one Europe had known since the Roman Empire. True, 
there had been wars, but these had been far-off colonial ones like the 
Zulu wars in southern Africa, on the periphery of Europe like the 
Crimean War, or short and decisive like the Franco-Prussian War”.3
It is exactly the disruption of the feeling of safety, progress, and wealth 
which made the outbreak and result of the War so paradigmatic in European 
– indeed, world – history.
The War shook Europe, leaving the continent crippled. G. M. Treve lyan 
 describes the feeling on the evening of August 3, 1914, the day Great  Britain 
went to war (in Johnson 1989: 177): “That night, as the lamps were being 
lit in the summer dusk, [sir Edward] Grey standing in the windows of his 
room in the Foreign Office overlooking St James’s Park, said to a friend: 
‘The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in 
our lifetime’.”
And, in a figurative sense, he was right. The outbreak of the Great War 
was a shock, and it meant the end not only of the Belle Époque and a fairly 
carefree optimism, but also of Europe’s role as the world’s dominating con-
tinent, and it marked the beginning of an era of conflicts, on the continent as 
well as outside, which would last until the end of the Cold War in 1989. The 
period from 1914 to 1989 is seen as one historic conflict event, only broken 
by periods of ceasefire, and still influencing our lives today more than 100 
years later. In this sense, the Great War has proven to be just as important 
as the Thirty Years War, if not even more so.
The importance of World War 1 in shaping world affairs is unquestionable, 
and a large number of books have already been written. So, why another 
book on World War 1? We have three series of arguments:
First and foremost, as mentioned already, the Great War shaped today’s 
world, inter alia, politically and economically, so one cannot simply be 
“finish ed with it” and proceed. In Europe, particularly, but also in for ex-
ample the Middle East, one has to return to it again and again in order to 
understand the world of today.4 Our book brings new contributions to the 
War’s influence on the softer elements of European culture beyond military 
history and politics, which leads us to our second argument:
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Second, this book adds a broad interdisciplinary survey of cross-country 
impacts. As a quick look at the book’s chapters shows, this book takes a 
distinct interdisciplinary approach, bringing together experts from different 
disciplines, which makes it quite unique. This “360 degree” investigation 
will give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the War and its im-
pact. We know that it is not possible to cover all aspects of the Great War 
but, by approaching it from a historical, political, psychological, literary 
(we consider literature the prism of culture), economic, and technological 
angle, we strive for an ambitious and broad survey of the War’s impact 
across a number of disciplines and across a number of states. This interdis-
ciplinary approach stands out, as most recent books dealing with World War 
1 and its impact tend to be monographs which concentrate on the impact 
of the War on a particular discipline.5 Thus, this makes our book a general 
reader for those seeking a broad interdisciplinary introduction, not only on 
the War, but also its cultural, economic, and technological impacts.
Third, this book goes beyond the Anglophone impact – but in English. 
The book provides the reader with the finer details of the War’s impact on 
continental European states. The country-specific chapters (Gemzøe’s on 
Denmark, Schlosser’s on Germany, and Jørgensen’s on France) expose the 
subject of the impact of the War in European societies other than the UK or 
the US, but in English; of course the impact on Anglo-Saxon literature is 
included, too (Sørensen’s chapter).
Structure and contents of the book
The first part of the book is focused on the War and the peace-conference 
and provides the overall frame. After this chapter, Valsiner asks how it was 
possible to make people go to war. Knudsen analyzes the events leading 
up to the War, Zank analyzes the course and development of the War, and 
Dosenrode looks into the peace treaties ending it.
In the second part, the book focuses on the impact of the War with a number 
of specialized contributions. The first four chapters (Schlosser, Jørgensen, 
Sørensen, and Gemzøe) focus on the War’s impact on literature, before 
turning to an analysis of the impact on economy (Olesen), technology 
(Skyggebjerg), and on the impacts outside Europe focusing on the spread of 
Communism to Asia, an often overlooked but crucial consequence (Xing). 
In the final chapter, the long-term consequences are analyzed, both by 
14
drawing on the findings of the previous chapters, but also extending them, 
asking which impacts of the War were the most important (Dosenrode). 
In detail, the contents looks like this:
Following this chapter, which sets the frame of the book, Jaan Valsiner writes 
in Chapter 2 that “War is willfully escalated violence built on the dynamic 
reciprocity of the warring side”. And he continues: “I will raise the question 
of the ways in which human beings – fascinated by the socially suggested 
representations of war – marched into the massacres on the battlefields of 
World War 1. The history of World War 1 is a particularly fitting arena for 
interdisciplinary collaboration – between history and psychol ogy”. This is 
his focal point. He leans on Carl von Clausewitz, as well as especially cul-
tural psychology, linking to the theory of social representations, which is 
especially fitting for linking with history.
Knud Knudsen discusses the reasons for the War in Chapter 3. His chapter is 
centered on the events of July 1914, demonstrating how the assassinations in 
Sarajevo were turned into the pretext for war. It is the basic idea of the chapter 
that some political and military leaders in Europe wanted a war in the Balkans, 
but also that no one got the war that they wanted. Further, it is argued that the 
political leaders in the capitals of Europe acted rationally, standing by their 
treaty obligations in an upcoming crisis, but also that they might have acted 
otherwise, that alternative options existed, and that they might have sought to 
restrain the crisis. This assertion is the basis for a final brief discussion of the 
structural ties that might have prevented the European leaders from acting in 
the interest of a peaceful solution for the 1914 July Crisis.
In Chapter 4, Wolfgang Zank gives an overview of the course of World War 
1. The major political and military events are summarized. The conflict 
between Germany and the Western powers receives due attention, given the 
point that the Western Front, after the intervention of the United States, be-
came the theater where Germany lost the War. But, in other areas, the War 
left much more long-lasting destructive impacts: Russia turned into a failed 
state where a rather small but disciplined and fanatical political force could 
seize power. This created a cleavage in world politics for some 70 years. 
Also, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary left multiple seeds of conflict, not 
least in Yugoslavia. And, in the Middle East, the disorder after the disinte-
gration of the Ottoman Empire can be said to be ongoing to this day. Also, 
the conquest of the German colonies in Africa and China had a lasting im-
pact. The processes leading to these outcomes in Russia, Austria-Hungary, 
the Middle East, Africa, and China will therefore also be dealt with.
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Chapter 5 is concerned with the end of the War, the negotiations among the 
Entente Powers, and their dictates to the losing powers. Søren Dosenrode 
starts out analyzing the war aims of the powers which were in conflict, 
as they guided the victorious powers. From the outset, especially France, 
Germany, and Russia wished to aim at securing their superiority. Next in 
the chapter, there is a brief section on the peace initiatives taken during the 
War, by the belligerent powers, by neutral ones, and by others. There were 
many initiatives but, as the main parties all hoped for victory, the prospects 
for peace were dim. The focus of this chapter is on the peace negotiations, or 
rather the negotiations among the Entente Powers which lead to the dictated 
peace. The very different approaches of France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States are presented, as are the considerations of the Imperial, 
and then republican German governments. After a survey of the peace trea-
ties and their consequences, the chapter rounds off by discussing the conse-
quences of the peace treaties.
Chapter 5 ends the first part of the book, which analyzes the War itself, why 
it broke out, why people were willing to sacrifice themselves, the course of 
the War, and how it was ended. The next part is focused on the implications 
of the War, starting out by looking at the impact the War had on culture and 
literature, followed by its impact on the world economy, on technological 
development, and on the world outside Europe.
Culture is a central concept, and in David Landes’ words (2000: 2), it makes 
“almost all the difference”.6 James Winders formulates the impact of World 
War 1 on culture like this (2001: 99): “It is difficult not to conclude that the 
Great War of 1914 to 1918 set in motion many of the violent forces and much 
of the cultural despair that beveled the remainder of the twentieth century. 
The War shattered the confident ideals of an entire generation, many of 
whom in their dissolutioned state would succumb to the lure of the apoca-
lyptic politics of fascism”.
Using literature as a seismograph for societal developments is not new in 
itself; e.g. Donna Baker did it when analyzing the relations between Nazism 
and the petit bourgeois back in 1975. It has the advantage that a good author 
is able to capture the Zeitgeist, which a more typical positivist approach 
may not (cf. Niemeyer 1978).7 Phrased differently, the focus on literature is 
important because of its ability to absorb and amplify less tangible feelings 
and emotions, and if it succeeds in “hitting a nerve”, it will reach a big 
audience, thus contributing to both “framing” and characterizing a period. 
That, e.g. Barbusse, Hesse, and Jünger’s works are still published and read 
16
today is a rough indication of the War’s impact, and of course of their work’s 
literary qualities. These four chapters look into the impact of the War on lit-
erature in Germany, France, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and Denmark. By 
doing so (though not being able to include all states), we focus on the main 
antagonists – the powers – and also look at a representative sample of small, 
neutral states: Denmark.8
World War 1 was an event which left its imprint on literature in all the 
European countries, and beyond. Obviously, the strongest traces are found 
in the literature of countries which participated in the War, but traces are 
also found in those of neutral ones. Not surprisingly, there are many paral-
lels, e.g. the literature seeing the War as a possibility for reviving a country’s 
culture and soul, vs. those authors who opposed the destruction of people. 
One of the large impacts felt until at least the 1960s was on the economy. 
Finn Olesen analyzes the economic impact of the War in Chapter 10. He 
states that, up until the outbreak of World War 1, expectations on economic 
matters were, in general, rather positive. At least the vision of Adam Smith 
– a macroeconomic outcome of harmony and optimality with economic 
growth and a significantly high level of wealth for the first time in modern 
history – seemed to be within reach for many of the European countries and 
the USA. However, the outbreak of the War, along with its consequences, 
dramatically changed this scenario – far from an economic environment 
of economic growth, the future was most likely to be one of troublesome 
economic – as well as political – turbulence. In his 1919 book The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace, the English economist John Maynard Keynes 
made an early prognosis on what could and should be expected to be the 
economic reality for the years to come, not only for Germany but also for the 
victorious countries. As history has shown, Keynes actually, unfortunately, 
was rather spot on with this prognosis. Somehow, the Versailles Treaty her-
alded the coming of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Furthermore, from 
then on, Great Britain was no longer the world’s most powerful Empire, 
economically or politically. Her position was overtaken by the USA which, 
to a large degree, had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both 
Great Britain and France.
It is occasionally claimed that World War 1 had a huge impact on develop-
ment in science and technology, but is this so? Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg 
analyses the impact of the Great War on everyday technologies with a spe-
cial emphasis on transport and communication technology in Chapter 11. 
Skyggebjerg asks what impact the Great War had on everyday technology 
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in continental Europe. Many accounts of the connection between World 
War 1 and technology focus on the development of weapons and other tech-
nologies for military use, like tanks, machine guns, flamethrowers, poi-
son gas, battleships, aircraft, and submarines. Others look into technolo-
gies invented during the War or which are claimed to have been boosted 
by wartime use, like sanitary napkins, tea bags, zips, stainless steel, ra-
dio technology, and wristwatches. The main aim of the chapter is, with 
a basis in empirical examples, to discuss the popular assumption that the 
general effect of war on technology is stimulation, an assumption which 
is criticized, among others, by the English historian of technology, David 
Edgerton. Thus, Skyggebjerg’s chapter looks into the question of if and how 
the Great War influenced the development and diffusion of mass communi-
cation (concretely of the civil use of radio in Denmark) and into how some 
“surplus” wartime technologies were transformed and used for civilian 
transport purposes after the war. The last analysis is based on two cases 
of technology transfer from the belligerent countries to Denmark after the 
War, the FF.49C seaplane formerly used by the German navy and the Mack 
truck used by the American army on the battlefields in France.
This book has a European angle in its conception. Still, one of the im-
pacts of World War 1 is of such importance that it had to be included, even 
though it happened outside of Europe: in Asia, to be precise. The Russian 
Revolution and the emergence of the Soviet Union had a lasting impact on 
most, if not all, of the world. As Zank mentions in Chapter 5, Lenin declared 
war on the capitalist world by founding the Communist International. The 
Russian Revolution inspired and supported, inter alia, Mao Zedong in his 
fight for supremacy in China. Li Xing analyzes this relation, this lasting im-
pact in Chapter 12, the impact of the war outside Europe – “The Expansion 
of Communism: The Chinese Revolution”.
Li Xing emphasizes the historical importance of the World War 1 in bring-
ing about a fundamental transformation in China’s contemporary history 
– the victory of the Chinese Revolution. In other words, it explores China’s 
century-long “challenge-response” dynamism, i.e., how external factors 
helped to shape China’s internal transformations, and how generations of 
Chinese people had been struggling to respond to the external chal lenges 
and impact. The author sheds light on the historical background of the 
Chinese Revolution that was seen as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty 
in the aftermath of World War 1. The Chinese May Fourth Movement in 
1919 was a milestone as a national outcry and response to the injustice of 
the Treaty. The Movement provided the soil for intellectual debate on the 
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role of Marxism, Leninism, and the Russian Revolution, and their relevance 
in the Chinese situation. One of the immediate outcomes was the rise of the 
Chinese communist socio-political force and its struggle in a century-long 
revolution. The chapter concludes that China’s socio-political and socio-cul-
tural transformations coincided with the historical course of World War 1, 
and the effects of the War contributed to a radical change in the political sit-
uation in China and shaped the country’s developmental trajectory through 
the entire twentieth century.
In the last chapter, Chapter 13, Søren Dosenrode traces the impacts of the 
Great War. The basis for his analysis is the analysis in the previous chapters. 
His chapter follows the basic structure of this book’s second part, but is ex-
tended in scope. Concretely, the first section centers on the impacts of the 
War on culture and literature. This is followed by an analysis of the political 
impacts of the War both domestically (the spread and collapse of democ-
racy, woman’s rights, the bureaucratization of the state) and in international 
relations, following a regional approach (Europe, the Middle East, Africa, 
Asia, and the Americas). This leads to a section on the economic conse-
quences of the War, including inflation, the shift of economic power away 
from Europe, and ends with its long-term consequences. The next section 
focuses on how World War 1 impacted science, technology, and medicine. 
In the concluding remarks, Dosenrode asks what the greatest impacts were. 
Using the criterion of focusing on the stability of the international system, 
he names three: the Russian Revolution, the instability of the international 
economic system, and the rise of Nazism. He then briefly comments on the 
usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach.
19
Reference list
Angell, Norman (1913) The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of 
Military Power to National Advantage. 4th ed. New York and London: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 
Baker, Donna (1975) “Nazism and the Petit Bourgeois Protagonists: The 
Novels of Grass, Boll, and Mann”, New German Critique, 5: 77-105. 
v. Bernhardi, Friedrich (1914) Germany and the Next War. Popular edition. 
New York: Chas. A. Eron 
Fussell, Paul (2000) The Great War and Modern Memory. Oxford 
University Press. 
Hammond, Mary & Shafquat Towheed (eds.) (2007) Publishing in the 
First World War. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan.
Harrison, Lawrence E. & Samuel P. Huntington (eds.) (2000) Culture 
Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. Basic Books.
Hofstade, Geert (1980/1984) Culture’s consequences. Newbury Park: 
SAGE Publications
Johnson, Paul (1989) The Oxford Book of Political Anecdotes. Oxford 
University Press.
Keegan, John (1998) The First World War. Knopf.
Keynes, John Maynard (1919) The Economic Consequences of the Peace. 
1st. ed. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.
Landes, David (2000) “Culture Makes Almost All the Difference”, in 
Harrison, Lawrence E. & Samuel P. Huntington (eds.) Culture Matters: 
How Values Shape Human Progress. Basic Books.
MacMillan, Margaret (2013) The War that Ended Peace. London: Profile 
Books Ltd. 
Moorhouse, Geoffrey (2008) Hell’s Foundations. Farber & Farber. 
Mosse, George L. (1986) “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War 
Experience”, Journal of Contemporary History, 21: 491-513. 
Neilson, Keith (2014) “1914: The German War?”, European History 
Quarterly, 44(3): 395-418.
Niemeyer, Gerhart (1978) “For These Things Our Eyes Are Dim”,  
The Review of Politics, 40(1): 135-137. 
Rosecrance, Richard (1986) The Rise of the Trading State. Basic Books.
Sharp, Alan (2010) Consequences of the Peace. Haus Publ.
Sørensen, Niels Arne (2005) Den Store Krig: Europæernes Første 
Verdenskrig. Copenhagen: Gads Forlag.
Taylor, A. J. P. (1966) From Sarajevo to Potsdam. London: Hartcourt, 
Brace & World.
20
Trevelyan, G. M. in Johnson, Paul (1989) The Oxford Book of Political 
Anecdotes. Oxford University Press.
Winders, James A. (2001) European Culture since 1848: From Modern to 
Postmodern and Beyond. New York: Palgrave.
Zweig, Stefan (1947) The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography. 5th ed. 
London: Cassell and Company.
21
Endnotes
1  John Maynard Keynes identified the same attitude in his 1919 book 
on the Versailles Treaty in which he describes the prewar time as con-
ceived of as prosperous, stable, and good (p. 6): “But, most important 
of all, the [the middle or upper-class inhabitants of London] regarded 
this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the 
direction of further improvement, and any deviation from this is aber-
rant, scandalous, and avoidable.”
2  In his 1986 book The Rise of the Trading State, Richard Rosecrance 
discusses the logic of commerce vs. conquest in depth.
3 But MacMillan (2013: xxix) also reminds us that: “The outbreak of war 
was a shock but it did not come out of a clear blue sky. The clouds had 
been gathering in the previous two decades and many Europeans were 
uneasily aware of that fact. […] On the other hand, they had, many of 
them, leaders and ordinary citizens alike, a confidence that they could 
deal with the threats of conflict.”
4  As enduring evidence of the interest in World War 1, Routledge re- 
issued fifteen volumes relating to World War 1 in 2014, some of which 
were first published as far back as the 1960s. This interest in World 
War 1 was naturally intensified by the centenary celebrations in 2014, 
and the same happens now at the centenary of the end of the War in 
1918.
  
5  See John Keegan’s 1998 The First World War (politics), Alan Sharp’s 
2010 Consequences of the Peace (politics), Geoffrey Moorhouse’s 
2011 Hell’s Foundations (military history), Mary Hammond’s 2007 
Publishing in the First World War (publishing), and Paul Fussell’s The 
Great War and Modern Memory (literature and public perception).
6  Geert Hofstede makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning 
culture, when dividing it into “Culture one” and “Culture two” (1991: 
16). “Culture one” is culture in the classical meaning of the word; that 
is education, refinement, art etc. “Culture two” includes the activities 
in “Culture one” but is broader – very much broader – including every-
day work and routines like greetings, eating, loving etc. Culture in this 
book is mainly concerned with “Culture one”.
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7  We will, so to speak, practice the latter without neglecting the former, 
getting a fuller picture of the epoch and its impacts.
8  Why Denmark? From a methodological point of view we could just 
as well have chosen, for example, Holland, Norway, Sweden, or 
Switzerland but, as this book originates in Denmark, it was natural to 
choose this country. Why not also include e.g. Russia? Two reasons: a) 
This book has a Western focus – some would say bias – and b) adding 
an additional chapter would tip the balance we try to maintain between 
the impacts on politics, psychology, economy, science and technology, 
and culture.
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Chapter 2
Minds going to war:   Psychology of patriotic carnage
Jaan Valsiner
War is a disaster. Yet – in contrast to all kinds of natural calamities such 
as earthquakes, floods, famines – war is a human-made disaster. Even if it 
may begin from occasional misunderstandings between social power hold-
ers, once it escalates, it becomes a framework for purposeful selective de-
struction – of values, value holders, and value creators. 
It is human beings – as they keep taking on social roles or having those 
inherited by aristocratic or oligarchic lineages – who make war. They con-
struct the tools (armament, fortifications) and socialize new generations into 
volunteering for war efforts, or at least accepting recruitment or conscrip-
tion in obedient ways. Young men have been – over centuries – made proud 
of wearing their military uniforms and medals indicating their success in 
killing other human beings. Mothers of these men have been persuaded to 
accept the loss of the lives of their sons not as a cruelty against humanity, 
but with pride for their sons’ carrying out of his “patriotic duty”, while end-
ing up as one of the so many crosses in the wide fields of war cemeteries1.
War is a cultural product – similar to wedding ceremonies, weather 
forecasts, bull fights, and table manners. Yet it has its specificity – it is a 
cultural construction of acts of purposeful destruction. Not only are once 
created objects destroyed – this happens also by accident – but the purpose 
of human action is set to be that of demolishing – and doing it with full 
righteousness as if it were an act of a worthwhile cause. Everything human 
beings have carefully been building in peacetime becomes turned into a 
potential target for destruction (Lewin 1917). Human beings who have been 
brought up through their childhoods with the moral imperatives “thou shalt 
not kill!” and “thou shalt not steal” remarkably easily move to the mode 
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of the opposite: “you must kill!” (the “enemy”) and “you can loot” (the 
enemy’s property). 
It is here where the need to consider psychology as a science in the ser-
vice of making sense of wars comes to the social sciences. Movement from 
construction to purposeful destruction is a major psychological transfor-
mation – which happens in phases. A local friction between communities 
may escalate into temporary acts of violence, and de-escalate into ordinary 
peaceful co-existence between neighbors sometime later. It can be episodic 
– clubs of football fans travelling around Europe to confront their opponents 
in some peaceful town where the given football match is scheduled. Or the 
escalation of inter-state relations can lead to a war that can last short time, 
or not a short time – it can last even thirty, or hundred years. When peace is 
made again, the former enemies may move to a state of amiable acceptance 
of the histories of their socially-sanctioned cruelties towards one another. 
While some of the losers in the war are singled out as objects for final sym-
bolic (and physical) destruction – peacetime trials and convictions of “war 
criminals” – the overwhelming majority of both the “winners” and “losers” 
in the just finished war go back to their peacetime constructive activities 
of sowing and harvesting crops, building up destroyed cities, opening res-
taurants and hotels, creating new consumer goods, and – in that myriad of 
peacetime activities – inventing new weapons for future wars to be fought. 
The technology of drones of the twenty-first century is developed for mili-
tary purposes first, and may find its uses in everyday life later.
Psychology as science can relate with other sciences in their efforts to study 
wars. It is in the case of the phenomenon of massive participation in the war-
to-peace (and peace-to-war) transitions where the interests of social psy-
chology, history, and political sciences meet. No wars could be fought with-
out the psychological readiness of ordinary persons to join in the act. Such 
readiness depends on mechanisms of internalization and external ization of 
social suggestions that psychology handles in the domain of the study of 
development of the dialogical self (Markova 2012; Valsiner 1987). 
The feeling of the “patriotic glory” by decorated war veterans is a cultural 
resource for pride for the next generations – ready for new wars (Figure 1). 
Historical events and political processes fully depend on psychological con-
ditions that are intuitively embedded in the social practices.
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Figure 1. The bessmertnyi polk- Moscow, Red Square, May 9, 2015
Figure 1 illustrates a powerful recent political effort to mobilize the per-
sonal family ties into the service of expansion of patriotic unity feelings 
around the issue of celebrating 70 years from the end of World War 2 in 
Europe. The history of a war won (or lost) matters – and is made to work for 
– the future. New generations, carrying the photographs of their deceased 
relatives who were in the war, join the promotion of the new vigilance of 
defense of their country in the future. Adding the notion of eternity (bess-
mertnyi, immortal) to the collective military unit (polk, a battalion) carries 
the affective personal links with one’s relatives forward to future readiness 
to devote the lives of the young (and their children) to the future political 
needs of the “fatherland”. Patriotism is promoted in all societies (Carretero 
2011) and its function is set up ahead of time when it is needed to achieve 
concrete political goals. The nature of wars may change in history (Beck 
2005; Leach 2000) yet these remain – as von Clausewitz (1908/1832) pointed 
out in the nineteenth century – a continuation of politics through military 
means (Roxborough 1994). The wars fought in the courts of law in any 
country, or between them, are peacetime continuations of the military acts 
on real battlefields.
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Turning backward in time in the present book, I will raise the question 
of the ways in which human beings, fascinated by the socially suggested 
representations of war, marched into the massacres on the battlefields of 
World War 1. The history of World War 1 is a particularly fitting arena for 
interdisciplinary collaboration between history and psychology. For histori-
ans, the making of the war – an escalation of the political oppositions at the 
pace at which these proceeded in 1914 – is a fitting target for analysis that 
still is far from having been captured (Neilson 2014). For sociologists, it is 
the transformation of the societal structures in Europe between 1848 and 
1914 that could provide for serious insights into societal transformations 
in general. The complexities of World War 1 even led to the emergence of 
the scholarly field of the study of international relations (Lebow 2014). Yet 
the scholarly interpretations of the dramatic (and traumatic) social changes 
in Europe and the rest of the World as a consequence of the 1914-18 events 
remain as heterogeneous as the multifaceted phenomenon itself.
Psychology has been curiously peripheral in the discussions of World War 
1. One needs to make sense of the rapid transformation of the “just plain 
folks” into soldiers who settle down in the trenches and keep shooting at 
“the enemy”. And even more than this, how could a war become glorified 
as “The Great War”? How can human beings accept the social suggestions 
to affectively frame an activity of devastation as if it had positive moral 
value? How have ordinary human beings, the sufferers of the wars and their 
collateral effects (famines, epidemics), managed to survive and resiliently 
re-build their prosperity – until the next war hits again?
In the reality of war (and peace), psychological issues are central. The wag-
ing of wars is older in human history than any psychological reflection. Von 
Clausewitz (1908/1832) outlined three types of reciprocities in the condi-
tions of war:
1. War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds: as one side dic-
tates the law on the other, and the other attempts precisely the same to 
the first, there arises a sort of reciprocal action which reaches its ex-
treme.
2 War is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action 
of a living power upon an inanimate mass. “As long as the enemy is not 
defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he 
will dictate the law to me as I did to him” (Clausewitz 1908: 5).
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3. The exertion of powers depends on the available resources and the 
strength of the will. As both warring sides depend on the will of the 
fighters, the enhancement of the fight is based on the reciprocity of act-
ing against the other, getting similar feedback, and escalating the will to 
fight.
War is willfully escalated violence built on the dynamic reciprocity of the 
warring sides. It is not only built on the goal orientations of the opponents 
to launch into the destructive sequence of actions, and the socially-guided 
wills of the fighters to annihilate “the other”. It entails socially-guided es-
calation of all these features. Such social guidance is deeply interdependent 
with the environment: the fighter’s will is socially cultivated action orienta-
tion where no doubts are allowed to spoil the escalation of courage.2
However, not all is immediately useful for historians peeping into the field 
of psychology for collaboration. Psychology in its traditional form – looking 
at individuals separated from their immediate life environments and attrib-
uting causality to the intra-psychological causes for actions – has little to of-
fer history and sociology in the understanding of the human psyche at war. 
It is in the habit of asserting causality for the outcomes of some conduct to 
selected – but never provable – causal entities in the past. Trying to analyze 
Napoleon’s war crimes3 in terms of his difficult childhood or personality 
dispositions creates a social discourse that may be of interest to common 
gossip networks (“How interesting! All that Hitler did was due to his being 
sexually abused at age 3!”), but has no scientific value. What psychology 
has traditionally overlooked is precisely the willful escalation of goal orien-
tations to destruction that is the psychological core of war.
Psychological phenomena are always co-determined by the person and the 
environment in an open-systemic arrangement (Valsiner 1987, 1998, 2007, 
2014). The persons create their environments so that these environments 
guide them: a young man putting on a soldier’s uniform changes his rela-
tionship with the world; he starts acting like a soldier, and feeling like one. 
That feeling leads to further changes in the environment, escalating the 
feeling of being a warrior sometimes to the extreme.4 They may become 
conscientious killers, until the realities of being under attack by their op-
ponents on the battlefield temper their bravado and lead to the main psy-
chological feature that keeps wars going: fear (Bion 1997: 203-204, Grass 
2007: 123-125; Sen’yavskaya 1999, 2006). By social guidance of the fighters 
towards courage, the military socialization system sets up constraints upon 
fear: once it is evoked, it is to be transformed to its opposite (non-fear) which 
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can allow irrational acts dangerous to one’s survival to emerge. Such acts 
are results of affective synthesis at the given moment. Later on, these acts 
may be depicted as “courageous” and given to others as examples of “cou-
rage.” 
The depths of the human psyche are embedded in the social organization of 
purposeful conflict in the case of war. War is a theatrical act of destruction. 
It involves costumes (military uniforms), rituals (military parades), social 
order of a rigid kind (discipline) that at times is let out in moments of the 
reversal of order (looting). It is a profitable destruction, as most rich en - 
tre preneurs benefitting from wars, or military industrial complexes in coun-
tries that produce war instruments, can testify. 
Georg Simmel focused on the functional role of war (and peace) in resolving 
tensions within the social system:
“Conflict itself is the resolution of the tension between the contra-
ries. That it eventuates in peace is only a single, specially obvious 
and evident, expression of the fact that it is a conjunction of elements, 
an opposition, which belongs with the combination under one higher 
conception. This conception is characterized by the common contrast 
between both forms of relationship and the mere reciprocal indiffer-
ence between elements.” Simmel 1904: 490, added emphases)
The phenomena of conflict (and war) are wholes that are qualitatively dif-
ferent from the elements that they contain. They are organized in terms 
of Ganzheit, a whole of some abstract fluid form that is “in the air” of the 
given social situation. If – instead of a large tourist ship – an aircraft carrier 
were to dock in a little city like Aalborg, the whole affective atmosphere in 
the city would be changed. Nothing has happened, but the “feeling of war 
is suddenly in the air”.
Wars emerge as a result of the escalation of conflicts: legal, political, eco-
nomic. They end as the conflicts are re-directed to other means of resolu-
tion. Rarely would an end to a war mean the end of a conflict; this might 
be possible only under conditions of complete annihilation of “the enemy”. 
A war – won by some and lost by others – leads to new conflicts (and, po-
tentially, to new wars). Human beings create them, and suffer from them. 
If there is a need to show the inherent paradoxicality of the human mind, 
the movement of people through cycles of war and peace gives us dramatic 
examples of it. Yet, in this movement, human beings are resilient – which 
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is a major challenge to the science of psychology. So many human beings 
proudly marching onto a glorified arenas for collective suicide – be it at 
Austerlitz, Verdun, or Stalingrad – brings our scholarly efforts in psychol-
ogy and history to share the same object of investigation.
World War 1 as a psychological object (Gegenstand)
The breaking out of World War 1 remains an enigma for political and so-
cial sciences (Neilson 2014; Lebow 2014). July 1914 passed, and the whole 
of Europe found itself at war. The whole societal organization at wartime 
is a complex social and psychological structure that becomes activated. It 
involves actors in different positions – soldiers on the front, others in the 
rear, civilians in the home places of the fighters involved in supplying the 
fight and taking care of the casualties. The whole social order changes to 
accommodate to wartime: economic activities concentrate on war provi-
sions, hospitals become military hospitals, and religious institutions begin 
participating in the psychological preparation of the populace for the war 
and for the losses of the war. Ordinary “neighborhood watch” is turned into 
“spy watch”, and secret services earn their living by detecting and report-
ing anti-war sentiments expressed in public. The public has to face various 
shortages of food (Bonzon & Davis 1997) and energy, and adjust to the scar-
city of otherwise available objects. Things of low value at peacetime: cig-
arettes, salt, become a valued currency for wartime exchange. Middlemen 
who gain profits from wartime scarcities become notable figures in every-
day life (Robert 1997). Food scarcity leads to long queues in the cities as 
well as to dependence on the links of urban environments with their rural 
counterparts (Healy 2007). Yet life goes on, almost unchanged, except for 
caution in crossing the streets at time covered by sniper fire (Macek 2000). 
World War 1 was also remarkable in the ease in which the best thinkers 
of Europe: philosophers, scientists, artists, rushed to take sides in the con-
flict (Bergson 1915; Wundt 1914). Counter-voices to the ideological align-
ment existed as well, yet the propagation of pacifism was under attack in 
all warring countries (Russell 1917). War’s first casualty is the mind, as 
its goal orientations are central for the social interests of the warring insti-
tutions. The panic reactions to the use of chemical warfare on both sides 
(Jones 2014) make the psychological sides of that war particularly dramatic. 
Understanding any war – and its aftermath – may require a special focus on 
the psychology of its survivors.
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Cultural psychologies and the war: Linking with history
Two directions within contemporary cultural psychologies (Valsiner 2012a) 
can be brought together with history as possible domains for interdiscipli-
nary scholarship. First of all, the theory of social representations (Moscovici 
2001; Sammut, et al. 2015) is an explanatory framework that is ready for 
use in historical explanations. The meaning complex of social representa-
tion allows social psychologists to trace the link between macro-social and 
individual-personal levels of meaning construction. According to Serge 
Moscovci, the founder of the Social Representation Theory (SRT), the goal 
of use of this seemingly vague concept is clear:
“By taking as its centre communication and representations, it hopes 
to elucidate the links which unite human psychology with contem-
porary social and cultural conditions…. The reason for forming 
these representations is the desire to familiarize ourselves with the 
unfamiliar.” (Moscovici 2001: 150, added emphasis)
Since all moments in human lives are facing the unfamiliar – that of the next 
moment in time – social representations link what is familiar up to now with 
what is to come, but is not yet known. So, a statement “We’ll have breakfast 
tomorrow morning” links the familiar (“breakfast” of this morning, and 
mornings before) with the yet-to-happen tomorrow morning. However, if 
we modify the statement and claim “War will begin tomorrow”, the imme-
diate experience of previous wars may be absent in the young generation 
that may volunteer to join the “Glorious War” (as World War 1 was labeled 
at its beginning). It is only through the schematized meaning war that the 
yet-unknown becomes “familiar”.
Representations are social in three concurrent ways (Moscovici 2001: 153):
1. They are impersonal (they are considered to belong to everyone). “This 
is a just war” is a generic statement promoted by a political institution 
for its goals, and assumed to be shared by all.
2. They are representations of the others – belong to other people – and 
through relating with the others become one’s own. A teenager admires 
his father’s war decorations and decides for himself that “this war is 
glorious”.
31
3. They are – at the same time – personal (they are felt affectively to belong 
to the ego). The teenager may enlist out of his patriotic fervent in the 
“glorious war” without the parents’ knowledge or approval.
The unity of the three layers: social, inter-personal, and intra-personal in the 
case of social representations makes them into the center of social persua-
sion efforts. All war (and peace) propaganda entails operation with social 
representations in goal-directed manner. The tools, social representations, 
enter into social projects that move the participating actors towards their 
future goals (Bauer 2015; Bauer and Gaskell 1999, 2008). By analysis of 
the tactical use of such representations (e.g. Gibson 2015) one can trace the 
birthplaces of conscientious violence that is characteristic of wars.
Music is one of the most important cultural inventions of the human species, 
ranging from the simple sounds of a drum or violin to the sophisticated 
works of Stravinsky or Schönberg, which guides our affective lives. Music 
is included in most cultural rituals: including those of wars. The existence 
of military bands and the use of music in collective activity settings (choir 
singing, orchestra playing, or serenades by romantic young men in front of 
the fair ladies they are courting) allows the linking of social representation 
of the societal level with a personal commitment to the collective act. A 
religious hymn or a folk song in the mouths of a performing person carries 
forward the cultural history of the society while affectively directing the fu-
ture of the performer (Dilthey 1927). There are examples of how attending 
an opera could give rise to a revolution5.
The human mind is open for social direction through the feature that in SRT 
is called cognitive polyphasia (Jovchelovich & Priego-Hernandez 2015). In 
terms of simple description, that notion refers to the heterogeneity of hu-
man reasoning where different mutually opposite ideas may be endorsed by 
the person in different contexts without any feeling of contradiction. Such 
inconsistency constitutes the resource for innovation in meanings, through 
dialogical processes (Bauer 2015; Markova 2012). Any use of social rep-
resentations by persons or institutions needs to be open to directed recur-
sivity (Beckstead 2015; Veltri 2015); the social suggestions carried by such 
representations need to be re-combinable in ever new complex forms, yet 
all of them leading in particular directions. A particular goal orientation – 
dedication to a religious or patriotic cause – can be redundantly encoded 
into everyday practices, songs sung at local festivals, religious sermons, or 
neighborhood gossip. Participating persons are completely embedded in a 
symbolic social environment guiding them to feel and act in some direction. 
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Examples of enhanced patriotism at the beginnings of wars abound. SRT is 
eminently suitable for the study of human relations in history, providing a 
layer of analysis that is absent in historical and political science accounts.
“History is not simply a relevant topic for the study of so-
cial representations, but a critical one. It is critical because 
the ways in which history is constructed can have profound 
consequences for how politics are mobilized and how the 
identity of entire generations of peoples may be shaped. 
Those historical events and people widely regarded as im-
portant across all segments of society constitute important 
symbolic resources for mobilizing public opinion. They 
are difficult to ignore in public debate because they carry 
such widely shared emotional resonance and political legi-
ti macy” (Liu and Sibley 2015: 279)
The second direction of cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics (Valsiner, 
2014, 2015) inks with the SRT as it situates the social representations in a 
temporal scheme oriented towards the future (Figure 2). As applied (retro-
spectively) to historical events, it becomes possible to reconstruct the dif-
ferent possibilities for peacemaking in the middle of the ongoing war, and 
to demonstrate how these possibilities were not actualized at the time. 
Analysis of “war efforts” can be done looking at the intended future inter-
nalization of the public messages meant to be taken over and further esca-
lated by individuals. 
Figure 2. Guided emergence of a sign with feed-forward to the future
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S
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The function of signs is always future oriented, both in their immediate 
impact (turning the next immediate future into a new present) and their 
general orientation towards encountering similar situations in some inde-
terminate future moment. The emergence – construction – of the particular 
sign (S) is guided by the social representation system that sets up the whole 
social atmosphere in the given situation. Once the sign (S) has emerged – 
made by the person, it becomes one’s “own”. Its “birthplace”, a social sug-
gestion based on social representation, is forgotten. Persons act on their own 
will in the direction suggested by the social representation. This can lead to 
the mistreatment of the enemy’s prisoners of war beyond the social norms 
agreed upon (Feltman 2010). Creativity in the invention of torture tech-
niques and symbolic violence in wartimes has been known for centuries.
If sign use is future oriented, how can it be that the meaning-makers are 
constantly referencing the past: digging into one’s memory, trying to recall 
relevant life moments of the past? This question applies to the study of his-
tory: why are we taking interest in some wars (e.g., World War 1) rather than 
others (e.g., the Balkan Wars that preceded World War 1)? There are many 
to choose from, but only some are chosen. Such efforts – even if they seem 
to involve backward referencing – are actually forward referencing. The 
meaning-maker at the present accesses different traces of the signs of the 
past as s/he is moving towards the future. What looks as if it entails “look-
ing back” at the given moment is actually “looking forward”, thanks to 
the accessibility of different trace signs from the past (see Figure 1 above). 
Within irreversible time one cannot reference “what was” without making it 
to be in the service of “what might come.” Explaining the intricacies of the 
making of World War 1 can give us knowledge to detect the emergence of 
World War 3 – even if a regional escalation of a conflict in some area in the 
world is not (yet) labeled that, at present. History, like cultural psychology, 
is a science that generalizes universal patterns of development (of societies, 
and of persons) from single systemic cases.
General conclusion: Going beyond Wilhelm Dilthey’s
failure
What contemporary cultural psychology – in the form of SRT and the per-
spective on semiotic dynamics (CPSD) – can contribute to the interdiscipli-
nary study of history is the generalizable analyses of single unique cases 
of societal or personal transformations. In this respect, this new synthesis 
allows us to transcend the dichotomy between “explanatory” and “under-
34
standing” sciences that Wilhelm Dilthey introduced in the 1880s (Dilthey 
1883). Dilthey introduced his distinction between Geisteswissenschaften 
and Naturwissenschaften towards the end of the “natural sciences war” 
(Valsiner 2012b) in the Germany of the nineteenth century – when the natu-
ral sciences side of the war was clearly winning and all the Naturphilosophie-
linked scientific perspectives were being pushed out of the “real” sciences. 
It could be seen as a step to preserve the Geisteswissenschaften by allocat-
ing to them a qualitatively different role. 
Yet there was a price to this rescue effort. As a result of this split, both 
history and psychology found themselves within the Geisteswissenschaften 
category, with the result being axiomatic denial of generalization goal of a 
science. Nothing can be more detrimental for science than accepting this 
axiom. The evidence in both history and psychology is unique – but follows 
general rules that science needs to recover. Understanding concrete phe-
nomena – of history or of persons – was assumed to be that of understand-
ing the particular case, rather than a road to a general theory of historical 
or psychological processes. This ideology against generalization was fur-
ther fortified in the twentieth century by the dominance of post-modernist 
philosophes that denied generalizability in principle, and its necessity in 
practice. Combined with the general movement into the accumulative em-
piricism that governs all sciences – Natur or Geist in similar ways – the 
result is the defocusing from creation of general theories of either history of 
the human psyche.
In our twenty-first century, we can do better. Cultural psychology is a 
science of culture within persons that is of universalistic and developmental 
focus. Individual case studies serve as bases for generalization to models of 
human development through cultural means. The inductive generalization 
prevalence is changed to its abductive counterpart (Salvatore 2015). The 
focus of cultural psychologies is on the development of generalized knowl-
edge about how social representations or signs work in the making and 
breaking of the most complex creations of human phenomena: art, litera-
ture, society, and – adding here the topic of this chapter – war and peace. 
Over a hundred years of intra-psychology war for “objectivity” – fought 
on the battlegrounds of “behavior” and (later) “cognition” – the focus 
once again turns to finding adequate general models of human complex-
ity (Valsiner et al 2016). Possibly this example may be of use to history 
to develop into a universal science of temporally unique societal change 
processes. Interdisciplinary work can have outcomes that go far beyond the 
“normal science” in the old sense of Thomas Kuhn, and establish a new 
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socio digm (Yurevich 2009) in which different sciences find concrete arenas 
for mutual collaboration – rather than being caught in rivalries.
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Endnotes
1 Individually marked soldiers’ graves were very much a legacy of Word 
War 1.
2  “The mind must… first awaken the feeling of courage, and then 
be guided and supported by it, because in momentary emergencies 
the man is swayed more by his feelings than by his thoughts” (von 
Clausewitz, 1908: 51, added emphasis)
3  See Dwyer, 2009
4 Escalations of affective kind have been documented in battlefield  
histories in wars. During World War 2 around 400 Soviet soldiers have 
been reported to sacrifice themselves for the sake of covering up the 
path of enemy’s automatic rifle fire by their own bodies (Aleksander 
Matrossov and Aleksander Pankratov were the martyrs selected by 
Soviet propaganda for hero myth making about their suicidal acts)
5 On August 25, 1830 the crowd attending opera in Brussels – of Daniel 
Auber’s La Muette del Portici – after the duet “Sacred love for father-
land” moved out to the street in a crowd act that played a key role in 
Belgian independence.
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Chapter 3
The origins of World War 1
Knud Knudsen
Historical accounts of World War 1 usually begin with the assassinations in 
Sarajevo in late June 1914 when Gavrilo Princip shot the Austrian Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. From the gunshots in Sarajevo, there 
seems to be an almost unbroken chain of events and decisions that led to 
the outbreak of war in August 1914; events and decisions that suggest that 
what began in Sarajevo inevitably had to lead to war. But it was not so. A 
general war in Europe was not the inevitable outcome of the killings in 
Sarajevo. On the contrary, it is the argument in this chapter that the as-
sassinations in Sarajevo ended in war because some military and political 
leaders intentionally made them do that. It might be argued that the killings 
in Sarajevo were turned into a pretext for war. Some prominent politicians 
and military leaders in the capitals of Europe convinced the skeptical minds 
that war was advisable. It should be added that it is also the perception that 
no politician and no military leader in the summer of 1914 wanted a general 
European war. Those political and military leaders who wanted war did not 
get the war they went for; instead of the localized war in the Balkans they 
got something else: the general European war. 
After the War, at the Peace Conference of 1919 in Paris, the victorious pow-
ers agreed that Germany was the guilty nation that had caused the War and 
it had to accept full responsibility. Somehow, the issue of guilt has obstruct-
ed, or at least impeded the discussion of the causes of war. In this chapter, 
it will be argued that the origins of war should be sought in national entan-
glements in the Balkans, and that the primary culprits were those Austrian 
and Serbian political and military leaders who escalated the local crisis into 
a general war.
The debate on the causes of World War 1 is one of the classic debates among 
historians. Books and articles on this topic have been produced in vast num-
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bers. Why this massive interest? Two good reasons for the interest in the 
origins of the War might be suggested. The first is the notion that World 
War 1 marked a caesura in history, not only because of the enormous de-
struction caused by the War – including ten million dead soldiers – but 
also because the War set the scene for the catastrophes to come in the next 
three decades: how were such disastrous forces let loose, and why this del-
uge upon Europe? The second notion is the course of events 1914-18. No 
one had foreseen a war of such disastrous dimensions. How could trained 
politicians, diplomats, and generals miscalculate the consequences of their 
decisions? How could so many be so wrong? 
Historians often distinguish between two categories of explanations for the 
causes of World War 1; the first is those related to the events of July 1914. 
During the July Crisis of 1914, politicians and military leaders made deci-
sions with fatal implications. Why did they make these decisions? Maybe 
they were not fully informed of the circumstances, or they might not have 
been able to interpret the moves of the other sides. We may have a situation 
with both a lack of information and a lack of understanding. World War 1 
might be depicted as the result of the unintended consequences of decisions 
made by politicians, diplomats, and generals. 
The second category is the structural causes, explanations relating to the 
structures of European societies in the decades before 1914, such as the 
system of alliances, militarism and arms race, imperialist rivalries, nation-
alism, and national controversies. Considering for example the system of 
alliances, the argument was that, in Europe in the early twentieth century, a 
limited war involving only one of the great powers was not possible because 
all the great powers were woven into a complicated web of treaty obliga-
tions, with the implication that, as soon as one great power was involved, all 
would become involved.
Finally, we should not ignore those historians who argue that, in fact, 
Germany wanted a war and got the war that it wanted. I am referring to 
the Fischer school in the 1960s and 70s. According to the German historian 
Fritz Fischer, Germany planned the war, and Germany had expansionist 
aims in 1914, as it had again in 1939. The only thing that went wrong 1914-
18 was that Germany lost the War. That was not according to the plan.
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Historiography
The views of this chapter are in accordance with the ‘mainstream’ per-
ception which Charles Emmerson refers to in the introduction to his book: 
1913: The World before the Great War: “Historians do not now generally 
believe that war was inevitable from the moment that the Austro-Hungarian 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo in June 1914”. (Emerson 
2013: xi) The notion of “inevitability” is deceptive, as also emphasized by 
Margaret MacMillan in her recent book The War That Ended Peace: “Very 
little in history is inevitable. Europe did not have to go to war in 1914; a gen-
eral war could have been avoided up to the last moment on 4 August when 
the British finally decided to come in”. (MacMillan 2013: xxv)
On the other hand, it may be argued – as Christopher Clark does in The 
Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 – that the killings at 
Sarajevo were not a mere pretext for war. According to Clark, such a view is 
a symptom of “the marginalization of the Serbian and thereby of the larger 
Balkan dimension of the story”, which already began during the July Crisis 
itself. Serbia, according to Clark, “is one of the blind spots in the histori-
ography of the July Crisis.” (Clark 2012: xxvi) No doubt, Clark has a point 
in placing Serbia and the Eastern question at the center of the initial crisis.
The literature on the origins of World War 1 is extensive. James Joll’s intro-
duction to the debates in The Origins of the First World War (1984) is still 
among the best. (Joll, 1984) Joll’s book is both an introduction to the litera-
ture and a well-informed discussion of the key issues. Shorter introductions 
to the debates on the causes of World War 1 have been published in rich 
numbers.(Martel 1987; Stevenson 1997)
The publication of documents on the origins of the War started when the 
Bolsheviks published documents from the archives of the Tsar to show 
the co-responsibility of Russia for the outbreak of war. Soon after, other 
European governments followed suit and published collections of docu-
ments. The new political leaders in Austria and Germany had nothing to 
hide; they just exposed the folly of the previous imperial regimes. As noted 
by Christopher Clark and others, the debate over the attribution of responsi-
bility for the War has raged ever since: “the blame game” has never lost its 
appeal. (Clark 2012: 569; Emerson 2013: x) The publication of documents 
encouraged research into the origins of the War and the general conclusion 
of these early studies was a revision of the views of 1919 that Germany 
was solely responsible; responsibility had to be shared by more. (Mombauer 
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2002) According to the revisionist views, Germany had been exposed to 
unfair treatment by the Peace Conference in Paris.
Valuable treatments of the origins of war appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Sidney Fay’s The Origins of the World War (1928) still counts among the 
classic books; so does Luigi Albertini’s De Origini della Guerra del 1914 
(1942-43) in three volumes, published in Italy during World War 2 and 
translated into English in the 1950s. Albertini was struck, as he wrote, by 
the disproportion between the intellectual and moral endowments of the 
decision-makers of 1914 and the gravity of the problems which they faced, 
“between their acts and the results thereof”. (Joll 1984: 7) Albertini’s book 
was primarily concerned with the diplomatic history of the origins of war, 
not least the July Crisis. 1400 pages were devoted to a detailed study of the 
course of events between 28 June and 12 August 1914.
Even more controversial was the book published a few years later by 
German historian Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (1961), followed 
by Krieg der Illusionen (1969). Fischer argued that Germany did desire the 
War and pointed to the annexationist aims of Germany in World War 1 
as sketched in the so called Septemberprogramm of 1914. A controversial 
point in Fischer’s argument for German responsibility was his discussion of 
the war council of prominent German political and military leaders in 1912, 
allegedly planning for war. Fischer’s two books provoked a bitter debate 
among historians, in Germany in particular. (Moses 1975) A.J.P. Taylor’s 
War by Timetable (1969), on the role of mobilization and timetables, was 
another controversial interpretation in the 1960s.
The Fischer controversy stimulated a new phase of research in the origins 
of World War 1, and after a period focusing on Germany, historians now 
turned to studies of the foreign policies of other European great powers. 
According to Gordon Martel in his introduction to the historiography of 
the origins of World War 1, published in 1987, the Fischer debate provoked 
“an explosion of research” and these studies “stimulated fresh controversies 
far removed from the Fischer debate.” According to Martel, it was the most 
widespread assumption underlying the interpretations of the 1960s and 70s 
that the crisis of July “was the logical (if not necessarily the inevitable) 
culmination of deep-seated antagonisms and fundamental forces”. In the 
1980s, the interest in the July Crisis itself had waned: “we seem to have 
reached the point where we know almost everything we are ever going to 
know about who said what to whom at what moment”. Those historians who 
concentrated on the events of July 1914, often did so – according to Martel 
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– to contest the argument that the War was the inevitable result of underly-
ing causes. These historians resisted the suggestion that war was intrinsic 
to the nature of the European states system and societies. Instead, they ar-
gued that, had it not been for the peculiarities of the July Crisis, war might 
have been avoided. (Martel 2003: 8-9) Thus, the Fischer debate seemed to 
have inspired a common understanding of the need to incorporate structural 
causes, such as for example the impact of armaments or the alliance system, 
into interpretations of the origins of the War. To argue that structural causes 
might be in play should not be identified with structural determinism. 
Approaching 2014, we witnessed a new wave of publications on World War 
1 and the origins of the War. In contrast to the studies which followed in the 
wake of the Fischer debate, the literature on the origins of the War published 
in recent years has focused increasingly upon agency, decision-making, and 
decision-makers. Notwithstanding his own bold statement in the 1980s, 
Gordon Martel has published a book which investigates the decision-mak-
ing processes in July 1914 in detail, and argues that at every step there were 
alternative options which might have avoided war. Presumably Christopher 
Clark, Margaret MacMillan, Sean McMeekin, and T. G. Otte – the authors 
of recent contributions to the ‘origins literature’ – would not subscribe to 
the perception that we already know everything that we need to know about 
who said what to whom in July 1914. Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: 
How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2012), Margaret MacMillan’s The War 
That Ended Peace (2013), Sean McMeekin’s July 1914: Countdown to war 
(2013), Gordon Martel’s The Month that Changed the World: July 1914 
(2014), and T.G. Otte’s July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 
1914 (2014) are important recent contributions. According to Otte, there is 
scope for a fresh examination of the sources and the July Crisis of 1914. 
As emphasized in the introduction to Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, 
his account is “saturated with agency”. In T. G. Otte’s July Crisis, the role 
of individual decision-makers is also placed at the heart of his analysis. The 
role of individuals in July 1914 was crucial, according to Otte: “By moving 
the actions of individual monarchs, politicians and generals into the fore-
ground, by examining the ethos of the ruling élites with its emphasis on 
‘honour’ and prestige, and by explaining the accelerating dynamic of the 
unfolding crisis”, he seeks to offer a reassessment of the July Crisis 1914. 
(Otte 2014: 522-23) According to Otte, the ruling elites of the European 
great powers were ill-suited to coping with the demands of the new age. 
Apparently, Otte’s conclusions support the views advanced by Albertini 75 
years ago.
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Subsequently, this focus on decision-makers has raised the question of who 
these decision-makers were, and opinions differ on that key issue. Whereas 
Margaret MacMillan subscribes to the traditional view, referring to “those 
few generals, crowned heads, diplomats or politicians” who made the deci-
sions that in the end led to war, Christopher Clark takes a different stand; 
there were, in Clark’s opinion, “many voices in European foreign policy 
… Policy-making was not the prerogative of single sovereign indi viduals”. 
(Clark 2012: 168) In his concluding remarks on the structures of deci-
sion-making, Clark uses the term, “the fluidity of power” and claims that: 
“The chaotic interventions of monarchs, ambiguous relationships between 
civil and military, adversarial competition among key politicians in sys-
tems characterized by low levels of ministerial or cabinet solidarity, com-
pounded by the agitations of a critical mass press against a background of 
intermittent crisis and heightened tension over security issues made this a 
pe riod of unprecedented uncertainty in international relations.” (Clark 2012: 
239) Clark argues that it was “this chaos of competing voices” that turned 
the July Crisis 1914 into “the most complex and opaque political crisis of 
modern times”. (Clark 2012: 160-79) As a general characterization of the 
structures of policy-making in the decades before 1914, Clark may be right. 
Still, it seems that the process of decision-making in the summer of 1914 
was dominated by a narrow and limited gallery of prominent diplomats, 
politicians, and generals in the capitals of Europe. In Otte’s interpretation, 
the problems were located in the three continental monarchies of Eastern 
Europe: the crisis was “to no small degree the result of a crisis of gover-
nance in the three eastern monarchies … The degree of professional incom-
petence displayed at St Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna during July 1914 was 
striking. (Otte 2014: 512-13)”
The general historiographical trend in later years has, as already mentioned, 
been to dismiss ideas of the “inevitability” of war. In early 1914, “The future 
was still open”, according to Clark, and MacMillan’s views are concordant: 
even in the summer of 1914, generals and crowned heads, diplomats and 
politicians still “had the power and authority to say either yes or no. Yes or 
no to mobilizing the armies, yes or no to compromise, yes or no to carry-
ing out the plans already drawn up by their militaries”. (Clark 2012: 363; 
MacMillan 2013: xxx)
Contemporary research also accepts the basic premise that Germany did not 
go for a European war. German leaders miscalculated the circum stances. 
The German leadership did not believe that the conflict would end in war, 
primarily based upon that “erroneous assumption that the Russians were 
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unlikely to intervene”. (Clark 2012: 417) However, both the Kaiser and 
the chancellor “believed that the Austrians were justified in taking action 
against Serbia”. Still, they wished to confine the conflict to the Balkans. 
(Clark 2012: 415-16) This is supported by Otte’s detailed examination of the 
diplomatic sources. In late July 1914, the diplomatic efforts of both German 
and British decision-makers went for a localization of the conflict. Germany 
did not want and did not prepare for a general war in the summer of 1914. 
(Otte 2012: 516-17) However, from 29 July, the conflict escalated, not least 
due to the aggressive acts of the Dual Monarchy – the ultimatum of 23 July 
and the declaration of war on Serbia five days later. The “war-party” was to 
be found in Vienna, in particular among some high-ranking officers and a 
few politicians.
Despite the focus on decision-makers, recent contributions do not alto gether 
ignore the structural restraints upon the decision-makers in the summer of 
1914. The “strange dialogue” between structures and individuals creeps into 
the historical accounts in various ways, for example in MacMillan’s discus-
sion of the weight of “underlying causes” such as militarism, nationalism, 
arms race, and alliances, and, not least, the determining influence of histo-
ry, in particular the experience of recurrent crises in the decade before 1914. 
History and the burden of distrust weighed heavily upon European deci-
sion-makers as 1914 approached and seemed to limit the options for those 
leaders who had to decide about war or diplomacy. “Yet while Europe’s 
leaders did not have to opt for war it was increasingly likely that they 
would”. (MacMillan 2013: 471) Besides being a well-informed and read able 
book, the ongoing discussion of the relations between structural causes, 
historical preconditions, and decision-making processes is one of the most 
thought-provoking and suggestive parts of MacMillan’s book. It is prob-
ably T. G. Otte who most emphatically rejects the theories of underlying 
structural causes. According to Otte, structures should rather be regarded 
as restraints, holding back the most belligerent war-mongers and promoting 
cautious measures. In this chapter, it might be of special interest to consider 
how these recent studies contribute to explaining the origins of World War 
1. First, it might be appropriate to recapitulate the events of the July Crisis 
1914 which led to war, and Sarajevo would be the place to start. 
The scene: The assassinations at Sarajevo 28 June 1914
Sarajevo was the capital of Bosnia. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina are one 
state in the Balkans, with a population of 3.8 million and a rather complex 
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political structure. In 1908, the Dual Monarchy (of Austria and Hungary) 
annexed Bosnia, and this illegal annexation of Bosnia caused anger and 
bitterness among nationalists in both Serbia and Bosnia. Therefore, the 
Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908 – the so called Bosnian crisis – was 
part of the problem in 1914, as nationalists in both Serbia and Bosnia wanted 
Bosnia to become part of Serbia. In 1914, the Bosnian crisis had not been 
forgotten.
Who was the young man who fired the shots in Sarajevo in 1914? His name 
was Gavrilo Princip. Was he a terrorist or a nationalist hero? I suppose that 
the answer depends upon the eyes which are doing the viewing. Gavrilo 
Princip was a young Bosnian Serb – a Bosnian of Serbian nationality – 
who was a member of a secret society called the Black Hand. The Black 
Hand was formed to overturn the Austrian annexation of Bosnia. When 
Gavrilo’s group was informed about the visit of Ferdinand and Sophie to 
Sarajevo, they planned to kill the noble guests. However, things did not go 
as planned, and the small group almost gave up; in fact, Gavrilo was on his 
way back when the car with the Archduke and his wife almost backed into 
him, and he fired the mortal shots. Were Gavrilo and his associates acting 
alone, independently, and on their own? No, the Black Hand was part of 
a web of clandestine groups that operated in Bosnia, maintaining contact 
with the Serbian intelligence service. Serbian officers supplied the Bosnian 
groups with arms and information as the planned attack upon the Austrians 
approached. 
Who were the victims – Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie? Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand was the heir to the Austrian throne. Emperor Franz Joseph 
was a very old man, and Ferdinand was designated to become the next em-
peror of the Dual Monarchy. Austria and Hungary were two distinct con-
stitutional entities. It was a multi-national empire comprising Czechs and 
Poles in the North and Croats and Serbs in the South, and besides these 
major ethnic groups, several minor ones: Ruthenes, Galicians, Rumanians, 
Slovaks, and others too. In Vienna, leading politicians (including ministers) 
feared that Slavic nationalities within the Dual Monarchy were attracted to 
their south Slavic brothers and sisters in Serbia. 
The kingdom of Serbia was another player. It was a new kingdom, one of 
the independent national entities decided upon at the Congress of Berlin in 
1878. After a coup in 1903, Serbia apparently entered a period of democratic 
government. Nevertheless, behind the parliamentarian surface, the military 
had a prominent position in Serbian politics in this period. As mentioned al-
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ready, Serbian intelligence was not quite innocent in 1914; there is no doubt 
about Serbian complicity in the killings in Sarajevo – which thus might be 
depicted as a case of state-sponsored terrorism. Leading circles in Belgrade 
were intent upon detaching the Slavic parts of the Dual Monarchy and mak-
ing them part of Serbia. The dream of a south Slavic state sounded attractive 
to Serbian nationalists. 
As the backdrop to the dramatic events in the Balkans in the early twen-
tieth century, we may point to the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire. The 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire was known all over Europe. The coup of 
the “young Turks” in 1908 – which served as the pretext for the Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia – did not solve the problems of the empire. In 1912-13, 
Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria engaged in the first and the second Balkan 
Wars in order to take possession of the European parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. When the conflict arose in 1914, some European politicians were 
inclined to regard this as a new phase of the unending “Balkan entangle-
ments”, a Third Balkan War might possibly be in the making. Few, if any, 
were considering a European war.
The July Crisis of 1914
After the assassinations in Sarajevo, European politicians held their breath. 
What would happen next? In fact, nothing happened. Gavrilo and his asso-
ciates were arrested. A sigh of relief, and then everyone could breathe again. 
After a day or two, Austrian newspapers engaged in serious controversies 
over the burial of Franz and Sophie. Could they be buried in the family 
burial-place of the Habsburgs – the ruling dynasty of the Dual Monarchy? 
Sophie was from a minor German noble family and was not entitled to be 
buried with the Habsburgs. Franz had married her for love, in spite of the 
protests of the senior Habsburgs. These seniors did not like him; nor did 
they like his wife. 
However, behind the curtains, diplomats and politicians were in a flurry of 
activity. Vienna is the proper place to start. Leading politicians in Vienna 
were convinced that Serbia was behind the terrorist acts in Sarajevo. The 
problem was to document and prove the Serbian connection. In the eyes 
of the war-party in Vienna, the assassinations in Sarajevo provided the 
best possible pretext for a war against Serbia – in order to demolish all 
dreams of a south Slavic state; to make it clear, once and for all, to the Slavic 
peo ples within the Dual Monarchy that they would remain inhabitants of the 
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monarchy – that is, of Hungary. The Slavic people would never be allowed 
to leave the monarchy to become part of Serbia. They might as well give up 
that dream. The leader of the Austrian war-party was Chief of Staff Franz 
Conrad von Hötzendorf. It was a badly kept secret in Europe that Conrad 
was keen to crush Serbia, sooner better than later. Like Cato the Elder in the 
Roman senate in antique Rome, Conrad consistently urged his colleagues 
to solve the Serbian question once and for all. (McMeekin 2013: 24) “War, 
war, war” was Conrad’s standard advice to the emperor. While the position 
of Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold was vacillating and 
hesitant, Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza definitely “objected to any policy 
designed to engineer an immediate conflict.” (Clark 2012: 397) Later on, 
Berchtold switched views and seemed to be prepared “to use Sarajevo as 
a pretext for a ‘settlement of accounts’ with Serbia”. (McMeekin 2013: 61)
As the interrogations of Gavrilo and the other arrested young men went 
on, it became evident to the Austrians that Serbian intelligence was in-
volved, although this was hard to prove. There was no smoking gun! This 
strengthened the position of the war-party in Vienna. Still, the Austrian 
Kaiser and his Prime Minister were not inclined to engage in initiatives that 
might result in war without consulting their German ally. It all depended on 
Germany. Why was German support so crucial? This was because Russia, 
as an ally of Serbia, might intervene. 
The consultations in Berlin between the Austrians and the German leaders 
resulted in the so called “blank check” of 5-6 July: the Germans reassured 
the Austrians of their unconditional support for any measure the Austrians 
might deem appropriate and necessary. Armed with this “check”, the 
Austrians started talks about the response to Serbia. Discussions in Vienna 
were intense before reaching a final conclusion, and two weeks later a note 
was dispatched to Belgrade.
What happened in Berlin when the Austrians had left? Nothing! It is sig-
nificant that the German Kaiser left the capital and went for his summer 
cruise. The Chief of Staff, von Moltke the Younger, left for a summer spa, 
and even Chancellor Bethmann Holweg left Berlin. They were obviously 
not preparing for a war involving German troops. If Bethmann were con-
sidering war – and he was – it was a localized war in the Balkans in order to 
settle the controversies between Austria and Serbia before any of the great 
powers could intervene.
The pattern which we observe in this case – the Germans confirming sup-
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port for their ally – was repeated in St Petersburg when the Serbs enquired 
about the Russian stance. Russia’s support was crucial to Serbia, and the 
Russian Tsar and his ministers reassured the Serbs of Russian support. In 
the Russian government, there was a Slavic circle, among them the Russian 
ambassador to Belgrade, who spoke in favor of unconditional Russian sup-
port to Serbia in case of war, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov 
did his best not to appear weak. Thus, the pattern of Berlin was repeated in 
St Petersburg: the Russians were keen to prove that they were trustworthy 
and reliable allies. What happened in St Petersburg when the Serbs left the 
Russian capital? Two things, the authorities began to prepare for a state 
visit from France, and to speed up preliminary naval preparations in the 
Black Sea; operations which had been ongoing for some time (months). The 
difference between Berlin and St Petersburg is conspicuous. The Russian 
government did not consider war to be an unrealistic scenario.
How about the two Western powers – France and Great Britain? France 
and Russia had been allies since the early 1890s and the French visit in St 
Petersburg in the summer of 1914 had been planned for a long time. The 
killings in Sarajevo had not been a top story in the French newspapers. In 
Paris, a sex scandal attracted all the attention of the French papers. French 
President Poincaré and his top ministers visited the Tsar in the second half 
of July. For a week, the Tsar and the President and their ministers had talks 
on the international situation. After these talks, the Russians were confident 
and assured of France’s full support for any strong stand they might take 
on Vienna. (McMeekin 2013: 166) During the visit, there were parades and 
champagne parties, and apparently the Russian court was better informed 
than the French. During a dance at one of these parties, a young duchess, 
Grand Duchess Anastasia, did her best to make the French ambassador feel 
good by confiding the recent news to him that “there’s going to be war. 
There’ll be nothing left of Austria. You’re going to get back Alsace and 
Lorraine. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be destroyed”. Had 
it not been for a “stern gaze” from Tsar Nicholas, she would have carried on. 
A look from the Tsar, however, put an end to their confidential conversation. 
After all, the duchess was married to a potential commander in chief of 
the Russian armies. “I must constrain myself”, as she told the ambassador 
with a hint of conspiracy. “The Emperor has his eye on me.” (McMeekin 
2013: 163) The duchess was well-informed, at least better informed than 
the French ambassador. There was no hint on the side of the French. The 
Russian alliance was crucial to French security, and the only French guar-
antee in case of a German assault. According to the Franco-Russian treaty, 
France was obliged to assist Russia in case of an assault by a third  party 
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(Germany). Poincaré left Russia, warning the Austrian government that 
Russia had a friend in France.
Finally, how about the British government? In the early stages of the crisis, 
the British had hardly discovered that there was something going on in the 
Balkans. In Britain, all public and political interest was directed towards 
Ireland and the controversies of Irish Home Rule. Very late, the British gov-
ernment realized that something might come up in the Balkans which might 
be dangerous to Britain too. In fact, this happened when the government in 
Vienna skipped off the Ultimatum to the Serbian government. Having stud-
ied the text, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey declared that this would 
mean war in Europe. 
The Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia was the result of talks in Vienna 
in continuation of the Austrian diplomatic visit to Berlin and the German 
“blank check” in early July. The Austrians decided upon a tough stance, 
including demands which were bound to be rejected by the Serbians: the 
Austrians demanded admittance into Serb territory to assist in the suppres-
sion of pan-Serb societies and to institute a joint judicial inquiry into the 
assassination plot (at Sarajevo) on Serbian soil, both of which challenged 
Serbian sovereignty. The Austro-Hungarian démarche – usually referred 
to as the “Ultimatum” – was in fact set up at a meeting on 14 July (the 
Strudelhof Meeting), but not delivered in Belgrade until immediately af-
ter the departure of the French delegation from St Petersburg. Due to bad 
communication at sea, the French leaders remained happily ignorant of the 
Ultimatum until their arrival in Paris.
At that time, it was evident to politicians and state leaders in Europe that 
“the Balkan entanglements” were serious business that might have grave 
consequences for the whole of Europe. The Serbian government was in se-
vere doubt about how to respond – at the time no longer fully confident of 
Russian support. The reply was, according to Otte, “a clever concoction 
of acceptance and equivocation, evasion and rejection, and all dressed up 
in accommodating language”. (Otte 2014: 282) Once the response of the 
Serbian government was known, a short moment of relief spread, due to its 
conciliatory tone. However, assessments differed, and a negative reading 
of the Serbian reply could hardly escape the conclusion that, of the polit-
ical demands, Belgrade accepted none in full. Under the circumstances, 
the war-party in Vienna got what they wanted: a pretext for war. Nothing 
but the unconditional acceptance of all demands would have satisfied the 
Austrians. On 25 July, the Habsburg Monarchy broke off relations with 
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Serbia. Three days later, on 28 July, Austria-Hungary ordered partial mo-
bilization and the old emperor signed the declaration of war on Serbia. Two 
days before, Russia had begun pre-mobilization measures. 
The same day, 28 July, the German Kaiser came forward with his  abortive 
proposal for a “halt in Belgrade”. At this stage, however, the obstacles to 
a diplomatic settlement increased and the crisis escalated. Events now 
seemed to switch from the hands of politicians and diplomats to military 
preparations. Austria-Hungary began bombardment of Belgrade on 29 
July. The Russian Tsar Nicholas authorized partial mobilization. On 29-30 
July, German Chancellor Bethmann Holweg made a last attempt to restrain 
Austria-Hungary, as before with no success. On the other side, the French 
government made attempts to hold Russia back, with equally little success. 
On 30 July, Tsar Nicholas ordered general mobilization in Russia. 
The course of events, not least the Russian mobilization, obviously came 
as a surprise to the Germans. When German intelligence discovered that 
Russian mobilization was heading not only southwards, but also towards 
Polish areas in the West – approaching German borders – the chancellor 
and the chief of staff acted in a hurry. Realizing that the prospects – or the 
risk – of a short and localized war between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia 
had failed, scenarios changed overnight. At this stage, it was the Schlieffen 
plan which should be implemented. The Schlieffen plan was the Germany 
plan for a war in which Germany was confronted with war on two fronts – 
by the Russians in the East and by the French in the West. The general idea 
of the Schlieffen plan was that Russia was the big and powerful enemy; but 
also an enemy which moved slowly because mobilization was a complicated 
and lengthy process. Therefore, the Schlieffen plan operated with a quick 
assault on France and a German rush for Paris; and having overcome the 
French armies, the German forces could be concentrated on the Eastern 
front to combat the mighty Russian army. The Schlieffen plan thus operated 
with a first assault in the West and the Belgians were first in line. Due to 
the Schlieffen plan, France would be engaged in war, and the march through 
Belgium was also risky business for the Germans, as Great Britain might 
thereby become involved.
Accordingly, the British stance was crucial to the Germans and German 
Ambassador to London, Karl Max von Lichnowsky, did his best to interpret 
the signs and signals of the British Foreign Minister, Sir Grey. To the best 
of his (Lichnowsky’s) knowledge, the British government had not yet – at 
the end of July – made up their minds. From London, he reported back to 
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the chancellor and the foreign ministry in Berlin that, in his interpretation, 
Britain would stay out, provided that Germany exerted a moderating pres-
sure on the Dual Monarchy. After the outbreak of war, Lichnowsky was 
fired, accused of having misled Berlin – which he had not done. The crucial 
point, however, was that the government in London did not speak out in a 
clear voice – for the simple reason that it sought, as long as possible, to keep 
a free hand in order to reconcile the conflicting parties. We cannot know 
what Germany might have resolved, had they been informed in due time 
by the British government that Britain would intervene. We know – from 
Otte’s detailed examination of the correspondence between London and 
Berlin – that the focus of the two countries, Britain and Germany, differed: 
whereas Grey in London demanded that Berlin use its influence to moder-
ate the views of her ally in Vienna, the focus in Germany was on Russia and 
Bethmann insisted that Britain restrain the moves of St Petersburg. In the 
final stages of the July Crisis, following the Austro-Hungarian démarche, 
Britain and Germany were the two parties seeking to reach a peaceful com-
promise by localizing the conflict. However, they did not agree upon how 
to reach that goal. 
In early August 1914, the politicians were apparently no longer in charge; 
events were slipping out of the hands of the politicians and into the orbit 
of military planning. At that stage, it was the generals who resolved which 
measures were to be taken. This brief review of the July Crisis supports the 
conclusion that the inner circle of decision-makers was indeed limited, that 
few people made the crucial decisions, as was also repeatedly emphasized 
by Margaret MacMillan and Otte, and also that, until very late, a negotiated 
settlement was within reach.
The July Crisis 1914: Rational decisions and 
alternative options?
Looking back upon the events of July 1914, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that European politicians made decisions and took precautions which were 
substantially rational and consistent. It was consistent with German foreign 
policy to support their ally the Dual Monarchy, and no objections could 
be made against Russian support to Serbia. The alliance between France 
and Russia was a pillar of both French and Russian foreign policy; nothing 
therefore could be objected to in the French promise of support to Russia. In 
an upcoming crisis, it was rational policy to stand by and confirm existing 
treaty obligations.
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At the same time, however, it may be asserted that all great powers might 
have resolved differently and acted otherwise. Germany was in a posi-
tion to put pressure upon the Austrians. From the very start, the German 
leaders were aware that their support was crucial for the Austrians; and 
Russia could have persuaded the Serbians to hold back and to cooperate 
with the Austrians. The problem of the Serbians was that they were ob-
viously involved in some kind of state-sponsored terrorism. France could 
have restrained the Russian government and made the Russians put pressure 
upon Serbia. All states acted rationally, and all could have acted differ ently. 
Rushing into war was not the only option but, in July 1914, none of the 
great powers acted in the interest of peace or compromise. They all pur-
sued their own national interests, as emphasized by Konrad Jarausch. These 
politicians and diplomats were neither “sleepwalkers” nor “fatalists”, but 
decision-makers who did not really understand “the bloody consequences 
of the decisions they were about to make”. In Jarausch’s opinion they lacked 
“a sufficient sense of responsibility for the whole to be inclined to compro-
mise”. (Jarausch 2015: 68)
Was Germany guiltier than any other state? It may be argued that the German 
“blank check” escalated the crisis – which it did – and that Germany de-
livered the declaration of war, thereby turning the conflict into a general 
European war. However, the Germans did not start it. The process was set 
in motion by the Serbs and the Austrians. Looking for the guilty party, 
the Dual Monarchy and Serbia were the two states which constituted the 
inner circle of the crisis, creating the crisis. In the next circle, we find that 
Germany and Russia are the two states which escalated the crisis. France 
and England were, more or less, drawn into a conflict which was of little 
concern to them. 
When war broke out in August 1914, the great powers seemed to have for-
gotten that the conflict was about Bosnia and the rivalry between the Dual 
Monarchy and Serbia. They chose the war which the generals had planned, 
and that was a general war between the opposing alliances in Europe. After 
the War, the politicians were confronted with the difficult task of explaining 
and justifying why millions of young men had had to fight and die in order 
to maintain the balance of power in Europe.
Structural preconditions
At this point, we may return to the structural or the “underlying” causes. 
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Asserting that the European leaders might have resolved and acted 
in other ways may be too easy. The insistence on the crucial role of the 
decision-makers – whoever they might be – does not imply that structural 
preconditions can be ignored. The question is, how do we balance the two 
levels of explanation and discuss how to interpret the connections between 
structures and decision-making? How do structures work? Did “underlying 
causes” limit the range of options available to state leaders? To which extent 
were the options of the decision-makers in July 1914 restrained by structural 
ties? Such questions might be posed differently, as a matter of framing: Did 
social, political, or cultural structures frame the minds and expectations 
of decision-makers in definite ways, making alternative interpretations 
unlikely or irrational? To take just one example, it may be argued that 
the ethos of militarism made it increasingly difficult for political leaders 
to question the plans of the generals. German politicians might doubt and 
question the political wisdom of trespassing through Belgian lands, as 
stipulated in the Schlieffen plan, though such a route might be sound from 
a military point of view. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of 
methodological questions, however important they might be. Structural ties 
worked in various ways. James Joll’s introduction still provides a sound 
basis for a review of such issues. A few comments on some of the most 
debated “underlying causes” – secret diplomacy and the system of alliances, 
militarism and arms race, nationalism and imperialist rivalries – will have 
to do here.
How important was the system of alliances and the polarization of Europe 
which it implied – on the one side the Alliance of Germany, Austria, and 
Italy, on the other the Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain? In 1918, 
before the War had ended, American President Wilson pointed to the secret 
diplomacy and the system of alliances as the basic reason for the War. Secret 
diplomacy was the evil and the curse of international relations, according 
to Wilson. The core of the argument was that the moment one great power 
became involved in war, the other great powers in Europe would be in-
volved too. This view has been repeated in historical textbooks on European 
his tory in the twentieth century, for example by Harold James in Europe 
Reborn: A History 1914-2000. The major European powers “had locked 
themselves into a system of alliances that now entailed security commit-
ments and preemptive strikes”. (James 2003: 49) No doubt, the alliance sys-
tem and the treaties mattered; still, it was not the text or the paragraphs of 
the treaties that settled things in July 1914. Statesmen “seldom act on the ba-
sis of simple legal commitments”, as noted by Gordon Martel. (Martel 1987: 
4) Rather, the alliances were important because they provided the basis for 
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military planning and conditioned expectations about the form a war even-
tually might take, “and who were likely to be friends and who enemies”. 
(Joll 1987: 66) MacMillan’s interpretation is similar: it was not the text that 
mattered. The system of alliances mattered, as diplomats and officers es-
tablished practices within the framework of the alliances. “Inevitable ex-
pectations and understandings of mutual support accumulated within the 
two alliances as diplomats and the military grew accustomed to working 
with each other”. (MacMillan 2013: 497) Christopher Clark emphasizes the 
importance of the alliances too: “The polarization of Europe’s geopolitical 
system was a crucial precondition for the war that broke out in 1914”. A 
general European war was unthinkable without the system of alliances as 
it was formed after 1890. “The bifurcation into two alliance blocs did not 
cause the war; indeed it did as much to mute as to escalate conflict in the 
pre-war years. Yet without the two blocs, the war could not have broken out 
in the way it did. The bipolar system structured the environment in which 
the crucial decisions were made”. (Clark 2012: 123) No doubt, the system 
of alliances mattered, and yet we might wonder at – as noted by Otte – that 
however much the powers depended on their respective allies, there was 
little coordination of policy between any of them. (Otte 2014: 510) 
Militarism and arms race – the making of standing armies of a size hitherto 
unknown in Europe – were factors at the structural level which have been 
discussed at length. I shall not go into the debates on the size of national 
armies. What is important is the changing role of the military in modern 
societies – with standing armies and military budgets that had no equivalent 
in pre-modern times – and a different ethos of militarism corresponding 
to the increasing weight and influence of the armies, not only as weapons 
of destruction in war but also as instruments of nation-building. (Sheehan 
2007) In Prussia, at least, the ethos of militarism prevented politicians from 
objecting to the political wisdom of the Schlieffen Plan, for example, as 
mentioned above, in passing through Belgian territory which might invite 
Great Britain into the War. Again, MacMillan presents fine observations 
on militarism as not only a question of arms, but also as a matter of culture 
and cultural structures. (MacMillan 2013: 321-22) It was not the task of “the 
civilians” to question the plans of the military.
The connections between imperialist rivalries and war were not present in 
the same obvious ways. It was the Russian communist Lenin who in 1917 
pointed to imperialism and imperial rivalries as the basic cause of the War: 
as Germany had entered the struggle for colonies late, she now claimed 
a redistribution of the colonies to get her share. Though imperialist am-
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bitions were not among the immediate motives of the decision-makers in 
1914, James Joll had a point, observing that earlier imperialist policies con-
tributed to “the frame of mind” in which decisions were taken in 1914. (Joll 
1984: 195) During the War, German General Erich Ludendorff seriously 
speculated about expanding German colonies.
Finally, the basic fact should not be forgotten that nationalism lay at the 
root of the Balkan entanglements. It seems to me that aggressive nation-
alism might be perceived as the crucial structural explanation of the War. 
Nationalism not only sparked the initial confrontationt of the conflict but 
also turned the local conflict into a major international problem.
The historical prelude: International crises in early
twentieth century
Leaving aside the fatal decisions of July 1914 and the structural causes, 
Christopher Clark and Margaret MacMillan seem to agree that the interna-
tional crises in early twentieth century constituted an important part of the 
historical context. The recurrent conflicts and crises, starting at the turn of 
the century with the Fashoda crisis in 1898 and the Boer War of 1898-1902, 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and the Russian revolution of 1904-05, the 
first Morocco crisis of 1905 and the ensuing conference at Algeciras of 
1906, the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908, the Italian assault on Libya 
in 1911, the second Morocco crisis (the Agadir Crisis) of 1911, and finally 
culminating in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, all served as the historical pre-
lude to the general war to come. In both MacMillan’s The War That Ended 
Peace, and Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, the experiences and the lessons learnt 
by the decision-makers in the capitals of Europe are accorded an important 
role in the explanations of the origins of World War 1. Summarizing their 
views, we may conclude that the international crises between 1898 and 1913 
prepared the way for the general war in 1914. 
The international conflicts of these years might be approached in essential-
ly two distinctly opposite ways: in the first, we depict the conflicts as indi-
vidual crises successfully solved by international diplomacy; in the second, 
we regard them as a series of interrelated crises, each intensifying the level 
of international tension and contributing to a weakening of the confidence 
among political leaders and their belief in the value of international diplo-
macy. In the first, the conclusion is that diplomacy worked and military 
hostilities between the great powers were averted; in the second, we might 
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conclude that decision-makers were increasingly losing confidence in inter-
national diplomacy. Instead, some leaders were convinced that a military 
settlement might be inescapable and indeed preferable. MacMillan sub-
scribes to the second view: these conflicts intensified the conflict-potential 
of Europe, and decision-makers increasingly lost confidence in the other, 
opposing powers. After the Balkan Wars, the pool of trust and goodwill 
was empty. In Clark’s argument, the Balkan Wars were crucial. The Balkan 
Wars upset the balance of power and influence among the great powers in a 
contested region of Europe. It was the Balkan entanglements that made the 
killings at Sarajevo so explosive.
Concluding remarks
Just as historians today do not subscribe to the idea of an inevitable route 
from the assassinations in Sarajevo in late June to the outbreak of war 
in early August 1914, so most historians also accept that the decisions of 
July 1914 have to be understood and explained in the broader context of 
European societies and the international system in early twentieth century; 
the question is how to disclose the mutual interdependence between struc-
tures and agency. 
Assessing the structural causes, it can hardly be repudiated that nationalism 
was at the root of the conflict, and that the system of alliances mattered. 
The Balkan “entanglements” were rooted in national controversies: expan-
sionist Serbian nationalism posed a threat to Austrian multi-nationalism. 
The Balkans and the Eastern question have to be placed at the center of the 
conflict – as Christopher Clark does – thereby turning the imperfections 
and the “backwardness” of the administrative and political apparatus of the 
three eastern monarchies into a major problem, which is also stressed by 
Otte. 
Still, it can be argued that the killings at Sarajevo were turned into a pre-
text for war; it required the efforts of the war-parties in both Vienna and 
St Petersburg to convince the skeptics of the wisdom of military action. 
Having witnessed the atrocities of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13, diplo-
mats and political leaders might well have gone for a diplomatic settlement 
to the crisis of 1914. To explain why that did not happen, MacMillan evi-
dently has a point, arguing that the recurrent crises between 1898 and 1913 
had rendered compromise increasingly difficult. Diplomacy, having averted 
military confrontation between the European great powers up to 1913, did 
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not work in 1914. Yet, it was not so that the experience of these conflicts 
had obstructed all prospects for a peaceful settlement in 1914. Otte’s minute 
examination of the July Crisis bears witness to the intensity of diplomatic 
efforts in July 1914 and a diplomatic conclusion of the crisis was not out of 
reach – had it not been for the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum, the Austro-
Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia, and the general mobilization 
of the Russian army. 
Unquestionably, recent studies of the decision-making process in the capitals 
of Europe in July 1914 document that something went wrong, at least accord-
ing to schedule. These studies add important new insight into the worlds of 
the decision-makers, their thoughts and contemplations. Somehow, the con-
clusions of the recent studies on July 1914 support the views of Albertini’s 
classic book: that the decision-makers of 1914 were hardly equipped – “ill-
coped” (Otte’s term) – to handle the serious crisis that confronted them 
in July 1914. Altogether, we are left with the impression that nothing in 
the decision-making processes of July 1914 suggests that either politicians 
or generals were considering seriously the consequences of four years’ de-
structive war; they were all victims of the “short war illusion”. (Joll 1984: 
106) Furthermore, it seems reasonable to conclude that a basic problem was 
that decision-makers in July 1914 were willing to run risks, yet had only 
vague ideas of the weight, the nature, and the extent of these risks.
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Chapter 4
The course of World War 1   and its incomplete endings
Wolfgang Zank
The opening: Loading the odds heavily against the
Central Powers
In the first two weeks of August 1914, seven of Germany’s eight armies con-
centrated along the French and Belgian borders. Colonel General Helmuth 
von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, followed the basic ideas of his 
predecessor, Alfred von Schlieffen, and based German strategy on the as-
sumption that it might be possible to crush the French forces in one devas-
tating blow at the beginning of the War, using Belgian territory for a mas-
sive enveloping maneuver. Thereafter, the majority of the German forces 
could be turned eastwards to confront Russia. Only this way did a German 
victory in a two-front war seem possible.
The Schlieffen Plan implied a monstrous violation of Belgian neutral-
ity. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg openly admitted in the 
Reichstag, the German diet, that Germany was violating international law; 
he promised indemnity for the period after the War. But, as he also said, 
someone who was as menaced as the Germans can only consider “how he is 
to hack his way through” (McMeekin 2013: 377). This reflected a perhaps 
dubious morality. But also, from the cool perspective of German interests, 
the Schlieffen Plan had obvious problems: it made the British entry into 
the War extremely likely. Indeed, still on 31 July, about three quarters of 
the British cabinet were determined not to be drawn into the War unless 
Britain was attacked. But on 2 August, when it was clear that the German 
army would march into Belgium, the proponents for a British entry, first 
and foremost Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, did not encounter notice-
able resistance any more (Clark 2013). Actually, Moltke and other German 
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commanders were quite aware of the possibility of British intervention. 
They thought, however, that they could accept this risk because the British 
army was small.
Interestingly, both Schlieffen and Moltke saw the possibility – if not likeli-
hood – that the war could become protracted and indecisive. As Schlieffen 
wrote in 1909, “The total battle as well as its parts, the separated as well 
as the contiguous battles, will be played out on fields and across areas that 
dwarf the theatres of earlier martial acts” (Strachan 2014: 44). This was 
quite an accurate prognosis. However, it did not make him or Moltke ques-
tion the basics of the Schlieffen Plan.
The German offensive in the west began on 18 August, and for about three 
weeks it looked as if the Schlieffen Plan could work. The French army, 
the British Expeditionary Force, and Belgian troops were repeatedly driven 
back. By the beginning of September, the 1st Army on the German right 
wing stood some 35 kilometers from the center of Paris. Their lines, how-
ever, were overstretched, and the troops were exhausted. On 6 September, 
the Allies started a counter offensive at the river Marne, and three days later 
the 1st Army had to retreat. On the banks of river Aisne, the German troops 
dug in. Mobile warfare continued for some two months as both sides began 
a “race to the Channel”, endeavoring to come around the other’s flank. But, 
by the end of November, the whole Western Front was “frozen”; an uninter-
rupted line of trenches, barbed wire, and fortifications stretched from the 
Swiss border to the Channel. The Schlieffen Plan had failed.
After the War, there was some discussion in Germany about whether the 
High Command made a fatal mistake when it, under the impression of a 
Russian advance into Eastern Prussia, transferred troops from the west to 
the east; they were missing at the Marne. But they could not have made a 
profound difference anyhow. By 1914, troops on the defensive had a huge 
advantage; consequently any major offensive necessarily ground to a halt 
quite soon. The Schlieffen Plan was simply an impossibility.
At the other fronts, the situation did not seem to be much more favora-
ble for the Central Powers. True, in Eastern Prussia in August the German 
8th Army annihilated a Russian army at Tannenberg and badly mauled an-
other one at the Mazurian Lakes in September. But in Galicia, the forces of 
Austria-Hungary, financially badly neglected in the years before the War, 
experienced a long row of catastrophes. And, against Serbia, the Austrian 
army made practically no progress at all. They could capture Belgrade on 
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2 December, but had to evacuate it again on 13 December. By the end of 
1914, both Austrian fronts were in stalemate. Within four months, Austria-
Hungary had lost 957.000 men, more than double the number of the pre-war 
size of the army (Strachan 2014). Germany could not expect much support 
from this ally.
The Central Powers seemed to gain a substantial reinforcement when 
the Ottoman Empire joined them. The Young Turkish leadership enter-
tained ideas of pan-Islamic and pan-Turanic expansionism. Not least, the 
Turkophone areas under Russian rule attracted their attention. On 2 August 
1914, Berlin and Istanbul signed an alliance, and three months later the 
Ottomans declared war. The Russian Black-Sea ports became cut off from 
the wider world, and Russia had to divert forces to the new front in the 
Caucasus. In Berlin many had rather wild ideas about raising the Muslim 
world in revolt against British and French colonialism, not least Emperor 
Wilhelm II. Sultan Mehmet V let indeed Sheikh ul-Islam, the highest- rank-
ing cleric, declare jihad against the Entente powers. But this had next to no 
effect. In September 1915, a German mission reached Kabul; in January 
1916 they signed a treaty in which, as the first European power, Germany 
recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign country. However, German hopes 
that Emir Habibollah would start an invasion of British India did not mate-
rialize; nor did ideas of creating an Indian government in exile in Kabul to 
start an insurgency (Opfer-Klinger 2014). In southern Persia in 1915, how-
ever, Wilhem Waßmuß, the “German Lawrence”, formerly Director of the 
German Vice-Consulate in Buschehr, was successful at instigating a tribal 
revolt against British domination. In 1916, the revolt spread to almost all the 
tribes in southern Persia. Only after the armistice with the Ottoman Empire 
in 1918 could the British restore control over the coastal regions (Loth 2014).
Far more important became a silent victory which the British navy won 
in the first days of the War: the establishment of a sea blockade against 
the Central Powers. It was a wide blockade between Scotland and Norway, 
out of reach for the German fleet. In 1914, the total steamer tonnage of the 
world was about 26 million tons. The Allies owned 59 percent; the British 
Empire alone 48 percent. Neutral countries accounted for 27 percent, and 
the Central Powers 15 percent (Germany 12 percent). The vessels of the 
Central Powers disappeared from the seas within the first days of the War. 
Sea-borne trade from then onwards was possible only through the neutral 
countries. During the first months, the blockade was restricted. Absolute 
contraband (military equipment and the like) on the way to Germany was to 
be confiscated, but the neutrals could still trade with conditional contraband 
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(most notably foodstuff). The British government endeavored to negotiate 
voluntary restrictions with the neutrals, but their basic rights were not yet 
questioned. But in March 1915, the British declared an unrestricted block-
ade: all flows of goods to the Central Powers had to be stopped (Hardach 
1987).
The effects of the blockade are difficult to assess. Armament production 
was seemingly affected very little. But from 1916 onwards, the food sup-
ply for the civilian population deteriorated visibly. Calculating the excess 
mortality rates compared to pre-war years, the official British history of 
the blockade quantified the number of civilian deaths in Germany caused 
by the blockade at 772,736. As Hew Strachan put it, “Indirectly, at least, 
the blockade breached the principle of non-combatant immunity” (Strachan 
2014: 209).
The Central Powers were thus gradually cut off from trade with the wider 
world. By contrast, the Western Allies had free access everywhere. This 
meant in particular to the gigantic industrial potential of the United States 
of America. Great Britain could also use the vast resources of its empire: 
raw materials and food stuff from all over the world, and soldiers from 
Canada, India, Africa, and Australia/New Zealand.
Britain’s naval dominance also implied that Germany was unable to send 
support to its colonies. Japan almost immediately seized the opportunity 
to attack Tsingtao on the Chinese Shantung Peninsula. By 7 November, 
the German garrison had to surrender. The Japanese leadership had no in-
tention of passing it on to China. On the contrary, in January 1915 Tokyo 
presented a list of the so-called Twenty-One Demands. They ranged from 
extended direct control in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Southern 
Shantung to trading rights and privileges. On 14 August 1917, China de-
clared war on Germany, with a view to participating at the Peace Conference 
(Strachan 2014). The aim was to get Shantung back. However, the Versailles 
Conference in 1919 decided otherwise, confirming Japanese ownership.
In 1914, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand took the German colonies on 
Pacific islands. In Africa, on 27 August 1914, British forces destroyed the 
German wireless station at Kamina in Togo. It had linked the other African 
stations with Nauen in Germany. Contact between the German colonies as 
cut. Conquering the bigger African colonies took a longer time, up to 1916 
in Cameroon and November 1917 in the case of East Africa. The German 
garrison managed to move into Portuguese Mozambique and did not sur-
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render before the armistice in 1918. This war was truly global in geographic 
terms. 
By November 1914, an assessment of the situation of the Central Powers 
would not give much scope for optimism. The Schlieffen Plan had failed, 
and Germany and Austria had to fight on two fronts with no possibility of 
defeating France or Russia any time soon. Great Britain was practically 
out of reach for the German forces. And for a drawn-out war, the possibil-
ities for the Allies were vastly superior in terms of industrial potential and 
manpower. True, the German army occupied strongly fortified positions in 
northern France and Belgium: to defeat it was to be a formidable challenge 
for the Allies. But for a war of attrition, the odds were heavily in favor of 
the Allies. 
Of the German leaders, Erich von Falkenhayn, the new Chief of the General 
Staff, seemed to have understood this for a moment. He argued for finding 
a compromise with Russia (Strachan 2014). There was, however, no support 
for this position, and Falkenhayn himself soon abandoned it. Instead, the 
German leadership stuck to the war aims which Bethmann Hollweg had 
formulated on 9 September 1914 (the Septemberprogramm). The program 
was comparatively modest as to open annexations. In practice, however, 
it would have given Germany hegemony over Europe (and a big colo nial 
empire in middle Africa). According to the program, France would be sub-
stantially weakened through reparation payments which would prevent 
re-armament for 15 to 20 years; a commercial treaty would make France 
economically dependent on Germany; and Germany would directly annex 
the iron-ore region of Briey, and perhaps also border regions of military im-
portance. Belgium was to cede Liège and Verviers to Prussia, and some bor-
der territory to Luxemburg (which would be incorporated into Germany). 
Belgium should be transformed into a vassal state, with German rights to 
use the Belgian coast militarily. Also, the Netherlands should be brought 
into a “close relationship” with Germany. An economic union with com-
mon tariffs should guarantee German economic domination over Central 
Europe. Russia would be pressed back from the German border “and her 
domination over the non-Russian vassal people be broken” (Fischer 1977: 
93-5). Practically right to the end of the War, Germany’s leadership stuck 
to this line. 
It was Fritz Fischer who, in 1961 in his seminal Griff nach der Weltmacht, 
published Bethmann Hollweg’s Septemberprogramm for the first time. His 
claim that it was Germany which started the War, and that Germany did so 
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in order to realize these imperialist aims, has not been vindicated by his-
toric research. But it is Fischer’s lasting merit to have brought these aims, 
formulated after the start of the War, to light. They strongly contributed to 
rendering a compromise peace very difficult, if not impossible.
Bethmann Hollweg spoke in public only vaguely about the “safety measures 
and guarantees” (Sicherungen und Garantien) which Germany needed. 
In the Septemberprogramm, the overall aim was formulated as “securing 
Germany towards West and East for the time imaginable” (Fischer 1977: 
7, 93). This might have been a rhetorical smokescreen for imperialist am-
bitions (as Fischer had assumed). But in case Bethmann Hollweg meant it, 
we can see the Septemberprogramm as a classical example of a “security 
dilemma”: full security for one means submission for the others. 
1915: Widening the ring, but no decision
In strategic terms, Germany had the advantage of the “inner line”: troops 
could be moved from one front to the other to create points of concentration 
and superiority. After the Western Front became immobile in November 
1914, the German leadership used this possibility for the first time when 
it reduced the strength of the divisions in the West from four to three reg-
iments, in order to create a strategic reserve which could be employed 
against Russia. In May 1915, a joint German-Austrian force broke through 
the Russian lines between Gorlice and Tarnow in Galicia. This was the be-
ginning of a long retreat for the Russian army. In June the Central Powers 
took Lviv, in August they entered Warsaw, Grodno, and Brest-Litovsk, 
and in September Vilna. The Russian leadership resorted to the scorched 
earth tactic. Certain areas were “cleansed” of “unreliable” people, notably 
Germans and Jews. As an army commander told Chief of Staff Nikolay 
Yanushkevich: “The complete hostility of the entire Jewish population to-
ward the Russian army is well established” (Strachan 2014: 144). There 
were indeed many Jews with pro-German sympathies. In Russia, Jews have 
become victims of numerous pogroms. By comparison, Germany appeared 
to be an orderly country under rule of law with no pogroms, and where Jews 
were, by comparison to their share of the population, strongly overrepre-
sented in leading social positions (Nipperdey 1993). 
In October 1915, German and Austrian forces crossed the Danube and 
marched into Serbia, soon assisted by the Bulgarian army which attacked 
the Serbian flank from the east. The Serbian troops had to retreat over the 
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mountains into Albania, with temperatures falling to minus 20 degrees. In 
relation to population size, Serbia suffered the most losses during the War. 
British and French troops landed in Salonika to open a new front, but this 
came too late to bring relief to the Serbian army. Entente ships brought the 
remaining Serbian troops first to Corfu and then to Salonika. Greece was 
still neutral, and using the territory of a neutral country was a severe breach 
of international law; but as David Lloyd George, Minister of Ammunitions, 
made clear, “there was no comparison between going through Greece and 
the German passage through Belgium” (Strachan 2014: 154).
In nearby Gallipoli, at the Dardanelles, the Allies had landed in April with 
the strategic aim of capturing the Ottoman capital and opening a passage to 
Russia. But the Ottoman forces provided a staunch defense. Mustafa Kemal, 
Lieutenant Colonel and commander of a division, became a national hero. In 
the trench warfare, the Allies lost many men to disease. And after German 
submarines had sunk two British warships, the Royal Navy withdrew their 
capital ships, leaving only smaller vessels with less powerful artillery to 
support the troops. In December and January, the Allied forces retreated 
from Gallipoli – yet another severe defeat for the Allied camp.
At the Western Front, Allied offensives brought no breakthroughs. All in 
all, 1915 was thus not a good year for the Allies. They could find some 
consolation in the fact that Italy had joined their camp in April. But, due to 
geography, the Italian army could not do much more than frontally assault 
the Austrian-Hungarian lines at the Isonzo River, with practically no results 
except long casualty lists. 
The Central Powers had thus gained some important successes and con-
quered much territory. But they were still far away from victory.
War crimes and genocide
At the outbreak of the War, a substantial body of international law existed, 
formulating rules for warfare with a view to restricting its destructivity. Its 
main bodies were the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the London Declaration on war at sea 
(signed but not ratified). However, these conventions could not prevent nu-
merous atrocities and the killing of civilians in practically all arenas.
Already during the war, the shooting of about 6,400 civilians in Belgium 
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and northern France by German troops was widely publicized, reactions to 
(usually imaginary) partisan attacks. Something similar happened during 
the Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia (1,500 to 6,000 victims). At the 
Eastern front and in the Balkans, the number of civilians killed was the 
highest. In Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania a culture of armed popular 
resistance existed. In these regions, real guerilla insurgencies began, reach-
ing their peak in the insurrection in the Toplica district of southern Serbia, 
in February and March 1917. It was brutally repressed by Bulgarian troops, 
assisted by Austrian-Hungarian and German units. Twenty thousand peo-
ple were killed, most of them innocent civilians (Neitzel 2014). Horrible 
as these waves of repression were, it should perhaps be emphasized that 
irregular guerilla warfare was also a breach of the conventions; only per-
sons wearing a uniform had the status of legal combatants, and thus claim 
to humane treatment in case of captivity. Others did not. These rules were 
formulated precisely with a view to protecting the civilian population.
German Zeppelins bombarded Paris already from September 1914, and 
from January 1915 onwards British cities too. About 1,600 British civilians 
lost their lives. Allied air strikes on German cities cost some 800 civilians 
lives. A first big Allied air offensive against German towns in 1918 was 
stopped only by the armistice (Neitzel 2014).
The use of poison gas was widespread from 1915 onwards. This was not a 
war crime in the legal sense, given the point that no convention interdicted 
its use. Only in 1925 did the Geneva Convention formulate a ban on gas. In 
the Second World War, this ban was basically respected – at the front lines. 
From a strictly legal point of view, air strikes against the civilian population 
were also not war crimes, again, because there was no convention against it, 
neither in World War 1 nor in World War 2. They were, of course, breaches 
of the general “principle of non-combatant immunity”. But this principle 
did not carry much weight in either World War. 
All these horrors were dwarfed, however, in comparison to what happened in-
side the Ottoman Empire. In January 1915, the Ottoman Third Army suffered 
a disastrous defeat at Sarikamish in the Caucasus. On their retreat, the troops 
committed brutal acts of “revenge” against the supposed traitors at their back, 
the Christian Armenians. This provoked an armed self-defense insurrection 
among the Armenians of Van. The advance of the Russian army saved about 
300,000 Armenians. The Young Turk leadership in Istanbul convinced itself 
that the time was ripe to “solve the Armenian problem”. On 24 April, 650 
Armenian politicians and leading intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested and 
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murdered. All over the country, similar atrocities were committed. In May 
1915, in each Armenian town and village of the six vilayet (provinces) nearest 
to the Russian border, proclamations of evacuation were hung up. The proce-
dures were the same all over, according to precise timelines: the people had 
two to three days to settle their affairs. The men, except the very old ones, 
were separated and brought out of town immediately. A few kilometers away, 
they were shot. The remaining population had to walk away, the official des-
tination being Aleppo. On their way, Kurdish gangs, frequently – age-old en-
emies of the Armenians – or units of the Teşkilât-i Mahsusa, a special secret 
organization under direct command of War Minister Enver Pasha, attacked, 
robbed and murdered the evacuees. This happened without any interference 
from the accompanying gendarmes. Often it was the gendarmes themselves 
to open fire. Food and water was insufficient, diseases additionally killed 
many. After some months, the survivors arrived at Aleppo, where no prepa-
rations had been made for them (Chalion and Ternon 1983: 14-17). After the 
“ethnic cleansing” of the eastern vilayet, the operations were extended to oth-
er regions in Anatolia, though not to Istanbul and Smyrna. There “discrete-
ness” could not be guaranteed.
The survivors of the marches were “resettled” along the Euphrates, usual-
ly in concentration camps. In October 1915, four teachers at the German 
Realschule in Aleppo wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: “How can 
we make our Armenian pupils read the story of Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs, how can we teach them to conjugate and decline, when in the yards 
next to the school their compatriots are dying of hunger? When almost na-
ked girls, women and children, some lying on the ground, others huddled 
among the dying or the waiting coffins, are breathing their last breath? 
… Of the 2,000 to 3,000 peasants, women and girls from Upper Armenia 
brought here in good health, only 40 or 50 skeletal figures remain” (Chalion 
and Ternon 1983: 68). Accounts of this kind, from missionaries, diplomats, 
nurses, and others, abound. 
By February 1916, about 500,000 deportees were alive, distributed be-
tween Aleppo and Damascus or the Euphrates and Zor. About 300,000 
had died during the “evacuation”. The Young Turk leadership was pre-
sumably surprised at the number of survivors. At any rate, in spring 1916, 
a systematic campaign began to murder the deportees in the concentration 
camps north of Aleppo. It culminated in the summer in the mass kill-
ings of the deportees in Zor and the Armenian workers at the building 
site of the Bagdadbahn. This wave cost presumably another 300,000 lives 
(Kévorkian 2011).
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For some historians, the use of the word “genocide” is misleading. For in-
stance, Hew Strachan wrote that the term might be correct for the scale of fa-
talities, but “in terms of causation the issue is more complex … The Ottoman 
Empire, a backward state, unable to supply and transport its own army in 
the field, was in no state to organize large-scale deportations”. He points 
at the cornered position of the Ottoman Empire, with the Western Allies at 
Gallipoli, Russian troops advancing in the Caucasus, and a British-Indian 
army moving northwards in Mesopotamia, and concludes, “Desperate situ-
ations begat desperate responses” (Strachan 2014: 111f). This reading of the 
events as an unfortunate evacuation accompanied by some crimes, can also 
be found among, for instance, some Turkish historians.
It is true that many of the fatalities were caused by the circumstances. And 
no one has ever found a written order by the Young Turk leadership to ex-
terminate all Armenians. However, this does not say too much. There is, 
for instance, no written order by Hitler to start the Holocaust either. The 
most important instructions were given orally. And as to the “evacuation” 
of the Armenians, there exists, for instance, a report by the German am-
bassador in Istanbul, dated 30 June 1916, in which he informed Bethmann 
Hollweg about the Young Turkish organization Ittihad, the Committee of 
Union and Progress: “The Committee is demanding the extermination of 
the last remnants of the Armenians, and the government must yield. But 
the Committee is not only the organization of the government party in the 
capital. To every authority, from the vali to the kaimakam, is attached a 
member of the Committee to second and to watch him. The deportations 
of Armenians have resumed everywhere” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983: 54). 
There are several other diplomatic reports about an explicit genocidal intent.
Furthermore, shortly after the war, the massacres were investigated in 
court, on various occasions. The biggest trial was the one against the Young 
Turkish leadership in Istanbul from April to June 1919. The jury studied 
much written evidence and interrogated numerous witnesses. It established 
the important role of the Teşkilât-i Mahsusa and of the Committee of Union 
and Progress in organizing the massacres and concluded: “This shows that 
the murders were committed on the orders of and with the knowledge of 
Talaat, Jemal and Enver Beys” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983: 89), i.e. the lead-
ing Young Turkish triumvirate. They and other high-ranking officials were 
sentenced to death in absentia. In another trial Kemal Bey, the “Butcher 
of Yozgad” was sentenced to death and executed. However, when Mustafa 
Kemal (“Atatürk”) took power in 1922, he put a lid on the issue.
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By this time, another trial had been finalized in Berlin, where Talaat Pasha, 
1915 Minister of the Interior, had lived in exile. On 15 March 1921, he was 
shot dead by Soghomon Teilirian, an Armenian survivor. The process be-
came quickly a trial of Talaat. Again, numerous witnesses were questioned. 
Among the documents studied were photocopies of cipher telegrams which 
Talaat had sent to Aleppo. Instead of destroying them, as he was ordered 
to, an Armenian, Aram Andonian, photocopied them and published them in 
Paris 1920. The court in Berlin had them assessed, and five of them could 
be authenticated. For instance, on 16 September 1915, Talaat sent a cable 
to Aleppo which read that the government, by the order of the Committee 
of Union and Progress, “has decided to destroy completely all the indi-
cated persons living in Turkey …. No regard must be paid to either age or 
sex”. Or on 7 March 1916: “Collect the children of the indicated persons 
… Take them away on the pretext that they are to be looked after by the 
Deportations Committee, so as not to arouse suspicion. Destroy them and 
report” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983). The court in Berlin acquitted Teilirian.
Raymond Kévorkian draws attention to the Armenian workers on the con-
struction sites of the Baghdadbahn. In 1916 they were murdered too. “The 
obstinacy with which the capital conducted these operations, against the ad-
vice of some military authorities … and in the face of all operational logic, 
illustrates, perhaps even better than the large-scale massacres perpetrated 
in Zor and Ras ul-Ayn, the desire of … the Young Turk leadership … to im-
placably carry through to the bitter end their plan to extirpate the Armenian 
Ottoman population” (Kévorkian 2011: 690). This was rather the opposite of 
what Strachan wrote: Due to the desolate infrastructure and administrative 
disorganization of the Ottoman state, a part of the Armenian population 
survived systematic genocide. 
Unrestricted U-boat warfare and the entry of 
the United States
There is presumably no other single decision taken during the War which 
had such far-reaching consequences as the German one of 9 January 1917 
to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. And none was based on such 
blatantly unrealistic assumptions.
At the beginning of the War, the German navy was blocked in the North 
Sea. During the first months, a few cruisers operated in distant waters un-
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til they were all sunk. Their impact on Allied shipping was small. There 
was, however, the possibility of hurting Allied shipping by using subma-
rines. But submarines were very vulnerable when they surfaced because 
they were slow and thinly plated. This made it difficult to use them and, 
at the same time, comply with international rules. According to these, a 
submarine, having encountered a ship, had to surface, stop, and search the 
ship, and establish whether it was an enemy ship or a neutral one carrying 
contraband. This became increasingly risky after the Allies began to arm 
freighters, often in a hidden way. The idea to declare an unrestricted sub-
marine war and let a submarine torpedo ships from underwater and without 
warning gained ground among the German leadership. This was illegal, but 
so was the British decision to have a wide blockade for the wholesale control 
of the trade of several neutral countries; only a close, near-coast blockade 
of the harbors of the Central Powers would have been in compliance with 
international law (Erdmann 1980). 
On February 1915, the German government declared unrestricted submarine 
war in the waters around the British Isles. Britain responded with the unre-
stricted blockade of the Central Powers (see above). The neutral countries 
protested against both. However, their sympathies were likely to glide to-
wards the British side. For most neutrals, in particular for the United States, 
trade with the Allies was more important; the War had turned the Western 
Allies into very good customers for US products. And the gruesome char-
acter of the German blockade of Britain did not fail to cost Germany sym-
pathies. This was in particular the case after a German submarine sunk the 
British passenger liner Lusitania on 7 May 1915, with 1257 passengers and 
700 crew on board. One hundred and twenty American citizens lost their 
lives. In September, the German leadership backed down: no submarine 
warfare on the British West coast, and in the North Sea only according to 
the rules (surfacing, warning, and checking). 
General-Lieutenant Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, 
brought the subject back on to the agenda at the end of 1915. In his view, 
German successes in the east could not decide the War; Germany had to win 
in the west. Therefore, he was preparing a big offensive at Verdun (to start 
in February 1916). But it could hardly bring victory alone; it had to be com-
plemented with unrestricted submarine warfare. Bethmann Hollweg was 
strictly against it and argued, in case it would not bring victory, it implied 
finis Germaniae. As a kind of compromise, in February 1916 the German 
navy was ordered to begin an “intensified” (verschärften) submarine war-
fare, not fully unrestricted, which, however, again produced gruesome 
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results. In March, the French liner Sussex was sunk, with 80 passengers 
killed or injured. On 20 April, US President Woodrow Wilson sent an ex-
traordinarily sharp note to Berlin, stating that a declaration of war would 
become unavoidable if the sinking without warning continued. Bethmann 
Hollweg was able to convince the Kaiser to cancel the verschärften subma-
rine warfare (Herzfeld 1968). 
In the meantime, Falkenhayn’s offensive at Verdun had failed. He wrote 
later that his intention had been a war of attrition, weakening the French army 
much more than the German one. But this was a construction he began to 
use from mid-March onwards. His original orders aimed at a breakthrough. 
This failed, and fighting continued until December with very limited gains of 
ground. With 337,000 casualties, the German army had suffered practically as 
much attrition as the French one, 377,000 (Strachan 2014).
On 1 July, the British army, supported by French troops, opened the of-
fensive at the Somme. Also in this case, breakthrough failed, and General 
Douglas Haig, the British Commander in Chief, then also used the term 
“attrition” as justification. Fighting continued to November. The German 
front withstood the pressure. But the German High Command was serious-
ly concerned about the vast quantities of material which the Allies could 
deploy. Just in the preliminary bombardment, the British fired 1.5 million 
shells (Strachan 2014).
At sea, the big naval battle at Jutland (31 May/1 June) had only confirmed 
the superior British position. Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the Commander 
of the German High Sea Fleet, had hoped to lead his fleet against weak-
er British forces. Instead, he clashed with the complete Grand Fleet and 
had to do his utmost to break off contact and rush back to Wilhemshaven. 
Meanwhile, the British blockade had become more effective. The list of 
goods classified as contraband became longer, and the neutrals had to 
accept quantitative restrictions on their imports and increased surveillance. 
Within a few months, German food imports from Scandinavia fell by half 
(Erdmann 1980). 
In the east, the Russian army had regained strength and launched a ma-
jor offensive against Austrian-Hungarian forces. This made Romania 
enter the War on the Allied side. This blow cost Falkenhayn his post. On 29 
August, Paul von Hindenburg became his successor, with Erich Ludendorff 
as First Quartermaster General being the real “strongman” in the new High 
Command.
78
As had become obvious by the end of 1916, a German land victory in the 
west was impossible. The logical conclusion would have been to seek a 
compromise peace, at least in the west. But this meant that Germany had 
to drop all ideas about substantially weakening France or gaining control 
over Belgium. Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, the ambassador in 
Washington, informed the German leadership explicitly that the US regard-
ed a full reconstruction of Belgian independence as an essential part of 
any political solution (Fischer 1977). But the leading circles in Berlin were 
not prepared to give up the war aims in the west. Instead, they cultivated 
illusions.
Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiral Staff, declared 
that a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would crack Britain 
within five months. Scheer and Navy Minister Eduard von Capelle agreed. 
In their calculations, they worked with powerful multipliers: submarine 
warfare would not only destroy Allied shipping space, it would also drive 
insurance rates for the ships and freight rates and wages for sailors upwards 
because shipping would be so much more risky. The argument that, at least 
for the US, deliveries to Britain would become a war effort and thus not 
subject to the usual commercial calculations failed to make an impres-
sion. Furthermore, von Capelle and others quantified the risk of American 
troops arriving in Europe at zero, because the submarines would prevent it 
(Erdmann 1980: 131-132). As matter of fact, not one single ship transporting 
US troops to Europe was sunk.
By the end of 1916, the united military leadership, including Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff, pressed for submarine war. So did representatives of the 
bigger commercial interest groups (Fischer 1977: 247) and, in the Reichstag, 
so did Conservatives and the Catholic Zentrum party. On 9 January 1917 at 
the Crown Council in Pless, the decision was made. 
Bernstorff delivered the declaration on unrestricted submarine warfare on 
31 January. The US broke off diplomatic relations a few days later. On 2 
April, Wilson, with the support of the entire cabinet behind it, presented a 
declaration of war to the congress. Germany was doomed. Not immediately, 
however, because the US had first to mobilize and train an expeditionary 
force. 
The decision for unrestricted submarine warfare can be seen as the im-
plicit recognition of the German leadership that the War could not be won. 
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Only playing vabanque, based on illusionary assumptions, seemed to of-
fer a possibility. The material superiority of the Allies had become over-
whelming, and the blockade showed its deadly effect. Morale among the 
German and Austro-Hungarian troops, and not the least at the home front, 
was visibly declining, mostly under the impact of hunger. True, Germany, 
had successes at raising war production through the Hindenburg Programm 
of September 1916, and with the Law on Patriotic Auxiliary Work Efforts 
(Gesetz über den Vaterländischen Hilfsdienst) of 5 December 1916, aimed 
at mobilizing more of a labor force. But this was far from sufficient to bal-
ance the resources of the Western Allies. And, of course, Britain and France 
also started programs to increase war production. It was the French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau who first used the term ‘Total War’, referring 
the need for France to mobilize all of her resources (Strachan 2014: 253).
The concept of “Total War” came to cover over dynamics which made World 
War 1 like no other before. Highly industrialized countries unleashed forces 
of destruction on an unprecedented scale. And if the population at large 
had to be fully mobilized to drive industrial war output as high as possible, 
then the enemy could see the civilian population as a “legitimate” target; 
there were, so to speak, no civilians any more. Furthermore, as not least the 
events in Germany and Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1918 showed, 
the morale at the home front could become a factor of primary importance. 
Preventing “subversive” activities of any kind, real or imaginary, could 
be seen as measures of indispensable self-defense. Many could qualify as 
“subversives”, for example socialists or anarchists. Given the widespread 
thinking at the time in biological-racial terms, from a militarist perspective, 
Jews could even appear as “born” subversives.
It was thus by 1917 unavoidable that this War had unleashed forces of de-
struction which were bound to be felt many years after its end. Then, partic-
ularly in this year, a chain of events occurred which worked as a multiplier 
of destruction and instability on a global scale.
The Russian Revolution and the emergence of the 
Brest-Litovsk line
In February 1917, Petrograd became the scene of a growing wave of strikes 
and demonstrations, originally for social demands and more bread. By 25 
February, banners with political demands such as “Down with the War” and 
“Down with the Tsarist Government” appeared, and so did red flags. On the 
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26th, a Sunday, the troops were ordered to open fire, killing or wounding 
hundreds of people. But on the following morning, the Volinskii regiment 
mutinied. Soon, other units followed. The same night, the Tsarist govern-
ment resigned. Liberal Duma politicians formed a committee and contacted 
the military High Command: only if Tsar Nicholas resigned could order 
be maintained and the War continued. Most army leaders had come to the 
same conclusion. On 3 March, Tsarism came to an end (Smith 2006: 114f).
Meanwhile, the Duma Committee had appointed a provisional government 
under Prince Georgy E. Lvov. However, its authority was shaky. Workers 
and soldiers had elected soviets – councils – in factories and army units, 
and sent 1,200 representatives to a common Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Deputies. The provisional government invited the soviet to 
participate, but only the lawyer Aleksandr Kerensky accepted, whereas 
the left-wing majority in the Executive Committee (EC) of the Petrograd 
Soviet – mainly Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (SR) – refused. 
‘Dual Power’ was established, with the provisional government having the 
formal power, whereas the Soviet EC often had more real power through 
its influence over garrisons, transport workers, and the population at large 
(Smith 2006: 116).
The biggest mistake of the provisional government was the decision to con-
tinue the war. Six Mensheviks and SR entered the government in May with 
the intention of accelerating the coming of peace. Instead, they became im-
plicated in the preparation of a new offensive, energetically pushed for by 
War Minister Kerensky. The offensive, in July, turned into a fiasco; the 
Russian army began to fall apart.
By that time, the countryside was already tormented by a peasant revolu-
tion. The peasants were outraged about the state grain monopoly, by which 
the government tried to force them to sell their products at fixed low prices. 
Furthermore, beliefs were widespread that the land ought to be distributed 
from the nobility, state, or church to those who tilled it. The government 
was divided over the issue (the liberal Kadets insisted on full compensation 
for the land owners), and declared this an issue to be decided by the coming 
Constituent Assembly. The peasants began to take matters into their own 
hands. After harvest, often instigated by returning soldiers, they increas-
ingly occupied the gentry’s land, and confiscated equipment and livestock, 
distributing them outright. The government introduced martial law in sev-
eral districts, but did not control sufficient troops to suppress the movement 
(Smith 2006: 127f). In many factories, soviets established workers’ control, 
81
a praxis of supervising the management, not necessarily demanding social-
ization.
The economy disintegrated. Gross factory output fell by 36 percent in 1917; 
half a million workers were laid off. Disorganization spread in the trans-
port system and prevented grain and industrial supplies from coming to the 
towns. The government printed money in order to pay its bills, thus creating 
inflation. In Petrograd, real wages fell by half in the second half of the year. 
War weariness became endemic.
Among the non-Russian people, nationalism gained ground, though une-
venly across the regions. Initially, most nationalists demanded only cultural 
rights such as the use of the native language in schools, or political auton-
omy in a Russian federation. The provisional government, also divided on 
this issue, was reluctant to concede substantial autonomy. In September, 
Kerensky, now Prime Minister, endorsed self-determination, “but only on 
such principles as the Constituent Assembly shall determine” (Smith 2006: 
131). By then, nationalist politicians had already substantially stepped up 
their demands.
Russia turned into a failed state. Under such conditions, fanaticized and 
disciplined minorities got their chance. Particularly when led by a charis-
matic personality. The importance of dramatic actors in history has often 
been debated controversially. But in this case, it looks like indeed one 
person had tremendous influence, because he was endowed with charis-
matic legitimacy at the top of a strictly top-down organization, which in 
turn achieved unrestricted power in a huge failed state. When Vladimir I. 
Ulyanov, called Lenin, arrived in Petrograd on 3 April 1917, the Bolshevik 
leadership was divided and remarkably moderate: it agreed with qualified 
support for the provisional government, said yes to the military defense of 
Russian territory, and was open for negotiations with the Mensheviks with 
a view to reunification. Lenin changed this drastically: he was implacable 
in opposition to the government and the War, wanted no talk of union with 
the Mensheviks. Under his leadership, the Bolsheviks incessantly cam-
paigned for bringing down the government, ending the War, distributing 
the land to the peasants, bringing in workers’ control, and giving all power 
to the soviets. These slogans gained increasingly traction. Previously, the 
Bolsheviks were a tiny minority, with hardly 20,000 active members in 
March 1917 (Koenen 2005: 119). But over the year, they gained a popular 
basis – in particular in Petrograd and Moscow – the most important loca-
tions. 
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By September, Lenin pressed for an armed insurrection. The majority of 
the leaders were unenthusiastic. When Lenin managed to persuade a ma-
jority in the Central Committee to prepare for an insurrection, Grigory Y. 
Zinoviev and Lev B. Kamenev were strictly opposed, and even published 
the decision (Smith 2006: 134). The government was thus warned well in 
advance. But, in its own capital, it could not muster the few loyal troops 
necessary to prevent the insurrection – an action by a few thousands which 
had truly global consequences. 
Revolutionary emigrants had informed the German authorities in March 
1915 about Lenin and his position that a Russian defeat would be desir-
able. The Bolsheviks received German money (Koenen 2005: 92-97). In 
April 1917, with permission of the German authorites, Lenin went by train 
from Switzerland through Germany on his way to Petrograd. As we have 
seen above, Germany had not been very successful at supporting Jihad in 
Oriental lands. But in the case of the Bolshevik fundamentalists, it was a 
full success. This was arguably the most destructive act of German im-
perialism.
Immediately after the seizure of power, the Bolshevik regime offered an 
armistice and peace negotiations on the basis of no annexations or con-
tributions and self-determination of the nations, accompanied by decrees 
endorsing workers’ control in the factories and land distribution in the 
countryside. A Peace Treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. 
The Bolsheviks had to accept that Russia gave up sovereignty over a third 
of its 1914-population: Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, and Ukraine, 
and cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum to Turkey. According to a supplemen-
tary treaty on 27 August, Russia also had to recognize the independence of 
Georgia. 
Brest-Litovsk has often been seen as indicative of the megalomania of 
German imperialism, because in the territories which became separated 
from Russia, pro-German governments were in place, partly directly in-
stalled by German troops. The developments were, however, very different 
in the various territories. 
The disintegration of Russian state power released national energies, for a 
long time massively suppressed under the previous-Tsarist system, which 
had not allowed for the expression of non-Russian otherness or autono-
my. Only Finland retained a few autonomous rights – and these were ever 
further restricted. However, the great German and Austrian advances in 
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1915 worked as a catalyst for Russia’s territorial decomposition, because 
non-Russian nationalists saw the possibility for throwing off Russian op-
pression with the help of foreign troops. This indeed happened, but in many 
different forms. 
Already in November 1916, the Central Powers proclaimed a new Kingdom 
of Poland. Not least the hope for Polish soldiers had motivated this move. In 
Lithuania, occupied in 1915, the German military administration endorsed 
a conference in Vilna, composed of two representatives of all parties and 
districts, which in June 1917 elected a council (Taryba) as a kind of provi-
sional government. In December, the Taryba proclaimed independence ac-
cording to ethnographic borders, not the much wider historical ones. A sec-
ond, more precise, declaration underlined independence both from Russia 
and Poland. After the Taryba had accepted close connections to Germany 
in political, military, and financial fields, Emperor Wilhelm II confirmed 
Lithuania’s independence officially on 23 March 1918. In what later be-
came Latvia and Estonia, the German authorities negotiated only with the 
Baltic German nobility, which had the support of conservative Estonians 
and Latvians. Elections on the basis of general estates generated a com-
mon council (Landesrat), which decided to ask for a monarchic state un-
der German protection. Bourgeois and popular nationalists contacted the 
Western Allies; an Estonian committee gained their de-facto recognition as 
official national representation in May 1918 (Rauch 1990: 48-57). 
In the case of Finland, however, the road to independence was mainly an 
internal process. Under Tsarism, the country had retained some autonomy 
with a parliament, since 1906 elected on the basis of universal suffrage. 
The elections of October 1917 brought a bourgeois majority, and President 
Peter Evind Svinhuvud championed for full independence. But the Social 
Democrats refused to accept the result of the elections. They organized 
Red troops which cooperated with the remaining Russian forces, and in 
November they proclaimed a general strike. On 6 December, the parliament 
declared independence. Lenin formally recognized it. This did not prevent 
Russian support for the Red side. In January, full-fledged civil war broke 
out; the Red side occupied Helsinki. The government evacuated to Vaasa 
and organized White troops in the northern provinces. Germany assisted 
them with weapons and, in March 1918, with troops. In May, the civil war 
ended in a White victory.
In March 1918, Svinhuvud signed treaties in Berlin which established close 
ties with Germany. Finland was not supposed to make alliances with foreign 
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powers or offer them bases, whereas the German navy could require them. 
A commercial treaty guaranteed German products access to Finland free 
from tariffs, whereas Germany could impose tariffs. On 9 October 1918, the 
parliament elected a German prince as king (Fischer 1977: 449-454).
In Ukraine on 4 March 1917, a Rada (Ukrainian for soviet) established it-
self as provisional regional government. Bourgeois politicians dominated, 
but the political left supported it. The Rada was a corporatist institution 
with representatives of the major social and cultural institutions. Mychailo 
Hruševskyi, historian and main representative of the Ukrainian national 
cultural revival, became chairman (Hildermeier 1989: 211). In June, the 
Rada proclaimed: “Long Live Autonomous Ukraine in a Federated Russia!” 
(Smith 2006: 131). In January 1918, a declaration of full independence fol-
lowed. However, the new country was immediately threatened by Bolshevik 
troops. The Rada sent a formal request for support to Germany, whereafter 
German and Austrian troops drove the Bolshevik forces out of the coun-
try. However, German hopes for grain deliveries did not materialize; the 
Rada could not stabilize the situation. Consequently, in April, the Germans 
replaced the Rada with the Cossack Hetman and former Tsarist General 
Pavlo Skoropadski. This was a massive interference in Ukrainian affairs. 
However, as Peter Lieb pointed out, “archival evidence does not support the 
claim that … [Germany] sought long-term annexation or the creation of a 
new ‘super’ empire under direct rule”; here Fischer and his supporters had 
over-interpreted the material (Lieb 2012: 630, 641n11).
As Bethmann Hollweg had formulated in the Septemberprogramm of 1914, 
Russia’s domination over the non-Russian vassal people ought to be bro-
ken. Brest-Litovsk seemed to assure this. The big German advances in 
1918 had been possible only because Russia had disintegrated, the “vassal 
people” themselves wanting to go. In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, the 
Bolsheviks could reverse this in 1919 and 1922 respectively, by military 
force. However, from Poland to Finland in the interwar period, the borders 
were very similar to the Brest-Litovsk line. Stalin could wipe it out, leaving 
only Finland in conditional – and Poland in formal – independence. But, 
in 1990, the Brest-Litovsk line appeared again in the Baltic countries and 
Poland. At the time of writing (2018), the turn of Georgia, Moldava, and 
Ukraine towards EU association in 2014 seems to have re-established the 
line in its full length. It looks as if it would be quite wrong to see the Brest-
Litovsk line mainly as a product of German imperialism.
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The collapse of the Central Powers
Russia’s collapse made it possible for the German High Command to move 
44 divisions from the Eastern to the Western Front between 1 November 
1917 and 21 March 1918 (Strachan 2014: 283). For the first time since 1914, 
the German army became superior on the western theater – for some weeks. 
On 21 March 1918, the German army struck at the British positions astride 
the Somme, after a bombardment of only five hours. For the first time, the 
Western Front was properly broken, the War turned mobile again, and the 
German troops approached the important railway junction of Amiens. For 
some time, a kind of panic spread through the British lines of command. 
But the German army did not have sufficient transport to bring up supplies 
and artillery fast enough, and it lacked the cavalry to exploit advances. On 5 
April, the offensive ended. After gains of some 60 kilometers.
The German High Command ordered four more offensives, which basic-
ally repeated the pattern: achieving a breakthrough, then some advances, 
and again a standstill. By July 1918, German military power had reached 
the maximum of its geographical extension, stretching from positions near 
Paris to Rostov in Russia. But the offensives in the west had cost some 
800,000 German casualties. And German morale had suffered a crushing 
blow: the victorious end of the War, seemingly so near in spring, had reced-
ed again into a distant future. In the meantime, fresh American troops had 
arrived in big numbers at the Western Front, 25 divisions by July (Strachan 
2014: 283-292, 303).
By 18 July 1918, the initiative on the Western Front passed to the Allies 
who, in a series of limited offensives, drove the German army back. At the 
same time, Germany’s allies collapsed. Bulgaria was the first one. A mixed 
Allied army, also containing Greek troops, broke through the Bulgarian po-
sitions at the Salonika Front on 18 September. Already on 29 September, one 
third of the Bulgarian troops were prisoners. This was the day that Bulgaria 
signed an armistice. The Allies now had free passage to the Danube, and the 
railway connection between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was broken 
(Herzfeld 1968: 342).
In Palestine and Mesopotamia, British forces had taken Bagdad on 11 March 
1917 and Jerusalem on 9 December. Thereafter, the British had to withdraw 
many troops to the Western Front, but in September 1918 they could resume 
the offensive, supported by an Arab insurrection army. By an effective com-
bination of tanks and cavalry operating in the Ottoman rear and cutting 
86
the Hejaz railroad, the British troops paralyzed the Ottoman forces. By 31 
October 1918, they entered Damascus, having taken 75,000 prisoners. In 
Mesopotamia, British troops could enter Mosul with its rich oil fields after 
an arrangement with the remnants of the Ottoman 6th army. On 30 October, 
the Ottoman government also signed an armistice (Herzfeld 1968: 340-3). 
By this time, Austria-Hungary was also in a state of advanced decompo-
sition. On 16 October 1918, Emperor Charles offered a new federal con-
stitution for the Austrian part; in Hungary the ruling nobility still refused 
any such reform. It was too late anyhow. Four days later, US President 
Wilson, who had already committed himself to the creation of an indepen-
dent Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, declared he would not negotiate peace 
with Austria-Hungary as a whole. The Italian army began an offensive at 
the Piave Front on 23 October, and achieved a breakthrough at Vittorio 
Veneto five days later. The Austro-Hungarian troops went home. Revolution 
grasped Budapest and Vienna on 31 October. Austria signed an armistice on 
3 November; Hungary did so on the 13th (Strachan 2014: 318).
In the German High Command, Colonel General Erich Ludendorff, the 
“strongman” since August 1916, declared himself to still be optimistic on 
24 September. But two days later, he demanded briskly that the government 
should seek an armistice. Instantly (Mai 1987: 150). On 3 October, a new 
government was formed under Prince Max of Baden, a known advocate 
of a compromise peace. This government had a broad base, and included 
Social Democrats for the first time. The next day, Berlin sent a proposal for 
armistice to US President Wilson. An exchange of diplomatic notes fol-
lowed, where Wilson repeatedly raised the demands. By 23 October, it was 
clear that he demanded military submission. The military High Command 
turned 180 degrees and claimed a continuation of the War – without show-
ing any solution for how this could successfully be done. In order to sta-
bilize an increasingly fragile internal situation, but also to accommodate 
Wilson, the constitution was changed on 28 October. Germany became a 
parliamentarian monarchy; the chancellor became dependent on a parlia-
mentary majority. Most parties had demanded this for decades.
 At the end of October, the High Sea Command ordered preparations for 
an operation towards the Channel. But, on 29 October, the sailors began a 
mutiny. Within a few days, the mutiny had spread to the cities of Northern 
Germany. The army leadership informed Emperor William II that he could 
not count on loyal troops to crush the rebellion; the soldiers just wanted 
peace. On 9 November 1918, Wilhelm went into exile in the Netherlands. 
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The same day, Prince Max of Baden transferred the chancellorship to the 
Social Democrat leader Friedrich Ebert who formed a left-parties-only gov-
ernment. In addition, all over Germany, Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte (i.e. so-
viets) were formed. For a short while, Germany seemed to slide in a Russian 
direction
On 5 November, US Secretary Robert Lansing communicated that Germany 
could expect a peace based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. This implied the 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine and some territory in the east because an inde-
pendent Poland ought to have direct access to the sea. Overall, however, 
the Fourteen Points gave the impression of a reasonable and equilibrated 
solution. Germany accepted and signed the armistice on 11 November. The 
terms made her defenseless, while the blockade continued (Erdmann 1980: 
231-3).
In December 1918, the Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte accepted the Social 
Democratic proposal of election to a National Assembly. It took place in 
January 1919. The Social Democrats, the Catholic Zentrum, and the left-wing 
liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei, i.e. parties which had demanded a 
parliamentary constitution with equal franchise for decades, gained more 
than three quarters of the votes (Boldt 1980: 359). The Assembly convened 
in Weimar and finalized a new republican constitution in August 1919. 
After all, Germany was different from Russia. 
A war not really ending
On 11 November 1918, World War 1 ended in the west. The weapons be-
came silent and, after some months, a formal peace treaty was concluded. 
The War ended in the Balkans too. The break-up of Austria-Hungary cre-
ated many tensions, and Hungary even had to go through the horrors of a 
Communist revolution and a White counterrevolution. But also here formal 
peace treaties were concluded which produced a basically stable situation.
But the situation was quite different in Russia. In November 1918, the 
civil war was still raging. And when Germany signed the armistice, the 
Bolsheviks cancelled the Brest-Litovsk peace, invaded Ukraine and intend-
ed the same with the Baltic states. The Russian civil war lasted until 1921/2. 
But because World War 1 had turned Russia into a failed stated, it rendered 
the Bolshevik dictatorship – which had the openly declared intention to 
spread armed revolution – possible. In 1919, they formed the Communist 
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International in order to create an instrument for this purpose. This was a 
declaration of war against everyone else. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks also 
regarded large sections of their own population as enemies. They declared 
all somewhat richer farmers to be potentially counterrevolutionary kulaks, 
a group which they never defined exactly. But the Bolshevics also regarded 
smaller peasants with a very suspicious eye. As Lenin put it, “day by day, 
hour by hour small scale production is engendering capitalism” (Conquest 
1986: 22). Stalin “solved” this problem by deporting the kulaks and forc-
ing the other peasants into state-controlled collective farms. This fatally 
disorganized agricultural production which, in combination with merciless 
forced procurements, caused millions of deaths, possibly as many as four-
teen million (Conquest 1986: 305). In short, this was war against huge sec-
tions of their own population. 
Also in the Near East, World War 1 did not really end for many years to come. 
The Ottoman Empire had to sign the humiliating peace of Sèvres (June 1920) 
and give up all non-Turkish areas; Italy acquired the Dodecanese, Greece, 
the whole of Thrakia and all islands in the Aegean Sea. Greece could also 
formally occupy Izmir for five years. Turkish sovereignty was restricted in 
many ways. However, a national movement appeared in Anatolia under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal, later called “Atatürk”: father of the Turks. 
The Greek government tried to expand its hold on territories in Little Asia, 
occupied Bursa, and in 1922 even tried to occupy Ankara. Devastatingly 
beaten at the river Sakarya (August-September 1922), the Greek army fled 
to Izmir, from which the British navy evacuated the troops (and many of the 
Greek-speaking inhabitants of the area) to Greece. In July 1923, the Peace 
Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkey’s full sovereignty and returned some 
territory, including Izmir. A huge population transfer was part of the agree-
ment; Turks in Greece had to move to Turkey, Greeks in Turkey to Greece. 
Three thousand years of Greek history in Asia Minor ended.
In Syria in November 1918, the Arab insurgents under Prince Faysal had 
installed an Arab government in Damascus. They claimed full independ-
ence for a Greater Syria, including Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Hijaz 
(Rogan 2009: 157). Regarding the void after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, they would have presumably prevailed, if it was not for foreign 
intervention. And Britain had promised a united Arab kingdom for Arab 
support against the Ottomans. But back in 1915 France, Great Britain and 
Russia had divided the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. By 1918, 
Russia was out of the picture. Consequently, in 1920, France and Britain 
implemented their deal in the form of a mandate by the League of Nations. 
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And back in 1917, British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour had declared that 
His Majesty’s Government would support a “national home for the Jewish 
people” in Palestine, without, however, prejudicing “civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Rogan 2009: 154). 
He left open how this could possibly be done. Taken together, these schemes 
and contradictory promises appeared as if designed to produce long-lasting 
instability and conflicts.
90
Reference list
Boldt, Hans (1990) Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Band 2. Von 1806 bis 
zur Gegenwart. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. 
Chaliand, Gerard and Yves Ternon (1983) The Armenians: From Genocide 
to Resistance. London: Zed Press.
Clark, Christopher (2013) The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 
1914. London: Penguin Books.
Conquest, Robert (1986) The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization 
and the Terror Famine. Oxford University Press.
Erdmann, Karl Dietrich (1980) Der Erste Weltkrieg, Gebhardt Handbuch 
der deutschen Geschichte, Band 18. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag. 
Fischer, Fritz, (1977 [1961/7]) Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die 
Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18. Kronberg: 
Athenäum Verlag.
Hardach, Gerd (1987) The Pelican History of the World Economy in the 
Twentieth Century. The First World War 1914-1918. Harmondsworth: 
Pelican Books.
Herzfeld, Hans (1968) Der Erste Weltkrieg. München: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag.
Hildermeier, Manfred (1989) Die Russische Revolution 1905-1921. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Kévorkian, Raymond (2011) The Armenian Genocide. A Complete History. 
London and New York: I. B. Tauris.
Koenen, Gerd (2005) Der Russland-Komplex. Die Deutschen und der 
Osten 1900-1945. München: C.H. Beck.
Lieb, Peter (2012) “Suppressing Insurgencies in Comparison: the Germans 
in the Ukraine, 1918, and the British in Mesopotamia, 1920”, Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, 23 (4-5): 627-647.
Loth, Wilfried (2014), “Dschihad made in Germany”? Einleitung“, in 
Loth, Wilfried und Marc Hanisch (Hrsg.), Erster Weltkrieg und 
Dschihad. Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Orients. 
München: Oldenbourg.
Mai, Gunther (1987) Das Ende des Kaiserreiches. Politik und 
Kriegsführung im Ersten Weltkrieg. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag.
McMeekin, Sean (2013) July 1914. Countdown to War. London: Faber & 
Faber.
91
Neitzel, Sönke (2014) „Der historische Ort des Ersten Weltkrieges 
in der Gewaltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts“, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 64 (16-17): 17-23.
Nipperday, Thomas (1993) Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918. Erster Band. 
Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist, third edition, München: Beck.
Opfer-Klinger, Björn (2014), „Der Krieg an der Peripherie – Mittelasien 
und Nordafrika“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 64 (16-17): 24-31.
Rauch, Georg von (1990) Geschichte der baltischen Staaten, 3. Auflage. 
München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
Rogan, Eugene (2009) The Arabs. A History. London: Allan Lane.
Smith, S.A. (2006) “The Revolutions of 1917-1918”, in Suny, Ronald 
Grigot (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III, The 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press.
Strachan, Hew (2014) The First World War. London –New York Sidney 
Toronto New Delhi: Simon & Schuster.

93
Chapter 5
A war to end all wars?   The peace conference 1919-1920
Søren Dosenrode
Introduction
On 11 November 1918, an armistice entered into force and the Great War, 
“[a] war to end all wars” (Wells 1914)1, “[the] greatest seminal catastro-
phe of this century” (Kennan 1979: 3), “[the] European civil war” (Keynes 
1919: 3) was over. It was now time to design the peace, but which kind 
would it be?
This chapter starts out analyzing the war aims of the main belliger-
ent powers2, before it touches briefly on some of the more important 
peace initia tives taken through throughout the War, and then focus-
es on the peace negotiations and some of their impacts.
War aims
To understand the war aims of the fighting parties is a precondition for un-
derstanding the peace treaties signed between 1919 and 1920, ending World 
War 1. 
Soon after war broke out in summer 1914, German Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg presented his Septemberprogramm, stating Germany’s 
war aims (quoted in Fischer 1967: 103i):
“The general aim of the war is security for the German Reich in 
west and east for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must 
be so weakened as to mak e her revival as a great power impossi-
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ble for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from 
Germany’s eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Rus-
sian vassal peoples broken”.
The Septemberprogramm was written during the German army’s initial 
victorious sweep through neutral Belgium and Northern France. Although 
it had a very political aim – to secure Germany against France and Russia 
– it was also the plan to ensure German (economic) hegemony over Central 
Europe (Mitteleuropa), quoted in Fischer (1967: 104):
“4. We must create a central European economic association through 
common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, 
Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and 
Norway. This association will not have any common constitution-
al supreme authority and all its members will be normally equal, 
but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise 
Germany’s economic dominance over Mitteleuropa.”
These war aims remained in until the end of 1916, when Bethmann Hollweg 
(but not the military leaders), had come to the conclusion that Germany 
could not win the war in the West.4 
The British, French, and Russian leaderships – and later also the American 
one – also expected to win the War, and had war aims. Starting out, France 
and Russia gave each other a free hand after the expected victory in the West 
and in the East respectively, while Britain was kept a bit outside. France’s 
overall aim was security, and she obviously wanted the Alsace-Lorraine 
back. Not only had they lost in the humiliating peace after the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-71), they were also important industrial centers with 
natural resources, important for France’s future economic revival. Added 
to this, France wanted to annex the Saarland and perhaps Luxemburg, and 
occupy or dominate the Rhineland. This should have been a part of a French 
dominated customs union aiming at keeping Germany “down” (Soutou 
2017; Kennedy 2014). Russia was more modest, “only” wanting the Prussian 
and part of Poland. As the United Kingdom had entered the War due to the 
violation of Belgium’s neutrality, it was not a surprise that a restauration of 
Belgium was the top-priority (Kennedy 2014). However, especially after 
Lloyd George took over as prime minister after Asquith in 1916, British 
demands also hardened (Soutou 2017: 7):
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“From a fundamental geopolitical perspective, Britain felt that it 
would be impossible to stop the Reich from uniting the European 
“heartland”, Mitteleuropa, including Austria, Poland and Romania. 
The British felt that it was essential, however, to control the sea front 
and keep Germany from gaining ocean access – and thus to chase it 
out of Belgium, Africa and the Middle East.”
These war aims were fulfilled with the peace treaty, when it came about. 
Both in Africa and in the Middle East, the United Kingdom was able to 
expand (cf. Chapter 13 for a full discussion).
The United States was not a part of the negotiations and the secret treaties 
made between Britain, France, and Russia in the early years of the War.5 
On 8 January 1918 (around nine months after the US had entered the War), 
President Woodrow Wilson announced his plan for peace and a new world 
order, his Fourteen Points, which had a great effect on both the Entente 
Powers and the Central Powers (Wilson 2). 
The first five of the Fourteen Points, as well as the last one, were of a dip-
lomatic nature. The rest – Points 6 through 13 – handled territorial matters. 
The “diplomatic points” are all liberal in nature and very much inspired by 
Immanuel Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch“. Wilson 
wanted to set the frame for a world of peace. The Fourteen Points included 
demands for a cessation to secret negotiations and agreements in diplomacy, 
freedom for navigation upon the sea, a removal of economic barriers to pro-
mote free trade, disarmament, and an impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims where the interests of the populations living in the colonies should 
have the same weight as that of the colonial powers. The last point was 
a suggestion for the creation of the League of Nations as an organization 
to secure peace, working to advance collective security and disarmament. 
When looking at the territorial provisions, this runs like a Leitmotif through 
it, that as a rule, territorial questions should be solved according to nation-
ality. Wilson wanted to create peace, justice, and democracy in the inter-
national realm, just as they were present domestically, in the USA. He also 
stated that he wanted a just and fair peace with Germany (Wilson 2):
“We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in 
this program [the Fourteen Points] that impairs it. We grudge her no 
achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such 
as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not 
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wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or 
power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile 
arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us 
and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of jus-
tice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of 
equality among the peoples of the world, – the new world in which 
we now live, – instead of a place of mastery.”
However, these thoughts were not shared by the other Entente Powers, es-
pecially not by France. In their essence, the war aims of all the participating 
great powers – with those of the US as a possible exception – was to win the 
War and to prevent the adversary from ever being able to get into a position 
to wage war again. Of course, such aims did not promote a negotiated peace 
“without winners” as long as the fighting parties still believed victory was 
possible.
Soutou (2017) rightly remarks that the war aims respectively the conditions 
for peace of Britain, France and the USA were hardened after the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Soviet Russia in March 1918. Germany 
had expected the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to be a bargaining chip in the 
coming negotiations with Britain, France, and the USA, and thus made the 
conditions harsh. This harshness boomeranged, convincing Britain, France, 
and especially the USA of Germany’s imperialistic and raw nature, thus in 
them calling for harder peace terms. 
Peace plans
All the belligerent parties thought they would win the War partly or as a 
whole. Still, there were a large number of peace proposals during the War, 
resulting in hesitant exchanges which mostly came from the Central Powers, 
the USA, and civilians outside the government, and not that many from 
Britain, France, or Russia.
Germany began her opening towards France and Russia already at the end 
of 1914. These were promoted by Germany’s feelings about her military 
strength, on the one hand, and on the other hand the deadlock on especial-
ly the Western Front. Added to this was the German chancellor’s feeling 
that time was not on Germany’s side (Kennedy 2014). Later on, in 1918, 
other German proposals were launched. Fischer comments (1967) that these 
proposals served two aims: to end the War in Germany’s favor, or if they 
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failed, to be able to blame the Entente Powers for the continuing war. All the 
attempts were futile. The same was the case when Woodrow Wilson tried 
to intervene. In 1916, Wilson considered a post-war international security 
organization as a means to get peace negotiations started before conflicts 
escalated (Kennedy 2014); before 1917, Wilson tried to make the fighting 
states state their peace terms; and, in January 1917, Wilson addressed the 
US Senate and demanded “a peace without victory” (Wilson 1).
Socialist groupings, believing in the idea of international solidarity amongst 
labor parties, made several attempts to launch peace processes. An early one 
was the meeting of 37 people from 12 states who assembled in Zimmerwald, 
Switzerland in September 1915 (Henke-Bockschatz 2014). In the resulting 
manifesto, they demanded a peace without annexations, without repara-
tions, and founded on the right to self-determination of the peoples. 
Kennedy (2014) analyzes and discusses an extensive range of peace initiatives 
from the period 1914-1918, and he concludes that the peace proposals failed 
due to two basic reasons: a) the costs of “defeat”, understood as “not victory” 
were too high. The powers involved in the War all felt that their survival as 
great powers and/or their governmental systems were at stake should they 
not be victorious. And, b) the expectation of victory. Great Britain, Germany, 
France, and the US, and – to a much lesser degree, Austria-Hungary – felt 
they that they had a fair chance of winning the War, a conviction which was 
maintained until early 1918 (Kennedy 2014; Henke-Bockschatz 2014). To 
this, one should add that the huge losses of life, the sacrifices, would make a 
negotiated peace hard to legitimize towards the populations. On such a basis, 
a negotiated peace, a “peace without victory” becomes close to impossible. 
Only two peace treaties were concluded before the end of the War; the 
Central Powers’ peace with Soviet Russia (cf. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918) 
and the one with Romania (cf. Treaty of Bucharest, 1918), and these treaties 
were dictated, not negotiated.6
Armistice
By the end of September, the alliance of the Central Powers had begun to 
crumble7 when Bulgaria asked for an armistice on 29 September, followed 
by the Ottoman Empire on 30 October and Austria-Hungary on 3 November. 
A truce was signed with Germany, to be effective from 11 November 1918 
at 11.00 A.M.
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Of the Central Powers, Germany was militarily and economically the 
strongest, and its enemies occupied no part of its territory. Already in July 
1917, the German Parliament had passed a peace resolution, calling for 
a peace of understanding and lasting reconciliation amongst the peoples 
(Henke-Bockschatz 2014). As the government was not tied into following 
the Parliament, this did not have external consequences, but it did indicate 
that the people were not wholeheartedly in favor of the War. In Germany, 
strikes and riots broke out, and after yet another unsuccessful offensive in 
July, and the successful Allied offensive in August 1918 (the “black day” 
of 8 August), the German High Command asked the government to sue for 
peace (Groener 1957). By October, a new, more democratic government had 
been formed, supported by the Parliament, and it asked for peace, based 
on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points plan (Henke-Bockschatz 2014). The 
domestic situa tion in Germany deteriorated further and led to a revolution 
in November 1918, resulting in the end of the Empire and the birth of the 
Republic8. 
The conditions for an armistice imposed on Germany and her allies 
were made in such a way as to make a renewed fight impossible (Henke-
Bockschatz 2014): occupied territories were to be left immediately (includ-
ing Alsace-Lorraine); the left bank of the Rhine was to be vacated (and to 
be occupied by the Entente Powers); the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and 
Bucharest were to be annulled; and large numbers of U-boats, airplanes, 
guns, ammunition, etc. were to be handed over. According to MacMillan, 
the Allies made at least one mistake: they did not hold a victory parade, e.g. 
in Berlin: a parade which would have made it obvious to the German pop-
ulation that they had lost the War, and thus prevented the widespread myth 
that the army had not been defeated militarily (2001).
In his memoirs, General Groener, the German quartermaster general (Chief 
of the general staff, second-in-command of the German army) writes about 
the High Command of the German Army’s analysis of the Entente Powers 
conditions for armistice (1957: 466, my translation)9: 
“In plain words, we wrote the government that the Army’s High 
Command, after what had happened at home which had taken away 
the support of the army, we did not have the possibility of declining 
the conditions for an armistice, nor the power to get better conditions 
through the use of arms. The government bore the consequence and 
accepted the conditions”.
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The armistice ended four years of bloodshed among the great powers, but 
many smaller wars would continue or soon break out. 
Dictating peace
The objectives of the peace conference can be summarized in the three words 
(MacMillan 2001: 162): “Punishment, payment, prevention”.10 As mentioned 
before, one result of the Franco-Prussian War was that France had to cede 
Alsace and Lorraine to the new German Empire. The prominent French 
statesman Léon Gambetta pleaded for the reclamation of the lost territories 
from the very day they were lost until his death in 1882, and said, “Always 
think about it, never talk about it”, which turned a national mantra. Now it 
was payback time! As mentioned above, Germany had become a democratic 
republic just before the armistice, but Taylor (1965) notes that the Entente 
Powers did not really believe in Germany having purged her guilt by getting 
rid of the emperor and having introduced a very democratic constitution. 
Besides, one should not forget the hatred of the populations of the Entente 
Powers towards the Germans, and one wanted Germany to pay the costs of 
the War.11. The consequence was (Taylor 1965: 68) that “the Germans were 
treated harshly. The settlement was imposed on them virtually without nego-
tiation, certainly without verbal negotiation – a unique case in modern times”. 
However, the lack of negotiations was not a sign of strength, but rather one of 
weakness. According to Sharp (2010), the position of the Entente Powers was 
fragile, and a direct confrontation could have undermined it. Harold James 
commented nearly 40 years after Taylor that “Versailles and the Paris treaties 
have come to represent (in the popular mind) the most striking example of a 
pointless vindictive peace settlement” (2003: 73), but he added that, because 
of the costs and suffering of the War, “any settlement would be a disillusion”. 
It should be added that this was not the intention Woodrow Wilson had ar-
rived with, but “peace without winners” did not go down very well with his 
colleagues, so he used many of his skills to try to establish a new world order 
with the League of Nations as its focal point (MacMillan 2001). 
How did the peace settlement come about? The Supreme War Council met 
in Paris on 12 January 1919. It consisted of the heads of government12 and 
the foreign ministers of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. They decided to include their Japanese counterparts, and then lead 
the conference. They formed the Council of Ten (Sondhaus 2011; Watson 
2008). Beside this council, there were to be plenary sessions where all the 
victorious states were represented according to their size and contribution 
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to the war effort. The first session was on 18 January. It was opened by 
French President Poincaré, who reminded the participants that they were 
assembled to redo the evil done by Germany in 1871 and to prevent it from 
happening again (Sondhaus 2011). 
The Paris peace conference lasted from 18 January 1919 until 21 January 
1920, but the most important part of it terminated with the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles, that is the peace treaty with Germany on 18 January 
191913. After that, both Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, leaving 
Clemenceau in charge, together with their deputies.
According to Sondhaus (2011), it took less than a month for the Council 
of Ten to agree on the main features on the treaty with Germany, and 
MacMillan (2001) emphasizes that – apart from the question of reparations 
– a basic agreement was reached fairly soon. After that, the concrete for-
mulations were left to sub-committees, while the Council concentrated on 
Wilson’s proposal of a League of Nations. Later on, the Japanese members 
of the Council of Ten withdrew when matters not related to Japan were 
discussed, and the Council of Ten did not convene after 25 March. From 
then on, only Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Orlando met, as the 
Council of Four. This council was further reduced when the Italian Prime 
Minister Orlando left in protest, not having being able to secure even larger 
territorial expansions for Italy (James 200314). 
John Maynard Keynes, as quoted at length in Chapter 10, clearly saw the 
French attitude as a dictate from a position of strength, to prevent a new 
war (1919: 15). Keynes described the renowned characteristics of the French 
Prime Minister and Minister of War George Clemenceau’s approach to ne-
gating with Germany (1919: 16):
“His principles for the peace can be expressed simply. In the first 
place, he was a foremost believer in the view of German psychology 
that the Germans understands and can understand nothing but in-
timidation, that he is without generosity or remorse in negotiations, 
that there is no advantage he will not take of you, and no extent to 
which he will not demean himself, that he is without honor, pride, or 
mercy. Therefore you must never negotiate with a German or concil-
iate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will he respect 
you, or will you prevent him from cheating you.”15
On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom were more 
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inclined to secure a less harsh peace to avoid the pretext for revenge 
and a new war. However, the French line prevailed in the negotiations16 
(MacMillan 2001).
The Versailles Treaty between the victorious powers and Germany was the 
blueprint for the treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ottoman 
Empire.17 It included 440 articles, divided into 15 parts, of which only the 
most important will be looked into here18:
Part I created the Covenant of the League of Nations, a novelty in interna-
tional affairs suggested by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points. Part II 
stipulated Germany’s new boundaries, the territories Germany had to cede 
(Belgium got Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, 
several eastern districts were given to the resurrected Poland, Memel came 
to Lithuania, and parts of North Schleswig came back to Denmark after 
a referendum in Schleswig). Part III of the treaty stipulated the return of 
Belgium and Luxemburg as sovereign states, the return of the occupied 
parts of northern France, a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, and the 
separation of the Saarland from Germany for 15 years. Part IV stripped 
Germany of all its colonies, which were put under “mandate” of the League 
of Nations, but administrated by old colonial powers. In other words, a co-
lonial aggrandizement. The Part V concerned the limitations of Germany’s 
armed forces, which were reduced dramatically (it contained very detailed 
rulings including the prohibition of possessing certain kinds of weapons, as 
well as the demand for the dissolution of the general staff which was seen 
as the epitome of German militarism). Part VIII began with Article 231, in 
which Germany and her allies had to accept responsibility for the losses 
and damages of the Allies “as a consequence of the war imposed upon them 
by the aggression of Germany and her allies” (the so called “War Guilt 
Clause”19). It established Germany’s liability for reparations, and Part IX 
imposed other financial obligations upon Germany (without specifying the 
exact terms).
When the treaty was presented to the German delegation, the German 
foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorf-Rantzau, protested strong-
ly, claiming that the terms would mean the death by hunger of millions 
of Germans, but without success. The German government also protest-
ed strongly, especially against the “War Guilt Clause”. In a cabinet meet-
ing, Brockdorf-Rantzau suggested rejecting the terms. In the end, both 
the Chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann, and Brockdorff-Rantzau resigned. 
Gustav Bauer and Herman Müller succeeded them, and decided to accept 
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the terms to avoid a further radicalization in Germany (cf. Sondhaus 2011; 
Groener 1957).
When the peace terms became known, General Groener ordered the German 
general commands to investigate the mood of the German population con-
cerning a resumption of the war. The answers were negative (apart from 
one), “worse than expected” Groener noted (1957: 497). After further analy-
sis of the situation, his conclusion was that Germany had to accept the peace 
terms (Groener 1957). General field marshal von Hindenburg, commander 
of the German army, came to the same conclusion, but considered a defeat 
with honor as an alternative; that is, a last battle (Groener 1957). In the end, 
the army supported the government and there was no military revolt.
President Wilson adhered to the principle of the people’s right to self 
determination but, to save the ideal of a new world order and espe-
cially the League of Nations, he made a large number of compro-
mises, inter alia self-determination was not applied to the colonies, 
and it had to be relaxed when it contrasted with the desire to reduce 
                    and Hungary to small powers, as well as in relation to the Polish 
Corridor where the population was primarily German.20 In Central Europe, 
the Austria-Hungarian Empire was split into three new states: Austria, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and it had had to cede land to Italy, Romania, 
Poland, and Serbia (which was later to become Yugoslavia). Bulgaria had to 
cede territory to Greece, Serbia, and Romania. Concretely, this resulted in 
a situation where there were, for example, large Hungarian and Bulgarian 
minorities in neighboring states21, and where there was an immediate and 
lasting desire for changing the borders.22 
Russia, although not a Central Power, also lost territory. Concretely, Finland, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland came into being, and Romania was 
extended by Bessarabia and Bukovina (and Transylvania from Hungary). 
For a short period, Ukraine and Georgia were also independent before the 
Soviet Union occupied them.
The Soviet Union did not participate at the peace conference, and the other 
states watched with anxiety what happened there. So, if one looks at a map, 
a “cordon sanitaire” had been created; separating Central and Western 
Europe from the “infected” Soviet Union by a string of states: Finland, the 
Baltic States, and Poland, and strengthening Romania and Greece (Gilchrist 
1995, Howard 2002). 
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The Ottoman Empire was split up, too. The first peace treaty (the Treaty 
of Sèvres, 1920) was signed by the Ottoman Empire. It included an inde-
pendent state of Armenia, autonomy for the Kurds, the renunciation of all 
non Turkish territory, and the Empire’s cession to the Allied administra-
tion. Cession of land to Greece, including Smyrna (today Izmir), a British 
Mandate for Palestine and Iraq, and the French Mandate for Syria and 
Lebanon.23 The terms and the presence of Greek troops in Anatolia fueled 
nationalist feelings and helped General Mustapha Kemal Ataturk to gain 
power, dispose of the Sultan and his government, and wage a war against 
the Allied forces situated in parts of Turkey (1919-1923). A new peace treaty 
was negotiated in Lausanne, and signed in 1923.24 The Treaty of Lausanne 
left Turkey in control of Anatolia and the Straits, as well as a small piece of 
territory in Europe (Howard 2002). In connection with the Lausanne treaty, 
the Lausanne Peace Treaty VI or the Convention Concerning the Exchange 
of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed (Lausanne Convention). 
The background was the Ottoman Empire’s – and later the Turkish gov-
ernment’s – mass-prosecutions of Greek Orthodox Turks during the War 
and in its aftermath, (paralleled with the genocides against Armenian and 
Syrian Christians, cf. Chapter 4 in this book). Approximately 1.5 million 
Greek Orthodox Turks were expelled from Turkey, and approximately half 
a million Greek Muslims from Greece. Thus, the new Turkish Republic 
was recognized internationally, but its conduct strained its relationship with 
Greece.25
It is obvious that the peace agreement was not an ideal fundament for a 
new peace in Europe.26 It was harsh to the Central Powers, but it is worth 
remembering that it was less brutal than the peace Germany and the other 
Central Powers imposed on Soviet Russia in the Brest-Litovsk peace agree-
ment (Brest-Litovsk), and on Romania (Bucharest 1918). When Germany 
tried to negotiate her terms, Clemenceau urged Lloyd George and Wilson 
not to give in, and Wilson, returning from a trip to Belgium where he had 
seen the destruction caused by the German attack and later occupation, 
agreed (Sondhaus 2011). Still, it is worth remembering that Germany re-
mained a power in Europe. Economically, the peace treaty did not endanger 
Germany’s potential as the second largest economy (cf. Henke-Bockschatz 
2014). Sharp has a good point when concluding that (2010: 214), “under 
these circumstances, […] the peacemakers did well to create any settlement 
at all”. And Margaret MacMillan is very much in the same line when stating 
(2001: 493), “if they could have done better, they certainly could have done 
much worse”.
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Reparations…
The negotiations on reparations to be paid by Germany and her allies turned 
out to be one of the most difficult topics during the peace conference. 
Difficult for the victorious powers (MacMillan 2001): France, the United 
Kingdom, and the US had very different interests. The United States did 
not want anything for itself, but insisted that the loans given to France and 
the United Kingdom should be paid back. France and the United Kingdom 
needed reparations to pay back their debt to the US, as well as to pay for 
rebuilding their respective countries. Both countries had expenses for 
pensions to be paid to war-invalids and widows etc., and France had huge 
areas to rebuild after four years of fighting and occupation (cf. James 2003). 
These desires were all launched on the platform of the uncertain question 
of how much Germany could pay without her economy collapsing. In the 
end, France, the United Kingdom, and the US gave up agreeing on a figure 
for the size of the reparations to be paid (MacMillan 2001). Thus, the peace 
treaties were not specific on the reparations to be paid, but Article 231 (the 
War Guilt Clause) laid down the legal basis for reparations, as it established 
Germany and her allies’ responsibility for “for causing all the loss and dam-
age to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals 
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the 
aggression of Germany and her allies” 27. 
Following this, Article 233, inter alia, stated that: 
“The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to 
be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied 
Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission and consti-
tuted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in 
Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto”.28 
By 1920, France and the United Kingdom had agreed upon on how to share 
the payments (52% and 28% respectively), and by 1921 they had agreed on 
the sum of the reparation payments: 132 billion gold marks (MacMillan 
2001). 
According to Sharp (2014), much of this was “’phoney money’ – window dress-
ing to mollify Allied public opinion. Of the three series of bonds Germany 
was to issue, over £4 billion were C bonds, which no one believed would be 
paid. Its real debt, under the A and B bonds, was therefore about £2.5 billion, 
well within British and American estimates of its capacity to pay”.
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Peace and security at last?
The peace treaties did not bring the security which was longed for, and 
France was worried about her security, especially after the US and the United 
Kingdom declined to guarantee it as Clemenceau had requested. Thus, she 
insisted on a full reparation payment and of Germany living up to every 
word of the treaty. As Germany could not pay in 1923, France and Belgium 
occupied the Ruhr area in Germany, resulting in civilian unrest there. The 
US and the United Kingdom put pressure on France, and a compromise 
regarding the payments was found. As new statesmen came into power in 
Britain, France, and Germany, tensions relaxed and, in 1925, the Locarno 
Pact was signed, guaranteeing France and Belgium’s borders to Germany, 
and also the borders in the East (Locarno Pact). The treaty was signed by 
Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Germany was 
admitted into the League of Nations in 1926, and the Locarno Treaty was 
followed up by the Kellogg–Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris) of 1928, where 
the signatory power29 renounced the use of war as an instrument for solving 
conflicts (Kellogg–Briand Pact).
On paper, these initiatives and treaties gave France the security she strived 
for. Unfortunately, the principle of pacta sunt servanda works best amongst 
democratic states, and Europe was already on its way into an era where 
democracy was not en vogue (see below), and the peace treaty was de facto 
annulled as the 1930s progressed. 
Consequences
The peace treaty was hard on the losing Central Powers, as described and 
had many consequences30. Nevertheless, it did end the general war, the Great 
War, at least for a while. However, a large number of bigger and smaller 
conflicts broke out, partly because of the peace treaties, e.g. the wars be-
tween Soviet Russia and Poland and between Greece and Turkey31. Gatrell 
(2010: 558) phrases it aptly: 
“Four uninterrupted years of mass bloodshed in the chief the aters 
of war did not make the postwar world a more peaceful place. 
Revolutions, civil wars, wars of independence, ethnic conflicts, 
and anticolonial uprisings occurred around the globe. Churchill  
observed that ‘the war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the 
pygmies have begun’”.
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The War brought down three imperial families, which had shaped European 
history (the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov dynasties). The 
German and Russian empires had to cede territory, but survived.32 Not so 
the Austrian-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires, which were cut into 
pieces. As a result, new states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East.33
The new states should, according to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, have been 
created in accordance with the nationalities involved, the “self determina-
tion of the peoples”, to make new nation states. As mentioned previous-
ly, this idealistic approach clashed with “realistic” political considerations, 
leaving Europe with dozens of national minorities cut off from their per-
ceived home states.34 The breaking up of empires also hurt national pride, 
when land perceived as one state’s “historic territory” was ceded to another 
country, like in the case of today’s Burgenland in Austria which, seen with 
Hungarian eyes, was historically Hungarian, and so forth. 
Losing territory and ethnic kinsmen, having a bad economy (and having 
to pay reparations35), and being blamed for the bloodshed (the War Guilt 
Clause), stirred nationalistic feelings and sowed the seeds for a desire for 
revenge. In Germany, the legend of being “stabbed in the back” grew. 
According to that, the armed forces had not lost on the battlefield, but had 
been “stabbed in the back” by an alliance of Jews and socialists at home. 
Therefore, there is a line between the results of the Peace Conference in 
Paris and the rise of fascism in Italy36 of Nazism in Germany, etc. and the 
outbreak of World War 1. However, it is not “causal” such that World War 
2 was inevitable. World War 1 did not “create” Hitler and Mussolini, but it 
did create the frame (hurt national pride, revanchism, economic crisis, etc.) 
which they could use and abuse (cf. Chapter 13)37. The peace treaties did not 
create a lasting peace. 
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Endnotes
1 H.G. Wells coined the Phrase in an article published in The Daily 
News on August 14, 1914 titled ‘The War That Will End War. 
However, it is mostly associated with pres. Woodrow Wilson and his 
approach to peace after World War 1.
2 The Entente Powers were, inter alia, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The Central Powers included 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire.
3 Fritz Fischer’s thesis, that Germany had planned and wanted the War, 
has been widely discussed cf. Knudsen, Chapter 3 in this book, or 
Neilson (2014).
4 In his seminal but controversial book Germany’s Aims in the First 
World War, Fischer places the responsibility of the outbreak of World 
War 1 solely on Imperial Germany, based on, inter alia, the war aims 
mentioned above. See also Chapters 3 and 4.
5 It was exactly this kind of secret deal President Wilson wanted to pre-
vent, and it is worth noting that the United States of America did not 
join the alliance of Britain, France, and Russia but remained an “asso-
ciate”, giving Wilson the freedom to act without needing the consent 
of the other three countries, if he felt he needed to.
6 When the German High Command had decided that an armistice was 
needed, the next step was to appeal to Woodrow Wilson, based on his 
Fourteen Points and the “peace without winners” statement, rather 
than to e.g. Clemenceau who was expected to be less favorable towards 
Germany. That was the argument for introducing democratic reforms 
and to dispose of the chancellor in favor of Prince Max of Baden, a 
liberal. Max of Baden insisted on including the Social Democrats in 
the government – Philipp Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer (cf. Beckett 
2013: 544). 
7 See also Zank, Chapter 4 in this book.
8 In his memoires, General Groener, a conservative, gives a vivid and 
detailed account of the collapse of Imperial Germany as seen from the 
very top of the German military establishment.
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9 “In dürren Worte wurde darin der Reichsregierung mitgeteilt, dass 
die O. H. L., nachdem die Ereignisse in der Heimat dem Heer die 
Rückensicherung genommen habe, nicht mehr über die Möglichkeit 
verfüge, die Waffenstillstandsforderungen abzulehnen odder mit der 
Waffe eine Verbesserung der Lage zu erzwingen. Die Regierung zog 
die Folgerungen und nahm die Bedingungen an.”
10 Fink summarizes the aims of the three major, victorious powers aptly 
(2010: 543): “France, one of the war’s main battlefields, aimed at a per-
manently reducing German power and creating substitutes in Eastern 
Europe for its lost Russian ally; Britain, with its principal naval and co-
lonial goals already achieved, now sought to guard its economic inter-
ests, revive the European balance of power, and protect its shaken em-
pire. The United States, which had entered the fighting in the last year, 
had the most grandiose design of them all, to create a stable world of 
democratic governments, limited armament, and open markets”.
11 Reparations were an enduring theme during the conference. France 
and Belgium especially, both having suffered tremendously under 
German occupation, were hard on this issue. As MacMillan notes, 
Lloyd George was pleased that the final amount for reparation was not 
mentioned in the treaties; it was left to further negotiations (2001: 201) 
(see further below).
12 From France, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau; from Italy, Prime 
Minister Vittorio Orlando, from the United Kingdom, Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, and from the United States, President Woodrow 
Wilson. They were joined by the Former Prime Minister of Japan, 
Kinmochi Saionji.
13 January 18th marked the anniversary of the 1871 proclamation of the 
German Empire at Versailles – so the conference, oddly, opened on a 
Saturday in order to mark the defeat of the German Empire.
14 There was still the Council of Five, the foreign ministers plus the 
Japanese representative who actually drafted many of the territorial 
clauses and much of the Austrian treaty, though they passed the hot 
potatoes to the Four.
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 15 John Maynard Keynes participated in the British delegation, and  
resigned in protest at the treaties’ harshness. See Olesen, Chapter 10; 
Nicolson discusses Keynes’ frustrations (1964: 350).
16 Nicolson (a British junior diplomat who participated as member of the 
British delegation) refers to the text of the Versailles Treaty, describing 
it as punitive (1964: 359). He also describes how Lloyd George unsuc-
cessfully tried to soften it (1964: 358).
17 The treaties were named after the locations where they were signed: 
the one with Germany was called the Versailles Treaty (signed 28 
June 1919), with Austria was the Saint-Germain-en-Laye Treaty (19 
September 1919), Bulgaria’s was the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (27 
November 1919), Hungary‘s the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), and 
that of the Ottoman Empire the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920). The 
latter was later renegotiated and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne (24 
July 1923).
18 The peace treaties from 1919 have been discussed and analyzed 
by dozens of scholars. John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace from 1919 is still very readable. For good, 
contemporary analysis see, for example, MacMillan (2001), Sharp 
(2010), or Sondhaus (2011), and chapter 13 of this book.
19 The full text of the Versailles Treaty: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sub-
ject_menus/versailles_menu.asp 
20 The Polish Corridor was a territory connecting the restored Poland 
with the Baltic Sea. It cut East Prussia off from the rest of Germany.
21 Approximately 30 million people belonged to minorities after the 
peace settlements (MacMillan 2001: 486).
22 E.g. Hungary lost 72% of its country and 64% of its population 
(Sondhaus 2011: 463).
23  This division of the spoils in the Middle East had been roughly agreed 
on in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 (cf. Chapter 13)
24 Lausanne Treaty: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_
Lausanne 
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25 See also James 2003: 75-76.
26 The Field Marshal, the Earl Wavell, is supposed to have said of the 
Paris Peace Conference, “After the ‘war to end war’, they seem to have 
been in Paris at making the ‘peace to end peace’.”
27 Article 231 was really a sop to Allied opinion – in theory it justified a 
claim against Germany for ALL allied costs, but Article 232 limited 
the categories that could be claimed – including, of course, the contro-
versial pensions and allowances.
28 “While most of the 440 clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have long 
been forgotten, the handful dealing with reparations stand, in what  
is still the received view, as evidence of a vindictive, shortsighted and  
poisonous document” (MacMillan 2001: 181).
29 Signatories included France, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, 
Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Later on, 
more states joined.
30 See also Chapter 13 for a general discussion of the War’s consequences.
31 Among others: 1917-1921, the Ukrainian War of Independence; 1918-
1920, the Lithuanian Wars of Independence; 1918-1920, the Estonian 
War of Independence; 1919-1920, revolutions and interventions 
in Hungary; 1918-1919, the Austro-Slovene conflict in Carinthia; 
the Polish-Czech war for Teschen Silesia, 1919-1920; and the 
Czechoslovakia-Hungary War.
32 It is estimated that more than one million Russians fled the revolution 
to find shelter, mainly in France and Germany (James 2003: 76-77).
33 The background and the serious consequences Middle East are  
analyzed in Chapter 13.
34 E.g. Hungary.
35 The de facto importance of the reparations as a cause of Germany’s 
economic crisis is contested. According to Bresciani-Turroni 1931:  
94-95, the reparations “only” amounted to 1/3 of the German deficit 
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and the inflation would have come anyway. See Chapter 13 of this 
book for an analysis.
36 Originally, Italy was allied with the Central Powers, but shifted to the 
Entente Powers when she was promised territorial gains. As Italy did 
not have all of her territorial wishes fulfilled, Orlando left the peace 
conference in protest, and a feeling of having been cheated for the 
fruits of victory prevailed in Italy, stirring nationalist sentiments, and 
paving the way for Mussolini. 
37 Margaret MacMillan (2001: 493-494) defends the Versailles Treaty, 
admitting its shortcomings. She also states that “Hitler did not wage 
war because of the Treaty of Versailles, although he found its existence 
a godsend for his propaganda”. In this author’s opinion, she misses the 
point, because World War 1 and the Treaty of Versailles paved the way 
for nationalism and Nazism.
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Chapter 6
The impact of World War 1 
on German literature: 
Ernst Jünger, Herman Hesse, 
and Georg Trakl
Jan T. Schlosser
Introduction
World War 1 resulted in a military, political, economic, social, and men-
tal breakdown for many Germans. In 1918, a socialist revolution failed in 
Germany when the Social Democrats cooperated with the former army of 
the Kaiser. German democracy was strained by this cooperation and by 
the hard and demoralizing Treaty of Versailles, later also by the infla-
tion and the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Most Germans were obviously not 
aware of the fact that Germany had suffered a total defeat in 1918. The 
Dolchstoßlegende, saying that the German army was not beaten on the bat-
tle field, prevented a realistic estimation of the German defeat.
World War 1 is essential in German society and literature in the 1920s. The 
1920s in Germany were definitely not the “Roaring Twenties”. The century 
was dominated by poverty and an insecurity that is a vital contrast to the en-
thusiasm of August 1914. In literature, the 1920s were a fruitful period with 
various experimental forms and efforts to find modes of expression in accor-
dance with the time. Literary texts with a pacifistic (for instance the poems 
of the Dada founder Hugo Ball) or very realistic attitude were only found in 
a few cases – like Erich Maria Remarque’s novel Im Westen nicht Neues/All 
Quiet on the Western Front (1929) – able to oust military books like Ernst 
Jünger’s war diary In Stahlgewittern/Storm of Steel (1920). In Günter Grass’ 
novel Mein Jahrhundert/My Century (1999), every single year in the twen-
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tieth century was described in 100 short stories. The war years 1914-1918 
consist exclusively of a fictive dialogue between Jünger and Remarque. No 
other authors got as much space in Grass’ novel as Jünger and Remarque. The 
pacifists like Remarque or Georg Trakl – Trakl committed suicide in 1914 
– are representatives of a generation destroyed by World War 1 and its absur-
dity. On the other hand, Jünger identifies himself with the war generation. 
This chapter focuses on three authors (Ernst Jünger, Hermann Hesse, and 
Georg Trakl) who deal with World War 1 in the context of modernity and 
intellectual aristocratism.
The breakdown of the German Kaiserreich in 1918 resulted in a variety of 
culture and in new themes. German literature after World War 1 is dom-
inated by crisis-thinking. Hermann Broch focused on the decline of the 
bourgeois society in 1918 in the novel Die Schlafwandler/The Sleepwalkers 
(1930/1932). Gottfried Benn had already written about the decline of reality 
during World War 1. German philosopher Oswald Spengler diagnosed the 
transformation of cultures into civilization. His book Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes/The Decline of the West (1918/1922) became a slogan for the 
crisis after World War 1. Spengler positioned himself beyond everyday po-
litical rhetoric. 
Ernst Jünger was on the Western Front in the period 1914-1918. He volun-
teered for the German army because he thought World War 1 would be suit-
able as a field of the male love of adventure. Already in the fall of 1913, the 
18 year old school boy had shown a love of adventure. He escaped his boring 
schooldays and volunteered for the Foreign Legion in Northern Africa, but 
his father took him back to Germany. In World War 1, Jünger became a 
lieutenant and was wounded and decorated several times. 
Jünger was not the only one who had war fever. The majority of German 
intellectuals looked positively on World War 1 in 1914. Even the humanist 
Thomas Mann, the playwright Gerhart Hauptmann, the Austrian aristocrat 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and the sculptor Ernst Barlach saw the War as a 
potential purification. Thomas Mann maintained that the War was a strug-
gle between German culture and French civilization. Thomas Mann’s pa-
triotism from 1914 was revised in his speech Von deutscher Republik/The 
German Republic in 1922. In Der Zauberberg/The Magic Mountain (1924) 
Mann holds on to the traditional novel, but also writes a parody on this 
genre. The novel takes place just before World War 1 in a sanatorium in the 
Alps. In The Magic Mountain, Mann’s national conservatism is replaced 
with humanism, represented by the character Settembrini. Political radical-
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ism, represented by the character Naphta, is rejected. The main character, 
Hans Castorp, is unable to return to bourgeois society.
The majority of German intellectuals claimed that the bourgeois society 
was characterized by materialism and shallowness. Even the expressionists 
were enthusiastic about World War 1. The War seemed to be a possibility 
for revitalizing culture. 
In Heinrich Mann’s novel Der Untertan/The Patrioteer (1914/1918), it is 
demonstrated that the main character, Diederich Heßling, already pos-
sesses the extreme nationalistic, pre-fascistic, and orthodox mental condi-
tion (“germanische Herrenkultur”) that later would be essential for the Nazi 
consolidation of power in 1933. 
Storm of Steel established Jünger’s name in antidemocratic, extremely na-
tionalistic intellectual and political circles in Germany in the 1920s. Das 
Abenteuerliche Herz/The Adventurous Heart (1929) is the first text in which 
Ernst Jünger moves away from World War 1 as his primary subject. In The 
Adventurous Heart, it becomes clear that Jünger does not want a political ca-
reer, but wishes to establish his intellectual credentials as an author. After his 
sympathies for Nazism in the first part of the 1920s, he turns his back on this 
political movement because he disagrees with Hitler, who since 1925 aims at 
the legal assumption of power in Germany through participation in elections. 
Jünger does not wish to act politically on the terms of the hated democracy. 
In 1933, Hitler’s government tried to win Jünger as an intellectual front fig-
ure in the Third Reich, but he rejected all offers and moved from the political 
center of Berlin into the German provinces. He was still able to publish in the 
Third Reich, although the second version of The Adventurous Heart (1938) 
and the novel Auf den Marmorklippen/On the Marble Cliffs (1939) contained 
several critical reflections about Germany during the Nazi Regime. 
Hermann Hesse was a war volunteer too, but became a pacifist during the 
War. Hesse is for democracy and the German republic but like Jünger, also 
characterized by intellectual aristocratism and spiritual mysticism. Hesse 
maintains that the world disintegrates due to modern technology. In Der 
Steppenwolf/Steppenwolf (1927), the main character Harry Haller suffers 
from an identity conflict between the assimilated bourgeois part of his per-
sonality and the social and cultural critic part of his personality. Haller over-
comes his depression and antisocial attitude by optimistic grim humor. 
Like Jünger in The Adventurous Heart, Hesse also focuses on the inner, 
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mental life in his 1931 short story Die Morgenlandfahrt/Journey to the East 
(Schlosser 2009). The search for the metaphysical meaning of life is the 
central link between Jünger and Hesse. But Hesse is against the radicaliza-
tion of the crisis-thinking around 1930, and refuses all ideologies. Mental 
maturity is essential for Hesse.
Ernst Jünger
In German literary history, Jünger is an example of an author who was 
stigmatized as a man glorifying war, a nationalist, and a pioneer of Nazism. 
Until the publication of Karl Heinz Bohrer’s Die Ästhetik des Schreckens 
(1978), the research on Jünger was overexposed by interpretations of ideo-
logical, rather than philological, character. Jünger’s conservative defenders 
distinguished between his early texts – for example Storm of Steel – and 
later works to demonstrate progress from the glorification of World War 
1 to aesthetic implications. Martin Meyer’s voluminous monograph, Ernst 
Jünger (1990), contextualized his publications and placed Jünger in the 
European literary history of the nineteenth and twentieth century. On the 
other hand, Jünger’s critics looked at the early texts about World War 1 
and classified them as representative of his whole authorship. An example 
of this is Horst Seferens’ book Leute von übermorgen und von vorgestern 
(1998). Seferens argues that ideology is the central idea of Jünger’s aesthetic 
program. This position also includes ideological readings of Jünger in the 
1970s and a closer reading of his nationalistic articles from the 1920s. The 
articles were published in a well-arranged edition a few years after Jünger’s 
death in February 1998. 
Today, Jünger is part of the “canon” of modernity (Dietka 2011: 61). Jünger’s 
interest in modernity and his strategies to overcome it are worth noting. He 
moves from enthusiastic affirmation of modern technology in his World 
War 1 publications to proper skepticism in the late 1930s, during and in 
particular after World War 2. The leitmotif in his long-standing authorship 
is non-conformism. In every single period of his literary production he de-
clines to meet demands from the outside world. Jünger is a solitary figure in 
German culture in the twentieth century. 
Storm of Steel has often been read as an ideological text, as a radical vi-
olation of humanistic ideals. Storm of Steel is the text with which Jünger 
achieved his status as a controversial figure in German literature. 
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In 2013, the annotated edition of Storm of Steel was published. The new edi-
tion makes it possible to compare the seven different versions (1920, 1922, 
1924, 1934, 1935, 1961, 1978) of the text. The purpose is to date when the 
different stigmatizations of Jünger can be proved in his war diary. All ver-
sions are characterized by a radical reduction of World War 1 to a scene for 
Jünger’s own act of war, instead of the War seen as a whole.
In the 1920 edition, Jünger wishes to describe World War 1 as it was, and 
not as it could have been. Already in the first chapter about the mobilization 
in August 1914, he mentions death on the battle field as “No finer death in 
all the world than” (Jünger 2004: 5). Jünger’s official purpose, written in 
his preface, is not heroism but the glorification of war. He describes several 
battles, praises the heroic death, and the sense of duty.
An important aspect of Jünger’s glorification of war is its confrontation 
with killed soldiers. The precise observation of the mangled bodies of dead 
soldiers includes a very subjective view, namely an aesthetic view of the 
dead soldiers (Jünger 2013). The pleasure of looking at the soldier’s wounds, 
their death struggle, and the final rot of flesh breaks with humanism and 
ethical conventions like the inviolability of the grave. With such descrip-
tions, Jünger becomes an exponent of a violation of the values of the Age of 
Enlightenment. His purpose with the precise description of rotten flesh is to 
strengthen himself against the War.
World War 1 was the first war dominated by modern technology. Even men 
turned into material in Jünger’s book (Jünger 2013). With that, a direct line 
of communication was established between a view of the human being dur-
ing World War 1 and the Nazi ideology. The description of the soldier as a 
self-sacrificing and brave war hero, is a central link to Nazism. A ‘new man’ 
is born during World War 1. Jünger defines this man as a warrior who con-
trols modern technology. In the first edition of Storm of Steel, he outlined 
how the warrior does not accept destruction of French villages and the suf-
fering of the civilian population. Jünger also mentions that it is meaningless 
to send soldiers into a fight that cannot be won (Jünger 2013).
The first edition of Jünger’s book not only focuses on the glorification of 
war, but contains different considerations about the War as well. In the pref-
ace, there is mention that the war is grey and that the battlefield is a desert 
of madness (Jünger 2013). Trench warfare results in disillusion and does not 
promote heroism. Jünger is also a lonely and freezing soldier who is longing 
for something human in the trench (Jünger 2013: 34).
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Even though Jünger is praising the English soldiers and mentioning such 
things as weekdays in the war, disillusion, and friendship with the civil-
ian population, the stigmatization of Jünger as a man who glorifies war is 
proved in the first edition of his war book.
The War should not be forgotten: that is the purpose of Jünger’s 1924 edition. 
He is proud of World War 1. Future generations must be ruthless and ready 
to die for Germany. The warrior of the future is portrayed as a German pro-
totype and is very suitable for war, seen from a Nazi point of view. A so far 
unknown brutality will dominate the future. His prognosis is that there will 
be another war in Europe (Jünger 2013). Nationalistic passion is more im-
portant in the 1924 edition. The French are characterized as an enemy race 
(Jünger 2013). Jünger still pays respect to the English soldiers. His political 
object is the nationalistic and imperialistic state, but in his war diary he does 
not consider giving up democracy in favor of Nazism – as he does in other 
articles published in right winged papers in the 1920s.
In 1924, Jünger begins to focus more on nature (Jünger 2013). His interest 
in plants and animals is more obvious than in the 1920 edition. Looking at 
nature promotes Jünger’s fighting spirit (Jünger 2013). Nature and war seem 
to be competitive. Reading literature and studying beetles seems to contrast 
with the warrior who lives in eternal war. 
The focus on nature is even more evident in the 1934 edition. Nature is no 
longer important for Jünger’s fighting spirit. Nature is now an aesthetic 
phenomenon. The soldier Jünger likes to look at nature (Jünger 2013). The 
pleasure of plants and animals is an expression of Jünger’s mental change. 
The self-reflective and contemplative soldier is of importance in the 1934 
edition (Jünger 2013). Jünger is critical towards the heroic status of the War 
when he brings up subjects like the mercilessness of war and the soldier’s 
fear. The former focus on nationalism and on the sense of duty is deleted. 
In 1934, the stigmatization of Jünger as a man glorifying war, a national-
ist, and an ideological pioneer of Nazism changes. The Nietzscheanian and 
social Darwinistic perspectives are replaced by a criticism of civilization 
that is centered on stoicism and escapism. These are Jünger’s answers to 
political change in Germany during the 1930s. Some additions demonstrate 
that war results in the destruction of culture in France and Belgium (Jünger 
2013). Jünger admits that he and other volunteers were not welcomed with 
enthusiasm by the German soldiers on the Western Front in 1914 (Jünger 
2013). The technological war creates the illusion of hope that the individual 
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can settle the war. Comments on the mercilessness of the war have to be 
read in this context.
In the 1961 and the 1978 editions, there are very few substantial changes 
that move the focus from the battles to more reflective considerations, while 
nature is given a higher priority and the remaining nationalist words are 
deleted. A German defeat in World War 1 seems to be possible in 1918 now, 
and the sense of the War is discussed again (Jünger 2013). Pity for dead 
enemies is a subject now. Jünger writes about his sorrow for killing a very 
young English soldier, about his thoughts of him in the following decades, 
and about a state that claims warlike behavior from young men (Jünger 
2013). In 1961, Jünger deletes paragraphs from the 1920 edition glorifying 
death on the battle field.
Hermann Hesse
The interpretations of Hesse’s point of view during World War 1 are very 
different. Usually, he is classified as a pacifist and the novel Demian (writ-
ten in 1917 and published in 1919) – for instance in the postscript of the 
1974 edition – as a text belonging to “anti-war tracts and novels” (Hesse 
1974: 142). Research has failed to appreciate Demian as a text which deals 
with a variant of intellectual aristocratism which is part of a larger context 
in German literature about World War 1. Schwilk emphasizes Hesse’s am-
biguous relations to the War, his patriotism, and his opinion that man has 
to follow his archaic instincts (Schwilk 2012). In the summer of 1914, he 
did not act as a pacifist and was ready to defend Germany (Schwilk 2012). 
Hesse saw the War as a possibility for revitalizing culture (Schwilk 2012). 
He volunteered for the task in August 1914, but was refused because of 
his age and myopia. From November 1915, he participated in civil active 
service. In September 1914, Hesse demonstrated the anti-British attitude of 
German nationalism (Hesse 1973). Already in November 1914, his doubts 
about German nationalism and the brutal invasion of Belgium became ob-
vious, when he accentuated his international attitude (Hesse 1973). Also in 
November 1914, Hesse admitted his love of European culture in preference 
to patriotism, and was denounced as a traitor to Germany. An interesting 
point is that Hesse’s rejection of nationalism did not include a rejection of 
World War 1. In December 1914, Hesse claimed that the War would not 
destroy culture (Hesse 1973). In February 1915, Hesse praised the German 
philosopher Max Scheler (Hesse 1973). In Scheler’s book Der Genius des 
Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (1915), the War is described as the culmi-
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nation of the activities of the German state. In Scheler’s opinion, World War 
1 seems to be a possibility for developing life. Hesse advocates a European 
spirit, a supranational humanity, and is pro a cooperation between nations 
in 1915 (Hesse 1973). However, Hesse underlined Germany’s right to defend 
its position as a world power in December 1915. He emphasized that the 
Germans also have a right to express national feelings, because German 
culture has contributed so much to European culture (Hesse 1973). In June 
1917, Hesse announced that he was not politicized by World War 1. The War 
has reinforced the contrast between the outside and inside world. Hesse’s 
main interest is the inside world (Hesse 1973). 
Hesse’s most important work, written during World War 1, is the novel 
Demian (1919). The main topic is the young Emil Sinclair’s struggle for 
mental maturity in the period before and during World War 1. The motto of 
the text – “I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings which 
came from my true self” (Hesse 1974: XIII) – focuses on the philosophy of 
life and its “natural” life expansion. Hesse discusses whether humanity can 
still be expressed in a narrative form when millions of people are killed in 
a technological war. He emphasizes the unique character of every human 
being as a creature of nature. Every human being carries the spirit of life. 
This spirit includes archaic behavior as well.
Like Jünger, Hesse criticizes the boring bourgeois – and dying – society 
before World War 1. It may be a “good” world of peace and security, but 
Sinclair is also attracted by a “bad” world of evil that includes the idea 
of patricide, the elimination of the bourgeois society, and the longing for 
“life and adventure” (Hesse 1974: 60). Sinclair’s friend Max Demian has 
a self-determined life and is a “law unto himself” (Hesse 1974: 42). For 
a short while, Sinclair lives a self- destructive Dionysian life with alcohol 
and cynicism. At last, he abandons the excessive life in favor of a forceful 
interest in developing spiritual aristocratism, characterized by “purity and 
nobility” (Hesse 1974: 67). 
The main purpose of intellectual aristocratism is not a revitalization of the 
outside world, but of the inner world in every human being. The mental 
world is outlined as the “real” world in Demian; to achieve self-knowledge 
and mental maturity, defined as “another mode of vision” (Hesse 1974: 122). 
However, it is of importance to recognize that humanity has not developed 
in the pre-war society yet. Demian positions an actually not very well-de-
fined humanity in the future. Contemplative observation of nature is a cen-
tral part of intellectual aristocratism: “The observation of such configura-
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tions. The surrender to Nature’s irrational, strangely confused formations 
produces in us a feeling of inner harmony with the force responsible for 
these phenomena” (Hesse 1974: 88). According to Hesse, it is the same di-
vinity which determines nature and human beings. 
Collective ideologies are refused. According to Demian, World War 1 is 
no a possibility for improving the “old” world. This world – here Hesse 
agrees with the other intellectuals in the German speaking world – must 
be destroyed in the War, but new political constellations of power after the 
War are of no interest. Only mental maturity is: be yourself because you are 
unique. Heroism has no part in mental maturity, but belongs in the outside 
world, the “surface” (Hesse 1974: 140): “The most primitive, even the wild-
est feelings were not directed at the enemy; their bloody task was merely an 
irradiation of the soul, of the soul divided within itself, which filled them 
with the lust to rage and kill, annihilate and die so that they might be born 
anew” (Hesse 1974: 140). Mental maturity only belongs to the “underneath” 
(Hesse 1974: 140). Jünger and Hesse both look at World War 1 as a rup-
ture in world history. Modern technology becomes a “stahlgewittergleich” 
(Decker 2007: 61), a destruction of human life on the battlefields. Hesse’s 
objective, to understand the outside rupture mentally caused by World War 
1, is also Jünger’s literary project.
The Hesse research focuses on the C.G. Jung context, and not on World War 
1 in Demian. The text should be read as a story dealing with the experiences 
of central relevance for the whole generation which was sent into the War 
in August 1914.
Schwilk reads Demian as a story of becoming a human being during a war 
of extermination. Mental brilliance originates in spiritual independence 
(Schwilk 2012). Although Sinclair fights on the Western Front, he actually 
fights an inner struggle (Schwilk 2012). Freedman analyses the text as a 
symbol for the World War 1 period. Sinclair is the hero of the revitalization 
of mankind and humanity. Radical destruction can result in renewal and in 
a better world (Freedman 2013). A central topic in Demian is the fall of the 
old Europe, but the text presents an offer of new metaphysical meaning and 
identification (Singh 2006). Toprak interprets the text as the representation 
of an atmosphere that ends in the War. He reads Demian as a text that ad-
vocates World War 1, because it will generate a new and better world. The 
problem is Hesse’s new indistinct humanism (Toprak 2013).
The pessimism towards culture that Hesse formulated in the novel Peter 
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Camenzind (1904) is replaced by finding meaning in culture in Demian 
(Frenzel 1991). Camenzind moved from the countryside to the city and re-
turned to nature. Sinclair’s solution is not the simple life in nature, but a con-
fession to culture. Demian is the confession of a wounded soldier. Demian 
shows Sinclair the way back to himself. Demian’s mother is the archaic 
ideal of maternity (Frenzel 1991). 
Demian conduced to Hesse’s worldwide reputation as a representative of 
individualism and non-conformism. Demian became a figure of identifica-
tion in several époques, for instance in Germany after World War 1, when 
soldiers returning from the battlefields thought the text was written by an 
author belonging to their own generation, and in the American hippie era 
too (Limberg 2005). Hesse published Demian under the pseudonym of Emil 
Sinclair for more than fifteen editions. The genre of the publication was 
displaced from fiction to non-fiction. As a non-fiction text, Demian pre-
tended to be an “authentic” war report written by a soldier, like Jünger’s 
Storm of Steel. Actually, Demian is not as far from Jünger as the research 
asserts (Singh 2006). In 1920, Hesse had to reveal his authorship. Hesse was 
a moralist in the context of World War 1. He requested moderation from na-
tionalism. Hesse is interested in reconciliation between an excessive and a 
tranquil life, and he is always searching for a metaphysical meaning of life.
Hesse was attacked by the Nazis and the exile authors in the Nazi pe riod, 
but he insisted on his mental independence and refused all ideological 
instrumentalizations (Limberg 2005). The impact of Hesse is particularly 
obvious after World War 1 and World War 2 (Limberg 2005).
His pacifism made him a cult figure in the US during the Vietnam War 
(Schwilk 2012). Several traces of Hesse’s texts can be found in novels writ-
ten by the American Beat Generation (Esselborn-Krumbiegel 2013). The 
American rock band “Steppenwolf” was named after Hesse’s novel. While 
Hesse found many readers in the conservative society of Western Germany 
in the 1950s, the 1970s was a period of intensive Hesse reception in Western 
Germany too. He became interesting for the growing ecological movement 
(the political party Die Grünen was founded in Western Germany in 1980) 
as an author practicing spiritual opposition (Singh 2006).
Around the millennium, Hesse was still a representative of contemporary 
subculture in German novels, like in Ralf Rothmann’s Stier (1991) and 
Markus Werner’s Am Hang (2004). In the first mentioned novel, Demian 
is the mental companion on an LSD trip; in the second novel, Hesse’s 
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home for many years, Montagnola in Switzerland, is a place of humanism 
(Esselborn-Krumbiegel, 2013). The research in German literature often re-
jected the relevance of Hesse’s literature, and blamed him both for believ-
ing in an obsolete romanticism and for writing beyond modernity (Singh 
2006; Limberg 2005). In fact, Hesse is the leading figure of escapism in 
the modern consumer society and a representative of a magic world order 
(Esselborn-Krumbiegel 2013). Young readers in China, Korea, and Japan 
understand Hesse as a writer of their own culture and of their own gener-
ation, as he writes about the always-current conflict between individual 
autonomy and conformism in society (Limberg 2005). Hesse represents an 
aristocratic humanism that is not part of the outside world, but develops in-
side the human being. The strategy of this aristocratic humanism is to pro-
tect oneself from a frightening modernity. The modernist looked at Hesse 
as an author of integrity, but also as an intellectual looking back, instead of 
looking forward.
Today, Hermann Hesse is the most read German author from the twentieth 
century. Twenty-five million Hesse-books have been sold in the German 
speaking countries, 125 million in the whole world (Schwilk 2012). Hesse 
answered 35.000 letters from his readers, and for young readers Hesse is a 
representative of moral integrity and humanism (Limberg 2005). Hesse’s 
enormous impact of our time is bound up with an antiauthoritarian attitude 
and maximal individualism (Schwilk 2012). 
Georg Trakl
Georg Trakl’s last poem Grodek was written at the front, after he had to 
nurse almost 100 very badly wounded soldiers, all alone without any as-
sistance from doctors, for two days in an Eastern Front field hospital near 
Grodek in Galicia in September 1914 (Lichtenberger 1971). “He found in-
tolerable the facts of the human suffering – the physical squalor, the cries of 
the wounded. Within sight of the camp, the army command punished par-
tisan peasants by hanging them, leaving their decaying bodies on display, 
as warnings, in the trees” (Tapscott 2011: XI). Trakl’s attempted suicide by 
shooting himself failed. His cause of death was an overdose of cocaine in 
the psychiatry hospital of Cracow in November 1914. 
“On the basis of ‘Grodek’ alone, Trakl has achieved a place among the poets 
of World War I” (Lichtenberger 1971: 128). Stephen Tapscott’s new 2011 
translation of Trakl’s poems from German to English proves that Trakl’s po-
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etry has an important impact in our time, not only in the German speaking 
countries, but from a global perspective. His gloomy lyric poetry under the 
impression of World War 1 also shocks today, namely based on a “self re-
flexive melancholy” (Tapscott 2011: VIII). But the “traumatic events on the 
Eastern Front in WWI” (Tapscott 2011: XV) and their tragic consequences 
for Trakl’s life, seem to be of importance for his reputation as well. Indeed, 
Tapscott’s edition of Trakl’s poems attempts to emphasize the “continuity 
of his development” (Tapscott 2011: XV). From this point of view, Trakl’s 
poem Grodek manifests itself as a logical consequence of modernity, mod-
ern warfare, and modern inhumanity, and not as the author’s individual 
tragedy.
Trakl describes the apocalypse and is longing for humanity. He takes note 
of the decline of a well-ordered world. His reaction is resignation. Jünger’s 
is rebellion. Trakl is a representative for an aesthetic view of World War 1. 
Even on the battlefield, he finds aesthetic. The horror is revealed in aesthetic. 
Trakl’s main impact on our time is that his poems go very far beyond the 
historical context in which they were written. His position in German liter-
ary history is paradigmatic because his poems consider aesthetic tendencies 
that essentially conduced to establish modernity in the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Cellbrot 2003). His poems are characteristic of the way 
of looking at history. Many currents support his view on history as a period 
of decadence (Cellbrot 2003). The impact of Trakl in our time was docu-
mented in 2014 with the publication of Gunnar Decker’s illustrated work 
Georg Trakl. Photos and texts in Decker’s book show an author associated 
with an era of decadence and death (Decker 2014). Decker expounds Trakl 
as an extreme individualist who rejected all sorts of collectivism. With 
the author Trakl, German expressionism becomes fervent (Decker 2014). 
Decker positions the battle of Grodek as the basis of a new era of the me-
chanical destruction of human beings (Decker 2014):
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Grodek
In the evening the autumnal woods resound
With deadly arms, [as do] the golden plains
And blue lakes, over which the sun
Darkly [gloomily] revolves; the night embraces
Dying warriors, the wild lamenting
Of their broken mouths.
Yet quietly in the [low] pasture there gather
Red clouds, in which a wrathful god lives,
The spilt blood, moonlike coolness;
All streets run into black decay.
Under golden branches of night and stars
The sister’s shadow hovers through the silent grove
To greet the spirits of the heroes, the bleeding heads;
And softly in the reeds the dark flutes of autumn resound.
Oh prouder morning! You brazen altars,
Today the hot flame of the spirit is fed by an immense pain,
The unborn grandchildren. (Lindenberger 1971: 129)
In 1973, Ernst Jünger’s younger brother Friedrich Georg Jünger pointed out 
that putrefaction can no longer be passed over after World War 1. The War 
includes a rupture, not only with humanity, but obviously with warfare com-
pared with wars in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Georg Jünger makes 
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clear that Grodek shows the reality of World War 1, with dead and dying 
soldiers. According to Friedrich Georg Jünger, Trakl enquires about the 
substance of war and comes to the conclusion of not distinguishing between 
friends and enemies. They are dying together in Grodek (Jünger 1973: 12). 
Trakl worries that the next generations might be essentially influenced by 
the war fever of World War 1. They will never be born into a life domi-
nated by humanity. The hope that World War 1 might result in the mental 
change of mankind might be articulated in Grodek (Doppler 2001: 80) – but 
it seems to be as vague as Hesse’s uncertain humanism. Trakl’s perception 
of reality is characterized by a combination of subjects in new contexts. War 
and nature are the main subjects in Grodek. They are entwined. The quiet 
nature contrasts with the noisy and lethal weapon in an apocalyptic dimen-
sion. The concrete historical occurrence indicated in the title of the poem is 
relative, because the impressions of nature create a distance that urges the 
reader to reflect (Doppler 2001: 79-80). It is a landscape of outrage, death, 
and wailing. The soldiers are no patriotic heroes (Doppler 2001: 79).
The “evening” and the “autumnal woods” indicate both death on the battle-
field of World War 1 and the decline of an era. Even nature is dominat-
ed by the War and the apocalypse of the new era, when the woods echo 
with deadly weapons. The thematic focus in the poem is the crying of the 
“dying warriors”. With “All streets run into black decay”, Trakl emphasizes 
his criticism of modernity. Modernity leads to death and decline. Later in 
Grodek, nature still contains the values of the declined era: “And softly in 
the reeds the dark flutes of autumn resound”. Trakl’s aesthetic view of the 
War rests on nature.
Conclusion
The majority of the German and Austrian intellectuals looked positively at 
World War 1 in 1914. The War was seen as a potential purification and as 
a possibility for revitalizing culture. This chapter examined three authors 
who published during and about World War 1 in the context of modernity 
and intellectual aristocratism. The impact and reception of their work in our 
time and its culture were also examined.
The war diary Storm of Steel established Ernst Jünger in antidemocratic, 
extremely nationalistic intellectual and political circles in Germany in the 
1920s. According to the 1924 version, future generations must be ruthless 
and ready to die for Germany. The self-reflective and contemplative soldier 
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is of importance in the 1934 edition. However, Storm of Steel means a glori-
fication of war and a radical violation of humanistic ideals. All versions are 
characterized by a radical reduction of World War 1 to a scene for Jünger’s 
own act of war, instead of the War seen as a whole. In every period of 
his authorship, the nonconformist Jünger declines to meet demands from 
the outside world. Hermann Hesse’s novel Demian and Georg Trakl’s poem 
Grodek seem to represent pacifism at first sight, but they include remark-
able consistencies and differences with Jünger’s text with regard to intellec-
tual aristocratism and mental maturity. 
Like Jünger in The Adventurous Heart, Hesse focuses on the inner mental 
life. Hesse agrees with Jünger that radical destruction might result in re-
newal. The spirit of life includes archaic behavior. Hesse’s rejection of na-
tionalism does not include a rejection of World War 1. But Hesse is against 
collective ideologies and political radicalization. To him, European culture 
and supranational humanity are both important. Mental maturity – the in-
side world – is essential. He represents an aristocratic humanism that devel-
ops inside the human being. The strategy of this aristocratic humanism is 
to protect oneself from modernity. Demian was a figure for identification 
in several eras, despite the fact that the text formulates a very uncertain 
humanism in the future. With Demian, Hesse became a worldwide repre-
sentative of individualism and non-conformism. 
Trakl is more pessimistic than Jünger and Hesse. He focuses on the decline 
of the old world and gives up physical and mental life. In remarkable con-
trast to Jünger and Hesse, there is now future mental aristocratism for the 
next generations in Trakl’s poem. The possibility to revitalize culture after 
World War 1 manifests itself in Ernst Jünger’s and Hermann Hesse’s author-
ship, but not in Georg Trakl’s.
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Chapter 7
The impact of World War 1 on   Anglophone literature
Bent Sørensen
Introduction
World War 1 gave rise to a number of phenomena of lasting interest to histo-
rians and scholars of literature and culture in the Anglophone World. Prior 
to the Great War, English literature already had a long tradition of reflecting 
on wars and their impact on soldiers in the frontline, as well as the civilians 
on the home front (roughly speaking as part of the spine of the logic of em-
pire), but with the brutal witness-based poetry of the trenches of World War 
1 the awareness of the psychological effects of war and of trauma discourses 
and behaviours became foregrounded in new ways. In this chapter the aim 
is look at transmissions of the cultural iconicity (see Sørensen & Nielsen, 
2015) of World War 1 over the century that has now almost fully lapsed 
since the War unfolded. By cultural iconicity is understood the mechanism 
involved in memorialization through images; both physical, tangible images 
such as photographs and moving filmic images and pictorial art, and mental 
images such as those embedded in literary and non-fictional texts and other 
forms of concrete memorial storages such as testimonials, memoirs, trauma 
narratives and other medical records. All such images, the theses of cultural 
imagology run, are stored in and simultaneously have an impact on what 
could be termed the iconosphere, here understood as the sum total of images 
that a literate public has access to at a given point in time. The iconosphere 
thus resembles the totality of operationalized historical, literary and cultural 
knowledge of a given culture at a given point in time (by ‘operationalized’ 
is here meant easily accessible via the media and other current transmission 
mechanisms of the given epoch. See Johnson 2005). The iconosphere is, 
thus, by nature historically contingent, but also changeable and malleable in 
a rather ‘sluggish’ manner, i.e. relatively resistant to change in mentalities 
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and ideological priorities of the specific populace. World War 1 is arguably 
still an active portion of the global (or here the Anglophone portion of the) 
iconosphere of the second decade of the twenty-first century, but not in the 
same manner as it was in the Interwar decades of the 1920s and 30s, or the 
post-World War 2 decades (World War 2 having inevitably revitalized the 
images of World War 1…) Examples will be given of re-entries into the 
iconosphere of specific texts and images related to World War 1.
Specific interest is given in the second part of the chapter to the gener-
ational discourse that World War 1 occasioned in English and American 
cultural and literary history. Here the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the 
long, and by nature increasingly tenuous, lines drawn by the trauma of 
World War 1 in the iconosphere. The term “the Lost Generation” was 
coined as a way of discoursing about the national and personal trauma of 
losing upwards of one million UK citizens to military or civilian deaths 
directly attributable to the Great War. The generational metaphor is of 
particular interest as a reservoir of cultural memory of the losses con-
nected with the War, as generation follows generation, both in biological 
terms and in terms of cultural heritage and literary tradition. While the 
US lost relatively few soldiers in combat (ca. 117.000), the aftermath of the 
Great War was of great cultural significance there, as the Lost Generation 
identity position became widely disseminated to apply to many groups 
that had not directly been involved in the War. In fact, the Lost Generation 
became only the first of a number of American literary generations whose 
auto-image incorporated absence and negation in its label. It is, in other 
words, the main thesis of the second part of the chapter to follow, that it 
is also possible to trace the effect of World War 1 through the cultural 
and literary generational constructs of the entire 20th C. in an American 
context. Thus the legacy of the War plays itself out in several arenas, of 
which the chapter engages with the following: The preoccupation with 
World War 1 in a) popular culture and the media as a watershed event of 
continuing iconographic value to new generations; b) songs that continue 
to be performed, recorded and to matter for contemporary culture; and 
finally c) fictional texts that ‘produce’ and ‘perform’ generationality, and 
which thematically deal with feelings of repeated loss of life, identity and 
trauma transmission. To spell this out even more, the corpus of this article 
consists of texts that originated in World War 1 and still have imagological 
resonances in the iconosphere (poems and song lyrics), and texts that are 
part of the trauma transmission chain that started with the Lost Generation 
of the 1920s. The article cannot possibly refer to all Anglophone texts that 
ever referenced World War 1, and it deliberately chooses to look at texts 
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that have entered into the current iconosphere in surprising ways as part 
of a cultural transmission of memorialization or trauma.
Cultural Memory
As we currently move through the centenary years of World War 1, our 
cultural memory of the long bygone events is being constantly jogged and 
revitalized by new generations of social and cultural actors, producing new 
texts about the Great War, or restaging old ones in new settings and media. 
These new forms of memorialization form a natural starting point for a 
discussion of the continued relevance of World War 1 in the twenty-first 
century in the English-speaking World, as they are perhaps indicative of 
what forms memorialization will take in the immediate and long-term fu-
ture. Such a discussion is particularly poignant in a period where the very 
last survivors of World War 1 have recently died, definitively precluding 
the possibility of new living memory transmissions of the War experience. 
Historians and archivists may still be able to retrieve new testimonial ma-
terial but no more living voices can be recorded which insert the World 
War 1 experience into a contemporary cultural setting. This leaves us with 
traditional archival knowledge, remediation technologies and – of particular 
interest here – fictionalizations of the War as access lines to cultural knowl-
edge about the impact of the War and the development of the mental images 
future generations will store about it in the iconosphere. The imagological 
method is unique in allowing us indirect access to cultural texts cached in 
the iconosphere that may contain surprising traces of World War 1 despite 
on the surface appearing to have no connection to the Great War. This is 
the purpose of tracing generationality through the hundred years since the 
War generated the first literary generation-construct, the Lost Generation.
YouTube and the Iconosphere
YouTube has arguably become the major platform for cultural dissemination 
via video and video/audio formats in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century. With the seamless integration of YouTube and other social media 
platforms, it has become easy to share manifestations of cultural memory 
among users of these platforms, and the generational profiles of social me-
dia users ensure that people born in any decade of the twentieth century 
have easy access to an unprecedented selection of documents that carry 
individual, collective and cultural memory manifestations. 
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World War 1 is specifically memorialized on YouTube via the channel the 
Great War which follows the events of the War week by week, exactly a cen-
tury after they happened. Currently 133 ‘episodes’ are available for viewing 
on this platform, and in 2017 episodes routinely reached 80.000 views with-
in the first week of upload, with an expectance of reaching at least 150.000 
views after 6 weeks. Videos from the first ‘season’ of the series, covering 
the year of 1914, also hover around 150.000 views, with especially popular 
episodes (the first instalment and episodes following particularly signifi-
cant battles) reaching ten times that amount. Clearly these are significant 
numbers of views, indicating in their own right a level of interest or fasci-
nation with the Great War that is perhaps surprising given the conventional 
wisdom of our postmodern age being one of cultural acceleration and di-
minished individual and collective mediatized attention span. A closer look 
at the format of the videos, however, creates nuances in the picture we may 
have formed of this state of cultural memorialization. Each video is held 
carefully under the ten-minute mark, features a digest version of a narrative 
presented in talking head style, and copious use of archival footage and 
still photography. Every episode also features extensive use of map anima-
tion showing troop movements during battles and strategic concerns of the 
combatant parties. The format is thus adapted to a profile of users/viewers 
which prefers short format texts and a serialization that allows for ‘binge’ 
watching of episodes at times convenient to the individual needs and life 
style of the user. Further, the simplification of information in the program-
ming, allows for the episodes to be used didactically in school systems even 
in countries that are not predominantly Anglophone.
The Canadian Memorialization of the War: 
Cohen and McCrae
Yet this is not the only way in which World War 1 is re-entering the current 
iconosphere via YouTube as dissemination platform. A striking example of 
how other routes of transmission of cultural memory may open unexpected-
ly occurred in November 2016. In the immediate aftermath of the death of 
Canadian cultural icon, singer-songwriter and poet, Leonard Cohen, numer-
ous cultural texts memorializing his life and cultural impact were produced 
or re-surfaced from archives. His multimediatized obituary, if one likes, was 
disseminated in multiple instalments and types of features far beyond the 
traditional genre of newspaper and radio/TV obituary texts. One of the most 
popular cultural documents that circulated very widely in November 2016 
consisted in a reading Cohen had done the year prior to his death of the most 
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iconic Canadian World War 1 testimonial poem, namely John McCrae’s 
In Flanders Fields (1915). In Canada, World War 1 has traditionally been 
memorialized on 11 November, which of course is the day of the armistice 
ending active hostilities in 1918, under the name of Remembrance Day. 
With this day occurring so closely to Cohen’s own death (on 7 November 
2016, but not announced by his estate until 9 November), the coupling of 
the two events became particularly poignant, increasing the impact on the 
iconosphere of the dissemination of Cohen’s reading of the poem. Multiple 
news outlets throughout the World created pieces that incorporated embed-
ded video links to the various YouTube uploads of Cohen’s reading, and the 
electronic versions of these articles were obviously extremely sharable via 
social media, creating an unexpected viral spread of McCrae’s already quite 
iconic poem which is traditionally taught and recited in primary school in 
Canada and other Anglophone countries. The first recording of Cohen’s 
reading of the poem marked the centenary of its composition and took place 
in 2015, and the original upload of the audio/video-montage quickly soared 
well above 500.000 views after Cohen’s death, despite its original obscurity 
on Legion Magazine’s YouTube channel. A later live recording of a very 
frail and ill Cohen reciting the poem from memory was also circulated by 
news media, but this less iconographically striking video has only reached 
a little over 28.000 views. Still the fact that a century-old poem whose rel-
evance to young readers/listeners may long have seemed dubious can once 
more impact upon the iconosphere is significant. Further reasons behind 
this impact, beyond the sensationalism and pathos of Cohen’s death, can 
briefly be offered.
Cohen had personal reasons for taking an interest in the poem, as his father 
served in the Canadian expeditionary force during World War 1, so Cohen 
already used the poem to revitalize his father’s living memory every year 
on Remembrance Day in what amounted to a private ceremony. Further, 
Cohen’s public performance career contained multiple songs with war, or 
perhaps more accurately anti-war, narratives, both of his own composing 
and performances of other writers’ songs, notably The Partisan, a song 
about the French Resistance during World War 1 (recorded by Cohen in 
1971). These songs, regardless of the conflict they originally sprang out of 
and memorialized, served as an essential part of Cohen’s image as a coun-
ter-cultural, oppositional figure which his audience could rally around in 
symbolic fashion. Cohen thus played an active role, both during his writing 
and performance life, and posthumously through the continuous dissemi-
nation of cultural texts such as the recording of In Flanders Fields, in the 
memorialization and manifestation of the continuing relevance of World 
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War 1 as an ideational backdrop for sentiments about death and loss in war 
– and potentially the transcendence of these negative structures through art 
and memory.
Lieutenant Colonel McCrae’s poem itself warrants a brief analysis. Its most 
poignant feature (and one that doubtlessly resonates with a contemporary 
audience already preoccupied with stages of death and undead beings) is 
that it is spoken by the dead soldiers themselves, although it is at first un-
clear whether the speakers’ collective ‘we’ are the fallen or simply those 
doomed to fall, given the imbecilic strategies of warfare employed in World 
War 1, where soldiers watched futile attacks kill multitudes of their fellow 
combatants, leaving them with a certain knowledge that they themselves 
were next. The line (highlighted in the Cohen video – it simply appears 
on the screen when spoken, unlike any of the other lines of the poem, and 
it even features a word printed in red, a colour otherwise reserved for the 
poppies that are the symbolic illustration of the dead and wounded, bleed-
ing soldiers remaining in the fields of slaughter) in question, giving away 
the speakers’ position, runs in all its simplicity: “We are the dead”. The 
impact of this line is of course increased by the fact that McCrae did not 
survive the War. Along with the work of Wilfred Owen, who also perished 
in the very last months of the War, McCrae’s poetry has been given an 
extra lease of line due to the tragic circumstance of its apparent prediction 
of his own demise. The poem’s ghostly tone is further underscored by the 
dead speakers’ threat to return to haunt the living if they do not pick up the 
“torch” and carry on the “quarrel” with “the foe”. In a manner of speaking 
this parti cular poem embodies the cultural function of memory and trauma 
of combat to haunt the survivors, sometimes through several generations. 
McCrae’s poem is also the reason for “Poppy Day” being the popular de-
nomination for Armistice Day in Great Britain, due to the poem’s reference 
to poppies growing over the buried dead. The continuing success and iconic 
presence of Poppy Day, esp. in Britain is to a very large extent operative in 
keeping World War 1 alive in the iconosphere in the Anglophone World, 
what with the poppy having become an established synecdoche for World 
War 1 as such.
Hopefully it is apparent to attentive readers that the imagological analysis 
above is not exclusively a reading of Leonard Cohen, but simultaneously a 
reading of Cohen as a receptacle of memorialization of the Great War and 
a text that is co-contemporaneous with World War 1. Only through such 
diachronic cultural studies perspectives can we continue to access the War 
and its legacy.
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Commonwealth Experiences: Ireland and Australia
As a further historical context one can offer the fact that every nation of 
the Commonwealth that sent soldiers to fight alongside the British in World 
War 1 has a particular iconographic aftermath to the events and the sacri-
fices borne by their troops. Irish, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand 
forces were often placed at the forefront of the heated interactions between 
Allied and Central Powers frontlines, and a remnant of this bitterness can 
be detected in the cultural texts that particularly effectively commemorate 
the participation of these nations in World War 1. In Flanders Field is a 
bitter text, but maintains at its closure that the sacrifice is necessary for 
the survival of the nation and its populace, thus echoing, perhaps some-
what unconvincingly, the prevalent rhetoric surrounding the incipient war 
years, suggesting that the War was being fought to keep the World safe for 
democracy or similar types of legitimating illusio in Bourdieu’s parlance 
(See Bourdieu, 1984:56). Thus it echoes the most famous British pro-World 
War 1 poem, Rupert Brooke’s pathos-laden The Soldier (first published in 
the magazine New Numbers in January, 1915) in which the speaker claims 
“a corner of some foreign field” as “forever England” by virtue of his blood 
sacrifice and death. Here the imperial discourse is quite naked and una-
bashed, the words “England” and “English” occurring no less than six times 
in the poem’s 14 lines, and the poem suggesting that colonization of the 
“foreign” is a worthwhile endeavour to die for, and in fact one that one is 
morally obligated to perform as a thank you for the “thoughts”, “sights and 
sounds”, “dreams”, and “laughter” that England has already supplied the 
titular soldier with.
Other nations have provided their iconospheres with bleaker, more critical 
texts about the logic and economy of empire in which the ‘colonial’ soldiers’ 
lives are shown to have been eminently dispensable for the greater glory of 
Britain. In Ireland the year of 1916 is of specific cultural significance due 
to the centenary of the Easter Uprising, marked last year by many academic 
and popular cultural events. In a song entitled The Foggy Dew, whose lyrics 
were composed after the end of World War 1 by Canon Charles O’Neill to 
fit the tune of The Moorlough Shore, an air from the late nineteenth century 
(for variations in lyrics and in-depth context, consult O’Boyle, 1973), the 
speaker imagines watching Irish lads in 1914 who have enlisted to fight in 
the War for the British, and he muses with remarkable foresight on what 
awaits these young men on their way to “their lonely graves […] by Suvla’s 
waves or the fringe of the great North Sea”. He further suggests that they 
would have been better off not heeding the illusio of empire for the War: 
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“’Twas England bade our wild geese go, that ‘small nations might be free’”, 
and instead to have fought at home for true freedom, i.e. independence of 
the self-same empire they were soon to die for: “’Twas far better to die 
‘neath an Irish sky, than at Suvla or Sud el Bar”. The song thus suggests 
that it is better not to die in the corner of some foreign field (referencing 
specifically the Gallipoli campaign), but does not reject the value of na-
tional martyrdom wholeheartedly – as long as one dies for the right nation! 
This song has had an intense afterlife as a parable that transcends its initial 
World War 1 setting, featuring recordings and performances in various cul-
tural contexts, including those of the immediate Irish nation-building era of 
the early 1920s; the troubles era of the 1970s, during which the song was 
memorably recorded by The Dubliners; and the post-ceasefire era of the 
late 1990s, leading up to the Good Friday Agreement, during which Sinéad 
O’Connor recorded the song with The Chieftains. Thus the images of young 
Irish sacrificial lambs led to slaughter for the British Empire, or more po-
etically expressed the freedom-seeking “wild geese” of mercenaries, have 
survived in the iconosphere, carrying on the critique embedded in the orig-
inal version of the lament.
For Australia the great loss of innocence with regards to the motives of 
empire is also associated with World War 1, and more specifically the same 
events at Gallipoli, where Commonwealth soldiers were used as cannon 
fodder in the first waves of attack on the Turkish lines. Immortalized in the 
song And The Band Played Waltzing Matilda by Eric Bogle in 1971 (a time 
where pacifism was a dominant mode among young members of the global 
counter-culture, not least due to the disaster of the Vietnam War (cf. Cohen’s 
recording that same year of The Traitor)), the gruesome description of the 
meaningless loss of human life in this campaign is coupled with innocent 
national pride through the citation of the unofficial Australian national an-
them Waltzing Matilda (which underlines the carefree nature of Australians 
and has an anti-war sentiment embedded in some versions of its lyrics as 
well). In several ways Bogle’s lyrics are unusually sophisticated for an an-
ti-war anthem1. Not only is the description of battle lucid and graphic, and 
its aftermath is described in a cynical tone (“Well we buried ours and the 
Turks buried theirs/Then it started all over again”) indicative of how trauma 
narratives often appear2, but the song also bitterly describes the altered post 
festum narrative of the battle that the logic of nation-building dictates, in 
a description of the annual April parades commemorating the campaign. 
The lines eloquently formulate the question of the usefulness of the War 
in generational terms: “I see my old comrades, how proudly they march/
Renewing their dreams of past glories/I see the old men all tired, stiff and 
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worn/Those weary old heroes of a forgotten war/And the young people ask 
“What are they marching for?”/And I ask myself the same question…” Past 
glories are extolled by the nation state, and in the process the sacrifices of 
the men involved are elided from the history, except for the fact that the 
younger generation see through the rhetoric and acknowledge the futility of 
the War. On the question of remembrance (of the “forgotten war”) the lyrics 
are slightly ambiguous, as the purpose of the song obviously is exactly to 
remember the War – not for its glory, but for its effect of reminding us that 
never again should we follow blindly the pied piper of nationalism into a 
war that is not ours.
The first part of the chapter has thus examined cultural texts that thematize 
the Great War in a transnational Anglophone perspective, offering up read-
ings of how the War was conceptualized by Canadian, Australian and Irish 
voices co-contemporaneous with World War 1, as well as the later and still 
vivid representation of this history in the intervening century. These chains 
of memorialization are diachronic in the sense that they bring the past in 
contact with our own present through the medium of the iconosphere where 
the traces are stored and revitalized in surprising ways.
Generationality as cultural memory: The US
Trauma Transmission
Having examined a number of cultural texts that inscribe World War 1 in 
the iconosphere of specific nation states, esp. those of the dependent corners 
of the former British Empire, the second half of this chapter turns to the me-
morialization of World War 1 in an American context. Here the focus will 
be on generational texts and the transmission of trauma from one generation 
to the next, not coincidentally aligned with the movement from one war to 
another3. American literary history had not been narrated explicitly in terms 
of generations until the 1920s when the concept of the Lost Generation was 
constructed. The first occurrence of the construct can be pinpointed quite 
accurately to Ernest Hemingway’s debut novel from 1926, The Sun Also 
Rises, which contains two epigraphs which both thematically reference the 
transmission of time and the potential of loss as well as continuity (the latter 
is indicated by the epigraph quote from Ecclesiastes which the title phrase 
also cites). It is however the other epigraph that performs the generational 
naming speech act. In it Hemingway cites his literary mentor, Gertrude 
Stein, for saying “You are all a lost generation”. In Hemingway’s later book, 
A Moveable Feast, which is a revisionist memoir of his life in Paris in the 
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1920s, he tells a fuller version of how the phrase came into existence. Stein 
claimed to have overheard a mechanic at her garage yelling the phrase at 
another, younger, worker whose skills he was dissatisfied with. Stein then 
picked up the phrase in conversation with Hemingway, and specifically cou-
pled the mechanic’s state of lostness and confusion with the war experience 
that left many men of Hemingway’s generation crippled physically and/or 
mentally. It is also in this trauma and war-related context that Hemingway’s 
epigraphic use of the phrase must be read. 
His protagonist in The Sun Also Rises, Jake Barnes, has been physically 
emasculated by his war experiences, having suffered a grievous wound 
while serving as a volunteer airman in the Italian air force. He refers to 
it obliquely on numerous occasions, including the levity that the situation 
could well have occasioned, if it was not so tragic. Barnes states that he 
received the wound flying on a “joke front” and that the injury is akin to 
having had your joystick damaged. He even makes a self-deprecating but 
nonetheless chauvinistic mockery of the gravity with which his Italian com-
manding officer receives the news and tries to soothe Barnes with patriotic 
claptrap. Barnes is having none of the officer’s fake bravado on his behalf, 
and after the War has ended he tries to make the best of life as a disabled 
person. While the exact nature of the injury is never revealed it is clear 
that it makes Barnes impotent in the traditional sense of the word, although 
there is some indication that he is not beyond all forms of sexual satisfac-
tion. All this is revealed through his desperately co-dependent relationship 
with the novel’s female protagonist, Brett, who is however also depicted as a 
ruthless femme fatale who is enthralled by her own needs for instant grati-
fication. She enjoys seducing men, and subsequently have Barnes rescue her 
from the sordid consequences of her affairs. At the end of the novel Barnes 
finally seems to break free of this unhealthy circle of betrayals and rescues, 
and leaves Brett to her own devices after one final trip to Madrid to bail her 
out of a failed relationship. Thus, the novel deals with a number of ways in 
which its characters can said to be lost: Barnes is lost in a World that favours 
masculine pursuits and expressions, none of which he is ultimately able to 
fully participate in: bull fighting, boxing, fishing and cycling being the most 
prominently mentioned in the novel. He negotiates a precarious, secondary 
masculinity as an observer and as a writer about all these pursuits, depict-
ing himself as a hard-working journalist. Instead of the original primary 
masculinity he is barred from enjoying and participating in, he substitutes 
a more cynical form of surrogate masculinity where he lets money play 
the role of potency. In particular, the novel associates France and French 
culture with prostitution and corruption. As long as one can decode what 
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the price of a transaction is, one will always be able to do well in France is 
the message Barnes sends. It is remarkable that a nation that has come out 
victorious in the War is seen as having lost its more primal values, but in 
the novel it is clearly a pattern that dogs all the victorious nations of World 
War 1, including the joke warriors of Italy, and the soft, almost homosexual 
masculinities of the US.
Lost Generation
On a more general level, this was exactly the inscription that Hemingway 
intended to add onto Stein’s original label of “Lost Generation”. Where she 
seems to indicate, echoing her perceptive garage mechanic, that the young 
men of the generation that came home from the War damaged were ‘lost’ 
in the sense of having lost their way or sense of direction, both physically 
and spiritually (the French word “perdue” carrying the religious overtone of 
‘perdition’), Hemingway reads the lostness in a more brutally literal sense: 
His characters have lost their balls, or at least their sexual prowess. The 
other characters in the novel, who are not as literally wounded as Barnes, 
are all soft and queer in some way as well: Cohen, whose Jewishness is de-
scribed as a weakness as well, is a boxer – but he lacks the knock-out punch. 
Romero, who is a strapping young bullfighter whose tight green pants leave 
nothing to the imagination of either Brett or the reader, ends up emasculated 
by her rapaciousness, and loses his touch with the bulls. Mike, Brett’s actual 
husband, is bankrupt and not man enough to face his debts and debtors. 
Even Bill, Jake’s only true American friend, is found wanting in his skills as 
a fisherman and a conversationalist (he is also the only character to openly 
mention the phenomenon of homosexuality). Thus, queerness is associated 
with the loss of the Lost Generation in Hemingway’s treatment of the phe-
nomenon. As mentioned earlier he returns to the scene of his writer’s life in 
Paris at the time in his 1964 memoir, A Moveable Feast, and in that bitter 
retrospective volume he viciously mocks Stein for her homosexuality and 
his closest friend and rival, F. Scott Fitzgerald for his anxiety over the size 
of his penis. It would seem that among the many things that were lost in the 
War for Hemingway was all human decency, that is to say whatever moral 
compass he might have had before his own war experiences as an ambu-
lance driver on the Italian (joke) front.
The tradition of thematizing traumatic loss and absence of values in genera-
tional writings that Hemingway founded with The Sun Also Rises continues 
in several ways in generational work by American fiction writers. F. Scott 
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Fitzgerald, who is the other important male writer of the Lost Generation, 
thematized trauma and loss of moral compass in somewhat different terms. 
Where Hemingway tended to rage against the World at large and take his 
frustrations out on his female characters, Fitzgerald’s characters were no 
less misogynistic, but tended to turn their rage inward as a destructive 
form of self-loathing. Fitzgerald’s debut novel, The Great Gatsby, which 
appeared the year before Hemingway’s debut and caused great jealousy in 
Hemingway, makes little overt reference to the War at all, but features a set 
of characters that are equally as damaged as those in Hemingway’s novel. 
The novel is set in the US, and concerns social and sexual ambition, rather 
than physical wounds and psychological compensation for them. Gatsby, 
whose story is lovingly told through the naïve narrator Nick, is gradually 
revealed to be an impostor who has used criminal means to gain a great 
fortune which he however is busy jeopardising and eventually squandering 
to impress his former sweetheart Daisy who in the meantime has married a 
fascist member of the old, moneyed East Coast autocracy. Daisy is an ambi-
tious social climber who is willing to take any amount of abuse to maintain 
her status, and she is in fact quite happy to raise her daughter in the same 
manner. Gatsby is however blind to Daisy’s fatal character flaws and will-
ing to go to any lengths to win her back and protect her from her own va-
cuity and ambitions. When he takes the blame for a vehicular manslaughter 
Daisy commits while drunk, he sets himself up for a rapid loss of all he has 
worked meticulously to attain, and Gatsby dies stupidly at the hands of the 
accident victim’s husband in a misguided act of attempted revenge. Nick 
is left to muse over what the story of the “Great” Gatsby might mean, but 
does not really have the mental acuity to offer much beyond blind loyalty to 
the image of Gatsby he has formed for himself (being in need of a hero and 
a moral compass that his own father was unwilling or able to supply) The 
novel ends with a famous passage in which Nick pleads for us all to toil on 
like boats desperately attempting to sail against the wind, and most critics 
and casual readers have failed to recognize the rather obvious irony in this 
plea – after all that is exactly what brought about Gatsby’s utter demise; the 
inability to face up to the reality principle.
In this novel the loss is twofold: a loss of moral direction, and a loss of en-
ergy and purpose in the face of life in general. Of course, The Great Gatsby 
does not directly lay the blame for these losses at the feet of the Great War 
in the unambiguous manner that Hemingway’s novel does, but nonetheless 
these feelings of anomie and shiftlessness are often described as core ele-
ments of a diagnosis of combat fatigue, or what in more modern terms is 
termed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, in Fitzgerald’s last 
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completed novel, Tender Is the Night, a failed attempt at surpassing his ear-
lier masterpiece, he creates a character, Dick Diver, who is both a psychoan-
alyst and a victim of war trauma. Diver is however also, and perhaps chiefly 
a victim of hubris in connection with his relationships with women, having 
breached all codes of ethics in the psychoanalytic profession and married 
a client of his who eventually ends up dragging him down into suicidal de-
pression himself. Nicole, Diver’s patient/wife is a traumatized incest victim, 
whom Diver fancies himself capable of saving – a pattern which repeats it-
self when Diver becomes disenchanted with Nicole and starts an affair with 
a much younger woman, Rosemary, for whom he commits a cover-up of a 
crime (exactly repeating the plot of The Great Gatsby). Eventually Diver 
ends up betrayed and abandoned by both women, and despite his saviour 
syndrome he is unable to save himself from alcoholism and inability to 
work as an analyst. Much of Diver’s need to function as a saviour can be 
traced back to his experiences in World War 1 that left him prone to self-
doubts and addictions (alcohol).
Thus the core texts by core members of the American Lost Generation share 
common features. They depict a crisis of masculinity, directly traceable 
back to the War and its onslaught on the manhood of its participants. The 
fear of death, but equally of cowardice, evinced by these characters, could 
and should have been assuaged by the females that have ‘kept the home fires 
burning’ while the men fought the war, but the women commit the ultimate 
betrayal by denying their men the comfort they long for. Instead, the wom-
en are either too gender ambiguous as in the case of the predator Brett in 
The Sun Also Rises, or too weak and needy as the neurotic and narcissistic 
female characters in the two Gatsby novels. This pattern in generational 
novels by male authors to pin the cause for loss of masculinity and freedom 
on female characters continues for almost the whole remainder of the twen-
tieth century in the US, and this could perhaps be argued to be one of the 
biggest unnoticed trauma chains/consequences of World War 1 in American 
culture. 
Part of the reason why this reading possibility for Lost Generation novels 
has gone largely unnoticed is of course the presence of much more overt 
novelistic commentary on the Great War, to some extent authored by the 
same individuals as those discussed above. Hemingway is naturally the best 
example of a generational writer who also practised the art of the war novel. 
He in fact wrote two of his best known novels about wars he personally 
participated in: A Farewell to Arms (1929) about a World War 1 ambulance 
driver who is wounded on the Italian front (as was Jake Barnes); and For 
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Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) about the Spanish Civil War. It is A Farewell 
to Arms that warrants a brief commentary here. The novel was in fact 
Hemingway’s first bestseller, and it therefore had a more immediate impact 
on the iconospheric afterlife of World War 1 than his debut novel had at the 
time. The iconic afterlife of A Farewell to Arms has also been furthered by 
numerous adaptations, first for the stage, and later for both film and TV. Its 
plot, however, is largely a variation on the tragic story of how war and love 
get conflated in a traumatized male psyche (Frederic Henry, the wounded 
ambulance drivers falls in love with his nurse at the hospital where he is a 
convalescent) that we already were told in The Sun Also Rises (as the two 
novels are both autobiographically occasioned, this similarity is not entirely 
surprising). In A Farewell to Arms the female protagonist, Catherine, offers 
potential salvation for the wounded and traumatized hero (much as Brett 
did, albeit under different circumstances, for Jake Barnes), who is unjustly 
persecuted for treasonous and cowardly behaviour at the front. After mul-
tiple escapes and much hardship, the couple effectuates a successful escape 
to Switzerland, but in a melodramatic turn of events, Henry loses both his 
lover and his child during the birth of the latter. Female consolation is thus 
again shown to be utterly inadequate as salve for a war wound.
The Beats and Onward
We now return to the general thread of intergenerational trauma transmis-
sion. The later literary generations in the US all share features with the 
Lost Generation in their labelling practice. The adjectives without fail have 
the same duality of absence and presence that ‘lost’ carries in it. The ‘50s 
Generation of the Beats, the ‘80s Blank Generation, and finally the 1990s 
Generation X show elements of transgenerational trauma transmission as 
well, in connection with their representations of beleaguered masculinity. 
Looking first at the label ambiguities and the acts of naming involved it is 
clear that ‘Beat’ at first glance looks more upbeat than ‘Lost’, perhaps to 
the uninitiated suggesting a rhythmic element to the characters’ lives as 
well as the authors’ prose. While this to a certain extent is true, it should 
also be noted that Jack Kerouac, the author who is the ‘father’ of the Beat 
Generation in the same way that Hemingway is of the Lost Generation, in-
sisted on the duality of the ‘Beat’ label (see also Mortenson, 2011 for a gen-
eral introduction to Beat poetics and ethos). For Kerouac, those who were 
‘Beat’, were so in the sense of being downtrodden and worn-out elements at 
the bottom of society in terms of social class and status. Kerouac borrowed 
this sense of the word ‘beat’ from the street slang of black and white hipsters 
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of his acquaintance, frequenting the dives of Times Square in New York 
City in the late 1940s. Many of these characters were ‘Beat’ in the sense that 
they were addicts and criminals, discarded by society because of their lack 
of willingness to contribute to the economy and conform to the materiality 
of the American Dream, for instance by serving in the recently concluded 
World War 2. In subsequent versions of his narrative of naming his genera-
tion, Kerouac added a religion dimension to the label ‘Beat’ by suggesting 
that a member of the generation could also become ‘beat’ by being ‘beatif-
ic’ in the sense of being a radiant saint-like role model for his peers. This 
added layer of significance grew in Kerouac’s understanding of the label’s 
implications as he reverted to his childhood Catholicism after flirting with 
Buddhist beliefs in his most famous novels On the Road and Dharma Bums 
which established him as a generational spokesperson.
The two final generational labels are ‘empty’ in a slightly different way than 
the first two, in the sense that ‘Blank’ directly indicates the absence – the 
space before the word ‘Generation’ is literally left blank – yet, at the same 
time it is NOT blank, exactly because the word ‘Blank’ literally is there. 
The label ‘X’ is particularly rich in connotations, but let it suffice here to say 
that ‘X’ indicates, among other things, the unknown entity, the value that 
one has to solve the equation to come up with, and the marking on a map 
of the spot where treasure lies buried. These dualities again encompass the 
absence/presence duality, involving a promise of fulfilment if one does the 
required work. The suggestion behind this brief sketch of the label evolution 
in American literary generations is that in some ways the emptiness of the 
original loss of the post-World War 1 generation continues to haunt the later 
generations. “I once was lost, but now I am found”, as the lyrics to the popu-
lar gospel song Amazing Grace goes, indicating the hope of young men (the 
protagonists in American generational novels are almost invariably male, 
as are the authors writing such novels) of redemption of the original loss. 
And where does the loss stem from? It is a mixture of original sin (which as 
we know was first perpetrated by woman in the Garden of Eden, when the 
primordial fruit of knowledge was shared), and traumatic loss of innocence 
provided by the experience of the slaughter of war (which echoes the first 
murder scene in the Bible, the killing of Abel by his brother Cain). This is 
not to suggest that all generational novels in the last three literary genera-
tions are all war or trauma narratives, however the traumatic loss of mas-
culinity is there as an unbroken chain, transmitted from Hemingway and 
Fitzgerald’s post-World War 1 fictions. The last part of this chapter briefly 
examines the transmutations of the themes of trauma and loss in the later 
American generational fictions.
148
In Kerouac’s On the Road, the two male protagonists drive thousands of 
miles across the American continent, from east to west and back again, 
before finally plunging south, into Mexico, in their quest for an elusive re-
demption or tranquillity, which in the novel is labelled with frustrating lack 
of concreteness as “IT”. This “IT” is related to jazz music, to the African-
American race and its culture, and to an immediacy of life that for Kerouac 
is associated with Spengler’s idea of the Fellaheen, the poor uneducated 
people of the land, which in Kerouac’s case becomes synonymous with be-
ing ‘Beat’. The quest continues unsuccessfully to the novel’s very end where 
the two protagonists part ways. One goes on in his search for ‘kicks’ (anoth-
er synonym for “IT”), the other goes home to his mother’s house to attempt 
to heal his wounds and the sickness his travels have inflicted on him. The 
latter is Sal Paradise, Kerouac’s alter ego in the novel, who is the more re-
flective of the two, and who has understood that “IT” should not be equated 
exclusively with sexual pleasure and loud music and drugs, but can only 
truly be attained through contemplation and peace of mind (for a further 
discussion of the quest in Kerouac’s On the Road, consult Sørensen, 2013b). 
This ‘cure’ for restlessness and a feeling of emptiness and that “everything 
was dead” resembles the strategies Hemingway’s Barnes attempted in 
the battle of overcoming his trauma, and in fact there are two scenes in 
Kerouac’s On the Road that directly reference Hemingway (naming him as 
a stylist) or offer up a direct pastiche of the plot of The Sun Also Rises. One 
could therefore argue that the trauma travels intertextually into the next 
generation of seekers in the quest novels of the Beat and later generations.
In Douglas Coupland’s novel Generation X, we again meet two main pro-
tagonists, both male, who seek a form of sanctuary from the trauma of their 
contemporary culture and the burdensome legacy of the previous, far more 
privileged, generation (in this case the post-World War 1 Baby Boomers). 
Again it is sanctuary that these young males seek, and in a striking parallel 
to Kerouac’s novel, it is south of the border, down Mexico way, they hope 
to find the particular locus of their peace of mind. The protagonists’ uto-
pian project in Generation X is to found a hotel, where one pays not with 
money but with stories to stay. Along the way, the protagonists try to come 
to terms with the loss of material and emotional capital, as they all opt out 
of careers and marriages/nuclear families in favour of elective affinities in 
peer groups. The trauma narrative is less obvious in Generation X, since 
this generation has not been called upon to serve in any war, unlike the Lost 
and the Beat, but it is nonetheless present, as evidenced by Dag, one of the 
protagonists, who has a deep-rooted fear of the nuclear holocaust, having 
been a young child at the height of the Cold War (for a deeper discussion of 
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nostalgia for the past in Coupland, see Greenberg, 2013). Thus even three 
generations removed from World War 1, young American males experience 
an intergenerationally transmitted war trauma (by proxy, in the case of the 
X’ers) which render them insecure in their roles in society, family relations 
and expressions of their own sexuality.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present chapter has been an attempt at reading a wide va-
riety of cultural texts, ranging from documentary films, via various types of 
personal and communal memorializations of war (mainly poems and songs), 
to generational fictions. These cultural texts have been discussed in an ima-
gological perspective to determine the continuing presence of World War 1 
in the iconosphere even a full century after the events of that war. It has been 
established that images of the War continue to be recharged with new sig-
nificance for every new, passing generation – often aided in their presence 
by transmission by iconic contemporary figures whose own memorialization 
is on-going (as in the example with Leonard Cohen and In Flanders Fields). 
Further, the first half of the chapter demonstrated some of the global legacies 
of the British involvement in World War 1, with particular attention to the 
critical, or even postcolonial figurations of the Great War in twentieth centu-
ry and contemporary popular culture in Canada, Ireland and Australia. The 
second half of the chapter was not as directly focused on the imagological af-
terlife of the War, but rather on the trauma chains World War 1 initiated in the 
form of a crisis of masculinity in American culture, or as imagology would 
have it, the auto-images of Americanness. It was shown how the transmission 
of such sexualized traumas as represented in Hemingway and Fitzgerald’s 
novels travelled obliquely to the post-World War 1 period in the writings of 
Beat Generation author Jack Kerouac, and could be traced in novels as late as 
1991’s Generation X by Douglas Coupland.
World War 1 is thus still with us in both positive and negative images. The 
images of heroism that the immediate contemporaries of the War years 
longed to impose on the war effort and the societal order it created in its 
aftermath have not fared well over time, whereas the anti-imperialist im-
ages produced in the 1920s and onwards have grown in strength, not least 
by becoming intertwined imagologically with positive auto-images of inde-
pendence in the Commonwealth countries, but also negative auto-images of 
faltering masculinity in strands of American culture.
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Endnotes
1 For full text, consult Bogle (2016). 
2 Repetition, indicating a Sisyphean feeling of futility. See also Carruth 
(1995).
3  For a discussion of trauma transmission, consult Sørensen (2013a)

153
Chapter 8
The impact of World War 1 
on French literature: 
Literary traces of the war 
experience – formal challenges 
in French literature
Steen Bille Jørgensen
Given the central role of France in World War 1, as well politically, strategi-
cally, and geographically, the War itself left multiple and profound traces at 
all levels of the nation. Not only were the landscapes around Verdun formed 
by the battles, but memorial monuments bear witness to traces of the war 
experience in French culture. In France, the commemoration of this event 
has played an important role in the official history, with the early decora-
tions of war heroes and military parades marking the armistice every year 
on 11 November. As a historian, Pierre Nora has worked on cultural mem-
ory and created the notion of lieux de mémoire to emphasize the relation 
between history and ways of representing the past. According to this per-
spective, history is dependent on storytelling, and it is hardly surprising that 
an abundant literature on different aspects of La Grande Guerre (The Great 
War) has marked the literary history of the twentieth century. “La Grande 
guerre a nourri la littérature durant un siècle”1. These words are Laurence 
Campa’s, which she develops further:
“comprise comme une rupture inaugurale. C’est pourquoi elle s’in-
scrit dans la mémoire contemporaine, ainsi que dans les récits de 
transmission et de filiation, qui forment un courant majeur du roman 
contemporain (pensons aux Champs d’honneur de Jean Rouaud”)2.
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However, the question remains: how should we distinguish and understand 
the specific ways in which writers deal with the war experience, and more 
generally the theme of World War 1? One first observation could be that 
narratives allow human beings to create order vis-à-vis reality and the lived 
experience. From this perspective, the French attach a quite particular at-
tention to the force of literature. This is probably the reason why P. Nora, 
following a philosopher like Paul Ricœur who examines and compares his-
torical and literary discourses, emphasizes the importance of – more or less 
ritual – revitalizing of national collective memory3. Still, when it comes to 
the variety of literary expressions, we must take into account a more criti-
cal attitude towards “official national commemoration”4. In many ways, the 
literary – “written” – and individually based relationships to the past can be 
seen as the contribution of French culture to a larger cultural history with 
its nuanced approach to the relationship between collective memory and 
individual experience as such5. 
If it is fair to say that the beginning and the end of the War can be fixed 
to the period 1914-1918, it is more complicated to delimit both the individ-
ual and the collective memory. Publishing his inventory of testimonies or 
témoignages, Norton Cru equally established that a chronology 1915-1928 
of firsthand – or immediate – renderings of the war experience could not 
move beyond the end of the twenties, one of his own criteria being the ve-
racity of the soldiers’ writings, their quality as memoirs. However, in French 
literary history, the traces of the collective national experience can be de-
tected in fictional – or increasingly, mediated – writings, less patriotic than 
the early ones and more critical in storytelling, competing even with the of-
ficial nationalistic versions. Beyond official celebration of heroism, Antoine 
Compagnon points out this aspect of writing on the war:
“Toute écriture de la guerre, y compris la composition d’une an-
thologie, passe par une descente aux enfers, impose une épreuve 
expiatoire, entraîne la rencontre de nos fantômes, et l’on ne revient 
pas indemne d’une telle expiation” (Compagnon, Préface, p. 7)6
In his recent anthology La Grande Guerre des écrivains (2014), in his at-
tempt to sketch the history of literature on World War 1, Compagnon distin-
guishes three phases of literary writing7. Taking our point of departure in 
the early writings and its canonized writers like Apollinaire, Barbusse and, 
later Céline (but also Aragon), the more intricate part becomes the increas-
ingly formalist novels in contemporary literature and how to deal with the 
distance in time and poetics based on documents, rewriting, and intertex-
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tuality. Writers of our time do not have firsthand experience, but have gath-
ered knowledge and information in many different ways. As we shall see 
through a series of works published from the late eighties and onwards, it is 
crucial to take into account the combination of stylization and critical inten-
tion.8 The emotions that are very often the point of departure for the writing 
are, evidently, related to losses and suffering very much present at the level 
of the family. Still, it remains open how the writer goes about persuading 
the reader to cease the more collective ideological aspects of the personal 
experience. Paradoxically, this becomes a question of aesthetics and literary 
form, and this kind of “oblique approach” does have a privileged status in 
the French context.9 
Writing the war 
It is quite intriguing to think that one of the first writers to publish on World 
War 1 was the poet Guillaume Apollinaire. Much along the lines of futur-
ist euphoria related to progress, technology, and even warfare, his poem 
La Petite auto / The Little Car – expressing uncertainty – is also a poem 
about new horizons. The “narrator” of this trip in an automobile is thor-
oughly dated (although it probably took place a month earlier): “Le 31 du 
mois d’Août 1914”10 is the first line of the poem, where we hear about a 
trip from Deauville to Paris, much like the one Apollinaire actually made 
when he heard that the War had been declared, and he decided to join the 
army: “Nous dîmes adieu à toute une époque”11 (Apollinaire 1965: 207). 
Even before his actual participation in warfare, Apollinaire is aware of its 
enormous consequences that contrast with the word “small” we find in the 
title, and the subject seems ready to let destiny rule. Heroically, he imagi-
nes the “hauteurs inimaginables”12, where the human fights against another 
human. Formally, the poem corresponds to the ideal of Esprit Nouveau, the 
words and stances forming the graphic image of a car floating between two 
uncertain lines or borders. This image, marking a pause in the text, might 
suggest a future that is blocked and the idea of an exploded tire could simul-
taneously suggest the positive renewal and the uncertain future. 
Later, in his Poèmes à Lou from 1915, Apollinaire writes love letters to 
Louise. These poems express the intensity of both the war and his feel-
ings: “Ô mon ciel, ô mon beau ciel gemmé de cannonades / Le ciel faisait 
la roue comme un phénix qui flambe/ Paon lunaire rouant Ainsi-soit-il”13 
(Apollinaire 1965: 433). The image of the lightning from grenades is very 
powerful. The war experience and the love story seem to coincide, and the 
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writing transgresses the distance between the situations of the trenches and 
the loved one nourishing his imagination at a time when he had not yet 
been at the front line and felt the imminent threat to his life. If Apollinaire’s 
aesthetic and existential ideal is one of intensity, his view of the War would 
change once he moved to the front line of battle and discovered the atroci-
ties of the War. The impact or legacy of his work would indeed represent a 
more positive battle for humanist values. 
Like Apollinaire predicted, the War would change the world, and in France 
the literary norms would also be profoundly affected. Very radical artis-
tic positions, like Proust’s and Duchamp’s, would make 1913 a magical 
year and point to the absurdities of Dada and the surrealist avant-gardism. 
However, between 1915 and 1918, four novels on World War 1 received 
the prestigious Goncourt-prize. The second of these titles was Henry 
Barbusse’s Le Feu – Journal d’une escouade,14 which became a kind of 
model for writing on the War.15 Writing on the War and using the term 
Journal as a sub-title, readers would expect to find a relatively authentic 
narrative of the war experience. 
In general, the genre of the témoignage, or “testimony”, played an impor-
tant role and allowed the ordinary soldier a space for reflection and com-
munication of the horrors, but also the trust among fellow beings which is 
expressed by the term escouade, which means “squad”. In Le Feu, Barbusse 
not only uses surnames for all of his fellow soldiers, he also renders the 
language used in the trenches and creates a kind of model for the writing 
of the War. In this way, he gives an impression of authenticity regarding 
the relation between the narrator and his fellow beings. Nevertheless, in 
his commentaries on Le Feu, Jean Norton Cru questions its veracity, ques-
tioning the descriptions of the trenches after combat, and criticizing the 
composition of narrative as opposed to the rendering of “lived experience”. 
Critics have written much about the book as a sort of “fictionalized journal”. 
In fact, it is hard to say when you met the true story of the War, and even 
the ones who experienced the trenches need to construct the narrative.16 It 
becomes crucial to understand the importance of genre conventions and 
narrative strategies as ways of rendering the traumatic experience, both at 
an individual and a collective level. 
The war experience varied according to the point of view and the actual 
position of the writer. This becomes clear to reader of La Grande guerre 
des écrivains, an anthology published in 2014 by Antoine Compagnon. Of 
course we find letters from the trenches written, for example, by Norton 
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Cru and Céline, but we also find female authors like Colette and Yourcenar 
who did not, of course, participate in the battles. The impact on the ones 
left behind by the men was immediate, as we can see in Colette’s La Fin 
de Chéri (1926). Yourcenar’s journal writing, published in Le Labyrinthe 
du monde (1988), reflects on the front domestique (Compagnon 2014: 625). 
Yet another writer who wrote about the War, without having participated 
in warfare, was Romain Rolland. From his retreat or exile in Switzerland, 
he would – as an intellectual – try to persuade his contemporaries of the 
absurdities of war by way of rhetorical means, when he published his Au-
dessus de la mêlée in 191517, based on 16 articles published in the Journal 
de Genève from 2 September 1914 to 2 August 1915. As a writer constantly 
aiming at a universal perspective and with a remarkable sense of the oth-
er (Lüsebrink 2016 :149), he would receive the Nobel Prize for Literature. 
Although the prize is a recognition of his work in general, he received it 
right after having published this pamphlet in favor of peace. However, this 
kind of pacifist pamphlet against hatred and violence above national inter-
ests was not appreciated by the French. 
The novel, above all
Considering the more clearly fictional narratives based on the war expe-
rience, Compagnon talks about a certain distance necessary for the writer 
who would rethink the war experience (Compagnon 2014: 22). In the first 
half of the thirties, we find novels by Montherlant and Drieux La Rochelle, 
but the most widely read, translated – and controversial – would be Céline’s 
Voyage au bout de la nuit. As a novel on the ancient combatant, it would be 
followed in 1944 by Louis Aragon’s Aurélien, which resumed the commu-
nist writer’s cycle Le Monde reel. Both of these novels are considered to 
be stylistic masterpieces, and both narratives develop a plot line based on 
the young man returning from war and trying to find his position in life, 
in spite of the writers’ different ideological positions. Still, let’s first take 
a closer look at Voyage au bout de la nuit, and then compare it to Aurélien.
It is interesting to consider that Céline himself did not believe that he could 
write as well about the War as Barbusse did in Le Feu. However, this novel 
remains a classic often quoted by other writers, even beyond World War 1 
and Céline’s anti-Semitic pamphlets written between 1937 and 1941. In a 
sort of Prologue, the plot of the War is launched with the following sentence: 
“Ca a débuté comme ça”18. The reader meets the narrator without knowing 
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his name, and at the end of the chapter we read, “On était faits comme des 
rats”19. In the following approximately forty pages, fear of death, humilia-
tion, and the imagined – but never actually present – enemy is presented, 
but at the same time mediated in a sarcastic-ironic tone. The claustrophobic 
experience of obedience and, more or less abstract, threats makes the reader 
understand that every human can be a coward and that Bardamu’s volun-
teering was based on a naïve idea of the War.
Regarding the structure of the novel, the protagonist’s experience of the 
War is presented in the first fifty pages of this linear, chronological narra-
tive. However, the apparently authentic representation of the War is clearly 
literary. This artistic intention is even more thoroughly signaled in three 
preceding small texts: “Voyager, c’est bien utile ça fait travailler l’esprit”20, 
and on the following page: “Ah on remet le voyage en route”21. The reader 
is already immersed in the narrative development related to the allegorical 
title before he meets the protagonist who will carry the plot and take him 
both to Africa and the US, before we return to the poor banlieues in Paris 
and ends with Bardamu’s reflections on Robinson’s death. 
In 1936, Céline would publish Mort à credit and create a kind of general 
narrative frame for the story on the Parisian Doctor Bardamu. However, 
both the tone and the structure are radically different from his first novel. 
In the opening, we meet the disillusioned Bardamu working as doctor after 
World War 1, as was the case in Voyage. However, in an extensive flash-
back, the narrative develops a kind of negative Bildungsroman that ends 
with the young protagonist who decides to volunteer and go to war. None of 
his family life, sentimental relations, or professional life promise any kind 
of future. At some point, he finds a position with the inventor and impostor 
Courtial, whom he respects and follows until this relatively positive role 
model commits suicide. Not even his uncle – the most positive figure – tak-
ing care of him at the end of the novel is able to persuade him not to go to 
war. The protagonist’s perception of the world determines the cynical view 
of humanity and its grotesque features. Humans appear to be controlled by 
their most simple needs, and only the phantasmagoric figure of the inventor 
or pseudo-scientist might have been some kind of a role model. However, 
the medical framing and the representation should be read as a diagnosis 
of the disease-struck humankind. The only aspect of Céline’s writing that 
inspires some kind of hope is the rage or the energy on the level of style. 
Somehow, we have to make friends with the dark sides of existence to be 
able to read his books and perhaps even find dreams and hope again, once 
we are through with reading.
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If we now turn to Louis Aragon’s Aurélien, the whole setting is quite dif-
ferent. Aurélien Leurtillois has returned from war, and lives on his heritage 
in Paris. Nothing really pushes him to work or otherwise define a project in 
life, unlike his friend Barbentane, who has a brilliant career. The portrait of 
Barbentane in Chapter 3 presents a smart – if not opportunistic – character 
who profits both during the War and after. The two of them became friends 
when Aurélien decides to contact his comrade from the War. However, in 
the first lines of Chapter 4 we get a closer look at Aurélien himself: 
“Le fait est qu’Aurélien aimait peu qu’on lui parlât de la guerre et 
qu’il craignait la façon de ceux qui l’avaient faite comme la curios-
ité malsaine des autres. Il n’aurait pas su expliquer la conséquence 
logique de ces choses, mais la politique d’après-guerre l’ennuyait 
à peu près de la même façon. Il n’avait pas répondu aux invites des 
sociétés d’anciens de ses régiments. Sollicité par plusieurs associa-
tions, il n’était entré dans aucune”22 (1944: 35).
Aurélien reflects on his own “irresolution”, and thinks he is the only one to 
suffer from this consequence of the war. The omniscient narrator, however, 
lets the reader know that a lot of men felt the same way. We also hear that 
his inactivity is a lot like his experience from the trenches in wartime: “cette 
attente sans objet, cette absence de perspective”23 (1944: 73). In the follow-
ing passage, three consecutive sentences begin with the word “L’étrange”24, 
and the narrator lets us understand that the reality of the War fades in his 
memory like dreams of the past. On this background of the war experience, 
the potential romance between Aurélien and Bérénice – who is already mar-
ried – seems to be the only perspective. Still, as suggested by the mere sur-
name Bérénice (which we also find in Apollinaire’s poetry) reminding us 
of Racine’s tragedy, the mortal ending comes where Bérénice is found dead 
comes as no surprise at the end of the book.
Both in Céline’s and Aragon’s novels, World War 1 and the war experience 
as such become an essential part of literary character. Both male protago-
nists have a hard time adapting to society. Structurally, both plots evoke the 
War in the opening and are marked by death in the ending. Céline’s pro-
tagonist is incapable of moving beyond the war experience, and the ending 
implies a fatal and cynical view of life. In Aurélien, the melancholy stems 
from the protagonist’s irresolution and the claustrophobic war experience 
prolonged in the Parisian bourgeois lifestyle. Insisting on the complicat-
ed alienated lifestyle of their protagonists, these two writers do not make 
the war experience the central theme of the novel. However, the impact of 
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the War on writing the relationship between the individual and society has 
changed, with a fatal-tragic dimension which finds very different stylistic 
expressions in the writing of two ideologically opposed writers. World War 
1 appears as a radical rupture and opposes the identity of the ancient com-
batant to society, as such in an almost ontological way.25
If a certain void in the writing on World War 1 can be detected in the period 
of 1945-198026, one wonders if this is due to World War 2, and the prox-
imity of traumatic experiences taken a step further with Nazism and the 
Holocaust. This is probably also the reason why Claude Simon’s L’Acacia 
– published in 1989 – is at the same time a novel on World War 1 and World 
War 2 with its alternating plotlines. In spite of the aesthetics of fragmen-
tation, which predominates Simon’s complex novels, he constantly insists 
on the reality of the war experience and how things really were. In other 
words, making a formal literary attempt to establish an equivalent between 
the two wars, Claude Simon, who was born in 1913, is trying to be the 
contemporary of earlier generations, in the same way that he wants his own 
contemporaries – and later readers – to become the contemporaries of his 
experience. In this way, the real persists thanks to indirect or oblique liter-
ary expression founded in the author’s specific experience.27
Narrative models, remediation, and serial effects
But how do things work when we look at literature written by authors who 
did not themselves experience the trenches or warfare altogether? In many 
ways, the literary strategies and topoi change. Memory is no longer an in-
dividual question of literary expression. On the contrary, the individual 
writer must necessarily rely on historical documents, whether they be 
official historiography, letters of documents (like photographs) found in the 
attic, or literary sources. Making an impact becomes a question of the way 
to valorize a specific memory, more or less in opposition with the official 
national memory.
Thus, in contemporary writing, one tendency which is specifically French 
or Francophone, is related to the status formula literature, like crime fiction 
and graphic novels (or comic books) and their quest for truth and justice 
with its emotional effects.28 Regarding the impact of the War and the ques-
tion of literary form, the codes and conventions of these genres both work 
with its stereotypes (narration and characters). This also implies a unique 
kind of attention to the everyday life that it depicts and celebrates. This is 
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probably one of the reasons why the traces of the war experience touch the 
reader of these forms all the more efficiently, making us understand that 
ancient combatants do, in fact, carry the traces of the War, and that these 
traces are very often neglected during the official (national) commemora-
tions.29 Thus, crime fiction is, with its critical potential, a special kind of 
“littérature populaire” – in the strongest and noblest sense of the expression 
“the people’s literature” – dealing with social injustice and provoking hu-
manist indignation. 
One of the first authors of crime fiction to take his work in this direction is 
Jean Amila / Jean Meckert. His novel Le Boucher des Hurlus (1982), which 
left traces in literary history, was rewritten by Didier Daeninckx whose 
book Le Der des ders would even be adapted to the medium of the comic by 
Jacques Tardi. 30 From this perspective, the writing and rewriting of history 
becomes a question of criticizing official narratives and storytelling, and 
reminding us of “alternative stories” rooted in the experience of ordinary 
people and everyday life. Let us take a closer look at Le Boucher des Hurlus 
(1982) and the way in which the writer uses formula literature to create a 
literary effect and a symbolic impact on World War 1 literature.
In this book, we are not exactly confronted with the destiny of the “the 
small soldiers” (as one critic calls the ones who fought in the trenches), but 
with the son of an ancient combatant who has been executed for his attempt 
at desertion. In this way, the impact of the War is related to the theme of 
generations, memory, and the mind, represented in the narrative perspective 
of the boy imagining more or less the destiny of his father. This destiny is 
also very much related to his mother’s situation. In the opening of the book, 
she is constantly harassed by the neighbors because of her husband’s sup-
posed lack of commitment and loyalty – he is suspected to be a mutineer – 
which illustrates the division between the men’s experience in the warzone 
and the women’s at home.
The taste for revenge becomes the driving force of the narrative, and the 
narrator finds accomplices in the orphanage that he is sent to after his 
mother’s committal to a psychiatric institution. The boy Michou, who is 
eight years old, convinces his orphan comrades that they have to kill the 
General des Gringues, the “Boucher des Hurlus” – in their mind respon-
sible for their fathers’ deaths – very much contrast with the adventurous 
spirit of some of the boys hoping to go abroad, to Canada for instance. The 
boys’ very simple, but still strong and coherent, reasoning contrasts very 
much with the chaos and absurdity of the adult world. What could be seen 
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as an absurd, infantile plan turns out to be a movingly absurd story, with its 
quality of anti-romantic Bildungsreise. One very material example of this 
is the pistol that the boys find and eventually use – more or less by acci-
dent – in taking another person’s life. They find a kind of relief in taking 
action, and some of them still want to hit the original target, but – absurdly 
– it turns out that the ancient officer that they are searching for has, in the 
meantime, died from natural causes. They even learn from the front page of 
a newspaper that he is going to have an official national funeral. The very 
impossibility of the boys’ project is symbolic of the injustice and the tone of 
the whole story equally related to despair and potential madness, when it is 
actually society that seems to have lost it senses.
Paradoxically, in adopting the children’s perspective, the critical and eth-
ical aspects of the book become all the more persuasive. The heroic way 
of taking action is based on emotion, intuition, and guts more than actual 
documentation. The fictional universe makes the reader feel the indigna-
tion and perhaps, more intellectually, adopt the critical and ethical point of 
view. This is probably also what inspires Le Der des ders (1984) by Didier 
Daeninckx, whose approach to World War 1, according to the “rules of the 
detective genre”, seems a lot more based on research and documents.31 One 
is even tempted to read the pun of the title as a signal of the fictional ma-
nipulations of historical facts: the Great War that has been referred to as “la 
dernière des dernières”32 in the French context. Still, the use of the gram-
matical singularis refers to the private investigator René Griffon, whose 
death perhaps also signifies the disappearance of idealism as such.
At least Daeninckx’ Le Der des ders does not inspire much more hope than 
Amila’s novel. The powerful ones, who are guilty, avoid punishment, and 
instead more socially fragile figures are the ones who end as the victims 
of history33. This may be the reason why the traditional figure of the pri-
vate investigator becomes the couple of a woman and a man. At least the 
narrative develops two parallel stories of couples: the investigation being 
based on a story of adultery, the retired colonel by involving the investigator 
that he wants to document the whereabouts of his wife, who actually hangs 
out with pilots of the War. Nevertheless, neither jealousy nor money is the 
colonel’s concern. It turns out that he wants to frame the detective in a plot 
on documents from the War – a soldier’s “témoignage” – testifying to the 
colonel’s role in the War. Just as was the case in Amila’s novel, the final 
page of the book reveals a newspaper announcement of the inauguration 
of a new memo rial monument. Quite significantly, the plot leads this main 
character to go undercover in the anarchist movement of the postwar period. 
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In this way, he discovers the existence of the “soldier’s journal” revealing 
the colonel’s guilt in a murderous act during the War. In Chapter 15, out of 
the book’s 16 chapters, the text of this document is reproduced, and thus 
the reader’s emotions become central when he reads the actual words of the 
solider. The feel of authenticity is essential to this kind of representation re-
lated to the ethical flaw of the officers ready to do anything to defend them-
selves, not at all engaging in combat to defend the nation. At the fictional 
level, the document remains unpublished and the truth unknown to the pub-
lic. The intervention of the private investigator paradoxically prevented the 
anarchists from revealing the content of the central document and injustice 
prevails. It is far from surprising that Jacques Tardi, as an author of comics 
and graphic novels, finds inspiration for his work in Daeninckx’s novel. 
Jacques Tardi’s work on World War 1 has found its most clearly documented 
form in the monumental It Was the War of the trenches, his masterpiece (of 
three volumes) which was translated into English in 2010. Here, the trau-
matic nature of the War is traced in minute detail, and the reading experi-
ence is quite overwhelming.34 If the pictures are likely to haunt the reader, 
this is probably because Tardi himself has been haunted by these. Tardi 
keeps depicting World War 1, and his friends have asked him if he ever gets 
out of his trenches. Still, this obsession with the topic does not mean that 
he just repeats himself, and this is probably one of the reasons why texts 
like Daeninckx’s become valuable sources of inspiration.35 The similarities 
between the two lie in their critical attitude and a strong sense of integrity, 
and both of them are motivated by a personal history and their grandfather’s 
war experience.
Tardi’s black and white comic version of Le Der des ders makes one feel 
an almost the melancholic atmosphere with its “baudelairian humidity”. 
The cold and the darkness of Daeninckx’s novel becomes quite tangible. 
However, one also finds a particular pleasure in the plot making, the econ-
omy of the pictures and the text being very well balanced. In this album, 
the careful Tardi-reader can also find one tiny image from the trenches, a 
nightmare scene provoking the awakening of the hero (1999: 46). This kind 
of intertextual strategy refers to Soldat Varlot which is an adaptation, an 
early version of “Le Monument” (1998), a Daeninckx text directly related 
to the trenches and the horrors and the absurdity of war as such.36 In Soldat 
Varlot, this story is developed into a horrible plot line depicting the pure 
chaos and absurdity of the War. Tardi succeeds in creating his own unique 
universe. Living soldiers look more and more like the skulls and skeletons 
of the dead, very much in contrast to the fleshy girls sleeping with the en-
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emy (as prostitutes), when Varlot is handing over a letter from his fallen 
comrade to his fiancé in the local village. The last image of this album, 
simply repeating the first, underlines the claustrophobic atmosphere of an 
absurd, inhuman universe. 
These three authors all depict the violence and injustice after the War, as well 
as during the life in the trenches and the attacks with grenades and, what is 
more, their motivation for writing on the War is very similar. Just like the 
case of many French people, their relatives of earlier generations had been in 
war and had tried to escape from its horrors. But what also becomes evident 
is the importance of a textual and intertextual logic. Contemporary writers 
must necessarily look for (literary and historical) sources, and Daeninckx’s 
short story integrates the narrative form of the “journal” to bring the reader 
closer to the actual experience of the “poilu”, leaving traces of his own read-
ings of the texts from the immediate postwar period at the same time. The 
fragmentation of the comic, presenting one image after the other, makes the 
reader feel all the more strongly that time seems to have stopped. This kind 
of suspension, through the representation of “text”, implies that no goal can 
be attained and no development is possible.
If one can detect a serial logic in the intertextual repetition of conflicts 
between the system and the individual, this is one of the major impacts of 
French “writing of the War”. All three authors point to the gap between the 
national mythology and the traces in the individuals’ minds. On the one 
hand, France as a nation celebrates the armistice and raises memorial monu-
ments in honor of the fallen (the unknown poilu at the Arc de Triomphe). On 
the other hand, the image of the trenches, the mutilated that have returned 
from the War, and the taste of revenge or acknowledgement is quite a differ-
ent story. In France, the commitment of the intellectual37 plays an important 
role. As a critic, one cannot help thinking that this is a very typically French 
phenomenon and a symptomatic expression of the literary awareness in its 
relation to history and ethical questions, such as injustice and disguising 
the truth on humiliation, suffering, and execution of the simple poilu on 
the orders of military superiors that appear to be cowards themselves. The 
real crimes are the ones perpetrated by the powerful representatives of the 
nation such as policemen and officers, and with Daeninckx’s crime fiction, 
“plot making” becomes a basic literary component for the archeological 
investigation of the present and the past38. 
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Minuit writers against the littérature impassible?
If we move from formula literature to the very sophisticated “Minuit-
literature”, a quite different formal tendency can be found. After the begin-
ning of Minuit with the New Novel, critics presented the novels of this pub-
lishing house using the term littérature impassible, which means a literature 
more or less untouched by reality. In many ways, its very aesthetic criteria 
can be seen as the opposite of crime fiction (and its genre conventions) with 
its strong focus on stylistic aspects of the novel. Claude Simon, who was 
published by Minuit, was very much in opposition to his fellow writers who 
deliberately neglected socio-historical aspects of literature. 
Significantly, Jean Rouaud wrote an article on Claude Simon, creating a 
kind of prototypical author of this tendency with his very personal style as 
a basis for apprehending collective matters and traumas defending a new 
form of realism.39 In most of his own novels, Rouaud proves to be a writer 
very much aware of the possibility of the importance of literature in the ap-
prehension of past experiences, i.e. creating the necessary conditions for our 
individual experience. Significant is Jean Rouaud’s Les Champs d’honneur, 
the first volume of a trilogy on three generations depicting the grandfather 
as the figure carrying a war experience which remains untold.
Les Champs d’honneur remains a masterpiece regarding the novel’s capac-
ity to give form to the individual’s experience. The family intimacy that 
we find in the opening of the book, with its portrait of the grandfather as 
a smoker and chauffeur of a 2CV, is a good example of this intertwining 
of everyday life in the present bearing witness to the experience of old-
er generations in the past. The grandson being the narrator, he observes 
micro-events, which appear as essential elements of the human experience. 
Going for a trip with granddad was a whole adventure, partly because of the 
man’s smoking habits and his way of lighting one cigarette after the other 
when he should be keeping his eyes on the road. On the one hand, the chil-
dren felt secure because of the comforting family atmosphere; on the other, 
they were joking about the life-threatening trip with their grandfather.
The climatic circumstances are an important part of the narrative’s opening. 
It is the most banal part of the atmosphere, in the Normandy region when 
you have to stop and wait for the rain to stop in a café, for instance. Still, 
it also becomes a quite strong symbolic sign of the essential moments of 
childhood and life, when the children experience the rain coming through 
the roof of the car. The words of the text on pretty banal situations still 
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take on a quite particular importance in relation to the silent, almost mute, 
grandfather whose pun “nez coulé” – meaning literally ‘running nose’ – in 
the primitive car gains intensity and attracts the reader’s attention to the 
detail of the text, with its existential texture parallel to the experience of cli-
matically defined situations. It seems as if the weather and atmospheres of 
everyday life are there to prepare the effect of the inhuman and exceptional 
situations during World War 1. 
In this book though, one of the interesting questions is related to the struc-
ture and the war scenes with their horrors at the end of the narrative. As 
readers, we rediscover the trenches and the soldiers’ feelings at being cap-
tured. The gas attack of the enemy I described is just another form of climat-
ic change; the clouds carried by the wind have a funny color and the soldiers 
react to the unusual sight by firing their arms somewhat desperately, only to 
discover the deadly effect of the gas that attacks their organs, a consequence 
of inhalation. The foreign atmosphere by the end of the narrative contrasts 
with the opening scene and its very intimate atmosphere. The young boys 
have no idea what their grandfather had experienced as a young man, and to 
what extent he had experienced insecurity and grief. 
Explaining why he chose to write this story, Rouaud points out that one 
piece of material and symbolic trace of the war experience related to the re-
ligious history of France played a decisive role. One day, Rouaud discovered 
the religious imagery related to the War and, at the same time, discovered a 
collective memory related to the Christian French fighting against the bar-
barians.40 The War was considered by many from this perspective, and the 
emotion of the young writer inspired his work on the novel that was meant 
to rehabilitate other young men of his grandfather’s generation having gone 
into war without the slightest idea of what warfare implied on a material or 
symbolic level. 
With Jean Echenoz’ novel 14, also published by Minuit, we discover a quite 
different logic that has apparently very little to do with the writer’s per-
sonal life. In fact, Echenoz shocked the French literary establishment by the 
simple fact that he had chosen a historical topic for his book.41 Covering the 
years of the War from its mobilization to its end, the very undramatic open-
ing takes the form of a portrait, Anthime going for a ride on his bike after 
lunch. Readers follow the experiences of everyday life in a very peaceful 
environment and, as a very positive critic of Le Monde who nevertheless 
ponders the meaning of the title as an announcement of the war points out42, 
one wonders if it could indicate that this was the fourteenth book of the 
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writer. Academic critics have been more skeptical concerning the choice 
of the historical subject to which Echenoz, in their view, simply adapts his 
playful narrative strategies.43
One of the relevant questions to ask would be if one could see a kind of 
“formal intention” implying that contemporary readers should only see the 
characters as mere “creations of ink and paper” or – in a way – as ghosts. 
In this way, the important part would rather be the present time and the (a)
historical premises of our existential situation. The rather distanced narra-
tion using the personal pronoun “nous” / “we” suggests a kind of common 
fate, still leaving us with an individual judgment, if not a solipsistic posi-
tion. Only this reading would imply that the reader is in fact aware of the 
fiction’s intricate relation to reality, and that the claustrophobic feel of life 
(and almost certain death) in the trenches, leaves us as amputated beings. 
Thus, the reader is well aware that the first peaceful images of Anthime’s 
life – and the vacation feeling often connected with the war experience – 
only lead into the trenches and confinement, both physically and mentally, 
but probably also in a more general existential way. Most European readers 
–perhaps the French more than any other population – will be aware of the 
high cost of the central European war, when the characters all too well fit 
into the collective idea of a swift and certain victory.
No euphoria of combat among other men; on the contrary, Arcenel loses his 
closest personal allies and finds himself isolated and disorientated. In this 
way, his execution for mutiny is the consequence of a mere strolling out of 
the camp following the road for just a little while, only to be discovered 
by the gendarmes who have no mercy. The sentence and the execution is 
simply “business as usual”. There is no escaping the confinement of the 
trenches, and the ones who survive are not able to find a normal life. These 
men appear as wounded and incapable of taking an active part in everyday 
life. The pain from lost limbs tells us about something that is no longer 
there, but still affects all of your life. Individual alliances and solidarity in 
such circumstances had nothing durable about them. Significantly, two for-
mer soldiers – one mutilated (after losing an arm) and the other blind – meet 
each other, but they only experience distance and difficulties in communi-
cation. They simply do not have anything in common. The mise en scène of 
non-communication between ancient combatants appears as a symbolic use 
of the grotesque, concerning our own period just as much.
Similarly, the apparently promising closure related to the birth of a baby 
is the result of a quite ironic and comic act of lovemaking. In this perspec-
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tive, one is tempted to see the title “14” as a kind of non-conclusive way of 
representing the War. Paradoxically, Echenoz’s style seems to imply that 
the impact of the War is a historical fact with its disillusion and amputation 
of mankind. We do necessarily live with the historical impact of war on 
our lives. Still, on the other hand, his version is very pessimistic and the 
choice of the topic may well be some kind of ultimately ironic comment 
on spectacular commemoration and probably also on the representation of 
historical reality. With 14, Echenoz is ultimately pointing to the limits of 
“historical realism” as such.
The story of the War… nothing more to tell?
One could say that, in the Echenoz version of the war, exhaustion haunts the 
individual, human civilization, and the novel genre as such. Still, though the 
last living combatants have disappeared, writers seem to continue telling the 
story of World War 1.44 It seems that the War, as any other subject, can be re-
told and find new force. One of the latest examples is Pierre Lemaître’s very 
popular Au Revoir là-haut / The Great Swindle, which is a very construct-
ed narrative as documented in the closing text entitled “Et pour finir...”45 
where he, in a very pragmatic way, indicates borrowings from historical 
and fictional representations of the War. In spite such “metafictional use of 
para-texts”, the plot dimension is essential. Like Echenoz’s novel, Lemaitre’s 
ends with the pregnancy of the female figure, and nevertheless, the situation 
is quite different. For Henri and Madeleine, being a married couple, this re-
sult could, in fact, seem very logical. Still, Henry sees different women and 
has never been accepted by his powerful father-in-law. His own business 
related to the handling of buried corpses is pure speculation on the account 
of victims of the War. The plot making is efficient and awakens the reader’s 
indignation (towards speculation and power as such), but another parallel 
story about two former soldiers selling non-existent memorial monuments 
just takes the grotesque to heights that paradoxically intensify the reader’s 
narrative desire. 
The construction of this novel with its narrative strategies evidently aims 
at a very broad reception, with the aesthetic flaws this implies, superfluous 
commentaries and such.46 Still, the portrait of the ancient combatant couple 
Edouard and Albert is somewhat touching in its violent love-hate aspects, 
and one feels the existential meaning of this rewriting of Jean qui pleure, 
Jean qui rit47 (Barbusse, 1928). Edouard seemingly loses everything: his 
family, his face, his capacity of speaking, and still he laughs in his own an-
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imal way. Albert, on the other hand, finds conflict in any decision making, 
and yet he succeeds in escaping with his loved one, carefully preserving the 
representation of a horse’s head as a symbolic trace of his war experience.48 
In this way, the book works as a grotesque drama, and makes one ponder 
about how human beings can go on living together, even after an experience 
like the humiliating nonsensical warfare. On the one hand, we discover a 
strongly mutilated society, but still the writer suggests that fraud and evil 
exist everywhere at any time, and that humans will always tend to negotiate 
their own fate. There is even a place for pity and mercy, when the powerful 
father figure Monsieur Péricourt is confronted with his lost son appearing 
with a sort of burial mask looking like his real face (before the war), when 
his father, stunned and seemingly paralyzed, runs him over in his car. In 
this way, the war of the trenches and warfare is not only limited to the actual 
champs de bataille. Warfare seems to be part of the human condition.
Any (literary) perspectives?
In French literature on World War 1, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the early writings and the variety of genres implying different points of 
view and different tonalities. The letters and different kinds of testimonies 
of ancient combatants clearly are at the center of attention. However, jour-
nals and novelistic forms become a way – even for women – to express 
their experience of the War far from the battlefield. The cases of Céline and 
Aragon have shown that the impact of World War 1 changed the perception 
of reality on the individual level, but also on the collective level, just like 
Apollinaire felt it would very early on. Later, the individual’s difficulty in 
communicating the War experience would lead writers to use indirect fic-
tional forms. This is also the reason why a whole series of novels, logically 
motivated by the hundred years that have passed and contributing to liter-
ature’s status as lieu de mémoire, have been published in recent time. One 
can wonder if World War 1 is going to persist as an object or a phenomenon 
bearing material for French writers. It seems that the early directly rep-
resentational writings on the War are mainly going to be read by people 
doing different kinds of research, and that more recent, stylistic-formal ap-
proaches – either of a popular kind or of an artistic kind – are going to be the 
most culturally profound traces of the war experience. War will probably 
always be a literary topic. Still, in the French context, it may well, in the fu-
ture, be difficult to find new and original approaches to La Grande Guerre, 
a theme that may well be exhausted.
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Endnotes
1 World War 1 has nourished literature for a century. “La Grande guerre 
a nourri la littérature durant un siècle » propos recueilli par Antoine 
Flandrin (Mis à jour le 14.02.2014 à 18h25) http://www.lemonde.fr/
culture/article/2014/02/04/laurence-campa-la-grande-guerre-a-nourri-
la-litterature-durant-un-siecle_4359928_3246.html
2 Understood as an inaugural rupture. This is why it is inscribed into 
contemporary memory, as well as in the stories of transmission and 
filiation which form a major tendency in the contemporary novel (such 
as Jean Rouaud’s Fields of Glory).
3 Voir “Entre mémoire et histoire” in P. Nora, Lieux de Mémoire, vol. I 
La République, Gallimard, 1984. 
4 Like Schoentjes also suggests in his critical work on World War 1 in 
French literature.
5 As an attempt to avoid ideological commonplace interpretations of the 
war, we have had very precious publications like La Grande Guerre 
des écrivains, edited by Antoine Compagnon.
6 All writing on the war, even the editing of an anthology, implies a de-
scent into hell and forces on you an expiatory test – making you meet 
your ghosts – and you are not unharmed by such an expiatory experi-
ence.
7 The first, an intense period running from the beginning of the war in 
1914 until 1920; the second, a more tempered period, followed in the 
twenties. Finally, the third and most important phase was the thirties, 
with major works published by Giono, Drieu La Rochelle, and Céline, 
among others.
8 A question much discussed by Antoine Compagnon, among others, 
is the matter of realism. The war experience as such cannot, no more 
than any other experience, be fully rendered in literature. 
9 A historical theme like the War implies particularly complex questions 
related to genre. Significantly, poems, letters (like Dorgelès’, Lettres 
de guerre), and journals are the result of the direct war experience. 
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Logically, fictional narration becomes the most adequate literary form 
for later generations. 
10 “The 31st of August 1914”.
11 “We said farewell to a whole era”.
12 “unimaginable heights”.
13 “Oh my sky, my beautiful sky spotted with cannonades / The sky 
unfolded its tail like a burning phoenix/ Lunar peacock in his pride. 
Amen”.
14 Not least, thanks to Céline’s praise of this novel.
15 See Compagnon (2014) and Schoentjes (2009).
16 Were the bayonets really used for killing? This question ,and others, 
has been raised.
17 Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen, “Concepts, topoï et metaphors des dialogues 
à la veille et au début de la Première Guerre mondiale (1912-1915), in 
H.-J. Lüsebrink und M. Schmeling, Romain Rolland. Ein transkultur-
eller Denker, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016.
18 Here is how it started. The passages (notes 19-22) are from Journey 
to the End of the Night, London: John Calder, 1988 (translator: Ralph 
Manheim).
19 “We were caught like rats”. 
20 “Travel is very useful and it exercises the imagination”. 
21 So, they’re putting Journey on the rails again. 
22 “ The fact is that Aurélien did not care for talk about the war; and he 
was just as much afraid of the chatter of those who had been through it 
as of the others’ unhealthy curiosity. He could not have accounted for it 
logically, but post-war politics got on his nerves in much the same way. 
Although he had been approached by several ex-service organizations, 
he had not joined any, nor even replied to their invitations.” (pp. 20-21)
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23 “This waiting without purpose, this lack of perspective”.
24 “The strange thing”.
25 This radical effect of the War can remind us of Balzac’s novel Le 
Colonel Chabert from 1832 on the figure of the living dead. In the 
context of the Napoleonic wars, where everybody believes Chabert is 
dead, the protagonist is finally resigned when he finds out that no one 
really recognizes his existence and his beliefs or values.
26 Pierre Schoentjes (2009), Fictions de la Grande Guerre. Variations 
littéraires sur 14-18. Classiques Garnier, Paris.
27 Quite recently, the novel Des Hommes by Laurent Mauvignier has con-
fronted the taboo of the Algerian War to reveal the collective trauma 
marking French society, much the same way as has been the case with 
World War 1.
28 Although a famous publishing house like Gallimard and a famous 
writer and editor like Raymond Queneau (who created the Série Noire 
and published Histoire des littératures) have considered these genres 
as actual literature, these are often seen as a more or less anarchist 
forms of writing. When it comes to the theme of World War 1, these 
forms are important, and writers are aware of the necessity of “collec-
tive rethinking” related to socio-historical and national-mythological 
issues they may find in each other’s works.
29 On the one hand, it implies violence and murder, but on the other, it 
also very often emphasizes more positive values such as solidarity 
when “official injustice” seems to be the social norm.
30 Daeninckx has very often been considered to do a historian’s work and 
critics talk about the “méthode Daeninckx” that was founded when he 
wrote Meurtres pour mémoire on the Papon affair, connecting the ear-
lier Nazi-friendly Bordeaux-based official to the Préfet of Paris respon-
sible for the slaughtering of Algerians at the Métro Charonne in 1961.
31 One can see the similarities with a historian’s approach in Daeninckx’s 
writing. Documents and the research of investigators and journalists 
play an important role. In the same way, he very recently (2013) pub-
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lished a book on French postwar advertisements with their imagery 
related to the evil “Boches” and the heroic attitude of the French soldier.
32 Literally meaning “the last of the last ones”. 
33 On a more personal level, Daeninckx explains very explicitly how his 
father’s legal battle against the army marked his childhood and made 
him aware of “the family tradition” of anti-militarism: “Table ronde à 
la villa Marguerite Yourcenar”. In Schoentjes (2008).
34 Thus, one is hardly surprised to find the Daeninckx fictions and uni-
verses in the black and white versions of Tardi, nor is one surprised to 
find the Daeninckx figure represented in Le Der des ders as a sym-
pathetic journalist. See also Hein, Michael, (2001), “What haunts a 
soldier’s mind: Monsters, demons and the lost Trenches of Memory”. 
“Representations of Combat Trauma in the Works of Jacques Tardi”, 
in Jan Baetens (ed.), The Graphic Novel, Leuven: Leuven University 
Press
35 His grandmother told him about his grandfather’s experience during 
the war.
36 For further clarification, one can read Urs Hangartner’s article on the 
vocabulary related to this kind of media reflection.
37 Probably thanks to Sartre’s idea of “littérature engagée”, but also 
thanks to Queneau’s publishing – as an editor at Gallimard’s  
– Histoire des littératures – A History of literatures.
38 Griet Theetens underlines the social and political commitment of the 
neo-polar that can be considered as a didactic genre working against 
historical “errors” and forgetting, Voir “Une remontée dans les traces. 
La representation de la Première Guerre mondiale dans le roman poli-
cier français contemporain”, in Schoentjes (2008) 
39 As a co-editor of the much discussed Littérature-Monde volume pub-
lished in 2007, Jean Rouaud (who had left Minuit) participated in the 
critique of what can be considered a “Robbe-Grillet formalism”.
40 This is what Jean Rouaud himself reveals during a round table debate 
that the reader finds published in Schoentjes (2008).
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41 The relatively puzzling title could also be seen as a playful way of  
indicating the number of books he has published, as suggested in  
Le Monde.
42 Like the academic critic – notably Schoentjes who sees, among  
other aspects (inscription of the centenaire), a direct reference to  
Victor Hugo’s Quatre-vingt reize – this is an important part of 
Echenoz’s intertextual games. Schoentjes, “Un dernier compte à  
régler avec la Grande Guerre”, in Critique no. 786, 2012/11
43 Thus, Wolfgang Asholt follows Schoentjes in suggesting that Echenoz 
voudrait en finir avec l’histoire “régler ses comptes avec l’histoire”.
44 Hedi Kaddour is one of these, and with his big novel Waltenberg,  
he more or less covers the history of the twentieth century.
45 Meaning literally “And to finish”.
46 The form of narration tends to guide the reader excessively in his  
understanding of the stereotypical characters and human relations.
47 “Jean who cries, Jean who laughs”.
48 His ‘platonic love story’ with the ‘beast’ Edouard taking an end when 
he leaves with the female ‘beauty’.
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Chapter 9
The impact of World War 1   on Danish literature:   War in the trenches and media
Anker Gemzøe
World War 1 and Denmark
During and after World War 1 Denmark – because of its marked neutrality – 
was often identified with the poet Jeppe Aakjær’s characteristic in The Song 
of History, written to a historical congregation in 1917:
“You infant-land that secretly cuddles together,
While the whole world is burning around your cradle”1
An experience of being reduced to the role of spectator and standing outside 
of decisive historical events was, in fact, quite common among Danes dur-
ing the war years. But, nevertheless, World War 1 was, also for Denmark, a 
time of dramatic change and – for the majority – hardly a good time. 
The sequence of the following chapter is roughly chronological. After a 
brief historical survey, I focus on the Danish debate during the War and 
then go into some early war movies and novels. I follow the important 
effects on various kinds of modernism and the avant-garde by the end of 
the War. Last but not least, I go into the profound and long-lasting traces 
of the War to be found in retrospective novels and autobiographical works. 
One main thesis is that, in addition to the direct experience of the War 
shared by a considerable number of young Danish men, the rapid and fun-
damental changes inthe media, created or at least accelerated through the 
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War, are especially important and visible as effects of the War on Danish 
literature.
In 1864, in the Second Schleswig War, Denmark had lost the duchies of 
Lauenburg, Holstein, and Schleswig to Germany (an alliance of Prussia 
and Austria that was dissolved by the Prussian War against Austria in 
1866). North Schleswig (the south of Jutland) – where Danish was the main 
language and the majority of people identified themselves as Danish 
– remained under German rule until 1920. Almost 30.000 young Danish 
men from North Schleswig were forced into the German army during the 
War, and more than 5.000 were killed.2 An equal number, 30.000, Danish-
Americans are estimated to have fought in the American army during the 
War. Other Danes, also motivated by the historical opposition between 
Denmark and Germany, enlisted individually and fought on the Allied 
side.
The majority of the Danish population was, in spite of widespread, tradi-
tional anti-German sentiments, inclined to neutrality because of the ex-
perience of useless sacrifices in the traumatic defeat of 1864 to the rising 
German superpower. The country was, moreover, led by an anti-militaristic 
Social-Liberal government that would go far to ensure Danish neutrality 
and thus, at the start of the War, acquiesced to German demands to lay out 
mines in the Great Belt.
After the War, the reunion of North Schleswig and Denmark – through 
one of the first and still one of the finest examples of border delimitation 
through a process of democratic vote – triggered a bitter political polar-
ization between nationalists and moderate tendencies, represented by the 
Social-Liberal government and its support in the rapidly growing Social-
Democratic party.
In many other ways, life and politics in Denmark were heavily influenced 
by the War. During the summer of 1914, a considerable security force of 
conscripts was convened, and a high degree of military mobilization was 
maintained through all the war years. One main effect of the War, was a 
sharp increase in social polarization. Many suffered from unemployment, 
malnutrition, and a shortage of housing. The poor supply situation was ag-
gravated after the German declaration of the Unlimited U-boat War in 1917, 
which moreover caused a considerable loss of Danish sailors and ships. 
While a majority suffered from the War, others, mainly those inside agricul-
ture and food production, profited from it, selling food supplies (often less 
179
decent quality tinned food, etc.) to the Germans as well as to the Allies. This 
so-called Goulash Capitalism had an energizing effect on the wartime cul-
tural situation, as some of the profits were directed into the cultural sphere. 
The problems of the War led, however, to new socio-political measures 
from the Social-Liberal government – supported by the Social Democrats 
– which in many respects anticipated the future Danish welfare state. 
These measures were decided not least by Ove Rode, the powerful inte-
rior minister. Likewise, the wartime situation probably helped to pave the 
way for a political compromise leading to a most important renewal of the 
Danish democratic constitution, which dated back to 1849. In the constitu-
tion of 1915, women’s suffrage was introduced. At the same time, Iceland 
was recog nized as a sovereign state. A further phasing out of Danish colo-
nialism, likewise accelerated by the War, was the sale of the Danish West-
Indian Isles to the US in 1916. 
The tumultuous wake of the War had many and complex effects on the 
situation in Denmark. On the positive list, the before-mentioned reunion of 
North Schleswig with Denmark in 1920 may be counted, as can the intro-
duction of the eight-hour-workday in 1919 – a considerable victory for the 
labor movement, and the implementation of a number of important laws 
in the beginning of the 1920s – radically improving gender equality. On 
the negative balance counts the death toll from the Spanish Flu, a further 
growing social and political polarization, and an unstable economy. As the 
European map was redrawn, Goulash Capitalism ended its fragile and un-
wholesome life in a serious financial crisis in 1922.
The Danish Debate on the War
From its outbreak in August 1914, the War was much debated in Denmark. 
All parties, regardless of their position in the debate, sensed it was a decisive 
historical and cultural threshold. But because of the country’s neutrality, very 
different attitudes could manifest themselves. Johannes Jørgensen – known 
as the author of the biographies of saints – and Martin Nyrop – the famous 
architect of the town hall in Copenhagen – defended the cause of the Entente 
Powers in internationally successful books. Karl Larsen, a satirical prose 
writer, was outspokenly pro-German. In a number of articles during and after 
the War,3 he claimed that accusing Germany of militarism and aggressive 
imperialism was “one of the many proofs of the breakdown of all historical 
memory and common sense during the first canon shots in 1914” (Larsen 
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2016: 69%). He pointed instead at a carefully planned French revanchism as 
the main cause of the War: “The thorough preparation and the clear French 
plans for the desired war are most obviously seen by Lieutenant Colonel A. 
Grouard’s France and Germany. The War to Come (La guerre eventuelle) 
that was published in 1913” (ibid.).4 Johannes Vilhelm Jensen, later a Nobel 
Prize winner, admitted to some sympathy with the German cause in an ar-
ticle in 19145, but added, “The present article is not meant to ‘support’ any of 
the parties, a terrible thought during peacetime and ridiculous during a war, 
where blood and iron settle the equilibrium of power between nations”.6
The most important Danish debater of the War was the internationally 
well-known critic Georg Brandes, whose comments on the War did in fact 
arouse much international attention. 7 He had foreseen a World War as ear-
ly as in 1881, and he commented on the War from its outbreak and on to 
the conse quences of the Versailles Treaty in a number of articles, some of 
them very long and thorough. Moreover, they were compiled and published 
in the books Verdenskrigen (The World War, 1916/17) and Tragediens anden 
Del, Fredsslutningen (The Second Part of the Tragedy, The Peace Settlement, 
1919).
In Verdenskrigens Forudsætninger (The Preconditions for the World War), 
first published in August 1914 he notes:
At this moment, five European superpowers release the desire for 
murder and rage of annihilation, primitive desires equipped with 
the most refined means of destruction, upon Europe, each of them 
claiming the love of peace, by which it has been animated, and each 
of them pleading the justice of the cause for which it is forced to 
fight. (Brandes 1987: 51).
Brandes did not take sides with any of the warring parties, but turned crit-
ically against them all. The article ends with this prophecy: “We are going 
to experience horrors and upheavals without measure and number that will 
result in a recoloring of the map of Europe and a complete revamping of the 
world map.” (Ibid: 67).
In 1915, public correspondence between Georg Brandes and Georges 
Clemenceau, the leading French politician followed.8 They had become 
friends during a stay in Karlsbad. In 1904, Clemenceau printed an appeal 
by Brandes against the severe Russian repression in Finland, accompanied 
by a conclusion that presented Brandes as 
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“one of the most imminent men in Europe. By his profound and 
universal culture, by his completely disinterested thought, by his 
constant pursuit of the highest ideal of humanity, Georg Brandes is 
even more than the first citizen of his country. He is a ‘European’ 
in the greatest and noblest sense of the word.” (Brandes 1952: 101).
Now, in 1915, Clemenceau harshly criticizes Brandes as a representa-
tive of a neutral Denmark that did not have the courage to join the War 
against Germany and fight for its lost duchies in an article, L’Ennemi du 
Genre humain (Enemy of the Human Race). In his Aabent Brev til Georges 
Clemenceau (Open Letter to Georges Clemenceau (February 28, 1915), 
Brandes protests against the vehement, hardly well-founded attack on 
himself and Clemenceau’s characterization of the Danes as cowards, say-
ing, “Your words about the Danes that they are a Nation without Pride” 
(Ibid: 68). He also clarifies that Denmark has no interest in regaining its 
lost duchies with a German-speaking majority through a humiliating peace 
for Germany, but only for the right to self-determination for the Danish-
minded population of North Schleswig. In a subsequent Svar til Georges 
Clemenceau (Answer to Georges Clemenceau, March 1915) he stresses that 
truth is the first victim of war: “One of the appalling things of a war like this 
is that it kills the love of truth. … I for my part consider the snorting national 
hatred that now divides Europe as an immeasurable disaster and as symp-
tom of an immense decline” (1915: 74). On the vocation of the writer, he 
writes: “He ought to be silent, where silence is gold. And when he speaks, 
he ought to stick to the simple truth that is outshouted by the nonsense at 
peace, by the thunder of the guns at war.” (Ibid: 77). Clemenceau concludes 
the argument with the public statement, “Adieu, Brandès”, unmistakably 
marking the end of a friendship. “I admit that it is my fault that I have 
been able to mistake myself so gravely about your character, your spirit” 
(Brandes 1952: 120).9 Another attack by a French intellectual on Brandes’ 
neutral position was Paul Loyson’s open letter St. George Tamed by the 
Dragon (March 1915).
One of Brandes’ reactions was a sharpening of his analysis of the mecha-
nisms accompanying and furthering war. Lovprisningen af Krig (The Praise 
of War, September 1915) contains this central point: “Nobody who knows 
something about the history of mankind can, in the present war enthusiasm, 
see anything but the most unambiguous atavism.” (Ibid: 78). After an acid 
depiction of atrocities committed in the name of religion, he concludes, “For 
upon religious madness has, as we all know, followed national madness” 
(Ibid: 81). Indirectly, he thus reminds his (former) liberal/radical friends of 
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their common front against the power of fanatical religion and implies their 
‘un-radical’ capitulation to extreme nationalism. 
In July 1916, Brandes – in connection with a number of other inter national 
peace initiatives, one of them by Henry Ford – tried the more activist ap-
proach of an Appeal to the warring parties. The appeal stirred up some 
international attention and was (as were quite a few of Brandes’ other utter-
ances about the War) translated into several languages. Neither at home nor 
abroad, however, were most of the reactions favorable. The Appeal provoked 
another public polemic. William Archer, the Scottish intellectual, play-
wright, and translator, had translated half of Brandes’ Shakespeare book 
and become a friend and intellectual comrade of arms. Now he launched 
a counter-appeal, followed by a number of articles which were compiled 
in the booklet Colour-Blind Neutrality”.10 In this quite-widespread publica-
tion, he characterizes Georg Brandes as a “Mr. Facing-Both-Ways” whose 
utterances are doing much harm. Archer was, at the time, attached to the 
office of War Intelligence. His successful intervention may justly, as was 
presumed by Brandes too, be seen as part of the efficient British propaganda 
machinery, the media war. 
Strangely enough, their friendship survived the harsh polemic. But, once 
again, it seems to have animated Brandes to explore yet other points of view 
on the War. Kampen om Kunder (The Battle for Customers (1916) accen-
tuates the economic interests behind the War and thus has affinities with a 
socialist approach. As a conclusion to the long and detailed article, he states: 
“And thus we are now faced with the business war, the trade war in favor 
of the countries’ bank directors and large industrialists … And the trade 
war is dressed up as a fight for the homeland” (Ibid: 90). Finally, in Finale 
(December 1917), he synthesizes one of his main points: “In England, as in 
France and Germany, it is not the war, but the enemy that is hated. The war, 
however, is that which deserves hatred” (Ibid: 94). 
In the articles compiled in his second book about the War and its conse-
quences, he comments on the peace settlement. In Nytaar 1919 (New Year 
1919) he declares – without appearing very triumphant to have correctly 
prophesized from the start of the War, “Three empires have been dissolved 
and dismembered. Inside the superpowers, the larger and smaller national-
ities have claimed their right to an independent national life. Princely glory 
has been replaced by republicanism” (Ibid: 98). At the same time, he points 
out how a mixed population in many places makes it impossible to divide 
people according to ethnic criteria. “A system of statelets is not happiness”, 
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he pinpoints – and warns strongly against Danish chauvinism in the case 
of Schleswig. In subsequent articles such as Den hellige Alliance (The Holy 
Alliance, 1919) and Europa nu (Europe Now, 1925) he draws up a cool and 
clinical picture of the final situation, foreseeing a thirst for revenge in the 
losing nation(s), unduly humiliated by the peace treaty. 
Georg Brandes’ war articles provoked many vehement reactions. In all of 
the warring nations, his neutral stand was extremely harmful to his rep-
utation. In the domestic context, he was treated with much hostility by 
the predominantly nationalist, conservative press. At the end of the War, 
he even experienced a break with ‘his own’ newspaper Politiken. The 
editor of this main organ for the Social-Liberal government, where Georg’s 
brother Edvard Brandes was an influential minister of finance, refused to 
publish a controversial article of his. Secretly the article had been present-
ed to Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius, who – considering Georg Brandes’ 
reputation as a ‘first citizen of his country’ – demanded it be stopped as 
dangerous for Denmark’s relationship with the victorious Allies, who had 
Georges Clemenceau as one of their most influential leaders. 
Besides, Brandes’ articles on the War inspired an old literary opponent, 
Helge Rode – major symbolist poet – to yet another general attack upon the 
realist, secular, and scientific tendency that Brandes represented and that 
had dominated most of the time from the Modern Breakthrough in 1871 up 
until the War. 
During the autumn of 1914, Rode proclaimed a Breakthrough of the Soul 
(as opposed to the Modern Breakthrough) in a number of articles in the 
magazine Illustreret Tidende.11 In the same months, he also published an 
article about the War that – with the title of Notes from the First Days of the 
War – became the introductory chapter of his book Krig og Aand (War and 
Spirit), issued in 1917. Herein he defends the value of the War, in spite of its 
horrors: “The unity, the densification, the common spirit and will make the 
war into something sublime, in spite of all. An immense greatness is creat-
ed.” (Helge Rode 1917: 18).
The first part of the book contains a critical retrospection of the cultural 
life up to the War, and a major concern is a polemic against Georg Brandes’ 
The World War. In the chapter The Man of Our Times as Peacemaker, Rode 
reasons the following: since Brandes is critical of religion, he has lost any 
right to criticize the War. Instead of a love of humanity, his lack of faith has 
lead him to misanthropy – atheism does that per definition – so we must 
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understand the implied presupposition of the argument. “Misanthropy is, 
however, not a good basis for a peacemaker!”, Rode writes, concluding: 
“Our times rose to protest against the war; but it lacked pathos, for it pro-
tested against itself!” (Ibid: 110). Although Rode is mostly highlighting the 
positive aspects of the War, the critical and secular prewar spirit is stigma-
tized as a main cause of the War.
In the second part of the book, The Problem of the War, Helge Rode unfolds 
his alternative to Brandes. It is a re-instalment of an – undogmatic, free – 
mystical Christian spirituality. The message ends up in this vision: “From 
every corner of the world I now heard the great song of life. It gushed and 
irrigated, it thundered and whispered the highest name, our faith and our 
comfort, our mighty knowledge: I am!” (Ibid: 217). 
Helge Rode’s point of view was not only contrary to that of Georg Brandes, 
but in stark contrast to that of his older brother, Ove Rode, the before-men-
tioned powerful interior minister. While Helge Rode had high hopes for 
the spirituality supposedly induced by the War, Ove Rode’s approach was 
deeply concerned and strongly critical. In a speech in 1916, The War and Its 
Lesson,12 he considers the war situation as a “magnifying glass”, glaringly 
revealing the already prevailing social conditions: “Poverty for the many 
with poverty’s tendency to stability and endurance – wealth for the few 
with the tendency of wealth to movement and growth” (Ove Rode 1921: 
17). Instead of the ongoing senseless slaughter of young men, accompanied 
by “reckless greed, money hunt and fraud, driven into an enormous size 
and driven into the absurd” – characteristic of the war time situation as a 
magnifier of the prewar conditions – he hopes and works for a postwar so-
ciety of solidarity, freedom, and peace, leaving capitalism, clericalism, and 
militarism behind. 
Early Danish anti-war-oeuvres: The media war
By coincidence, a Danish film became the first pacifist film in World 
War 1. The film Ned med Vaabnene! (Lay Down Your Arms! / Down with 
Weapons!) was produced by the internationally well-known Danish Nordisk 
Films Kompagni in 1914. It was based on Bertha von Suttner‘s novel Die 
Waffen nieder! Eine Lebensgeschichte (1889) that, before 1914, was trans-
lated into 16 languages. Bertha von Suttner’s novel, together with her active 
engagement in the pacifist movement, was rewarded with the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1905. The film was directed by Holger-Madsen and the manuscript 
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was written by Carl Theodor Dreyer. It was shown in US in September 
1914, where it was favorably received by critics as a contribution against 
war, “the hard, terrible, overwhelming reality of battles and mangled bodies 
of horses and men” (Motion Picture News d. 22.8.1914).13 The premiere in 
Europe was – because of the war! – postponed until 1915. 
 
Ned med Vaabnene! has been credited for its innovative camera work, for 
a suggestive depiction of death and destruction, anticipating the horrible 
realities of the World War, and also for its focus on the point of view of a 
woman losing two husbands.
The Danish novel Den tavse Dansker. En Bog om dem, der gjorde deres 
Pligt (The Silent Dane. A Book about Those who did Their Duty) came 
out in 1916. It was written by Erich Erichsen, the lawyer and journalist 
(1871-1941) who was attached to the newspaper København. In Denmark, 
it became a bestseller, but was soon forgotten. It was translated into seven 
languages. The English translation Forced to Fight. The Tale of a Schleswig 
Dane was published in 1917 in England by William Heinemann, London, 
and in the US by Robert McBride, New York. In the Anglo-American ver-
sion, a small propaganda twist was added: “Forced to Fight for the Huns” is 
the title of the first chapter. The pejorative “the Huns” is alien to the book 
in which the treatment of the Germans is generally sober and respectful. 
Forced to Fight has divided Danish critics from its first reception right up 
to its rediscovery in recent years.14 It was no doubt based on a thorough 
knowledge of the soldiers’ letters that were printed in the Danish news-
papers in Schleswig and a collection of war letters that was published al-
ready in 1915.15 Erichsen gave this documentary material a kind of fiction-
al finish that cannot just be dismissed as “blood fantasies” (as was done 
by a contemporary critic), but rather adds some fictional supplements. The 
documentary basis of the book is personified as a first-person narration 
to the author of the book in 1916 by a young Schleswig Dane who went 
to war in 1914 at 24 years old, and has now returned, badly wounded, de-
prived of his right arm. 
Though far from a literary masterpiece, the book does in fact present the 
situation of the Schleswig Danish soldiers in a convincing way. When mo-
bilized, the young man goes to his barracks in Berlin, where he feels utterly 
alienated by the overwhelming nationalist enthusiasm that is everywhere in 
the capital: 
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“I felt very forsaken and lonely as I walked back to the barracks – so 
inconsolably deprived of everything.
All the others possessed the hopes and longings of a great period in 
history – something great to suffer for, something great to die for, 
with a bright and happy smile on their lips, and a glad light in their 
dying eyes. […]
I had only one thing as my goal to guide me – duty. Cold, hard, 
unalterable duty, demanding everything of me, without giving me 
anything whatever in return, except the pale consciousness that I 
had done what I ought because I had to; and only because of that.” 
(Erichsen 1917: 34). 
Feelings like these are quite commonly expressed in the actually available 
documentary material. As before mentioned, quite a few letters came out 
during the War; many more by the end of the War and in the immediately 
following years;16 from then on, more and more letters, diaries, and memoirs 
have continued to become available.17 
Later in the book, it is well depicted how a deep disillusionment – grief over 
the fatigue, misery, hunger, and the hundreds of thousands of casualties – 
spreads through the German population instead of the initial enthusiasm. 
The battle descriptions are rather early attempts to catch the new World 
War experience of senseless attacks against machine guns, of trenches and 
barbed wire. They are violent and suggestive, but seem in general trustwor-
thy. The participation in the storming of Liege is rendered in great detail, in 
the rhythm of the commands to move on. A small fragment:
“Onwards and still on:
Until we reached the barbed wire.
The sight was appalling – later on. At the time my mind only grasped 
the picture as it took shape hastily during the moment of our onward 
rush.
It was not a barbed wire defense any longer. It was a steaming ram-
part of human bodies, torn asunder and trampled to pieces. Stumps 
of arms and legs, torn throats from which the blood ran in a clotted 
stream. Faces torn in cheeks and jaws and eyes. And a shrieking and 
death-rattling, a wailing and moaning that filled my ears and min-
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gled with our own shrieks and shouts till I sounded as if the world 
were coming to an end in fear and terror. 
But still we went on.
We had to leap over the barbed wire, while the lead screamed about 
us and man after man fell. We did not see where we jumped or where 
we trod.” (Erichsen 1917: 47f.). 
The book recreates the apocalyptic atmosphere of long drawn out bombard-
ments and gas attacks; of the deadly monotony, the indifference towards life 
and death after years in the trenches; of hunger, cold and snow blindness at 
the Russian Front; and, worst of all, of the nightmares filled with anguish 
and horror when sleeping, or trying to. 
Such descriptions you will hardly ever find in soldiers’ letters home, gen-
erally filled with trivialities and small cheerful moments. The narrator (and 
the implied author) are acutely conscious about this: 
“A constant stream of pious lies has flowed homewards from the 
front during this year of war, and that, too, not merely on account of 
the censor. How could it be otherwise? Who would have the heart to 
make those at home more sad and anxious than they were already?” 
(Erichsen 1917: 97).
This metafictional reflection points revealingly to a major deviance between 
documentary material such as soldiers’ letters and the special power of fic-
tion in rendering the war experience. In many respects, there is, however, 
as already indicated, concordance between fiction and the documentary 
material. That goes clearly for the immediate solidarity between the com-
rades in the trenches in spite of all national and ideological differences. The 
Schleswig Danish soldiers fought with the others and could even commit 
acts of bravery in spite of their lack of belief in the German cause. And, on 
their side, they were – although they were of course known to be out siders 
representing a national minority – treated with respect by their German 
comrades in arms.
The book ends with the sad home-coming of the mutilated, forcefully aged 
young man. His parents and his fiancée can hardly recognize him. Moreover, 
he has come home to a “grief-laden country and a grief-laden people. I am 
certain there was not one home in which there was not weeping over a life 
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that had been taken, or a body that had been maltreated” (Erichsen 1917: 
178f.). The long-term effects are foreseeable: “It will be a generation with 
sad hearts and many diseased thoughts … An impoverished generation – a 
joy-forsaken generation” (184).
It was no accident that this documentary novel was written by a journalist 
attached to København. The newspaper was passionately engaged in the 
cause of the Schleswig-Danes. But it was also an expression of the profound 
changes in the media world brought about by the War. On the documentary 
side, a flow of telegrams and of photos gave the War hitherto unknown cover-
age. On the ideological side, the warring nations built up enormous, well or-
ganized propaganda apparatuses. The World War was crucial for Denmark, 
as its outcome would obviously decide the fate of North Schleswig. At the 
same time, the country was neutral and relatively fewer young men than in 
the warring countries came home directly from the trenches. Because of 
both factors, the media became especially important for the Danish picture 
of the War in a certain way, being the main sources for the war experience, 
and vehicles for the attendant changes in perception and mentality. 
From the start the War, coverage was massive in the Danish newspapers, 
mostly in the form of a steady stream of war telegrams in the beginning, but 
soon with an extended use of photos, not least in the weeklies.18 At the start 
of 1915, one whole page of one of the main weeklies, Hjemmet (The Home), 
is covered with four captioned photos: one by an American war photogra-
pher showing dead bodies after a battle on the Serbian-Austrian Front; an-
other a mass grave in the English part of the Western Front being filled with 
about 900 dead horses; English logistics carrying a supply of plum puddings 
into the trenches; and a lightly wounded English soldier sitting smiling by a 
gramophone – with the caption “It’s a Long Way to Tipperary”. 
Just as an overflow of telegrams in the Russian-Japanese War had been the 
occasion to start a new form of popular newspaper, EkstraBladet, in 1904, 
a ‘competing’ newspaper, B.T., was started in 1916. It was one of the first 
Danish newspapers to brand itself with the well-prepared use of illustrations 
and visual layout of the pages.19 The War was present everywhere in the 
media, also in both the weeklies and in the cinema. Through the cause of 
the war, pictures of death and mass destruction were forced upon the pub-
lic with an insistence never before seen. With telegrams and photo reports 
as dominant forms, the news mainly appeared as fragmented glimpses, as 
a juxtaposition of heterogeneous announcements and images. This was to 
become crucial for the impact of the War on literature. 
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War, art, and literature: The many faces of 
Expressionism
In the pioneering work about the impact of World War 1 on Danish liter-
ature, Aargangen, der måtte snuble i starten (The Generation that Had to 
Stumble at Start), written during the World War 2 shortly after the German 
occupation of Denmark, Ernst Frandsen states that one main effects of the 
War was a shaking of the beliefs in evolutionary progress in the rational 
mind and in the masterful individual: 
The beautiful hope of the evolution of rational man to still higher 
cultural stages was like a mirage that dissolved under the shadow of 
the War. What might the clear thought mean vis-à-vis the national 
psychosis? And which weight might lie on the single individual in 
the trench? (Frandsen 1943/60: 105). 
Frandsen has taken the title of his book from the last phase in Jacob Paludan’s 
great Bildungsroman, Jørgen Stein.20 As a generational characteristic, The 
Generation that Had to Stumble at Start is a Danish equivalent – though not 
quite as hopeless – to The Lost Generation. Some of Frandsen’s assump-
tions about the impact of the War are correct and nicely put. The War was a 
cultural shock and a catalyst for an epochal change in mentality. On the oth-
er hand, his account appears today to be blatantly insufficient and un even, 
and he obviously overemphasizes the traditionalist and spiritualist side of 
the reactions. Actually, a broad contemporary rupture with the realist and 
naturalist tradition in art and literature took place. In some respects, it con-
verged with Helge Rode’s aspirations. It was, however, much less inspired 
by religious mysticism than by the development of the press – and by a 
number of new artistic and intellectual impulses, among them international 
modernism (French cubism, Italian futurism, and German expressionism) 
– together with psychoanalysis, neo-Kantianism, pragmatism, and histori-
cal materialism.
In the inter-artistic and inter-Nordic magazine Klingen (The Blade, 1917-
20), impulses like these co-existed and resulted in rather different kinds of 
modernism and the avant-garde. On the initiative of Axel Salto, the painter, 
a group of young artists, architects, and poets contributed. In the second vol-
ume, Otto Gelsted, the poet and critic, and Poul Henningsen, the architect 
– two of the figures that were to be central to the renewal of heritage after 
Brandes – came onto the editorial staff. Klingen was, as before mentioned, 
inter-artistic in its orientation. However, visual art, at the time considered 
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the most advanced art form, had a prominent place. As the arts benefited 
from an unusual financial generosity because of the goulash capitalist boom 
during the war years, Klingen – bringing a wealth of original lithographs, 
woodcuts, and engravings – became one of the most exuberant and beau-
tiful art magazines to ever appear in Denmark. The young experimental 
Copenhagen artists and intellectuals were seriously affected by the War, 
but could hardly be seen as representatives of a “joy-forsaken generation.” 
The special War Issue of Klingen, Vol. 1, no 8, May 1918, is symptomatic 
of mixed attitudes towards the War. Sympathy is clearly with the Entente 
Powers and the mood most of the way remarkably enthusiastic at this point 
of the War. The soldier in the trench in the front page drawing wears an 
English helmet. There are two cheerful reports from life in Paris during the 
War. The poem Mon sabre by the fallen Frenchman Jacques de Chouens, 
which has a pathetic-heroic tone, centers on the image of a female mouth 
kissing the steel of the sabre, consecrating it to liberate the home country. 
On the other hand, several of the drawings and lithographs, as well as some 
of the literary contributions, try to transfer the experience of the shocking 
war reality to form. They are examples of the modernist aspiration towards 
structural mimesis.21 The Norwegian painter Per Krohg had participated 
in the War a volunteer for a Norwegian ski ambulance.22 His one act play 
over two pages Nervousness or A Quiet Night at the Front, a front going 
right across a church shot to pieces, most of the ’characters’ are the guns 
and the ‘words’ their sound. They rise from the “Pling!” of the rifles to the 
“Oouiiiiii baooom!!” of the long-range cannons and then culminate in a 
mixed choir:
        Guns of all calibers, rifles, hand grenades, machineguns:
    Oiiiii plang! Baoum! Takketakketakketakkeouiiiii pling, pling! Baoum!
Baoum! Baoum!
After that, Jesus asks Mary where God is. God, (”a painted plaster figure”) 
has been captured by the Germans. He is finally blown to pieces by a French 
air torpedo. The de-humanized onomatopoetic mimesis of the sound of war 
continues futurist and Dadaist experiments with pure sound words. And 
the implication of the War Theatre from 1916 is a conception of the War 
as an end play for all metaphysics and religion received by tradition. Emil 
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Bønnelycke’s poem Hymne sets a vitalistic-futuristic potentiation of youth-
ful vitality as a counterbalance to the destructive War. 
While this poem could be accused of suffering from an excess of pathos, 
later issues of Klingen show some of his most daring experiments with 
visual poetry. Berlin in no 9-10, June-July 1918, is a wordless graphic poem, 
consisting of partly parallel, partly crossing lines, reminiscent of metropoli-
tan phenomena like railroad tracks, roads, cables or electric wires. 
New York in no 9, 1919 is another graphic poem, filling the back cover page 
in a rather large format (30 x 40 cm.). A green, stylized skyline of Manhattan 
with skyscrapers and the Brooklyn Bridge is made up solely of words in the 
author’s handwriting, with varying sizes of the letters, sometimes large and 
easily readable, sometimes small and more enigmatic. The top of the left 
skyscraper reads like this in translation: “O about your houses New York 
and about your bridges I dream wild dreams.” And the bottom: “Let me be 
as the child of the century of bustle happy in your homeless middle of New 
York.” The right skyscraper consists of the names of famous Americans: 
politicians, inventors like Robert Fulton and Thomas A. Edison, the famous 
Danish photographer Jacob A. Riis, and movie stars like Douglas Fairbanks 
and Charlie Chaplin. In the middle, constituting one side of a central build-
ing, the eye is drawn to enlarged names of authors such as Frank Norris, 
Walt Whitman, Jack London, Edgar Allan Poe, and Upton Sinclair. The two 
poems are the first Scandinavian graphic poems in the spirit of Apollinaire’s 
Calligrammes and display the iconographic importance of the metropolises 
of Berlin and especially New York in the postwar years. 
In addition to his contributions to Klingen, Emil Bønnelycke had already 
explored the expressionist way of interpreting the War in his debut collec-
tion Ild og Ungdom (Fire and Youth, 1917). In the city poem Gaden (The 
Street), the War is inescapably present on the newspaper front pages and in 
the street cries:
Cries of newspaper sellers: “The War! Lloyd George wants peace!”
“Gorky has served under Germany in secrecy”.
Crippled news-salesmen, rags, but cheerful dispositions. 
Fatigue and poverty in the voice, when you’re really listening …
The man selling newspapers is life in wreck −. 
“Latest news from today! “Hey!” A newspaper to the cyclist −. 
“Kerensky speaks out skeptically in “The Anarchist”. 
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This is a fine example of the war experience through the optics of the media, 
a juxtaposition of fragmented announcements and images
The war motif is also prominent in Aarhundredet (The Century), from 
Asfaltens Sange (The Songs of the Asphalt, 1918), one of Bønnelycke’s most 
famous poems, starting with this declaration of love: 
“I love you, you mysterious time, you century of centuries, who are 
rich in never guessed changes, rich in chaos, in the beauty of confu-
sion, the splendor of speed, rich in risky business, rich in terror, in a 
swelling, murderous overture, the war, whose trumpets, the canons, 
and drums, the machine guns, proclaim the world revolution.”
The form of the poem is a paean, an ode, an invocation. The listing of the 
modern, paradoxical beauties of technical civilization makes it a catalogue in 
the tradition of Walt Whitman and Johannes V. Jensen, but also connects the 
poem with its most obvious source of inspiration: Marinetti’s The Futurist 
Manifesto (1908) that was succeeded by several others. While carrying on a 
controversy against traditional art and literature, negativity is integrated into 
an overriding positivity. The paradoxicality of modernity, its blatant contin-
gency, is seen as an expression of dynamics and potentials. 
With the voluminous novel Spartanerne (The Spartans, 1919), Bønnelycke 
tried to render the war experience in expressionist prose. It is composed in 
three co-ordinate plotlines, similar to the principle of simultaneity in cub-
ism. We are apparently presented with three first-person narrators: a Spartan, 
a soldier from the World War, and a Danish recruit in Viborg, the barrack 
town. The two contemporary lines are gradually revealed as being narrowly 
connected. The fighting soldier is the very same as the recruit, presupposing 
a fiction of Denmark as a full-scale participant of the World War. The plot-
lines illuminate youth and arms throughout history. The passages about the 
Danish recruit are obviously based on personal experience. The love letters 
of the Spartan warrior contain the prettiest lyrical prose in the book. But the 
most interesting parts of the book are finally the reports from the World War. 
Firstly, there are expressionist battle scenes, sparkling with energy, but often 
on the verge of overshooting the mark in pathos: 
“My soul sees all this: The fire, the green bundles of stars, such 
magnesium explosions, falling, conic ghostly lights, skeleton para-
sols of a pale, unnatural glow of mercury, smoking, sweating a 
milky, smoldering smoke.”
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Secondly, and more daringly experimental, Bønnelycke seeks to illustrate 
the monstrous quantity of death and destruction though a kind of concrete 
poetry. This is the case in Chapter XIV, where the words “cross” and “graves” 
are mixed with names from many different nations. It begins like this: “I read 
a song of names, a requiem of cold data.” (“Jeg læser en Sang af Navne, en 
Dødsmesse af kolde Data.” (109)). There follows a long promenade among 
crosses and names: 
“Americans. National Army. 2den Foot Garde Division.[in English 
in the original] Fallen at Somme June 21 1917. 411. 3 Comp. 59 Batt. 
116. 2 Comp. 57 Batt. 301. 1 Comp. 59 Batt. 21. 4 Comp. 57 Batt. 
79. 2 Comp. 59 Batt. 824. 4 Comp 57 Batt. 823. 4 Comp. 59 Batt. …
On. On. Graves. Graves. Graves. Crosses. Black crosses. Cold cross-
es. Silent crosses. Threatening crosses. Sad crosses. Naked cross-
es. Rough crosses. Paths. Gravel. Sun. Drought. Withered flowers. 
Thirsty flowers. Burnt leaves. Faded dates.” 
The ending is:
“Graves. Graves. Graves.
Paths. Flowers.
Crosses. Crosses.
Crosses.” 
The book is not a perfect work of art. But, as an experiment, it contains 
some of the most interesting traces of World War 1 in Danish literature. 
Traces of the War likewise impose themselves in the imagery of Tom 
Kristensen’s famous program poem: Landet Atlantis. Et Symbol (The Land 
Atlantis. A Symbol) in Fribytterdrømme (Freebooter Dreams, 1920), his de-
but – and the most important contemporary Danish collection of poems. 
But these traces are coated with several layers of myth, already from the 
title. Atlantis is a mythic country that has even sunk into the sea. A symbol 
prescribes an indirect, symbolic reading of eventual elements of reality. It 
is also unclear, consciously indeterminate, who speaks in the poem. If the 
agitator has the floor after the two first strophes, who then is the speaker 
before that? 
In any case, the professed symbolic picture of a chaotic world is solidly root-
ed in the new pictures from the Great War and the subsequent revolutions:
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“Superb like a war-shattered station are
our youth and our strength and our wild ideas [...]
The land called Atlantis towards which we long,
has bright stacks of rifles adorning the streets.
Bonfires all flicker for the alleyway’s soldiers
hungrily leaning against the walls
and rapaciously grabbing at each scrap of food
they can extract from tin cans. 
The streets are deserted, the wind harshly howls
making flutes of the keyholes and spectrally
whining the skeletal waltzes
so festively danced on the ruins of houses,
while shattered panes from their windows
all grin like ironical skulls.”23
The link between reality and symbol is that a chaotic world requires a new 
intonation, hoarse and impetuous sounds. However there is – as everywhere 
in the poem collection – a contradiction between the garish and violent 
character of the images and tonality on one hand, and the classical, regular 
strophic form on the other. 
Even adhering to this tradition, the poem contains a vehement rejection of 
the canonized concept of beauty – in favor of a beauty born in the chaotic 
now: the beauty of destruction, killing, war, and revolution. Objects with 
their original function converted (plush, postman’s jackets), mixed with 
phenomena of vulgar culture (tin gramophones) are stirred into one heter-
ogeneous collage or montage. Forms and colors explode. But, at the same 
time, central elements in these stanzas are directly mimetic: veritable ek-
phrases of photos in Danish newspapers and weeklies from the World War 
and from the Russian and German revolutions.
The activist gesture at the end – “In chaos I raise up my gun/ towards 
beauty’s bright star and aim” (“I Chaos jeg løfter min Bøsse/ mod Skønhedens 
Stjerne og sigter”) – alludes to a famous sentence in Friedrich Nietzsche’s: 
Also sprach Zarathustra: “Ich sage euch: Man muss noch Chaos in sich 
haben, um einen tanzenden Stern zu gebären.” It also reminds one of the 
dramatic revolver shots by which Emil Bønnelycke ended a famous con-
temporary recitation of his poem about the killings of Rosa Luxemburg and 
Karl Liebknecht. 
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A politically and formally even more radical expressionism, an instance of 
the Danish avant-garde closer to Dadaism than to futurism, was represented 
by Rudolf Broby-Johansen with the poem collection Blod (Blood, 1922). All 
the poems of this provocative collection, for which the author was brought 
to trial for pornography, contain shocking, bloody incidents such as sexual 
murder, necrophilia, induced abortion, and birth. A stylistic specialty is that 
all the words, written in capitals, acquire a thing-like or noun-like character. 
According to the author himself, these poems are troubled reactions to the 
million murders of the World War. The most direct example is the violent 
and decadent poem “STRIDSMÆND FOR DET VI ELSKER/ BELGIEN 11-
6-1917” (“Warriors for what We Love/ Belgium June 11 1917”), in which a 
young girl is raped, killed and her body mutilated by six soldiers:
“RAPE […] THEN THEY FIGHT/ THEN ALL FIGHT/ WOMAN/ 
BODY/ CORPS/ BUTT/ HANDS/ BAYONET/ SQUASH/ CRACK/ 
TEAR // THEY FLEE FROM EACH OTHER // IN HALF-DARK 
EACH CORNER/ SYPHILITIC CRAWLS OVER PIECE OF 
THIGH/ BONE JOINT/ RUNNING CHROME OVER BLUE 
BLOOD PHALLUS (MUSHROOM !)/ SENIOR-SCHOOL PUPIL 
PUTS GENITALS INTO SHOE/ FEVERISH/ DOUBLE-NECK 
MASTURBATES CHEWING SANITARY TOWEL/ BALDHEAD 
DRAWS LABIA OVER FLUX PENIS AS A COLLAR” 
The poem and the collection as a whole reveal a familiarity with the des-
perate poetry of August Stramm, Gottfried Benn (e.g. Morgue, 1912), and 
Georg Trakl.24 But it is also the verbal equivalent of the terrifying war etch-
ings by J. F. Willumsen, the great Danish painter (1863-1958), who primar-
ily focused on German war crimes such as Miss Edith Cawell’s Martyrdom 
(1916), The Invasion (1917), Two Dead Soldiers (1917), and The Belgian 
Prisoner (1918).
Otto Gelsted was co-editor of Klingen and the author of Ekspressionisme 
(1919), an excellent introduction to the flourishing modernism in Danish 
painting, competently viewed on an international background. He was skep-
tical, however, towards the literary branches of expressionism represent-
ed by Bønnelycke and Tom Kristensen, as well as Broby-Johansen. With 
Reklameskibet (The Show Boat, 1923) he made a striking parody of futurist 
style, mixing it with the emergent language of advertisement – and present-
ed his own activist-radicalist alternative. But also in this poem there are 
‘expressionist’ traces of the World War: 
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“And now the ship is
One single sparkling illumination,
The airplanes shell it with Bengali bombs” 
Similar to before-mentioned poems by Bønnelycke and Kristensen, it ends 
with an activist gesture: the show boat is blown up, yet another indication 
of a militant attitude on the background of the War and the revolutions. The 
parodic, multi-voiced tonality of this poem became an important source of 
inspiration for the Danish lyrical modernism of the 1960s.
Prosaic retrospections
Years after the end of the War, its long-terms effects were registered and 
interpreted in different kinds of realist prose, in novelistic fiction, and au-
tobiographical works. One of the first instances is Jacob Paludan’s Søgelys 
(Searchlight, 1923). The novel’s main character is Hugo Fahlen, a Danish-
American now returning to Copenhagen. As one of maybe 30.000 Danish-
Americans, he had enlisted in the American army and taken part in the war. 
Back in US, with scars on his body and wounds in his soul, no other work 
was available than that as a driver in a dynamite factory, not especially help-
ful for getting over the heavy case of post-traumatic stress he had acquired 
in the trenches. In peaceful Denmark, he is from time to time still hit with 
terrible fits of remembrance and anxiety:
“Two claps of thunder behind him. He threw himself forwards in 
the chair, his nervous net became as ice, and the heart hammered 
loudly and swiftly, dookdookdookdook! The mouth gaped in terror, 
he grew deathly pale, crept over in the divan and started to shake in-
tensely. He saw a piece of blue sky, a canon swung into position, the 
muzzle opened soot dark and then − ! A whistling lightning leaped 
out, everything became dark night, green and white sparks striped 
over the sky. He was in the trench again” 
As were most of the returning soldiers, he is also deeply frustrated by the 
cynical commercial after-war atmosphere, without traces of brotherly un-
derstanding or tolerance. Hoping to find a little of the “unpaid goodness” 
left in his old home country, he registers with an alien, critical eye the 
rapidly growing Americanization of Denmark. He finds the effacement of 
the traditional gender roles especially appalling – “the more of equality, the 
more of unhappiness”, he thinks. The joyless competition of the sexes for 
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jobs and the feminine man are for him – as well as the traditionalist implicit 
author – the very worst signs of decadence. Unable to overcome his war 
traumas, he ends up in jail for a minor, casual case of fraud. He cannot bear 
the future, can barely find “a bridge back to the real world”.
Some years later, Jacob Paludan again approached the long-term effects of 
the World War in a very different kind of novel. Jørgen Stein (1932-33) is a 
historical Bildungsroman in two large volumes: Torden i Syd (Thunder in 
the South) and Under Regnbuen (Under the Rainbow). Jørgen, the younger 
son of a higher civil servant, a prefect in the small town of Thisted, Northern 
Jutland, is to begin his education in the somewhat larger city of Aalborg. The 
novel starts with a dinner party at the prefect’s house, where the sensational 
news of the murder on the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne and his wife 
is brought on a handbill from the local newspaper. Later, the start of the War 
is reported in a long series of still more ominous newspaper headlines. 
During the rest of the first part of the novel, located in Aalborg, the course 
of the War is constantly present as a background, a kind of subplot. Jørgen 
is growing up, enjoying his formative years in Aalborg, interesting relations 
to attractive girls, a close friend, and the stimulating city life in the self- 
confident, rapidly growing industrial town of Aalborg. But, while enjoying 
himself on a Saturday night at a popular dancing place, Jørgen suddenly 
remembers a newspaper telegram he noticed in passing: 
“Horrifying Battles in the Belgian Barbed Wire Fences.
‘After all it is strange,’ he said.
‘What is strange, you moron?’
‘The War at one place – and fun at the other.’” 
As the War drags on, this leitmotif is taken up again, but now with an added 
consciousness about the partiality of the media, the media war: 
“Music, song, indoor life; outside in the frost you could read war 
telegrams, but who cared to. One had discovered long ago that the 
press services worked in a partial manner. Both armies seemed to be 
victorious in their fight against one another, and if anyone gave up a 
few positions it was for tactical reasons … One had become callous 
towards the immense number of casualties long ago. In front of the 
long posters of misery, women screamed with pleasure at a daring 
joke and gentlemen bid each other on Aalborg’s special thé-russe 
against the cold.”
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The War changes its face in the winter of 1916-17. The Unlimited 
U-boat War is declared, ships are painted with camouflage, a com-
prehensive system of rationing is introduced, electricity and the 
opening hours of cafés cut down. Moreover, the winter is unusual-
ly harsh, many are starving, and civic kitchens are opened. Shady 
businessmen are imprisoned. “The movie theatres played Pax æter-
na,25 while the Russian Tsar was put in prison and America decided 
to enter into the War … Circle upon circle of waves spread out from 
the already so far away incident in Sarajevo.”
The second part of the novel, Under the Rainbow, describes the long-
term effects of the War on Jørgen and his generation. With Jørgen’s 
brother Otto as a leading character, there is a satirical portrait of the 
“Modern Mentality” of Goulash Capitalism, financial speculation and 
Americanization – in the vein of Searchlight. The armistice is dryly not-
ed: “This autumn finally brought the Armistice. No dazzling victory for 
anybody; a difference in degree of loss of blood and hunger was decisive.” 
Jørgen’s reactions are uncertain, far from jubilant. In the movie theatre, 
showing the march of the victorious troops into Paris, he regards Lloyd 
George, Marshal Foch and 
“The endless rows of soldiers. The music played incitingly, and the 
public was carried away – exactly the same psychosis as at the start 
of a war … He breathed heavily outside on the street, ashamed by 
the thought of these endless, khaki-grey masses, being silent about 
what they had seen. What did his courage concern those who had 
lived through the greatest; had not a half-hearted neutral lost all 
right to put in a word? 
For Jørgen – the hesitant heir of a prewar bourgeois culture, more or less 
generalized as representative of his generation – the War has meant an un-
bridgeable rift in his development as it swept away a well-established, tradi-
tional order, now yesterday’s world, without revealing any easy access to a 
new one. The novel ends with the gnomic sentence: “After all, he belonged 
to a generation that had to stumble at start.” 
In 1929, Thomas Dinesen presented a radically different Danish experience 
of World War 1 in his autobiographical work No Man’s Land. En Dansker 
med Canadierne ved Vestfronten. It was published in English one year later 
under the (rather arbitrarily) altered title of Merry Hell! A Dane with the 
Canadians. The translator is anonymous. The translation is generally rea-
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sonable, but there are serious flaws: it contains, as in the before-mentioned 
translation of Erichsen’s Forced to Fight, more pejorative expressions about 
the Germans than the original; almost all of the (very few) erotic hints have 
been censored away; there are quite a number of other deletions, e.g. of the 
poem Thomas composes to his mother in a conquered trench near the end 
of the book.26 
Dinesen was the third generation of a family of military engagement and 
distinction. At the outbreak of the War, he joined the Danish Academic 
Rifle Corps as his first step to real participation in a war against German 
militarism. After having graduated as an engineer in 1916, he tried to enlist 
in the French army. Though he could explain and prove that both his father 
and his grandfather had won the Croix de la Légion d’honneur as officers 
in the French army, it was of no use. He then tried England, was again 
met with refusal, but unofficially referred to the possibility of joining the 
Canadians. The book consists of extracts of letters to family during the war, 
diaries, notes, and memoirs. They are limited and self-centered, he admits, 
but claims truthfulness as their only merit. 
In the spring of 1917, he has come to New York. After an attempt to join the 
American army, again in vain, he is finally enlisted in the Canadian army. 
Following chapters on his time as a recruit in Montreal and his camp life 
in England, the remaining two thirds of the book are reports of his active 
service at the front from March 1918 to the end of the War. 
As a documentary report, it does not possess the full coherence and stylis-
tic finish of a fictional work, but has the advantage of the freshness of im-
pressions and the comprehensiveness of the account of life on front in the 
last year of the War. We are confronted with dirt, cold, hunger and thirst, 
the boredom of long waiting hours, close-ups on panic during drum fire or 
gas attacks, the adrenalin rush in raids – and the many, many ugly faces of 
death.27 
One of the first impressions of gunfire at the front is rendered though ono-
matopoetic words like an expressionist poem – “boom … boom … boom …
boom-boom … BOOM!”. “dah-dah-dah … dah-dah-dah … dah-dah-dah!”, 
“SWU-UPP!” (113) – but it is characteristic that, as a trained sportsman, he 
also notes a migration of birds on that night – “Gyw! gyw! gyW!” (114)– 
Duck, wild goose, woodcock, obviously indifferent to the guns. 
In the breaks between the battles, there is time to reflect on the final, deci-
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sive questions of life. As an agnostic, Dinesen has a keen and critical eye on 
strict religions, especially authoritarian Catholicism. He also wonders about 
the cynicism and meanness in the matters of sex and love of his comrades, 
good and loyal in other matters. He also is most critical of the stereotypes of 
the enemy in the war propaganda. In general, he thinks, the soldiers them-
selves are less prejudiced. He reports, however, a few grim instances of 
cruelties committed against German prisoners by Allied forces. 
The end of No Man’s Land contains a long description of “The Offensive”, 
including attempts to render the adrenalin rush at mad attacks: 
“A couple of survivors dash off from the post, and we rush after 
them, tear our hands and kilts on the wire, jumping across the over-
turned machine-gun and the dead or dying gunners, running pant-
ing and perspiring along the dry, hard trench, corner by corner … 
and then we reach the next machine-gun post and throw ourselves 
against it, yelling and roaring, with bombs and bayonets, battle-mad 
– regardless of everything in the world, our whole being intent on 
one thing alone: to force our way ahead and kill!” (239). 
In one of the conquered trenches, he admires the starry sky, remembers 
beautiful nights in his home at the Sound, and reflects upon his innermost 
impetus to go to war: “I have always wished that I might once be tried to my 
very utmost. When it comes to the crucial test, when each nerve and fibre in 
your bodies for days and weeks has been strained to bursting-point, − what 
are we worth then? what strength have we got in us? ” (249).
At New Year’s Eve 1918, he can look back upon the War and look forwards 
to working for peace and understanding. He has passed the test. In Bexhill, 
he has been awarded with the French Croix de Guerre, and in Buckingham 
Palace he has received the Victoria Cross from King George. Thomas Dinesen 
was the only foreigner to win the Victoria Cross during World War 1.
Karen Blixen was Thomas Dinesen’s sister. They were close and corre-
sponded eagerly during the war. Her Letters from Africa show her deep 
involvement in the course of the War and his fate in it. In her more ‘artistic’ 
autobiographical work Out of Africa (1937), especially in the fourth part, 
From an Immigrant’s Notebook, there are some glimpses of her sporadic 
contact with the World War in Africa. Like other Swedish immigrants in 
Kenya, her husband Bror enlisted at the start of the War. She herself risked 
being sent to a concentration camp for women, but tried to avoid it by volun-
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teering in a kind of “war safari”, transmitting information about the move-
ments of the German army. During her journey to the farm, six months 
before the War, she had become acquainted with the head-commander of 
the German forces in East Africa, General von Lettow-Vorbeck – soon to 
become a legend as an invincible opponent: defeated, but never caught.
A special instance of the long-term effects of World War 1 on Danish litera-
ture is to be found in the autobiography from 1943 of the dramatist and cler-
gyman Kaj Munk: Foraaret saa sagte kommer (Spring Comes so Gently). 
In two intertwined plotlines, he recalls his literary and religious formation. 
The effects of the World War are firstly direct and political. In the wake of 
the War, he strongly felt the turbulent turn of history at the fall of the princes 
and breakdown of empires:
“The thrones were overthrown, and the princes ran for their life, 
throwing their crowns behind them to hold up the pursuers … away 
were all the crowned heads in Germany. But the democracies tri-
umphed … I had no belief in the princes anymore. And still less in 
the peoples that acted with rebellion against their princes. My mind 
began to look out for the dictator.”
For most of his life, Kaj Munk sympathized with the idea of dictatorship, 
and through most of the 1930s he expressed sympathy for Hitler, and above 
all Mussolini. By 1938, however, he took a public stand against the perse-
cution of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Immediately after the German occu-
pation of Denmark, he intensely advocated resistance at any cost. He was, 
of course, put under censorship, but continued to preach openly against the 
occupiers. In January 1944, he was killed as the first prominent Dane in a 
wave of terror murders. 
He used his autobiography as a chance to circumvent censorship. The dou-
ble time perspective in it – narrator’s time and narrated time – also implies 
a subtle duplicity in his eye on World War 1 and World War 2. Even more 
interesting than the direct effects is the indirect influence on mind and men-
tality. It shows itself in images that connect the personal development to 
history at large and two world wars.
The experience of being chosen to his vocation as a poet by sudden inspi-
ration, is formulated like this: “It was as if an index finger lifted out of the 
parenthesis of the book and stretched against me with a: You are the man.” 
The feeling of vocation as a clergyman is formed in the same image: “And 
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suddenly the index finger once again grew up between the letters and point-
ed at me with a: You are the man.” And when he finally decides to accept 
a vicarage in a remote parish in Western Jutland, his inner clarification is 
rendered in this way: “After all the finger had appeared from the cloud and 
had pointed for me on Vedersø. Then things are of course settled. ... I had 
to take this job upon me. I had to go out into the trench. / Speak, o Lord, thy 
servant heareth.” 
The Biblical image at the end (1 Samuel, 3.10) – as well as the implicit refer-
ence to the Ecce homo motif – link the vocation as a prophet to the Christian 
tradition in which the author grew up. But the repeated image of the finger 
is taken from the British War Minister Lord Kitchener’s famous and vastly 
influential poster of recruitment from World War 1 – with its appealing 
index finger and the sentence: ‘YOU ARE THE MAN I WANT’. In this 
way, there is the juxtaposition of the acceptance of a benefice and “going 
out into the trenches”. And thus, the narrator demonstrates that the young 
main character’s personal feeling of holy vocation is profoundly shaped 
by his age: by the World War with its obligation to risk one’s life in the 
trenches, but not least with its modern media, aggressive agitation, and 
efficient language of advertisement. 
This leitmotif – the obligation to take a stand and fight like a good soldier 
– also connects back to the time of narration during World War 2 and to the 
indirect mobilization to resistance that is present even in the most ‘inno-
cent’ national idylls throughout the book. 
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, Danish literature was profoundly influenced by World War 1. 
So were the other main art forms. Some instances in Danish art have been 
briefly mentioned. In music, the sound of war is frighteningly audible in 
some of the principal works by Carl Nielsen, the great Danish composer, a 
close friend of the painter J. F. Willumsen. The vitalist Fourth Symphony 
Det uudslukkelige (The Inextinguishable, 1916) has in its climax a vehement 
duel between two sets of timpani that threatens to break the musical life 
flow of the orchestra. In the first movement of his Fifth Symphony (1922), a 
similar war drama is enacted as the music is progressively interrupted by an 
aggressive snare drum at an accelerated tempo; at its climax the snare drum-
mer should, according to the instruction by the composer, improvise “as if 
at all costs he wants to stop the progress of the orchestra”.28 
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In literature, the traces of the War are visible and profound from early in the 
War until many years later, in many different genres and literary currents 
from modernism to realism. Direct experiences of the War in the trenches 
are represented in documentary, semi-documentary, and fictive forms. At 
the same time, this chapter has demonstrated that one of the most impor-
tant, long-lasting sources of influence was that of the War as it appeared in 
the rapidly developing media. Basic phenomena of modernity – disconti-
nuity, fragmentation, simultaneous co-existence of heterogeneous elements 
– were shockingly accentuated by the War. Corresponding modes of pres-
entation, reflecting new ways of perception and a new mentality, were first 
and most broadly introduced in the modern media. They were then taken up 
and further developed in literature and other art forms.
Denmark’s neutral position, partly limited to a spectator’s role, partly in-
volved in a number of ways, has probably favored the importance of the 
media in the perception of the War and made the media angle especially 
visible. The variety of possible approaches may also – at least during the 
War and anything else equal – have opened a broader spectrum of attitudes 
to the War than in the warring countries, where the efficiency of the prop-
aganda machinery and the public restraints upon opinion were necessarily 
much stronger.
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Endnotes
1 “Du Pusling-Land, som hygger dig i Smug, mens hele Verden brænder 
om din Vugge” All through the chapter, all translations of Danish titles 
and quotations to English are my responsibility, unless otherwise indi-
cated. 
2 Cf. Adriansen, 2014 
3 Collected and reprinted as late as in 2016 in the book Ørnens flugt 
over Rhinen og over Ækvator. Essays (The Eagle ś Flight over the 
Rhine and over Equator, Larsen 2016). 
4 An extreme example of the pro-German point of view is Emil 
Rasmussen’s satirical novel Barbarkvinder (Barbarian Women, 
The Revelations of a French Eyewitness of the Terrifying German 
Conditions, 1917). Published under the pseudonym of Jean Poincanard 
[‘No lie’], it is a grotesque parody of the supposed image of Germany 
in the French war propaganda. Its rather daring erotic episodes were 
considered pornographic, and the author was condemned to 14 days of 
prison.
5 Reprinted in his book Introduktion til vor Tidsalder (Introduction to 
our Age, 1915). 
6 Translated by Bjarne S. Bendtsen, quoted from his article Colour-blind 
or Clear-sighted Neutrality? Georg Brandes and the First World War 
(Bendtsen, 2011: 126). 
7 Brandes wrote the first serious study of Hans Christian Andersen’s 
tales and the first important book on Søren Kierkegaard. In a series of 
lectures, later on published in the main European languages (English 
translation Main Currents in Nineteenth-Century Literature 1903-05), 
he inspired the Modern Breakthrough in Scandinavian literature and 
became one of the founders of Comparative Literature. He was an 
untiring European advocate of Ibsen – “the main architect of Ibsen’s 
international fame”, according to René Wellek – and of Strindberg. In 
1887 Brandes ‘discovered’ Friedrich Nietzsche. His published lectures 
(especially Aristocratic Radicalism, 1889) were decisive in preparing 
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the ground for Nietzsche’s fame, even in Germany. In the Anglo-
American world, his book on William Shakespeare (English edition: 
William Shakespeare: A Critical Study, 1911) was very influential – 
for instance leaving deep traces on the Shakespeare-motif in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses. See Gemzøe 2010.
8 Leader of the Radical Party, prime minister of France from 1906 to 
1909 and again from 1917 to 1920, one of the main architects of the 
Versailles Treaty.
9 The controversy is extensively treated in Knudsen 2004, summarized 
as an article in English in Knudsen 2010. 
10 Cf. Knudsen 2004 and Bendtsen 2011. 
11 Hereby, he also anticipated the heated cultural struggle in Denmark 
after the War that has been labelled Livsanskuelsesdebatten (the View 
of Life Debate).
12 His wartime speeches were also complied in a book: I Krigens 
Vendetegn. Udvalg af Taler holdt I 1913-1920 (In the Turning Sign of 
the War. Selection of Speeches Held in 1913-1920 (Ove Rode 1921).
13 Quoted from Kelly 1997.
14 A profound skepticism toward the book’s value both as literature 
and as a historical source is represented by Bendtsen 2014, whereas 
Lehrmann 2014 and especially Aabenhus 2014 defend it by comparing 
it to the picture drawn in the contemporary letters from the Schleswig-
Danish soldiers. 
15 Sønderjyske Soldaterbreve (Letters of Soldiers from North Schleswig, 
Nielsen (ed) 1915). 
16 Cf. Sønderjyden Mikael Steffensen. En af de Faldne. Minder og Breve 
(Mikael Steffensen, the Schleswig Dane: One of the Fallen. Memories 
and Letters, Rørdam (ed) 1918). 
17 Cf. Krestens breve og dagbøger. En dansker ved vestfronten i Første 
Verdenskrig (Kresten’s Letters and Diaries: A Dane at the West Front 
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in the First World War, Andresen 2012) and Øjenvidner 1914-1918. 
Sønderjyske soldaters beretninger (Eye-Witnesses 1914-1918. The 
Reports of Soldiers from North Schleswig, 2014).
18 An excellent account of the War as a “media event” is given by Ulrich 
Lehrmann (Lehrmann 2014), solidly based on his contribution to the 
story of Danish newspapers in Dansk mediehistorie 2 (Lehrmann 
1997). Regrettably it is, in the first mentioned article, combined with 
an underestimation of the impact of the War on Danish literature, not 
least because of an insufficient understanding of the relationship be-
tween precisely the media and the literature in question. 
19 Cf. Lehrmann 1997: 35. 
20 To be treated in the next part of the chapter. 
21 A definition of this concept can be found in Gemzøe 2003. 
22 Cf. Bendtsen 2010: 398. 
23 Translated by W. Glyn Jones, in Danish Literary Magazine Vol. 5, 
1993.
24 Cf. Gemzøe 2010: 864f.
25 Theatrical release on February16 1917. Like Down with Weapons Pax 
æterna was a Danish war drama film directed by Holger-Madsen.
26 No Man’s Land was re-published in 2014 with a preface by the Danish 
author and Afghanistan veteran Anne-Catherine Riebnitzsky. Merry 
Hell! has been reprinted by The Naval & Military Press, England. 
27 Tom Buk-Swienty, in his ’double biography’ Tommy og Tanne. Det 
store i livet, adds many important historical and personal nuances to 
Thomas Dinesen’s published self-portrait. As to No Man’s Land, he 
compares it to Ernst Jünger’s Im Stahlgewittern, and he rightfully char-
acterizes the protagonists as “unusual types of soldiers” (Buk-Swienty 
2016: 432). Though he might be right that Thomas Dinesen’s attitude 
to war is (even) more complex than revealed in No Man’s Land/Merry 
Hell! his evaluation of the book appears one-sided and reductive. 
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Perhaps a biographer is both a well informed and a biased literary 
judge of an auto-biography that his own work is intended to supple-
ment and correct.
28 28 Cf. Simpson, Robert (1979). Carl Nielsen, Symphonist. London: 
Kahn & Averill: 101. Quoted from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symphony_
No._5_(Nielsen).
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Chapter 10 
The impact of the War: 
Some economic aspects1
Finn Olesen
Introduction
Up to the outbreak of World War 1, expectations on economic matters were 
in general rather positive. Now at last, the vision of Adam Smith – a macro-
economic outcome of harmony and optimality with economic growth and a 
significant high level of wealth for the first time in modern history – seemed 
to be within reach for many of the European countries and the US. Trade be-
tween countries looked like a game from which all countries could benefit.2 
However, the outbreak of the War along with its consequences dramatically 
changed this scenario for decades to come, as we know from history. Far 
from being an economic environment of economic growth, the future be-
came one of troublesome economic as well as political turbulence. 
Through the years many economic historians have tried to depicture what 
happened economically during the War and afterwards. Often with an em-
phasis on the huge negative impact the War had on international affairs. 
Before 1914, international trade patterns, capital flows and the exchange of 
scientific knowledge seems all to have contributed to gaining more prosper-
ous times for all countries involved. After the War, the international eco-
nomic system broke more or less down given room for depressing economic 
conditions which finally gave way to the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
As this story has been told many times, the focus of the present chapter 
is somewhat different from the many contributions written seen from the 
perspective of an economic historian. Rather, the present chapter is written 
primarily seen from the perspective of a macroeconomist with an emphasis 
on the history of macroeconomic thought. As such, it becomes important 
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to the present author to try to illustrate how the war triggered out some 
early seeds to what later became known as the Keynesian Revolution in 
macroeconomics. The father to this revolution was the English economist 
John Maynard Keynes as he after many years of intellectual struggle fin-
ally published his The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
in 1936. The road to this new understanding in economics began as early 
as 1919 where he published the book The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace. From now on Keynes had established himself internationally as a 
well-known and respected economist who was capable of analysing and 
explaining complex economic matters thoroughly. Therefore, his book from 
1919 is a very important contribution in both the writings of Keynes and in 
the history of macroeconomic thought. 
With a focus on economic matters especially important concerning the po-
tential danger of an economic crisis, Keynes made in his book an early 
prognosis on what could and should be expected to be the economic reality 
for the years to come not only for Germany but also for the victorious coun-
tries of the War. As history has shown, Keynes, unfortunately, was rather 
spot on with his prognosis. Somehow, the Versailles Treaty signalled the 
coming of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Likewise, from now on, Great 
Britain was no longer the world’s most powerful Empire economically as 
well as politically. Her position was overtaken by the US, which to a large 
degree had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both Great Britain 
and France. 
The aim of this chapter is primarily to give a thorough examination of the 
book The Economic Consequences of the Peace. In this book, Keynes fo-
cused not only on economic consequences of the War he also took political 
considerations into account. Secondly, more economic history-like, it is to 
present some empirical evidence concerning various macroeconomic vari-
ables in order to depict some important economic consequences of the war.
Keynes-1919: Troublesome times ahead?
As known from the history of economic thought, the writings of John 
Maynard Keynes are rather extensive. During all of his life, he made several 
important contributions. The main characteristic of many of these was that 
they were not written only with a narrow focus on pure economic princi-
ples. In general, Keynes’s perspective was a much broader one. He under-
stood very well indeed that society develops and changes as time goes by 
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and the process of such a transformation could be rather complex to ana-
lyse. Therefore, you have to have an eye on economic, political, cultural and 
other relevant aspects when you study such processes. 
The scene is set
In 1919, Keynes wrote the book The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
after the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been agreed upon. As stated by 
(Skidelsky 1992), this book is seen by many as one of the best contributions 
that Keynes ever made in so far as he focused not only on an economic 
understanding of the Treaty, he also presented a political discussion of the 
dangers of a possible future European conflict.
In the spring of 1919, Keynes participated in the peace negotiations as a rep-
resentative of the British Treasury. As it became clear to Keynes that the ne-
gotiations would end with a Peace Treaty that could only be explained by a 
thirst for revenge especially towards Germany, he finally resigned from the 
British delegation in June 1919. As explained by (Skidelsky 1992), this was 
not a sudden reaction from Keynes’s side. He had for a long time been very 
unhappy with the negotiations. Already as soon as by the end of October 
1918, he had argued in a memorandum that it should be of essence that the 
winning side of the war should only put reparations on especially Germany 
of a size that she was able to pay. And the capacity to pay reparations was 
hinged upon Germany’s capacity to acquire a surplus on its trade balance. 
No one nation would gain by forcing reparations on Germany that were 
unrealistic. That would harm not only Germany but also both Europe and 
America as well.
At the Peace negotiations Keynes had tried to persuade the allied countries 
of this conviction. Nevertheless, he did far from succeed. In the beginning of 
May 1919, it was clear to him that the Allies would put forward reparations 
of such a magnitude that Germany had no chance of fulfilling. As Keynes 
wrote in a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain:
“We have presented a Draft Treaty to the Germans which contains 
in it much that is unjust and much more that is inexpedient … It is 
now right and necessary to discuss it with the Germans and to be 
ready to make substantial concessions. If this policy is not pursued, 
the consequences will be disastrous in the extreme … The Prime 
Minister is leading us all into a morass of destruction. The settle-
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ment which he is proposing for Europe disrupts it economically and 
must depopulate it by millions of persons. The New States we are 
setting up cannot survive in such surroundings. Nor can the peace 
be kept or the League of Nations live”; (Harrod 1972: 294).3
On 28 June 1919, the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed by the Allies as 
well as by Germany.
The need to explain the wrongdoings 
Back home, Keynes felt that he had to set the record straight.4 He felt he had 
to address the public about the harm that had been done at the conference. 
Because of this, he decided to write a book. At 12 December 1919, it was 
published. It immediately took on as sales rapidly went up. In August the 
next year, it had been translated into 11 languages and it had already sold 
more than 100.000 copies.
The intentions behind the need to write such a book were clearly expressed 
by Keynes himself in his Preface to the French edition. He stated that he had 
a need to demonstrate that:
“our representatives at the Paris conference committed two grand 
errors against our interests. By demanding the impossible, they 
forsook the substance for the shadow and will in the event lose 
everything. By excessive concentration on political objects and on 
the attainment of an illusory security, they overlooked the eco nomic 
unity of Europe – illusory because security is to be found least of 
all in the occupation of extended frontiers, and also because the  
political contrivances of the moment will be largely irrelevant to the 
problems of a later decade”; (Keynes 1919: xix).
The economic aspects 
In his book, Keynes seems in some important aspects to challenge the 
mainstream economic thinking of his time, especially concerning its view 
on economic stability. Actually, he was not sure that an overall optimal 
macroeconomic outcome would be brought about automatically by the mar-
ket mechanism itself. Rather, the outcome could be one of disequilibrium 
and it was possible that economically unstable conditions could develop into 
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a serious economic crisis. Moreover, more importantly, seen from a 1919 
perspective, such a situation might be the result of the terms put forward 
in the Peace Treaty. Not only Germany was in for troublesome economic 
times; that was the case for all of the European countries as they were now 
more than hitherto interrelated with one and other through trade. Therefore, 
it should be expected that an international economic crisis could develop in 
the years ahead, because as Keynes warned us with his opening words of 
Chapter 1:
“Very few of us realise with conviction the intensely unusual, un-
stable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic 
organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half 
century”; (Keynes 1919:1).
That is, you cannot take macroeconomic stability for granted. Economies 
can be hit by recessions as well as more boom-like situations. The macro-
economic outcome is, in general, probably not one of full employment. 
Furthermore, you also have to acknowledge the fact that macroeconomic 
stability is partly dependent on political stability. Political turbulence can 
make economic decision-making processes very problematic to conduct the 
proper way. Therefore, potential political turbulence could be transformed 
into potential economic turbulence, just as troublesome economic times 
could question the stability of political institutions. The two systems – the 
economic and the political system – interact with each other nationally as 
well as internationally. It is due to this understanding that Keynes was wor-
ried about the peace terms that has been presented to Germany. These terms 
would not only with certainty harm Germany; they are at the same time also 
harmful to the international society as well. 
Although Keynes, challenged the mainstream economic view on stability, 
he nevertheless acknowledged that Europe should be characterized as ”so 
organised socially and economically as to secure the maximum accumula-
tion of capital”; (Keynes 1919: 11). Not surprisingly therefore, accumulation 
of capital had been an important feature of Western economic development 
up to 1914. However, the War had torn apart that process of accumulation, 
Keynes points out. And there is nothing in the peace terms that tries to re-
address this fact. In sum, he finds that: 
“I cannot leave this subject as though its just treatment wholly de-
pended either on our own pledges or on economic facts. The policy 
of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the 
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lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation 
of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable – abhorrent and de-
testable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even 
if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe”; 
(Keynes 1919: 142).
How Europe might develop economically after the War is analyzed in 
Chapter 6 of the book. Generally speaking, this is sadly ”one of pessimism” 
as Keynes points out. Firstly, he questions if the population of Europe is 
capable of feeding itself in the years to come. Surely, many of the European 
countries and perhaps especially Germany and Russia might have serious 
problems in this regard. Secondly, many of the European countries lack the 
right infrastructure, which is damaging to the process of economic growth. 
To trade efficiently with each other, countries need a well-functioning in-
frastructure. And trade is essential in stimulating the processes of economic 
growth, Keynes points out. Thirdly and most importantly, there is the threat 
of inflation. Prices are already going up in Europe and probably that process 
would be enhanced in the years to come, Keynes tells us. If this happens, 
Europe has to foresee tremendous economic troubles. It will not only harm 
trade and thereby economic growth, it also induces to “the waste and inef-
ficiency of barter” (Keynes 1919: 152). And then of course, the nightmare 
of hyperinflation might have very severe damaging effects indeed to the 
working of the macroeconomic system: 
“By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, 
secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their 
citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confis-
cate arbitrarily … As the inflation proceeds and the real value of 
the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent 
relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate 
foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be al-
most meaningless … The process engages all the hidden forces of 
economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner 
which not one man in a million is able to diagnose”; (Keynes 1919: 
148, 149).5 
If this scenario is going to become reality, the consequences are cata strophic, 
as Keynes points out very pessimistically. If this happens:
“An inefficient, unemployed, disorganised Europe faces us, torn by 
internal strife and international hate, fighting, starving, pillaging, 
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and lying. What warrant is there for a picture of less sombre col-
ours?”; (Keynes 1919: 157).
Political considerations
According to Keynes, Germany should be treated differently than stated 
in the Peace Treaty. This was not due to economic arguments alone. Peace 
terms had to be not only economically acceptable they should also be politi-
cal fair and just. That is, you have to focus on international relationships be-
tween countries due to trade patterns and other economic relations between 
countries as well as political arrangements. Therefore, as Keynes pointed 
out at the very beginning of his book:
“If the European civil war is to end with France and Italy abusing 
their momentary victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-
Hungary now prostate, they invite their own destruction also, being 
so deeply and inextricably intertwined with the victims by hidden 
psychic and economic bonds”; (Keynes 1919: 2).
Because of this view, Keynes argued that the Treaty had to be revised. 
Rather visionary, Keynes states that one should hope that a Trade Union 
could be established in the near future including not only the European 
countries but also Turkey, Egypt and India. Such a Union ”might do as much 
for the peace and prosperity of the world as the League of Nations itself”; 
(Keynes 1919: 169). If such a free trade area is established one would expect 
Germany to be the core country of union, Keynes goes on arguing that such 
an institution “might go some way in effect towards realizing the former 
German dream of Mittel-Europa”.
Furthermore, you have to take into consideration that:
“A debtor nation does not love its creditor … If, on the other hand, 
these great debts are forgiven, a stimulus will be given to the solidar-
ity and true friendliness of the nation’s lately associated”; (Keynes 
1919: 177).6 
A way out, is to propose, Keynes goes on arguing, to set up an international 
loan scheme. The task of such an institution would be to finance Europe’s 
– including Germany’s – net import. And the financier of such an arrange-
ment has to be the US. 
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Finally, it is important not to put Russia aside, Keynes argues. Instead, 
the European countries should try to integrate Russia economically with 
Europe. That would be to the benefit of both. In trying to achieve this, 
Germany has an essential role to play, as Keynes sees it. In this respect, the 
Allies should ”encourage and assist Germany to take up again her place in 
Europe as a creator and organiser of wealth for her eastern and southern 
neighbours”; (Keynes 1919: 187). 
To sum up
The Economic Consequences of the Peace had a very clear and decisive 
message to deliver to its reader. The scheme of reparations stipulated in the 
Peace Treaty of Versailles, especially those concerning Germany, was not 
only not fair and just; the terms of the Treaty were also indeed very harmful 
to the future economic environment in Germany as well as in Europe. You 
had to expect that not only Germany, but also the allied countries them-
selves, would run into very severe economic as well as probably also polit-
ically troublesome times. Moreover, perhaps an economic depression could 
even be so deep that the forces of destruction – economic and political – 
would become victorious in the end. Seen from Keynes’s point of view, the 
harmonious, optimistic and prosperous economic times of prewar Europe 
were forever gone. 
As we all know, Keynes was certainly right in his prophecy in many ways. 
Unfortunately, it took some time before the politicians got around to ‘revise’ 
the Treaty of Versailles and ease the terms for Germany. Therefore, the 
1920s and 1930s became indeed a damaging period in history, with world-
wide tremendous negative consequences economically as well as politically. 
These events came to pave the road to the regime of Hitler and to the out-
break of World War 2.
Some empirical evidence
Of course, warfare has serious consequences. It affects human life im-
mensely in many ways. So did of course World War 1. It was, as stated by 
(Singleton 2007: 42):
“an economic disaster of the highest order, especially in Europe. Its 
greatest impact was felt at the level of the individual – millions were 
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killed or wounded and others lost relatives, wealth and incomes. It 
is impossible to put a dollar figure on the ‘cost’ of the war. What 
level of compensation would have been adequate to satisfy those 
who suffered, whether materially or psychologically, as the result 
of the war?”. 
In what follows, some economic aspects of World War 1 are presented.
Seen from the perspective of an economist, powers of war are basically 
depended partly on manpower – the size of population – and partly on the 
economic strength of the country in question as recognized by (Broadberry 
& Harrison 2009: 16):
“The richer countries were not only able to mobilise more men. 
Regardless of distance, they also supplied them better. Capital-
abundant economies were able to support capital-intensive war-
fare”.7
That is, the supply of armament in World War 1 was determined by the 
wealth of the individual country. The better off economically, the bigger the 
supply of weapons. Obviously, as indicated in Table 1, both the UK and the 
US were better off than France and Germany. 
Table 1: The wartime change in real GDP, 1913-1918
   UK US France Germany
 1913  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
 1914   92.3 101.1  92.9  85.2 
 1915   94.9 109.1  91.0  80.9
 1916  108.0 111.5  95.6  81.7
 1917  105.3 112.5  81.0  81.8
 1918  114.3 113.2  63.9  81.8 
Source: (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 12).
Furthermore, as a consequences of wartime activities the share of govern-
ment spending as a percentage of GDP had to grow. Once again, France and 
Germany were hit the hardest as shown in Table 2.8 And of course, govern-
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ment spending must be financed either by taxes or by cuts in non-wartime 
activities or by borrowing.
Table 2: The share of government spending (percentage of GDP), 1913-1918
   UK US France Germany
 1913   8.1  1.8  10.0  9.8
 1914   12.7  1.9  22.3  23.9 
 1915   33.3  1.9  46.4  43.8
 1916   37.1  1.5  47.2  50.3
 1917   37.1  3.2  49.9  59.0
 1918   35.1  16.6  53.5  50.1 
Source: (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 15).
As an example, the UK budget deficit rose from 334 (£m) in 1914/15 to 1,690 
(£m) in 1918/19. Because of this, the debt/GDP ratio rose from 26.2% in 
1913/14 to 127.5% in 1918/19 (around 80% of the national debt was domesti-
cally held). In general, debt problems restricted the economic development 
in Europe after the War. The US had provided Britain and France with war 
loans, that made Britain and France to extend their own credits to Italy and 
Russia keeping them both in the coalition fighting much longer than they 
otherwise would had been able to. 
Likewise, due to warfare activities, the economy is stressed as total aggre-
gate demand has to match that of a maximum of supply, or stated different-
ly, economies at war experiences both a demand pull as well as a cost-push 
kind of inflation. As such, the GDP deflator of the UK rose from an index of 
100 in 1913 to an index of 225 in 1919 (as a percentage of 1913); (Broadberry 
& Howlett 2009: 218, 219). Hurt the most was of course Germany who ex-
perienced a period of hyperinflation in the beginning of the 1920s, which 
brought its financial system to break down. In general, most European 
countries suffered from inflationary tendencies. 
Not surprisingly, in general, World War 1 combatants had a lower annual 
growth in real GDP than World War 1 neutral countries. That is the case 
concerning the war years as well as the interwar period. As pointed out by 
(Ritschl & Straumann 2010: 159-160), most of the European countries ex-
perienced growth rates that were below their historical growth paths. Seen 
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from their perspective, full recovery in this regard had to await the golden 
age of the 1960s: “In the three decades after 1914, Europe’s economy was in 
recession relative to trend during fourteen years, and cumulatively lost forty 
percent of its potential output”.
As such, the UK, Germany, the US, and to a lesser extent, France all expe-
rienced problems with unemployment from 1921 and onwards. Especially 
during the Great Recession in the 1930s unemployment rates grew to very 
high levels as indicated by Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in industry, 1921-39 (%)
Source: (Garside 2007:52).
In the period 1913-1929, the UK had an average growth rate of only 0.7%, 
Germany one of 1.2% and France – probably the country most stressed eco-
nomically during the war years9 – had the highest growth rate of 1.9%, 
whereas for instance Denmark had one of 2.7%; (Broadberry & Harrison 
2009: 33). That Germany has a rather low growth rate comes as no surprise 
due to the burden of reparations. That was to be expected because, as stated 
by (Ritschl 2009:68): “The harsh clauses of the Treaty of Versailles can be 
interpreted as a desperate attempt to achieve an ersatz victory by economic 
means”.10 
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More surprisingly, the UK had an even lower growth rate in the above-men-
tioned period. However, this might be explained, as stated by (Greasley & 
Oxley 1996), by a poor competitiveness which stressed the British industry 
tremendously in the 1920s, making the macroeconomic outcome, in gene-
ral, to be one of unemployment. The interesting question is then, which – if 
any – role did World War 1 play in this story? Based on their statistical 
analyses the answer seems quite clear: the impact of the War had indeed 
an important role to play – likewise, (Broadberry & Howlett 2009: 229) 
also argue that World War 1 had a significant negative long run impact 
on Britain’s wealth (a setback of 11.0% to 14.9% of pre-war wealth). Or as 
(Greasley & Oxley 1996:94) conclude:
“there were statistically significant breaks in British industrial pro-
duction during the period 1879 to 1938 ... [their statistical analyses] 
... emphasize that the First World War marked the major structural 
discontinuity in Britain’s industrial growth ... The macroeconomic 
shock of the First World War had enduring consequences for British 
industry ... [therefore] ... the origins of the depressed interwar indus-
trial economy appear to lie in the macroeconomic shock of the First 
World War, since neither the return to gold in 1925 nor the 1929 US 
crash had more than a transitory effect on British industrial produc-
tion”.11
Likewise, as international relations after World War 1 did far from function 
as well as had been the case before the war years might of course also have 
contributed to the low growth rates of Britain.
Furthermore, by use of supply side economic arguments, (Broadberry 1990) 
tries to explain why the UK developed serious problems with its level of 
competitiveness due to a rise in the real wage which resulted in the emer-
gence of mass unemployment in the UK. From 1921 to 1938 with an excep-
tion of the year 1927, the unemployment rate was above 10% – in the range 
of 10.3% to 22.1%; (see Figure 1 and Chick & Pettifor (2010)). At the same 
time, due to the regulation during World War 1 there was a built up of un-
satisfied demand. Because of this, Broadberry argues that workers in gen-
eral desired more leisure rather than more income as the supply of goods 
was rather limited.12 However, the reduction in hours worked13 – “the major 
supply shock of the interwar period”; (Broadberry 1990: 276) – was not 
accompanied by a similar reduction in the money wage and with a fall in 
the general price level, we have an increasing real wage. Therefore: “it was 
the unfortunate combination of the scale of the hours reduction, the mainte-
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nance of the weekly wage, and the appreciation of the exchange rate which 
was so devastating for British industry in the aftermath of World War I” 
(Broadberry 1990: 282).14
That France performs as well as illustrated may also seem surprising. As 
stated by (Hautceour 2009), France adapted growth-wise, apparently, quite 
astoundingly well to the war in comparison with its neighbors, although 
France had an ongoing severe budgetary crisis until 1926. Perhaps this fact, 
to some degree, could be explained by the huge state intervention in the 
economy as the state took a massive part in macroeconomic management 
(an enormous rise in government expenditure, the state’s demand for re-
sources e.g. in the labor market as well as financially). However, according 
to (Hautceour 2009: 201), France was hit hard by the fact that it lost its old 
position in the world, economically as well as politically.15 Similar to the 
UK, France’s position in the ‘new’ world order was less superior than it had 
been before the outbreak of World War 1.
Although the US became an active war partner rather late, the War had 
influenced the US economy from the very beginning as the European 
purchases of goods turned the recession around and created a rather long 
period of boom like times. In general, World War 1 highlighted the mag-
nificent economic strength that she had; economically as well as finan-
cially. From now on, the US took the first rank among countries as the 
industrial nation. Moreover, the US was not affected negatively to the 
same degree by wartime activities as was the case with the European com-
batants. As a result of this process of transformation – Britain’s economic 
weakness and the increasing strength of the US – it meant, for instance, 
that the War “undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of New York 
as a centre of capital export”. From now on, “entrepreneurs and govern-
ments would look to the one industrial nation that had remained large-
ly unscathed by the war”; (Rockoff 2009: 335). However, seen from the 
perspective of (Rockoff 2009: 338), the most important long run impact 
of the War might have been political rather than purely economic, as the 
War had an impact “on the ideology of the nation’s economic and political 
leaders”. That is, the lessons of World War 1 gave way to a new under-
standing of the “reforming liberalism of the 1930s that inspired future 
generations of would-be reformers”. 
That World War 1 had an impact on economic16 and political matters in the 
1920s and 1930s for many countries is a fact. In addition, of course, to some 
extent, economic and political matters were interrelated with each other. 
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When the War ended, all kinds of economic organizations were challenged, 
as economic conditions were in general very fragile indeed.17 
To some countries, the War had an even more devastating impact. 
In Germany, it gave birth to a new kind of democracy with serious eco-
nomic problems, which later on broke down as Germany transformed itself 
into the Nazi regime and gained economic recovery.18 In Russia, it meant 
the building up of the communist state of Lenin and Stalin and depressive 
economic living conditions for most of the population. In the UK, it gave 
her an inferior position than hitherto, politically as well as economically 
– for many years, the UK suffered economic hard times with huge unem-
ployment. In the US, it gave birth to her as a modern superpower; although 
hit hard by the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration gave its 
citizens not only hope of a better future but also a macroeconomic plan that 
early on in the 1930s began stimulating the level of effective demand in the 
US and made the economic recession less severe.
Concluding remarks 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see why a World War was not 
avoided in time. Why give away prosperous times for nothing? What were 
the motives for war? 
As pointed out by (Broadberry & Harrison 2009), the liberalism that fol-
lowed the classical economic period of Adam Smith and David Ricardo was 
challenged in the late nineteenth century by imperialistic political views. 
Now, more priority, politically, was directed towards being able to con-
trol more territory at the cost of trade benefits. As such, these politicians 
reasoned that “it was worth Germany’s while to break up world trade for 
a while in order to grab territory from the older powers”; (Broadberry & 
Harrison 2009: 3).19 Perhaps more territory could be a way to more wealth.20 
As we all know, that was not the outcome of the War. Instead, World War 1 
produced a fragmented Europe with countries that were “ensnared in rep-
arations and debts, and incapable of returning to political and economic 
stability”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 134).
That is, as Keynes had prophesized in 1919, the decades to come were in-
deed dramatic. For some, there were times of enormous economic prosper-
ity; for others it was years of heartbreaking depressive economic realities.21 
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On the ruins of World War 1, the foundations of the coming Nazi regime 
were laid down brick by brick.22 Once again, the quest for Lebensraum be-
came the keyword for Germany. However, at the end, they did not achieve 
this goal. Once again, Europe was torn apart. 
Furthermore, Britain lost its superior position in the world, economically 
as well as politically. From now on, the international scene was dominated 
by the US as the one and only superpower.23 And this is a position that she 
more or less has held ever since. 
On the ruins of World War 2, the foundations of the coming process of 
European integration were built. Also in this respect, Keynes had foreseen 
what probably would be the best solution for peace in Europe. This time, 
Germany succeeded in so far as she became one of the two founding part-
ners – the other one being France – of the European project24 that, until 
the recent crisis, paved the road to economic prosperity for most European 
countries. In this respect, as the most economically important member of 
the European Union – and the EMU – Germany finally ‘conquered’ Europe 
the third time. 
Finally, World War 1 also, at least to some extent, triggered a rather long 
period of massive unemployment in the UK and elsewhere. It was due to 
these empirical facts of depressive economic times that Keynes undertook 
the role, being the most internationally known economist of his time, to try 
to get economic theory to be in better accordance with real life phenomena. 
His long life struggle succeeded at last with his publication of his General 
Theory on 4 February 1936. As we all know, it was based on the content 
of this book that the Keynesian Revolution emerged, which for decades to 
come, set the scene for macroeconomic thought. Based on this economic 
understanding and its economic policy recommendations, prosperity was 
brought to many Western countries as argued, among others, by (Skidelsky 
2009).25
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Endnotes
1 Thanks to Søren Dosenrode, Wolfgang Zank, Mikael Randrup 
Byrialsen and Robert Smith for comments on an earlier draft of the 
present chapter. The content of this chapter is a revised version of 
WP 2016-3 ‘World War I – some economic aspects and consider-
ations’, Working Paper Series, MaMTEP, Department of Business & 
Management, AAU.
2 As pointed out by (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 3): “Globalisation 
has been under way for centuries. The modern wave of globalisation 
that dates from the early nineteenth century gave a significant boost to 
world trade, world capital flows, and worldwide migration, with great 
powers competing for colonial empires on a global scale. The Great 
War of 1914 to 1918 then interrupted and, for a time, set into reverse 
the process of globalisation”.
3 Finally, at 5 June 1919, Keynes addresses the Prime Minister Lloyd 
George: “I ought to let you know that on Saturday I am slipping away 
from the scene of nightmare. I can do no more good here. I’ve gone on 
hoping even through these last dreadful weeks that you’d find some 
way to make of the Treaty a just and expedient document. But now it’s 
apparently too late. The battle is lost. I leave the twins [Lord Cuncliffe 
and Lord Sumner, two members of the British delegation who both ad-
vocated a hard line towards Germany] to gloat over the devastation of 
Europe, and to assess to taste what remains for the British taxpayer”; 
(Skidelsky 1992: 375). 
4 With (Harrod 1972: 303): “The book was not written as a definitive 
history of the Peace Conference. It was quite intentionally designed as 
a polemic; it was composed in two months at a white heat of passion, 
immediately after the events. It sought to influence public opinion at 
once. Europe was disintegrating and must be saved”.
5 As Moggridge has interpreted Keynes’s general views on inflation: 
“Thus, as well as producing the currency fluctuations that impaired 
international trade and recovery, inflation was destroying the basis for 
capitalist accumulation itself”; (Moggridge 1992: 333).
6 As we know presently from the case of Greece; probably most Greek 
would agree with Keynes on this matter!
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7 Alternatively, stated more precisely: “The evidence of the chapters that 
follow suggests that the comparative success of the various economies 
in mobilising their resources depended on three factors that varied in-
dependently: their level of economic development, their proximity to 
the front line, and the duration of their engagement”; (Broadberry & 
Harrison 2009: 14).
8 It must be remembered, of course, that the war was fought in France 
as part of its territory was occupied. Therefore: “the economic impact 
on the war effort was high, since all the ten departments (out of a total 
of 87) that were occupied stopped producing for (and paying taxes to) 
France”; (Hautcoeur 2009: 172).
9 As pointed out by (Hautcoeur 2009: 170): “If the war did not come as 
a surprise, its development and duration were unanticipated … the war 
represented an enormous shock to the economy”.
10 “Germany’s debt burden was clearly less outrageous than it would ap-
pear. As long as a full return to the gold parity was expected for Britain 
and France, it seemed reasonable to burden Germany with a debt total 
not far below those borne by the victorious powers … However, an 
additional constraint was the fact that, for the most part, German debt 
was foreign-owned rather than domestic”; (Ritschl, 2009: 70). And of 
course, payment was based on a surplus of Germany’s trade balance, 
which puts a limit to the amount of goods that could be imported. 
11 That is Word War 1 “interrupted the long-established growth pattern 
by adversely affecting British industry’s competitiveness”; (Greasley & 
Oxley 1996: 98).
12 In general, the utility function is a positive function in both consumer 
goods and leisure time, U(C,L). However, if there is a kind of con-
straint on the number of consumer goods supplied at the market it 
could optimal for the individual to substitute towards consuming more 
leisure time thereby reducing his number of hours supplied as labor. 
13 Data on per capita hours covering the period 1913-1938 is reported 
in (Nason & Vahey 2009: 23). Their findings fully support those of 
(Broadberry 1990). Furthermore, this paper delivers other data series 
on relevant macroeconomic variables on business cycles for the UK 
during World War 1 and the interwar period.
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14 However, this explanation is questioned by (Glynn & Booth, 1992: 731) 
as they find his “effort to explain the slump of the early 1920s entirely 
in these terms is mistaken”. This point of view is, however, totally re-
jected by Broadberry’s reply; (Broadberry 1992).
15 “Before 1914, France had a central financial and political position in 
continental Europe and the Mediterranean, which balanced the indus-
trial position of Germany and complemented the mostly intercontinen-
tal position of Britain”; (Hautcoeur 2009: 201).
16 Not only concerning the level of GDP growth and fluctuations in the 
level of employment but also financially. As pointed out by (Oliver 
2007: 195): “the list of countries that experienced banking and cur-
rency crises by the end of the interwar years reads like an atlas of the 
world”.
17 Therefore: “Politicians, bankers, economists, businessmen, union 
leaders and workers had to make important decisions on the basis of 
incomplete or misleading information … Instead of working for the 
common good, many preferred to act in their own perceived best inter-
ests. Politicians sought re-election, bondholders campaigned for defla-
tion, workers demanded higher wages and so on. Suffice is to say that 
the problems were immense and the actors poorly informed, confused 
and selfish”; (Singleton 2007: 29).
18 As seen from Figure 1, the unemployment rate drops down from 1933 
and onwards. Perhaps not surprisingly, election results in Germany 
confirm that the support to the political extremes (the Nazi party and 
the Communists) could be seen as a ‘function’ of the economic situa-
tion – the deeper the recession the greater the support.
19 As argued in Chapter 3 of the present book, ‘The reasons for the war’ 
written by Knud Knudsen, this traditional old view of Germany as the 
aggressor is challenged somewhat by modern research as some studies 
argue, that Germany was far from being the sole responsible for the 
outbreak of the war. For details, please consult the chapter written by 
Knudsen.
20 That is “in continuity with the period before 1914 was the rivalry for 
colonies”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 140). According to (Broadberry 
& Harrison 2009: 7, 10), 1913-GDP per capita data gave the US and the 
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UK first positions with 5,301 $ and 4,921 $ compared with Germany’s 
level of only 3,648 $ (almost the same as that of France: 3,485 $).
21 “The First World War cast a long shadow over interwar economic  
development that international institutions failed to disperse. 
Unresolved tensions eroded the possibilities of returning to a normal 
world, and Europe became fatally polarized between wealthy and poor, 
democracies and dictatorships”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 149). 
22 With (Ritschl 2009: 72) on the Versailles Treaty: “It sought econom-
ic safeguards in the absence of a credible security arrangement. It 
prolonged the agony of Germany’s economy for several more years. 
It strengthened the elements aimed at revenge instead of promoting 
change and modernisation. And when its feeble controls ultimately  
collapsed, nothing was left to prevent Germany from rearming for 
World War II”. 
23 As pointed out by (Aldcroft 1987: 33), Europe in general experienced  
a decline in economic importance as the European “economic machine 
became impoverished and run-down during the course of hostilities, 
while she became increasingly dependent on external sources of sup-
ply and finance. The United States became the great provider, and as 
Europe lost overseas investments and contacts so America increased 
her influence and emerged from the war as a strong net creditor”. 
24 The first step in the European process of integration was the imple-
mentation of the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ in 1951 with 
six members: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg.
25 As stated by (Carabelli & Cedrini 2010), it seems as if Keynes with 
the Economic Consequences of the Peace got his understanding on 
the complexities of international economic relations in place early on. 
With this understanding, Keynes tried to pave the way to “a sound-
er political economy between nations”, (Carabelli & Cedrine, 2010: 
1026), with his plan for an International Clearing Union. The result 
of the negotiations at the end of World War 2 became known as the 
Bretton Woods system. Also in this respect, it seems, might World  
War 1 have had a lasting impact.
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Chapter 11
The impact of World War 1 on   everyday technologies:  
With an emphasis on transport   and communication
Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg
Poison gas and the sound of machine gun fire in the trenches in France. 
Submarines as a fatal weapon at sea and the German declaration of unre-
stricted submarine warfare. The first bombing of London carried out by 
German airships. Aircraft used for reconnaissance and developed as bomb-
ers and fighters as well. Tanks, flamethrowers, battleships etc. Many ac-
counts of World War 1 and technology focus on the development of weap-
ons and other technologies for military use.1 No doubt, there was a huge 
effort to perfect old weapons and develop new ones in the decades before 
and during the War, not least the aircraft. However, the aircraft did not have 
a decisive impact on the War (Wilson and Prior 2001), but was the opposite 
true? Did the War have a decisive impact on the aircraft itself or on other 
technologies which could be used for civilian purposes?
Some technologies used by the military are only useful as weapons, while 
other technologies are fit for civil use as well. In popular history writing, 
World War 1 is said to have boosted the development and diffusion of a 
whole bunch of such technologies like zips, stainless steel, radio, aircraft, 
tea bags, and wristwatches.2 The thesis in this chapter is that the connec-
tion between World War 1 and the development and diffusion of new tech-
nologies is much more blurred than this mainly positive and quite popular 
story about war as a booster of new technologies, common in popular his-
tory writing, at museums, and the like. We need empirically based analysis 
of how exactly war and technological change are connected, not just an 
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endless repetition of the same myth-based and unambiguous stories. In this 
chapter, I therefore look into certain aspects of communication and trans-
port in order to reconsider the relationship between war and technological 
change on the basis of empirical analysis. The analysis has an emphasis 
on the development in Continental Europe, especially Denmark, and on 
technologies for civil use. I focus on everyday technologies, understood 
as technologies which – not necessarily at the time of World War 1, but 
sometime later in history – became widely used for civilian purposes; tech-
nologies which became an unquestioned part of the quotidian, something 
we came to take for granted as an unquestioned part of our daily lives in 
Continental Europe. 
Purposely, I do not distinguish between the development of new technol-
ogies in a narrow technical sense and the transfer and diffusion of knowl-
edge, skills, and usage of technologies, as I see them as closely interrelated 
parts of any innovation process. In the Schumpeterian tradition, the pro-
cesses of invention, innovation, and diffusion are commonly seen as more 
or less clearly separable phases. However, inspired by the English historian 
of technology, David Edgerton with his plea for a more user-centric history 
of technology and focus on the transformation and use of old technologies 
(Edgerton 2006), I find it much more fruitful to treat invention, innovation, 
and diffusion as closely interrelated aspects of a messy and constantly on-
going process of technological change.
War and technology
In both belligerent and neutral countries, a war changes normal procedures 
in many ways. Denmark was not an active part of World War 1, and Danish 
industry was neither destroyed nor largely turned into armaments produc-
tion. However, even in neutral Denmark, industry in general was highly in-
fluenced by limitations in import and export during the War, not least after 
the submarine blockade came about in 1917. The experience of shortages in 
raw materials and fuel was a common experience, and some markets were 
turned upside down. The market for some commodities like silverware and 
canned meat flourished, while other industries tried to get through by using 
substitute materials and developing new products. The business anniversary 
literature often describes both World Wars as a kind of break from normal 
operation, a break which lasted longer than the wars because of the ration-
ing of materials and currency restrictions in the following years (Knudsen 
1921; Møller 1960; Villadsen 1995; Hansen and Serin 1997). To be sure, 
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even for a neutral country, World War 1 meant something, but was this 
something positive or negative regarding technological change?
The idea that war has a positive influence on the development and diffu-
sion of technology is, as mentioned, common in popular science literature, 
but also quite usual in the academic discourse. The positive correlation is 
often stated as a simple fact, an undisputable truth. A conventional argu-
ment is that large amounts of resources are invested in military research and 
development in wartime, which leads to the development of sciences and 
technolo gies for civilian and military use (Edgerton 2011, 21).
Lewis Mumford, a well-known historian of technology, argued in Technics 
and Civilization (1934) that war has been the chief propagator of the ma-
chine. While World War 1 was characterized as a large-scale industrial op-
eration, he found the opposite true as well: that modern industrialism could 
be termed a large-scale military operation. Key factors of modern industry, 
like interchangeable parts, standardization, mass production, and the mas-
sive manufacture of iron he ascribed to the pressure of military demands. 
In his view, “the most important fact about modern warfare is the steady 
increase of mechanization from the fourteenth century onward: here milita-
rism forced the pace and cleared a straight path to the development of mod-
ern large-scale standardized industry” (Mumford 1934: 87). In Mumford’s 
opinion, war stimulates invention, although he found it a paradox that the 
army often had resisted invention, in his mind because of what he termed 
third-rate minds (Mumford 1934).
Historian of economy John Nef is a proponent of the opposite view. In 1950, 
in his study of the influences of war on material progress, Nef strongly 
criticized the notion that war is a constructive economic force. Instead, he 
argued that remarkable technical progress was made possible by a relative-
ly peaceful period from 1815 to 1914, where peaceful requirements were 
of greater importance for inventors than military ones. In the period be-
tween World War 1 and 2, he found that the United States, compared to the 
European countries, had had favorable conditions for mechanical progress 
because the former had benefitted from the constructive advantages of 
military preparations without experiencing the directly destructive conse-
quences of warfare at home. In short, Nef argued that warfare had been less 
a cause for industrialism than its shadow (Nef 1950).
Since Mumford and Nef, there have been numerous studies on the relation-
ships between economy, technological change, and military imperatives, 
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often in the form of studies of the so-called military-industrial complex 
(Hacker 1994). Much of the discussion has been about the consequences of 
war for economic development and the development of social institutions, 
rather than technological change.3 When it comes to technological change, 
a key thesis is – as mentioned – that the military plays an important role as 
a stimulator of technological development, especially in wartime. As the 
story often goes, military-born technologies like radar, nuclear energy, and 
computers “spill over” into civilian use. However, this thesis is, among oth-
ers, criticized by historian of technology David Noble because it suggests 
that military influence is something external and temporary. In general, 
Noble finds that the military has played a central role in industrial develop-
ment and has shaped our technologies and social institutions, which he does 
not see as an unambiguously positive thing (Noble 1985).
David Edgerton, another historian of technology and an expert on World 
War 2, finds that the development of key civil technologies probably was 
retarded by the War. However, the significance of the military and mili-
tary-related institutions for innovation should, in his view, not be neglect-
ed, and he finds no simple answer to the question: does war accelerate or 
decelerate the progress of science and technology? (Edgerton 2011). In his 
view, conventional stories of the relations between war and technology are, 
in general, innovation-centered stories focusing too much on new technolo-
gies. As examples, he points out that the relatively novel machine gun and 
poison gas did not kill nearly as many on the Western Front in World War 
1 as artillery fire and small arms. The great battleships were hardly used, 
and the airplane did not have the devastating and decisive effect predicted, 
their significance was rather found in the threat of use, than in the actual 
use (Edgerton 2006).
In the following, I look into three specific cases regarding communication 
and transport – radio, motor trucks, and airplanes – where World War 1 is 
often thought of as a booster of technological innovation and diffusion. I do 
so in order to nuance this picture through empirical examples of the connec-
tion between World War 1 and technological development in Continental 
Europe, especially in Denmark. In the conclusion, I discuss the relationship 
between war and technological change on the basis of these empirical ex-
amples.
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Radio: Military involvement in point-to-point 
communication
It was in 1922 when radio as we primarily think of it today – used for trans-
mitting news and information, entertainment, and advertising to a gener-
al public – started booming. In Denmark, two radio amateur clubs were 
formed; they started publishing magazines and experimental radio pro-
grams were broadcasted. The situation was quite peculiar: while listening 
to the radio was forbidden until a new law was passed in 1923, the minority 
of amateurs who actually asked for permission to use a radio receiver got 
‘no’ as an answer. In 1925, the Danish State Radio started broadcasting 
(Den traadløse 1922; Gerald, 1926; Bramslev 1982).
These and similar events in other European countries marked a shift from 
a period where radio was mainly seen as a means of point-to-point com-
munication – a competitor for telegraphy by cable – to a supplementary 
perception of radio as a broadcasting technology useful for educational and 
cultural objectives, a mass communication technology. To a large degree, 
the same technical components were the backbone in two quite distinctive 
communication systems, radio as wireless telegraphy and radio as broad-
casting.
The rise of radio broadcasting in the early 1920s was in fact an unantic-
ipated consequence of a then quite old radio technology (Aitken 1985), a 
technology in which the military had taken great interest from the very 
beginning. The navies, especially, were involved in the development of ra-
dio as a point-to-point communication technology long before World War 
1, and during the War, radio and the military remained closely connected 
(Edgerton 2006). 
In the words of the historian Daniel R. Headrick, radio “was born into a 
world of jittery jingoism and started life as a weapon in the commercial and 
military rivalries of the great powers” (Headrick 1991: 116). In Germany, 
the development of Telefunken (Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie) and 
the planning and hosting of the two first international radio telegraph con-
ferences in 1903 and 1906 illustrate this point. These incidents were a result 
of a political and military interest in preventing a Marconi monopoly in 
wireless telegraphy (Friedewald 2000).4
The development in Denmark can also illuminate the high degree of mil-
itary involvement in the new point-to-point communication technology. 
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The Danish navy began experimenting with what was firstly known as 
wireless telegraphy only a few years after the Italian inventor Marconi 
had demonstrated radio technology for the first time. And in 1906, repre-
sentatives from both the navy and the army were in the Danish delegation 
at the international telegraphy conference in Berlin, where the term radio 
was adopted as the official word for wireless telegraphy (Gerald 1963; 
Bramslev 1982).
In the early years, radio technology was primarily seen as a maritime 
matter, imagined to be useful for rescue operations at sea and correspond-
ence with ships, both private and naval vessels. In 1907, the first Danish 
passenger ships began to use radio, and the first Danish radio act was 
passed – which gave the state exclusive rights to construct and operate 
wireless telegraphy. Without special permission, nobody else was allowed 
to experiment with and use radio. The navy was so involved in radio at 
that time that they actually suggested that they should control all future 
coast radio stations in the country. However, they were opposed by the 
State Telegraph, who argued that the handling of telegrams was their task 
(Gerald 1963; Bramslev 1982).
The military frame that dominated radio technology before and during 
World War 1 had consequences for the radio discourse as well, and thereby 
for the visions of inventors and developers. In the public imagination, radio 
technology had a close entanglement with security from early on, and this 
discursive context put constraints on the development of radio as a broad-
casting technology (Satia 2010).
Civil experiments with broadcasting
The technical prerequisite for the possibility of the expansion of radio from 
point-to-point communication in Morse code to including the broadcasting 
of music and the human voice was the development of a way of generating 
undamped continuous radio waves. This was impossible in Marconi’s sys-
tem. In 1902, the Danish inventor Valdemar Poulsen patented the Poulsen arc 
transmitter, one way to generate continuous waves. Another way, the radio 
frequency alternator, was developed in the US by Reginald Fessenden. He 
is often said to be the first to transmit music in 1906 (Buhl 1995). However, 
the main reason for finding new ways of generating radio waves was actu-
ally not a wish to transmit talking and music, it was to solve interference 
problems in the old point-to-point communication system.
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The new ways for generating undamped continuous radio waves were used 
for some years, not least for military purposes and with armies and navies 
as important customers. However, in the years after World War 1, they were 
outperformed by the use of vacuum tubes as a third technology to generate 
undamped continuous radio waves. During World War 1, all three systems 
were in use together with Marconi’s old spark system. However, the vac-
uum tube system was quite new and only just out of the laboratory in 1914 
(Aitken 1985).
The qualitative shift in what radio was used for, not only point-to-point 
communication but broadcasting as well, followed few years after World 
War 1 and the shift has often been interpreted in connection with the devel-
opment of radio technology during the War. I will therefore look into what 
World War 1 concretely meant for the development of radio.
First of all, the War generally stopped the experiments of radio amateurs, 
including early experiments with broadcasting. In Denmark, an assistant 
of Poulsen, Peter Jensen, had transmitted the human voice without wires 
as early as 1907 from Lyngby Radio, the Poulsen’s experimental station 
(Jensen 1948). Two years later, radio sent from Lyngby Radio was demon-
strated in public at an exhibition in Copenhagen. The first Danish ra-
dio amateurs, two teenagers experimenting with radio transmitting and 
listening, listened to the music experiments on their homemade radio. 
Unfortunately, because of the radio act of 1907, both their listening and 
their experiments with sending were in fact illegal, and when their activ-
ities were reported to the authorities, they were stopped. However, after 
a short break, they received official permission as experimenting radio 
amateurs. This went well until the outbreak of World War 1 stopped their 
experiments again. The authorities simply demanded their equipment dis-
mantled.
This is just one example showing that with war going on, the authorities in 
many countries would not allow civil radio experiments, neither listening 
nor sending. In Britain, constables actually confiscated and sealed thou-
sands of private wireless sets (Headrick 1991).5 In Belgium, where concerts 
were broadcasted regularly before the War, the War put an end to this, and 
in the US, a ban on amateur radio – among other things – stopped transmis-
sions of wireless phonograph concerts and other broadcasting experiments 
carried out by inventors, amateurs, and universities (Gerald 1963; Ahm 
1972; Breidahl & Rée 1940; Slotten 2006). Seen in this light, the few ex-
periments with broadcasting for soldiers during the War (White 1996/2015) 
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were nothing that really mattered. In general, the War put a spoke in the 
wheel regarding experiments with radio as a broadcasting technology.
The problem with amateur radio from a military point of view was twofold. 
Firstly, the radio amateurs sending radio could cause serious interference 
problems, and secondly, all radio amateurs could be listening in on secret 
communication. Contrary to wired communication, radio waves can be lis-
tened to by everybody with a receiver.
The military interests were in the possibility of transmitting secret encoded 
messages, not in radio broadcasting as a mass medium (Friedewald 2000). 
That meant that the uncontrollable spreading of radio waves in all directions 
was seen as a negative thing preventing secrecy, not as a positive thing 
enab ling many listeners (Aitken 1985; Headrick 1991).
Information flow, international cooperation, and 
business opportunities
The outbreak of the War did not only stop some amusements for radio am-
ateurs. The War in general meant that the military took over the existing 
radio systems. In Germany, as an example, all private and public radio sta-
tions were taken over by the military (Friedewald 2000), and in Denmark, 
the civil experimental station, Lyngby Radio, was – from the moment the 
War broke out – guarded by the military and soon taken over by the Danish 
state (Bramslev 1982).
The War also made it harder to maintain an international flow of informa-
tion about technological developments. When a Danish engineer in 1918 
did a lecture about the development of radio, he complained that it had been 
difficult to get information about progress in the previous years because the 
belligerent countries had treated information with confidentiality (Poulsen 
1918). This was not the only example of such complaints, and concretely, 
the War stopped the work of an “International Commission on Scientific 
Wireless Telegraphy” (Bramslev 1982) founded in Belgium in 1913. The 
limited international information flow was bad news for the development 
of the radio because, contrary to many myths about the lonely and only in-
ventor, the development of new technologies usually involves international 
inspiration and exchange of knowledge. As an example, the vacuum tube 
has been called “an international accomplishment” (Tyne 1977: 5). 
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If radio was going to be a useful technology, other kinds of interna tional 
cooperation were necessary as well, namely the coordination of the use 
of the wavelengths in the radio spectrum. This was a huge issue in the 
International Radio Convention, agreed upon in London in 1912. However, 
the War stopped this kind of international collaboration and no new con-
ference was called in Washington in 1917 as planned. In fact, no new inter-
national radio conference was held before 1927. Among other things, this 
meant that the section in the Treaty of Versailles that bound Germany to 
obey any international radiotelegraph convention that might come into force 
within five years was never in use (Headrick 1991).
As mentioned, the military was an important radio customer from the very 
beginning, and the War created business opportunities for the professional 
radio corporations in the form of military orders. The number of Danish 
civil ships equipped with radio also increased during the War (Gerald 1963), 
among other things to enhance safety in the unsafe wartimes with the risk 
of attack at sea. However, at the same time, the War destroyed other civ-
il business opportunities. After the War, Poulsen’s arc transmitter patent 
was extended, with reference to the problems induced by the War on the 
possibilities for commercial use. Historian of science Hans Buhl, who has 
studied the story of the arc transmitter in detail, concludes that the War had 
both inhibitory and stimulating effects on the development and diffusion 
of the arc transmitter technology used, among others, by the German navy 
(Buhl 1995).
Radio tubes 
One effect of the outbreak of the War in 1914 with direct consequences 
for the development of the Poulsen system was that the construction of 
a transatlantic radio station with arc transmitter in Canada was stopped 
immediately. This forced two Danes, M.P. Pedersen and Otto Skovmand, 
working on the construction, to leave Canada. Before they left, they con-
tacted Lee de Forest, who in 1906 had patented his audion, an early type 
of radio tube (Gerald 1963; Bramslev 1982). It was then arranged that 
Pedersen and Skovmand should be the representatives of de Forest’s com-
pany in Scandinavia, and they had an audion transmitter sent to Denmark. 
However, the War soon made the import of radio tubes impossible. Instead, 
they started their own production, in spite of troubles with a shortage of the 
mercury needed in the production process. This brought the manufacturing 
of a new technology, radio tubes, to Denmark.
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When historians often perceive World War 1 as an important period in the 
development of radio, they normally think of the technological development 
of radio tubes during the War, the radio technology that became dominant 
in the 1920s. In fact, all important vacuum tube inventions had been done 
before World War 1 but, in 1914, most of the available tubes were still at 
an early stage of practical application. Only few radio tubes were on the 
market, and they were not at all suited for war, being difficult to manufac-
ture, unreliable, and not very robust. During the War, more reliable tubes 
were developed first in France (available from 1916) and in the US before 
the country entered the War in 1917. Also in Germany, tubes were devel-
oped. Telefunken was involved in the development of a tube invented by 
Robert von Lieben in 1912, and the company started manufacturing tubes 
two years later. In 1917, the first vacuum tube transmitters were employed 
on German warships and used by the German troops at the Western Front 
(Friedewald 2000; Thrower 2014).
Radio innovation focused on military purposes
In general, the War speeded up developmental work and production on the 
background of military demands and highlighted the need for reliable and 
uniform interchangeable tubes (Tyne 1977; Anonymous 1919). In this way, 
the War had a positive influence on the development of radio in boosting 
the development of the technology that became dominant in the 1920s when 
broadcasting boomed. However, during the War, broadcasting was not at 
all in focus, not even as a technology useful for propaganda. Instead, the 
focus was on developing radio as a technology with a direct military output 
such as radio systems usable in the trenches or for communication with 
aircraft. The use of Morse code in airplanes had been demonstrated before 
the War, but the weight and size of the radio equipment, together with noise, 
vibration, and electrical interference caused problems. Radio communi-
cation with airplanes made a leap forward during the War. However, the 
equipment continued to be large and rather unreliable, and as late as 1927, 
Charles Lindbergh did not carry radio on his transatlantic flight, to save 
weight (Schroer 2003).
A Major, J.E. Cochrane, described the status quo of wireless telegraphy for 
military purposes in 1913, and listed four advantages of wireless compared 
to older methods of communication: it cannot be cut by the enemy, it can 
be quickly moved (no wires must be taken up and re-layed), communication 
can be established between two points without the necessity of traversing the 
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country between them, and communication can be established with ships at 
sea (Cochrane 1913). Radio technology was indeed used by the military in 
World War 1, but cable communication was still far more common. After the 
War, it was estimated, that the US Signal Corps had laid out around 100,000 
miles of wire in France alone (Mroz 2009). However, the War also showed 
the vulnerability of this kind of point-to-point communication and, during 
the War, the submarine cables were often overloaded with wartime traffic or 
simply cut by the enemy. Though the military and political importance of 
communication networks in the form of both cables and radio stations be-
came obvious during the War – if it had not been even before – it was still 
primarily the submarine cables and the question of what to do with the 
German cables which drew attention in the peace negotiations in Versailles, 
not the new radio technology (Aitken 1985; Headrick 1991; Winkler 2009).
To sum up, both before and during World War 1, military interests in radio 
had a stimulating effect on the development, production, and diffusion of 
radio in some ways, but with a focus on using the technology for point-to-
point communication. For the development of radio as a broadcasting tech-
nology, the War probably had a negative effect in stopping experimentation 
and banning radio amateurs. This use, so familiar today, was delayed rather 
than promoted by the War.
After the War, radio soon changed from a mainly military technology 
where civil use was predominately bound to maritime use and officers were 
important stakeholders, to a civil technology which still would be taken 
over by the military in case of war, but where the daily control in Denmark 
was left to the State Telegraph (Archival material: Danmarks Radio). When 
the use of radio for point-to-point communication, still crucial for safety 
at sea, was supplemented with radio broadcasting in the early 1920s, the 
influence of the military diminished and a new state institution, the Danish 
Broadcasting Corporation, was formed.
I now turn to the next empirical example, how World War 1 influenced 
the development of the truck. Does it show the same blurred connection 
between technological innovation and war as the radio history told above?
Noticed and unnoticed transport technologies in war
At the Danish Museum of Science and Technology, an American Mack AC 
truck is on display. This type of truck was widely used on the battlefields 
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in France in World War 1. In total, around 2,500 Mack AC trucks, with the 
nickname “Bulldogs”, were shipped to the Continent during the War (Mroz 
2009; Montville 1979). In 1919, the truck at the museum was purchased by a 
Danish company when the truck market became flooded with both used and 
newly produced motor trucks the armies didn’t need after the Armistice. It 
is, then, an example of technological cross-border transfer caused by World 
War 1.
Already at the beginning of the War, contemporaries called World War 1 
the war of technique, and one of the technologies used were internal com-
bustion engines in motor vehicles and airplanes. The visibility of this new 
technology was large, and among motor enthusiasts, it became common to 
ascribe a crucial role to the internal combustion engine for the war effort 
(Motor 1919; Hildesheim 1915; Rye 1938). Not least, one incident early in 
the War caught attention and has been retold many times ever since: when 
Parisian taxis and buses were used to move troops quickly under a German 
attack at Marne (Mroz 2009; Scheck 1997; Rye 1938; Norup 1938).
Historian of technology David Edgerton reminds us not to exaggerate the 
use of new technologies and forget the importance of old technologies, and 
the academic discourse in general often points to the importance of horses 
for warfare. Before World War 1, motorized vehicles had seldom been part 
of military equipment. Railways, horses, and mules were the normal means 
of transportation. In fact, the use of horses for transportation peaked in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and they were involved in huge num-
bers in both World Wars (Edgerton 2006). When the British entered World 
War 1, they shipped 60,000 horses, compared to 1,200 trucks, to France 
(Mroz 2009), and in late 1917, 450,000 British horses and mules worked 
on the Western Front, the majority transporting material, particularly from 
the railheads to the front (Edgerton 2006). In other words, horses may not 
have caught the same contemporary attention as the new motor vehicles, 
but they were essential. To quote John Singleton, a historian of business and 
economy, the horses were “as indispensable to the war effort as machine 
guns, dreadnoughts, railways and heavy artillery, yet because of our fasci-
nation with the history of technology we never give them a second thought” 
(Singleton 1993: 178).
The truck and the military
The Danish army got its first truck in 1908 (Rye, 1938), and even the much 
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bigger US army owned only 12 trucks in 1911. However, they began to ex-
periment with vehicles from a number of manufacturers, and despite prob-
lems with off-road performance, prewar American tests showed the useful-
ness of improved trucks for military transport. In 1916, trucks were used 
with success by the US army in Mexico, and when the US entered World 
War 1 in 1917, the numbers of army trucks of all types had increased to 
2,400. Several came to Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF), and their commanding Major General estimated that he needed no 
less than 50,000 trucks in Europe. The production of new trucks was geared 
up and, in the end, American manufacturers produced 227,000 trucks in 
1918 alone (Scheck 1997).
The British military had tested steam-powered and petrol-driven trucks 
already in 1901. They owned 507 vehicles of different kinds in 1914, but 
requisitioned and purchased many more when the War broke out (Singleton 
1993). In the German army, passenger cars had become an indispensable 
element of the work of higher officers by 1914, and motor trucks were also 
seen as useful for moving material. In 1914, they had approximately 500 
passenger cars, compared to around 20,000 in 1918. They used a substantial 
number of trucks during the War as well, not least a special army truck 
designed in 1907 and bought by hundreds of private users who, in return 
for a subvention, should make their truck available to the military in case of 
war. This principle of subvention was also used in countries like France and 
England (Showalter 2002; Schwarte 1920).
However, Albert Mroz, an expert on American vehicles in World War 1, 
finds six reasons for why motor transport was not widely used by the mil-
itary at the beginning of World War 1. The motor truck was considered 
unproven and unreliable, and nobody was certain of the best fuel to choose. 
Roads were primitive or non-existent, and hundreds of manufacturers 
offered an array of machines and parts which were not interchangeable. 
Reliable railroads were already available on the European continent, and 
people were not familiar with motors requiring hand-crank starting, con-
stant maintenance, repair work, and driver training, in addition to transport-
ing fuel and oil in huge quantities (Mroz 2009).
In short, before the War, motor vehicles were only beginning to be essen-
tial parts of military equipment, their reliability was relatively untested un-
der battle conditions, and a huge problem was the lack of standardization. 
When the AEF entered France, they used 294 different types of trucks, 
with the result that mechanics had to cope with tens of thousands of non- 
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interchangeable parts (Mroz 2009). By the end of the War, thousands of 
motor vehicles were integrated in every army on the battlefield, but were 
still far outnumbered by the number of horses and were less decisive than 
the railways (Singleton 1993; Wolmar 2009; Schwarte 1920).
Reliability test and surplus of a wartime technology
The War was a test of reliability, but no huge technical development of 
trucks and motor vehicles in general came during the War. Actually, the 
War sometimes meant that older technological solutions better suited for 
war conditions were used, for example chain drives instead of shaft drives 
on some trucks (Norup 1938; Schwarte 1920). Many military vehicles were 
built for special uses, not least tanks, but they could not easily be changed to 
civilian use after the War. It was a curiosity when the Danish journal Motor 
in 1919 could write that dreadful tanks in France were rebuilt as tourist bus-
es meant for touring in the mountains (Motor 11/10 1919).
The War certainly meant a shortage of and restrictions on the civilian use of 
gasoline in many European countries. However, what World War 1 changed 
most was the production capacity and the number of vehicles. In the US, the 
number of motor vehicles produced annually rose from 356,000 in 1912 to 
1,526,000 in 1916. Most of them were used in the US but, in the first year of 
the War, approximately 16,000 trucks were exported to Europe. This cor-
responded to one-tenth of the estimated total number of motor vehicles in 
Germany and France at the outbreak of the War (Mroz 2009).
The increased production to meet military orders resulted in a huge surplus 
of former army motor vehicles in Europe after the War. In January 1919, 
Motor brought out an article about the French army as the biggest – and per-
haps the only – automobile dealer in France. The army had a year before it 
decided to sell cars, trucks, and parts no longer useful for the military. They 
had put them on display near the Eiffel tower, and had already sold 7.500 
motor vehicles of all kinds. The selection of vehicles was odd and their con-
dition poor, according to Motor, which could tell that the vehicles for sale 
were cleaned and sometimes painted, but most of them could not be driven 
in their current condition (Motor 18/1 1919).
A couple of months later, Motor brought another article about the demobi-
lization of the German army and the sale of former military vehicles from 
an office in Munich. Because no petrol was available, interested buyers 
247
could not test these vehicles. The journal feared that neutral countries like 
Denmark would be “blessed” with a flood of old fashioned, worn-out wag-
ons, and warned their Danish readers from buying old war equipment from 
the belligerent countries (Motor 15/3 1919). The warning was repeated later 
the same year (Motor 1919), probably not least because of the magazine’s 
close connections to the Danish automobile industry. The surplus of used 
motor vehicles was not good news for the industry and, in fact, the Danish 
automobile factory Triangel had a large inventory of unsold trucks in 1919, 
and had to put production to sleep in 1920 (Jessen 2005). In October 1919, 
Motor could write that the French government had bought 150.000 vehi-
cles from the US army, according to Motor a very unpopular decision in a 
French motor industry afraid of a flooded market (Motor 25/10 1919).
The War did not only mean a huge surplus of used military equipment. 
The increased capacity of the manufacturing industry also meant that many 
newly produced vehicles were looking for new owners, not least when the 
European automobile plants used for armament production went back to 
normal after the War, first in France and later in Germany.
The War altered the balance between the American and the European au-
tomobile industry as well, and led to tough competition. Before the War, 
European cars were exported to the US. After the War, the European coun-
tries were flooded with American vehicles coming from a country spared 
from the direct ravages of war, and a country where the industry had not 
been turned into armament production. Instead, it had prospered from the 
massive export to the belligerent European countries (Schmitto 1938).
The surplus of trucks in Europe after the War was visible in Motor, where 
the number of advertisements for trucks increased in 1919 and far outnum-
bered prewar times. According to Motor, there were approximately 3,000 
trucks in Denmark in the summer of 1920, compared to the 930 vans and 
trucks in the official statistics from 1917. In between, there had been some 
years with little motoring because of import restrictions and lack of fuel 
(Motor 1920).
Looking back in 1938, it was claimed that the rising number of motor trucks 
in the first postwar years had been an unhealthy development based on the 
uncritical use of old military vehicles. However, what was called a much 
better development had begun in the middle of the 1920s, when lighter and 
cheaper trucks on pneumatic tires came on to the market. No matter what, 
the 1920s were a take-off time for the truck in Denmark (Mortensen 1938).
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To sum up, contrary to the development of radio, the military was not close-
ly involved in the development of trucks before the War. However, it became 
an important customer of trucks during the War, which led to increased 
production capacity and a huge surplus of trucks immediately after the War. 
The military interests in motor vehicles during the War led to the develop-
ment of advanced tanks, but no big leap forward in the technical develop-
ment of trucks in general (Schwarte 1920). On the contrary, during the War, 
a shortage of fuel and rubber put serious constraints on the development and 
use of trucks for civil purposes. And after the War, a market flooded with 
old vehicles made it difficult to produce and sell new ones, which probably 
delayed innovation.
I now turn to the third and last empirical example, how World War 1 in-
fluenced the development of airplanes. Contrary to the truck, the airplane 
changed a lot during the War.
From stuff of dreams to reliable means of 
transportation
When World War 1 broke out, radio and motor trucks were both relatively 
old technologies developed as practical, usable technologies. The airplane 
was, to a much higher degree, still the stuff of dreams. During the War, it 
changed and two years after the Armistice, the first Danish airline, Det 
Danske Luftfartselskab (DDL), started scheduled flights. The plane was a 
rebuilt German seaplane, the Friedrichshafen FF 49 C, originally designed 
for reconnaissance and equipped with two machine guns. Instead, it now 
had room for two passengers sitting in the open air and entering the plane 
by climbing a ladder. Just like the Mack AC truck, the plane was a case of 
the technology transfer of surplus military equipment from the belligerent 
countries to Denmark. 
In 1909, the same year the American army had the very first military air-
plane in the world delivered from the Wright brothers themselves (Hallion 
2014), the French aviator Léon Delagrange visited Denmark to demonstrate 
a brand new technology: flying in machines heavier than air. He, one of the 
greatest aviation heroes of his time, was interviewed to a Danish newspaper. 
He frankly told them that he did not expect the airplane to become a prac-
tical means of transportation like the railway or the car. However, he saw a 
future for the new technology in cases of war. This was due to the fact that 
airplanes can fly directly over the enemy and kill them easily. In his view, 
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the airplane would give war so many and such great opportunities, that war 
itself would become impossible (Lauridsen 2009). 
New technologies of transportation and communication, from the telegraph 
to the Internet, have often been followed by this kind of hope of an everlast-
ing peace (Edgerton 2006). However, as with many other technologies, the 
airplane was turned into an instrument of war. In August 1914, the belliger-
ent countries had approximately 1.000 military airplanes of different kinds. 
At the time of the Armistice, the number had risen to around ten times as 
many combat aircraft alone (Hallion 2014).
However, regardless of the rising numbers, the airplane did not play a de-
cisive role in World War 1. But, as a new and spectacular technology, it 
was extremely visible and full of symbolic meanings. Among contemporary 
aviators and other enthusiasts, it soon became common to call the War a 
triumph for the airplane, pilots became heroes, and every incident in aerial 
warfare was noted (Hildesheim 1915). Today, there is no consensus among 
experts on how exactly the War affected the development of aviation. It 
is commonly said that World War 1 speeded up technological progress. 
However, this has also been called a myth by, for example, people arguing 
that no new official records of altitude, speed, or endurance were made dur-
ing the War (Harvey 2006).
Military and civil aviation
World War 1 certainly ground the fledgling passenger traffic in machines 
lighter than air to a halt, namely the flights under the auspices of Deutsche 
Luftschiffahrt AG (DELAG). DELAG was founded in 1909 and flew with 
thousands of passengers in Zeppelins before the War. They began flying 
again in 1919, and the interwar period was the heyday for them in terms of 
passenger traffic in airships (Davies 1967; Strohmaier 2004).
According to R. E. G. Davies, chronicler of the world’s first airlines, World 
War 1 on the one hand encouraged the development of military airplanes so 
that long-distance bombing flights were possible by 1918. On the other hand, 
it retarded and impeded civil development because all nations concerned in 
aviation progress were preoccupied with war. He finds that the War halt-
ed the development of civil air transport, among other things because the 
ingenuity of the constructors was turned towards fighters,  bombers, and 
planes for reconnaissance instead of planes for the transportation of mail 
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and passengers. However, he also finds that World War 1 turned the air-
plane from something strange into something familiar. Pilots gained new 
skills, knowledge of aerodynamic and other technical problems of airplane 
construction was enhanced and, not least, many refinements were intro-
duced through wartime experience. This made the planes more efficient 
and reliable enough to permit the serious contemplation of air services for 
the public after the War. The first airlines using heavier than air machines 
began flying in 1919 and, by the end of the year, more than a dozen civil 
airlines were in business (Davies 1967).
In Denmark, civil aviation before World War 1 was limited to spectacular 
air shows, and for the dawning of military aviation, the outbreak of the War 
had a negative effect. It became practically impossible to import airplanes. 
In 1914, the Danish army had three aircraft, of which one was considered 
not to be suitable for either warfare or training. The navy had four. New 
Danish airplanes were produced during the War, but the production was 
handicapped by the difficulty of information exchange and scarce news of 
development in other countries, and because it was almost impossible to get 
hold of reliable engines (Førslev 1936; Nøring 1936).
After the War, the Treaty of Versailles – which was ratified on 10 January 
1920 – included harsh air clauses not only forbidding Germany to have an 
air force and demanding German military aircraft destroyed, it also for-
bade all manufacture and importation of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and 
other parts. The restrictions on civil production should have been in ef-
fect for a period of only six months, but they were prolonged by the Inter-
Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control (IAACC) until 1922 (Treaty of 
Versailles: article 198-210; Mulder 2006; Mulder et al. 2012).
A huge problem in the formulation and discussions following the Treaty of 
Versailles was how to distinguish between civil and military aviation. After 
lengthy discussions where aviation experts long claimed it to be impossible, 
a list of nine rules were agreed upon, distinguishing types through technical 
criteria such as engine size, speed, load capacity etc. However, many point-
ed to the fact that the distinction was problematic and that nothing could 
prevent civil aircraft from being converted into military ones and vice ver-
sa. The discussion was ongoing for years. However, at the latest after World 
War 2, the attempt to separate the military and civil uses of air power after 
World War 1 seemed artificial and unrealistic. Clearly, it had completely 
failed (United States Department of State 1919; ICAO 1994; Cooper 1946; 
Milde 2008; Treaty of Versailles 1968; Groves 1930).
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The problems with distinguishing the types is not surprising. There were 
close links between the development of airplanes and the military from 
early on, and the aircraft industry was highly dependent on the patronage 
of the military. Some historians have stated that, in practice, no clear line 
can be drawn between the civil and the military development of aviation 
(Roland 1979), and mainstream historical accounts – which see the his-
tory of aviation as a mainly civil history – have been criticized (Edgerton 
2006).
Another case of wartime surplus
While the exact influence of World War 1 on aviation can be discussed, 
there is no doubt the War brought the development of the new aviation tech-
nology in specific directions, reflecting the military requirements and uses 
for reconnaissance, air combat, bombings, etc. It also meant that production 
was increased and professionalized, and more reliable airplanes became 
available in huge numbers. In fact, as with motor trucks, the end of the War 
was immediately followed by a huge surplus of used military equipment 
and production plants desperately looking for new customers to replace the 
military when the market for military equipment suddenly disappeared with 
the Armistice.
In Britain, the Aircraft Disposal Company Ltd, created in 1920 with the 
purpose of converting and selling the many surplus military planes, sent 
thousands of cheap surplus planes and motors on the market (Barnes 1976). 
In Germany, the problem with the surplus war airplanes which made new-
built aircraft seem too expensive in comparison was reduced, because of the 
deliberate destruction of old aircraft on IAACC orders (Mulder et al. 2012).
The surplus not only included hardware, but men with aviation skills as 
well. Many aviators no longer employed by the military visited Denmark in 
1919 and showed their skills and/or tried to sell equipment (Foltmann 1936). 
The first pilot flying for DDL did also have a military background. He had 
been a pilot in the German navy (Kaas 1943). 
One of the airplane factories looking for new customers in 1918 was the 
German Junkers. They had produced military airplanes but, in November 
1918, the factory directed their attention to transport aircraft, expecting that 
military production would soon be a dead end. They therefore developed the 
first aircraft designed for the carriage of passengers, the Junkers J 13 (Type 
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F, later known as F.13). It flew from the summer of 1919. In contrast to the 
first Danish airliner, it had an enclosed cabin and was an all-metal aircraft. 
However, Junkers did not only produce this new plane designed for civilian 
use, they worked on the conversion of their military types into passenger 
transport machines too.
The Junkers factory was inspected by the IAACC in 1920, and the com-
mission accepted the J 13 produced from 1919 as a civil airplane. However, 
in the end, Junkers was not allowed to put the aircraft into service inside 
Germany. All available engines were seized by the IAACC, and effective 
from January 1920, a total ban on the production of civil aircraft came into 
effect. Despite this, Junkers continued to build airplanes. However, the 
factory also had to survive by producing furniture, radiators, and other 
non-aviation related items in the early 1920s (Mulder et al. 2012).
Davies claims that, seen in retrospect, the wish to cease the production of 
large German aircraft as part of the peace conditions seems to have been 
a mistake, at least if the goal for the Allies was to have had an advantage 
in the civil field. As it turned out, the peace conditions compelled German 
designers to begin afresh. They eliminated many German manufacturing 
companies, but at the same time allowed the remaining ones to concentrate 
on a limited number of projects. In his view, the British and French factories 
continued to work on the development of military planes and conversion of 
military types for civil use for too long, instead of directing their focus to 
machines designed from scratch as civil aircraft (Davies 1967).
One telling example of a converted English warplane was the twin-engined 
bomber Handley Page O/400, which was used for many years by European 
airlines after the War (Mulder 2006). When a Handley Page O/400 visit-
ed Denmark in 1919, the rebuilding seemed quite primitive. The military 
equipment inside was replaced with 12 wicker chairs for passengers, but 
the flight was perceived as quite boring because the fuselage was without 
windows (Foltmann 1936). As this example shows, there was still a long 
way from converted military equipment to airplanes that could match the 
comfort and reliability of travelling by train. Also, the speed of these old 
military aircraft was still not too impressive (Davies 1967).
If aviation is going to be a practical and effective system of transportation, 
much more than available and reliable airplanes are necessary. International 
cooperation is also on the list of necessities. As with radio, World War 1 
caused secrecy and delayed the international cooperation for a while but, as 
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part of the peace negotiations, an international convention – among other 
things settling the question of sovereignty in the air – was signed as The Paris 
Convention of 13 October 1919 (Convention Relating to the Regulation of 
Aerial Navigation). Denmark hesitated to sign the Paris Convention because 
of Article 5, which stated that “No contracting State shall, except by a spe-
cial and temporary authorization, permit the flight above its territory of an 
aircraft which does not possess the nationality of a contracting State”. With 
Germany excluded from the convention, this in practice would mean that 
Denmark was forced to exclude German air traffic from Danish air space, 
and could expect in return to be excluded from German air space (Archival 
materials: Trafikministeriet; Statens Luftfartsvæsen 1918-1924). When the 
Danish geographical location just north of Germany is taken into consid-
eration, this was unacceptable. The Allies had, in the Treaty of Versailles, 
ensured their own access to the Germany’s air space but, as a neutral coun-
try, Denmark was not included (Treaty of Versailles 1919: article 313-320). 
The restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles had other consequences for avia-
tion in countries like Denmark as well. The restrictions forced the German 
air industry into close cooperation with partners in the surrounding coun-
tries. The first Danish airline in 1920 was in fact a cooperation between 
Deutsche Luft-Reederei (DLR, German Air Shipping) and DDL (the Danish 
Airline). DLR was founded in 1917 by AEG, looking for new uses for their 
military aircraft. They carried their first passenger in 1919, and were the 
prime partner in the airline, owning most of the fleet and all surplus mili-
tary aircraft (Kofoed 2000).6
The cooperation between DLR, DDL, and four other European airlines re-
sulted in the founding of the International Air Traffic Association, the fore-
runner of IATA (International Air Transport Association), in The Hague in 
1919. For DLR, this was a way to be able to operate internationally, despite 
the clauses in the Treaty of Versailles (Hallion 2014).
Military expertise and facilities used for civil purposes
Not only are airplanes and international agreements necessary prerequi-
sites for the development of aviation as a civil transport system, but so also 
are expertise and facilities on the ground. In Denmark, in the aftermath of 
World War 1, it was the military that had most experience with aircraft, and 
they were also the only ones with the necessary ground facilities. They had, 
in fact, taken over the only civil airfield in Copenhagen in 1915 (Kaas 1943). 
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Therefore, in 1920, the first Danish airliner took off from the naval airbase. 
The festive speeches that day included thanks to the Danish aviators from 
the navy and the army, because their expertise and experience had been so 
valuable for the preparations (Weihe 1993).
It was also the Danish navy who, on behalf of the Ministry of Public Works, 
conducted the first Danish trials with air mail services in 1919 (Kofoed 
2000). They were later criticized for buying planes better suited for mili-
tary use than for civilian purposes for the trials (Archival materials: Statens 
Luftfartsvæsen 1918-1926), and the planes did, in fact, not have a future 
as civil equipment. They ended up as navy material. However, it was this 
kind of plane which dominated the market at the time and was available for 
relatively cheap purchase.
The close mingling of civil and military air institutions was not without 
problems, but hard to avoid in a situation where the experts and facilities 
were predominantly military. An aviation commission in 1920 suggest-
ed to the Danish Ministry of Public Works – working on the practical 
regulations and implications following the first Aviation Act passed on 4 
October 1919 – that the military should, as a temporary solution, take on 
civil supervision functions instead of establishing civilian institutions. In 
fact, the aviation branch of the Danish navy strongly opposed the creation 
of a civil air administration, probably eager to secure an important role for 
themselves in a period with disarmament. As it came about, the ministry 
paid the aviation branch of the army and the navy for their supervision 
of civil aviation for some years before a civil air administration was es-
tablished. Also, the military ground facilities were used for civil aviation 
until a new airport opened in 1925 (Gregersen 1936; Archival materials: 
Trafikministeriet).
This close mingling of civil and military aviation on the practical level, and 
the lengthy discussions of the differences in the aftermath of World War 1 
underscores the point of Noble, that the influence of the military on aviation 
cannot be seen as something external and temporary, only lasting as long as 
the War. The military played a crucial role in the development of aviation on 
many levels before, during, and after World War 1.
To sum up, no doubt the technical development of the airplane made a leap 
forward during the War, which meant that the planes of 1918 were much 
more reliable than the ones of 1914. At the same time, there were a lot more 
of them after the War, and surplus military equipment became the backbone 
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of the many new airlines popping up like mushrooms from 1919. This new 
branch was also dependent on the expertise of (former) military personnel. 
On the other hand, the War stopped the possibilities for civil experiments 
with airmail and passenger transport for a while, directed the attention of 
developers in specific directions, and put a spoke in the wheel of the possi-
bilities of international cooperation and knowledge exchange.
Booster or brake?
When World War 1 was coming to an end, a German biologist wrote: “If a 
war lasts as long as this one … and absorbs all the intellectual and material 
forces of the nations, it is not surprising that there should be a few inven-
tions while it is going on. There can be not the slightest doubt, however, that 
future statistics will prove that the annual number of inventions in Europe 
during the war was smaller – much smaller in comparison – than in any 
correspondingly long period we may select in the last few decades” (cited 
in Nef 1950: 376).
I have not counted the number of patents, but tried through three cases to 
look into the question: was World War 1 a technological booster, or did the 
War slow down technological change? Or as it was more specifically asked 
in the introduction: did World War 1 have a decisive impact on the aircraft 
or on other technologies, which can be used for civilian purposes? Did the 
War mean something positive or negative for technological change in a neu-
tral country like Denmark?
The stories about motor trucks, airplanes, and radio show that there is no 
simple answer to these questions. The War meant, among other things, 
shortages of fuel and materials, restrictions to the civil use of cars and ra-
dios, problems with international cooperation, regulation, and flow of in-
formation, a focus on military needs to the detriment of civil purposes, the 
speeding up innovation in some fields, the upscaling of production, and a 
surplus of certain technologies like trucks and airplanes immediately after 
the War. It also changed the balance between countries and created different 
opportunities for further technological development and production.
In other words, the War disturbed normal procedures, sometimes with a 
positive outcome, sometimes with a negative one for the civil development 
and use of new technologies. It seems that – except for the faster technical 
development of aircraft – the War itself mainly had a negative influence, 
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while the interest of military institutions in peacetime had a positive influ-
ence on innovation, not least as important customers buying much more of 
the new equipment than any civil users. This makes it important to distin-
guish between war and the influence of military institutions in peacetime 
(Hacker 1994). When it comes to radio and aviation, the military interests 
strongly shaped development before the outbreak of World War 1, but when 
it comes to motor trucks, no evidence shows a particularly military interest 
in the development or any importance of the military as an institution before 
the War. The truck is also an interesting example of how the technological 
change a war causes is not always unidirectional, but can include the (re)use 
of older technological solutions.
The War functioned as a huge reliability test of technologies like radio, 
trucks, and airplanes. However, the War did not “give” us the airplane, the 
radio, or the truck, and there is no sign that these technologies would have 
been different today without the War. The War was a disruption and it af-
fected development for some time, but it was by no means a cause for these 
technologies. All in all, a look into these empirical examples of commu-
nication and transport technologies shows that the importance of war for 
technological change is generally exaggerated compared to the importance 
of military institutions in peacetime and that, for some technologies like 
aviation, it makes no sense to try to separate civil and military development. 
They are constantly interrelated.
To return to the discussion in the introduction, neither the unambiguously 
positive view of Lewis Mumford, nor the negative of John Nef tells the 
whole story about war and technology. The general effect of war on the 
development and diffusion of new technologies is definitely not just stim-
ulation, but neither is it only negative. To conclude, reality is messy, and to 
say that war in general accelerates technological progress is far too simple. 
As the empirical examples in this article have shown, there is no straightfor-
ward connection between war and technological change. In each case, we 
have to ask the question anew. 
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Endnotes
1 This is a huge research field and a common subject in popular history 
as well. Just take a short look at popular websites like Wikipedia. They 
have several extensive descriptions of the development of weapons 
during World War 1 and the number of books published on the subject 
is legio. For an early example, see Schwarte, 1920.
2 Such stories are common on the Internet (see as examples Evans 2014 
and Wall Street Journal, 2014).
3 Often mentioned is Werner Sombart’s “Krieg und Kapitalismus” 
(Sombart 1913), wherein he looks into the question of “ist und inwie-
weit und weshalb ist der Kapitalimus eine Wirkung des Krieges” 
(Sombart 1913: 3). In short, he finds that war has promoted capitalism 
and made it possible. For a rather old bibliography about technology 
and war, see Roland 1985.
4 Michael Friedwald has studied the history of Telefunken from 1905 to 
1914 and he concludes that the German radio technology in that period 
was primarily shaped by military needs (to a higher degree than their 
British and American competitors), and that this have influenced the 
technology ever since (Friedwald 1999: 161).
5 For an analysis of the ban on amateur radio in the US and the role of 
the amateurs, see Arceneaux 2012.
6 DLR was in fact involved in negotiations about buying the more com-
fortable Junkers J 13 for passenger transport than their own converted 
military planes, some with open cabin. However, this never happened, 
because the support of their mother company, AEG, was dependent 
on the use of their planes (Mulder et al. 2012: 28). All the planes DDL 
owned before 1925 were rebuilt military equipment. Only the F.F.49c 
was unused and had been rebuilt at the factory in 1919. The other 
aircraft were purchased as used military surplus material in Britain 
(Lybye 1936: 280-281).
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Chapter 12
World War 1 and the Chinese 
Revolution
Li Xing
World War 1 and the forces for Chinese Revolution 
World War 1 had brought about unprecedented strains on the economic, 
social, and political constellations of all countries involved. The end of the 
War witnessed the dissolution of the “European Empire”: On the one hand, 
it smashed old empires, created new republics and nation-states, revived 
independence movements in the colonial world, and provided the opportu-
nity for the United States to become a world power. On the other hand, the 
political extremism that emerged in the wake of World War 1 fundamentally 
transformed the European political landscape, which had a great impact 
on the historical trajectory of other regions as well. The rise of political 
ideologies was transformed into various forms of radicalism, from fascism 
to communism, with two concrete results in the victory of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia and the triumph of extremist nationalism in Germany, 
characterized by Hitler and the Nazi Party. As one scholar described the 
effect and impact of World War 1 on the various movements towards social, 
national, and political revolution:
“The Russian revolutions of 1917 serve as the first case study, fol-
lowed by the mutinies in France, and the collapse of monarchies 
in Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Events in Italy and 
Greece show the danger of revolution even among the victors. The 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of modern Turkey, 
alongside French and British mandates, helped create the basis for 
the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East.” (Fulwider 2016)
Europe’s century-long Westphalian balance of power system of interna-
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tional relations was damaged. It was after World War 2, and with the su-
premacy of the United States, that interstate relations under a new world 
order were reinstalled.
When examining the global consequences and impact of World War 1, 
many questions that historians attempt to find answers for are: why did 
some countries vigorously subject themselves to a socialist or communist 
revolution, while others did not? What factors led to the forces of political 
radicalism of communist revolution in Europe and their worldwide expan-
sion? Why did the revolutionary forces generated by the War give rise to a 
communist regime in Russia, which inspired and encouraged a full-scale 
communist revolution in China?
The central question addressed and explored in this chapter is: what is the 
connection between World War 1 and the Chinese Communist Revolution? 
As mentioned previously, the impact of World War 1 was not only limit-
ed to the European continent. Rather, it brought about dramatic political, 
cultural, and social change across other regions such as Asia and Africa. 
Unfortunately, for most Europeans and for most Chinese population to-
day including scholars, the memory of World War 1 is rather vague. Most 
Chinese people only know that the War took place in Europe and it had 
little to do with the historical contingency in China’s development trajec-
tory. Much Chinese literature refers to World War 1 as “Ou Zhan” (which 
in Chinese means “the European War”) (Fan 2016). Hence, according to a 
Chinese scholar, the nexus between World War 1 and Chinese modern revo-
lutionary history has been a curiously neglected topic (Xu 2011).
After decades of silence, the impact of the War on the Chinese historical tra-
jectory has finally won the recognition of academic research both in China 
and in Europe. As one scholar points out,
“[His writing] discusses China’s role in the First World War with a 
focus on the country’s contribution to the war and the role of the war 
in shaping Chinese development and its place in the world. Contrary 
to common knowledge, China was not only involved in various as-
pects of the war, but the war also had a significant impact on China. 
The war period, therefore, marks a turning point for the country: the 
crises challenged China to define where it stood in the world and 
how to embark on a political and cultural revival.” (Mühlhahn 2014)
The chapter does not intend to focus on what kind of role China played in 
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the War. Rather, the chapter intends to anticipate that World War 1 was 
an important turning point in China’s contemporary history. The War, 
from which the Chinese communist movement evolved, marked the end 
of China’s self-isolation period of unrest and turmoil after the Opium Wars 
and the Boxer Rebellion in the nineteenth century, and the beginning of its 
long march towards the course of “internationalization” in the twentieth 
century. Chinese history underwent a dramatic transformation character-
ized by proactive engagement in the international system, ideas, forces, and 
trends which represent a clear leap forward in China’s rise as a modern 
“nation state” (Xu 2005, 2011). 
World War 1 and the Chinese (Communist) Revolution 
The concept of “the Chinese Revolution”, in a broad sense, covers many 
Chinese contemporary historical events, including the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. The historical legacies which underline this notion include: 
1)  The Xinhai Revolution in 1911, led by Sun Yatsan, a revolution 
that overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of 
China; 
2)  The Second Republic Revolution in the 1913, a rebellion against 
Yuan Shikai, who attempted to restore the imperial system; 
3)  The Northern Expedition during 1926–28, a military campaign 
against the conservative Beiyang Government led by Chiang Kai-
shek’s nationalist forces in cooperation with communist support; 
4)  The Anti-Japanese War (part of the Second War World) 1937-
1945; an eight-year protracted war during which the national-
ists and the communists formed a coalition to defeat Japanese  
aggression; 
5)  The Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949, a war between the nation-
alist government and the Communist Party-led forces led by Mao 
and the Communist Party. 
The final victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution also marks the fi-
nal victory of the entire history of the Chinese Revolution. Therefore, very 
often the notion of “the Chinese Revolution” literally refers to “the Chinese 
Communist Revolution”, and these two terms are often used interchange-
ably. 
Notwithstanding the historical richness of this notion of the Chinese 
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Revolution, the Chinese Communist Revolution mainly refers to the 
Chinese Communist Party’s uninterrupted struggle and drive to dominant 
power since its founding in 1921. The history of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution can be divided into two main phases: the first phase was a pro-
letarian insurrection on the Russian model, and the failure of this insur-
gence in 1927 caused the breakdown of the Nationalist-Communist alliance 
and reshaped the whole subsequent history of China. The second phase, 
triggered by the anti-Japanese War, ended with the victory of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949. 
The Chinese Communist Revolution has been researched, studied, and 
written about by numerous sinologists and historians. It is, without doubt, 
one of the most important events in Chinese history, and brought about dra-
matic socio-cultural and socio-political transformations, as well as funda-
mental changes in ideas, thoughts, value systems, and scholarship, includ-
ing all spheres of life. The decline of Chinese civilization from a “Middle 
Kingdom” into an underdeveloped periphery country has been a subject of 
interest in social science, and especially in the field of development studies. 
A number of contending theoretical explanations or “schools of thought” 
have been advanced to explain the causes of underdevelopment in China, 
embracing both internal and external factors (Li 2012), such as: 
1)  The Asiatic Mode of Production (a Marxist interpretation of the 
oriental pre-capitalist economic formations and the primitive so-
cietal forms and class structures); 
2)  The preindustrial stage theory (internal equilibrium combined 
with external pressure causing “a century-long process of disinte-
gration, transformation and slow gestation within the traditional 
Chinese order” (Eckstein as quoted in Lippit 1980:19); 
3)  The state and social structure theory (the social structure symbol-
ized by the Chinese family system, a conservative bureaucracy 
and ruling ideology, a parasitic elite, fatalistic attitude, etc.); 
4)  The colonialism and imperialism thesis, (underdevelopment is a 
historical process caused by Western colonial-imperialist expan-
sion; 
5)  The culturalist interpretation (the Weberian thesis on the incom-
patibility between modernization/modernity and cultural values, 
attitudes and practices).
The introduction of these competing theoretical explanations on the devel-
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opment of China’s underdevelopment does not aim to stimulate a new round 
of debate on the above explanations and interpretations. Rather, they are 
mentioned in order to highlight the historical background of the Chinese 
Revolution in which it was to find the solutions to these internal, as well 
as external, constraints, whether cultural, social, or politico-economic, that 
the Chinese Revolution, both before and after the People’s Republic, car-
ried out a unique attempt to transform China’s society and specifically the 
consciousness of its people in line with collectively accepted political and 
ideological norms. 
Therefore, it is absolutely meaningful to understand the role and impact of 
World War 1 on China’s modern history and the historical trajectory that 
China embarked on in such a political and cultural revival. While World 
War 1 forced the old European imperialists to concentrate on peace and 
security in Europe, the new emerging powers – Japan and the United States 
– speedily increased their influence in different parts of the world, par-
ticularly in Asia. Japan was able to position itself as an equal power, along 
with the existing Western hegemons, as a result of the War, while its am-
bition to control the whole of Asia was foreseeable. The United States also 
increased its trade with China, including political and cultural linkages. 
Meanwhile, China was convinced by the harsh lessons from the Versailles 
Conference that it could not trust and rely on the imperialist powers, and 
it had to look for new partners who shared similar experiences and aspira-
tions. The October Revolution of 1917 and the birth of a great Soviet Union 
was a source of inspiration for revolutionary transformations and for freeing 
itself from the hold of the Western colonial powers.
The objective and methodological consideration
The chapter intends to reveal the nexus between China’s internal trajecto-
ries and the external influences since the nineteenth century, with a focus 
on the role of World War 1 and its impact on China’s revolutionary trajec-
tories. Methodologically, the nexus is conceptualized by examining the in-
ternal and external interactions from a relational-historical approach. Such 
an approach is seen as a good way to study the interactive relationships in 
the process of transformation, with a special focus on the mutually-related 
internal and external factors. It implies that the “challenge-response” dyna-
mism has been always expressed in the internal-external nexus and is em-
bedded in the multiple causalities in China’s modern history (Li 2010). The 
“relational” aspect emphasizes the relation and interaction among internal 
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and external factors in the process, whereas the “historical” aspect under-
lines the transformative and dynamic nature of the process. 
The objective of the chapter aims to emphasize the historical importance 
of World War 1 in bringing about a fundamental transformation in China’s 
contemporary history – the victory of Chinese communism – which has 
shaped China’s development trajectory since the beginning of the twenti-
eth century. In other words, it aims to explore China’s century-long “chal-
lenge-response” dynamism, i.e., how external challenges helped to shape 
China’s internal transformations, and how generations of Chinese people 
had been struggling to respond to the external challenges and constraints. 
Likewise, it is equally important to understand how China’s inner transfor-
mation contributed to reshaping the regional and world order. Each time, 
be it China’s hegemony or decline, the capitalist world system has to adjust 
and readjust itself to the opportunities and constraints brought about by the 
“China factors”.
 
The historicity of the Chinese (Communist) Revolution
“In the 1930s a commentator for the Washington Weekly wrote: no 
matter whether you are a congressman, financier or general, or even 
the President of the United States, once you visited the countryside 
in China’s western regions and came to know the peasants there, 
you would immediately be a supporter and follower of the Chinese 
Communist Party.” (Wang 1994: 26)
The historical role and significance of the Chinese Communist Revolution 
has been written/rewritten and interpreted/reinterpreted over different peri-
ods of time. Was the Chinese Communist Revolution really necessary? Was 
it historically imperative? There are people inside and outside China who 
suspect the historical necessity for such a revolution under the assumption 
that if China had not adopted Marxist theory, had not gone through the 
armed revolutions, and had not taken the socialist road, China would have 
developed more rapidly and “normally”, and it could also be possible that 
China might have developed into an advanced nation possessing some of 
the characteristics of Western democracy. Unfortunately, history does not 
always follow one’s expectations, and nor did it grant the time and opportu-
nity which China needed. World War 1, World War 2, and the Chinese Civil 
War totally altered the course of Chinese development.
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Facing the critical questions at the present time – why did China have to 
go through a communist revolution? Why did it have to look to Marxism at 
the time when there might have been other social theories and alternatives? 
Many people have tried to study the history of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution in a non-Marxist approach, but they all ended up with a 
dilemma. As Dirlik describes, “students of Chinese Communism in the 
West, the majority of whom do not share a similar conviction in Marxism’s 
truths, have nevertheless found in China’s circumstances variegated reasons 
for radicals’ attraction to Marxism and consequently turning to Communist 
politics, as the only means to resolve the problems of Chinese society” 
(Dirlik 1989: 255). Therefore, to understand the transformation of China, 
one has to understand the historical context of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution and its entire discourse.
The historical background of the Chinese (Communist) 
Revolution
When Marco Polo brought back to Europe his image of China: the most 
powerful, stable, and efficiently ruled country in the world, the West began 
to pay great interest to the East. Actually, his China-wonder was not unique 
because, since Roman times, the flow of trade and commodities were over-
whelmingly from East to West. Although the West now takes special pride 
in its technological achievements, the transmission of major new techniques 
was, until the recent past of the industrial revolution, no less overwhelming-
ly from East to West (Segal 1966: 318; Hobson 2004). The Western image of 
China was indeed infinitely mysterious and promising. 
China’s real interest in the outside world was relatively recent in its history 
of several thousand years. In ancient times, if one was asked to travel lands 
outside China, the answer would be that one who knew the Chinese clas-
sics had nothing left to learn. Until the arrival of European colonialists in 
the nineteenth century, China was still an autonomous, self-satisfied, and 
self-contained civilization. Its geographical compositions were also unique: 
barren steppes and desert in the north, high mountains and arid plateaus in 
the west, the endless sea in the east, and inaccessible jungles in the south 
made it possible for China to establish a highly developed preindustrial civ-
ilization (Kapur 1987: 1). Chinese people used to think that their civilization 
was the highest in world history and their position was the center of the 
world (the English word “China” is “Middle Kingdom” in Chinese), sur-
rounded by barbarians. Based on this worldview, the Chinese devoted many 
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of their energies to the development of the humanities, civil, and cultural 
activities, rather than to capital accumulation and military buildup. 
Contrary to the Yuan Dynasty (the Mongol Empire) which was an outwardly 
expansionist empire, since the Ming Dynasty, China began to isolate itself 
from the external world, like the “Forbidden City”. The emperor in the late 
Ming Dynasty in 1521 ordered all ocean-going junks destroyed, and trade 
outside Chinese territorial waters was forbidden because the merchants, 
with their wealth based upon worldwide trade, were becoming a challenge 
to the imperial power based on tribute from the land (Brown 1993: 16). 
Therefore, China’s perception and view of the outside world was closely 
linked with its long-term isolation and was rarely influenced and challenged 
by external factors. This is perceived by the West as an example typical of 
China: self-satisfaction and a lack of curiosity about the outside world. Such 
an attitude is believed to have placed China in a disadvantageous position 
and caused her much suffering since the nineteenth century. Chinese did 
not foresee the necessity to provide for proper protection against possible 
external aggression, because the empire had been a hegemonic power and 
was free from any serious external threat prior to 1800.
In the early nineteenth century, China faced several crises. On the one 
hand, two powerful neighbors posed potential threats to China’s security. 
Russia slowly expanded up to China’s northern frontiers, and Japan gradu-
ally crossed the narrow sea. On the other hand, the forced entry into China 
of Western nations was even more dangerous, not only to its security, but 
also to its entire civilization. The forcible opening up of China to Western 
industrial products and civilization ideas, the establishment of industries 
on its shores, compounded with the inevitable problems involved in the ac-
culturation process, destroyed the delicate balance the Chinese system had 
created after centuries of intellectual and economic efforts (Kapur 1987: 2). 
While China had no interest in dealing with outsiders and it wanted nothing 
form the West, the West wanted a great deal from China. The ambition of 
European powers was not only to urge their governments to protect their 
trade, but also to force a passage for other products. The enforced open-
ing of China’s market and sovereignty after its defeat in the Anglo-Chinese 
Opium War (1939-1842) has been described as the start of a “century of 
humiliation.”1 
The consequences of the Opium War were very damaging: traditional trib-
utaries were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the 
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authority of the emperor, upon which Chinese order based, was ended; the 
hand-labor-based industries on which Chinese economy depended were de-
stroyed; and the favorable balance of trade which existed until 1830 and 
which had brought an uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became 
lopsided (Kapur, ibid.: 2). China indeed became an international colony. 
The traditional social structure was finally broken down. China’s customs 
offices and post offices were largely controlled by Westerners; Western 
ships were permitted to navigate freely in its waters and even to demol-
ish some of its coastal defenses; many Western troops were stationed at a 
number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in various parts 
of the country were taken over as concessions. China was, thus, divided by 
Western powers as “spheres of interest” and was “carved up like a melon.”
This situation was really an unprecedented challenge to the Chinese “Middle 
Kingdom” identity as a whole. The loss of power was a great humiliation, 
and it marked the decline of Chinese prestige and power. Since the collapse 
of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese academics and elites were deeply divided in 
how they should adapt to the new situation and deal with the new challeng-
es. There were four main schools of attitude. The first school favored the 
restoration of the traditional social structure, recovering ancient power, and 
expelling outsiders. The second school preferred a limited change, but was 
not interested in modern science and industry, nor was it interested in learn-
ing about the Western political philosophy and economic system. Its only 
interest was Western weaponry technology and military training. The third 
school went to the opposite extreme: it favored total Westernization, and 
was convinced that science and technology did affect values. This school 
believed that it was impossible to borrow Western technology while main-
taining Chinese ways of thinking and its outdated institutional structure. 
The most influential one was the fourth school – revolutionary Marxism 
and Leninism. The final victory of Marxism and Leninism in China was 
an outcome of a long process of internal turbulence and struggle. Thus, it 
is important to review this process so as to understand why China became 
communist.
From the first large-scale domestic uprisings, the Taiping Uprising (late 
1850’s-early 1860’s), to the establishment of a republican government after 
Sun Yat-sen’s Xin Hai Revolution (1911-1912) which marked the end of im-
perial rule, Confucianism as a national guiding philosophy had been facing 
fundamental challenges from both inside and outside. The struggle, search-
ing for new inspirations and new solutions to stimulate a re-emergence of the 
“Middle Kingdom”, continued as the world entered the twentieth century.
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The Versailles Treaty and the May Fourth Movement
On 14 August 1917, as World War 1 entered its fourth year, China aban-
doned its neutrality and declared war against Germany. China’s involve-
ment in World War 1 in Europe was mainly in the form of deploying work-
ers to battlegrounds in Western Europe and Russia. This contribution was 
already historically unprecedented in Chinese history, since both the Ming 
and the Qing Dynasties had restrictive policies in trying to keep the Chinese 
people from going abroad (Mühlhahn 2016). China sent more than 100,000 
laborers to France and Belgium in the Western Front and 2,000 of them 
were buried in France (MacMillan 2014). In addition, another 40,000 of 
them were scattered across France, working in factories, digging trench-
es, carrying ammunition, toiling in docks and railway yards, together with 
a few hundred Chinese students recruited as interpreters (The Economist 
April 26, 2010). 
Despite the huge Chinese contribution and immense sacrifice, and despite the 
fact that China belonged to the winning side of the War, the whole Chinese 
nation was completely shocked by the fact that the Treaty of Versailles 
 granted Japan the right to take over from Germany the resource-rich pro-
vince, Shandong, which was also the birthplace of Confucius. The humilia-
tion that the Versailles Treaty imposed on China was immensely unbearable:
“For China, the Treaty of Versailles was a similar debacle. None 
of China’s demands were taken seriously by representatives of the 
allied powers, including U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the great 
idealist, who arrived in Paris with his Fourteen Points in tow. China 
demanded an end to extraterritoriality for foreign powers on its soil, 
a cancellation of Japan’s exploitative ‘Twenty-One Demands,’ and 
the return of Shandong from the Germans.” (Panda 2015)
Dismayed by the failure of the 1911 Xin Hai Revolution2 to establish a re-
publican government, and triggered by the “Western imperialism” revealed 
at Versailles, where the secret agreement of transferring German rights in 
Shandong to Japan had been previously signed between the Allied Powers 
and Japan to lure Japan to enter World War 1,3 a nationwide movement 
broke out on 4 May 1919, when thousands of students rallied in Beijing to 
protest against China’s treatment in the Treaty of Versailles and against the 
Chinese government’s perceived humiliation and capitulation to the whims 
of Western imperial powers. 
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Their protest was supported by striking workers across China. A new force 
joined in the fray, as workers in factories went on strike in support of stu-
dent demands. The growth of industry had brought a modern working class 
onto the stage. At the end of 1916, there were nearly one million industrial 
workers, and this number doubled by 1922. The effect and consequence of 
the May Fourth Movement radicalized political movements in China and 
contributed to the rise of powerful political and intellectual groups such as 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was formed two years later.
The May Fourth Movement and the rise of the Chinese 
communist socio-political forces
After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, and between 1911 and 1949, China 
was stagnated by a protracted and complex process of civil wars and revolu-
tions. During this period, the event of the May Fourth Movement was a his-
torical milestone. It was not only a political protest against Western imperi-
alism and a patriotic movement for the restoration of Chinese independence 
and sovereignty, but also an intellectual turning point in Chinese modern 
history. The May Fourth Movement was also a “New Culture Movement”, a 
nationwide movement calling for a cultural reform of Confucian values, for 
a socio-political reform based on “democracy, equality, science”, as well as 
for creating viable values for a new and modern China.
There are two important impacts of World War 1 to contemporary Chinese 
history. The first is that the Versailles Treaty paved the foundation for the 
subsequent Japanese aggression against China. As one Chinese scholar 
sharply points out,
“At the Paris peace talks, the United States approved Japan’s  
seizures in Shandong.  After the war, Japan accelerated its invasion 
and expansion into China, occupying our country’s three northeast-
ern provinces. The powers … including the United States, Great 
Britain, and France … did not even apply any sanctions against 
Japan, refused … to call Japan an invading state, and even de-
manded that China recognize Japan’s ‘special rights and interests’ 
in China’s Northeast, thus in actuality supporting Japan’s invasion.” 
(Qian Wenrong, cf. Goldstein 2015)
The second is that the War fundamentally changed China’s worldview. 
Previously, the Chinese perception of outside world had been based on ide-
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as and concepts that had not been tested, and the Chinese rejection of the 
foreign world was not based on any real knowledge or any real experience 
and rested upon a lack of knowledge and indifference (Kapur 1987: 2). Now, 
people like the translator Yan Fu held the Western civilization in contempt 
as he wrote with outright and hostility following the end of World War 1, “It 
seems to me that in three centuries of progress the peoples of the West have 
achieved four principles: to be selfish, to kill others, to have little integri-
ty, and to feel little shame. How different are the principles of Confucius 
and Mencius, as broad and deep as Heaven and Earth, designed to benefit 
man everywhere” (Yan cf Woetzel 1989: 1-2). It was at this time that China 
had to consider a new geopolitical phenomenon in which the new situation 
needed a new perception, and the new experience required a new response. 
How to respond and act in the face of this massive acculturation was both 
imperative and urgent. 
In retrospect, the May Fourth Movement was part of a series of worldwide 
revolts as an outcome of the effects of World War 1, and was enthusiasti-
cally inspired by the Russian October Revolution of 1917-1923. The Russian 
Revolution took place in 1917 during the final phase of World War 1. The 
Revolution transformed Russia from being a traditional monarchy into be-
coming the world’s first communist state. The Russian victory presented 
an alternative model to China, where the new communist leaders prom-
ised to build a new, fairer, and more efficient society. Two years after the 
May Fourth Movement, the Communist Party of China was founded. Mao 
Zedong later cited the May Fourth Movement as a “new stage in China’s 
bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism” (Mao 
1939). The May Fourth Movement also marked a turning point in which 
China’s intellectuals began to turn to supporting the CCP. 
Intellectual debate and the victory of communist 
radicalism
From the 1840s, the questions of national wealth and power, national sur-
vival and cultural identity have become pivotal concerns for all Chinese. 
What transformations did China have to undertake in order to create a new 
viable culture, capable of combining the best of the traditional with the 
modern, the indigenous and the foreign, thus ensuring China’s existence as a 
political entity? At every stage of domestic turmoil, whether facing Western 
imperialist invasion or civil wars, the question was intensely  debated among 
Chinese intellectuals in different classes. Facing the increasing disintegra-
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tion of the imperial regime, Chinese began to ponder the necessity of a 
social transformation which would overthrow imperial feudalism and de-
velop a new society. Many great intellectuals and thinkers engaged in this 
endeavor. 
Kang Youwei (1858-1927) was regarded as China’s first modern thinker 
since the late nineteenth century. He advocated radical changes in China’s 
imperial system. His ideal Chinese society – variously translated as “great 
harmony” or “great unity” – consisted of a much more radical vision than 
that of a communist society. He advocated not only for the abolition of pri-
vate property and of national government, but also the complete dissolu-
tion of families and even the elimination of personal names (Chi 1986: 5). 
However, Kang admitted that this ideal vision was to be realized in the 
distant future. For the China of his own time, he advocated a constitutional 
monarchy resembling that of some European countries.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who established the first republic, advocated 
a revolution in order to replace the Manchu imperial rule with a republic. 
While Kang had advocated for a peaceful change with the support of the 
imperial government, the 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun was an armed re-
bellion aimed at overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty. By 1924, Sun had elab-
orated his revolutionary theory and formulated his Three Principles of the 
People into a system – nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood. The 
principle of nationalism was seen as promoting equality among all Chinese 
people, as well as China’s equality with foreign powers; his principle of 
democracy sought to establish a democratic form of government based on 
the model of the United States with certain modifications; and his principle 
of people’s livelihood was a kind of socialism with a certain degree of reg-
ulation of capital and the relative equalization of land ownership (ibid.: 5).
Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was another influential intellectual during 
China’s New Cultural Movement, and he was one of the earliest founders 
of the Chinese communist movement. He and Li Dazhao, another influen-
tial communist advocator, were among the first May Fourth intellectuals 
to write on the October Revolution, and played a significant role in the 
early attempts to adapt Marxism to the Chinese situation. He once dreamed 
of making a combined model of capitalism and democracy for China. He 
converted to Marxism in 1920 and favored the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat. He was one of the founders and early leaders of the CCP. His effort in 
making China a prototype of the Soviet model failed after two decades of 
bitter experiences.
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Among the most influential of early thinkers, was Mao Zedong (1893-
1976). Like Sun Yet-sen, but unlike the others, Mao was both a thinker and 
a revolutionary who devoted his whole life to the course of an envisioned 
just society. Mao has been regarded as the only person who success fully 
combined Marxism with China’s real situation, and adopted a strategy 
of organizing a peasant army to gradually seize political power from the 
Kuomintang. After Mao succeeded in the civil war and established the new 
republic, he led a continuous revolution towards the building of socialism 
and an independent force against the international isolation and Western 
imperialism. 
The challenges facing the nation were dual: China not only had to build a 
modern economy, but also create a new culture and value system in order 
to shape the direction of national development. In other words, the require-
ment for forming a new cultural identity became a yardstick for generations 
of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, because a new value system and 
attitude were preconditions for the transformation of individuals, as well as 
the material base of society, and economic development and culture were 
intricately interconnected (Kung, 1975: 219). For a long period, debates on 
the necessary cultural transformations were centered on four areas: (a) the 
reform of Confucian value systems; (b) the sinification of Western values; 
(c) the establishment of a consciousness of class struggles; and (d) social 
revolution versus evolution.
Since the Opium War, the repeated failure of the Confucian state to defend 
Chinese society from foreign invasion and social disintegration brought 
the inherent confrontation between state and society to a breaking point. 
Despite its 450 million people, rich resources, long history, and centuries of 
civilization, China had nevertheless been unable to resist the Japanese in-
vasion as a consequence of its feudal and semi-colonial stagnation. In other 
words, China had lost its vestiges of independence and nationhood.
From the first large-scale domestic uprisings, the Taiping Uprising (late 
1850s-early 1860s) to the establishment of a republican government after 
Sun Yat-sen’s revolution (1911-1912) which marked the end of the Confucian 
state, Confucianism as a national guiding philosophy faced a fundamental 
challenge both from inside and outside. The desire to search new inspira-
tions for an emergence of China’s new national culture continued as the 
world entered the twentieth century. The final coming out of a new cultural 
consensus was a product not only of historical development, but also intel-
lectual debates through a few phases: the May Fourth Movement (1916-21); 
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the first civil war (1921-27) and the second civil war (1927-37); the Sino-
Japanese war (1937-45); and the third civil war (1947-49). 
The May Fourth Movement was a milestone in Chinese modern histo-
ry during which different schools of thoughts bloomed, including many 
foreign- inspired schools, namely Marxism, Leninism, socialism, liberal-
ism, Darwinism, etc. It was during this period that Marxist proletarian cul-
ture and class theory began to influence and inspire the way of thinking of 
Chinese people, and especially Chinese intellectuals. 
After numerous failures in resisting Western imperialist challenges, 
Confucian ideology as an analytical framework was finally discarded even 
by most conservative intellectuals. This was because Confucian ethical and 
political traditions obviously proved to have lost their viability during a 
time when China urgently needed a new analytical framework to exam-
ine the new social structure after the overthrowing of the imperial system. 
Being without Confucianism as a state ideology, together with the abolish-
ing of the feudal system, left China two options: moving towards capitalism 
through gradual reforms as Darwinian evolutionism suggested, or advanc-
ing directly to socialism with a mass political and social revolution. 
The debate in Chinese intellectual circles on whether China should take a 
capitalist or a socialist road divided them into two major groups. One group 
believed that China was far from able to develop a socialist system even 
though it seemed to be superior to the capitalist system, and in order to re-
solve its poverty and backwardness, China only had the alternative of devel-
oping capitalism. People of this group maintained that the success of social-
ism de pended on a viable proletarian working class, but at the present stage, 
“Chinese factory workers are too few and too weak to take over political and 
economic responsibilities;” and in order to create the conditions for social-
ism, the immediate task of Chinese society was to develop capitalism under a 
strong central government, rather than eliminate it (Chow in Kung 1975: 258). 
The other group thought it impossible for China to develop capitalism in-
dependently, due to the international and domestic conditions, and the only 
option for it was to develop socialism as Russia did. This is because, “in the 
first place, the imperialist powers would not allow China to carry out any 
transformation aimed at autonomous capitalist development if they could 
possibly help it,” and every time people stood up against traditional rule, 
the imperial powers intervened and suppressed the effort by force (Hinton 
1990: 164). 
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Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Chinese nationalist revolution which over-
threw the Qing Dynasty, felt perplexed. “Why don’t the teachers ever allow 
the pupils to learn?” he asked. Mao observed that China had been deter-
mined to learn from the progressive model of Western capitalist countries 
since the 1840s, and China had also wanted to obtain salvation and achieve 
modernization. But, as he noted, the aggressions of the imperialists had 
shattered those dreams of the Chinese people, “How strange! Why do 
teachers always carry out aggression against the students?” He finally con-
cluded that to take the road of the Russians was the most effective option. 
In addition, the group of progressive intellectuals perceived capitalism as a 
system in which the bourgeoisie and businessmen dominated society. It was a 
system which they found it hard to accept. Thus, to develop capitalism as 
an alternative to resolving China’s social problems was not generally con-
sidered to be a workable alternative.
However, the opposite view is that China could possibly have achieved 
modernization in a stage-by-stage process by independently embarking on 
a capitalist road, and this view might not be incorrect, seen from today’s 
perspective of economic marketization. But, history does not always fol-
low one’s will. The historical circumstances, including both external and 
internal conditions, have determined the unlikeliness and impracticality 
of China trying independently to develop capitalism (Hu 1997: 6). This is 
due to a number of reasons: Firstly, there was the lack of a strong presence 
of bourgeois forces capable of creating the preconditions for the develop-
ment of capitalism, and the national bourgeoisie was too weak to mobilize 
the necessary social transformations. Secondly, the fact that China lost its 
sovereignty and independence, suffering aggression and oppression at the 
hands of almost all Western imperialist powers offered China little ground 
to speak of in developing national capitalism. Thirdly, considering China’s 
internal chaotic situation of national disintegration such as socio-political 
disorder and contradictions and civil wars, the realization of national unity 
must be achieved prior to the development of any new socio-political sys-
tem. The importance of achieving national unity can be seen from the fact 
that, in building the preconditions for developing capitalism, the Nationalist 
Party, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had to cooperate with the newly emerging 
Communist Party. Lastly, China’s miserable peasant class, which comprised 
of 80% of its population, could not provide any basis for developing capi-
talism. Most of the industries centered along the coast cities and big cities 
along the Yangtze River. Workers made up a small segment of the popula-
tion, and they did not even possess a unifying class consciousness. This was 
a problem for the revolutionary movement.
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The short life of Sun Yat-sen’s Republic Revolution and the humiliation in 
the Versailles Treaty of World War 1, together with Japanese imperialist 
intentions tore up the Chinese admiration for learning from the West and 
Japan. So, if both Western constitutional monarchy and republicanism, as 
well as Japanese militarist culture could not be imitated as alternatives to 
save China, then what else could be an option? Early Chinese Marxists Li 
Dazhao and Chen Duxiu argued that, with or without a strong state, the 
establishment of Chinese capitalism would eventually become the agent of 
Western capitalism and would not solve China’s poverty and backwardness. 
The most forceful and comprehensive argument was put forward by Li:
“Although China itself has not yet undergone a process of capitalist 
economic development such as occurred in Europe, America, and 
Japan, the common people (of China) still indirectly suffer from 
capitalist economic oppression in a way that is even more bitter than 
the direct capitalist oppression suffered by the working class of the 
various (capitalist) nations…
If we look again at the international position of China today, (we 
see) that other nations have already passed from free competition 
to the necessary socialist-cooperative position, while we are still ju-
veniles; others have walked a thousand li, while we are still taking 
the first step… I fear that we will be unable to succeed unless we 
take double steps and unite into a socially cooperative organization. 
Therefore, if we want to develop industry in China, we must organ-
ize a government made up purely of producers in order to eliminate 
the exploiting classes within the country, to resist world capitalism, 
and to follow (the path of ) industrialization organized upon a social-
ist basis.” (Li cf Kung, 1975: 259)
Li’s argument identified China as a “proletarian nation”, although it lacked 
a strong proletarian working class. He associated the potential of a Chinese 
proletarian revolution to the worldwide proletarian movement against inter-
national capitalism. His far-reaching and insightful analytical worldview 
paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition within the CCP, 
which was further developed by his disciple, Mao Zedong. It was Mao who 
was able to combine the Marxist-Leninist theory with China’s unique socio- 
economic and socio-political reality, which led the Chinese Revolution into 
the final victory.
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The role of Marxism, Leninism and the Russian 
Revolution
Since the May Fourth Movement and especially since the victory of the 
1917 Russian Bolshevik Revolution, Marxism and Leninism began to play 
an active role in influencing the direction in which China was moving. The 
origin of the Chinese Communist Revolution did not come directly from 
the mass peasants, but firstly from the intellectuals. Not all of China’s 
intellectuals became communist, of course. Nevertheless, a large number 
of students and professors turned to favor communist ideas. A vast num-
ber of Chinese students and intellectuals were eager to find a way out of 
China’s long-suffered desperate position, and they were ready to devote 
themselves to any movement that gave them hope for the restoration of 
national self-respect, economic sufficiency, and individual dignity. Many 
of them looked forward to Western democracy as a favorable choice, but 
they had little opportunity to see the advantage of free enterprise and eco-
nomic competition. It was far from clear that Western democracy could 
be made to work in China. It was even difficult to find a Chinese defi-
nition of democracy upon which it could neatly fit Chinese society and 
cultural tradition. At that moment, Western democracy had no program 
for a country like China; and indeed, it had never given much real thought 
to China’s problem (Creel 1954: 261). Western civilization was imaged 
in Chinese minds by science and democracy which the Chinese admired 
and wanted to learn from. But the problem was that Western political 
culture and its economic advances were often associated with me mories 
of Western aggression. The West tried to help China, but in a rather 
different way. Missionaries had been sent to Christianize the Chinese, 
teachers to educate them, and money to alleviate their distress and sorrow. 
But none of these addressed the real social problems. After all, it was the 
Western nations which had long contemplated China with contempt and 
had repeatedly used military force against it. At this moment, Marxism 
– as a theory of Western origin and yet one critical of contemporary 
capitalism – found receptive followers among Chinese intellectuals who 
were intellectually drawn to Western enlightenment.
This frustration and anger towards the Versailles Treaty exploded with the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which the appeal of Marxism ex-
panded, and many intellectuals claimed to discover a solution to China’s 
social problems from the important teachings of Marxist revolutionary 
ideas. Marxism, and especially Lenin’s theory of capitalist imperialism, 
provided Chinese intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework, as well 
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as a psychological answer to their difficulties in finding the proper expla-
nations and theories for the failures of traditional Chinese culture and for 
the humiliation suffered at the hands of the West (Peck 1975: 73). It was this 
school that they finally turned to. Therefore, it is important to know why the 
Chinese communist movement could prevail in a society where the cultural 
heritage had been dominated by Confucianism. The attraction of Marxism-
Leninism to the Chinese was that, as Kapur observed:
“It was an effective ploy to criticize the West from a Western point 
of view; b) it gave the Chinese a new methodological framework to 
understand their own past and foresee the contours of their future; 
c) it offered a conceptualized view of international reality. Lastly, it 
amply proved its anti-imperialist credentials-an important source of 
attraction-after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet lead-
ers denounced imperialism, unilaterally abolishing unequal treaties 
and relinquishing many privileges of tsarist Russia including extra-
territoriality as well as their share of Boxer indemnities.” (Kapur 
op.cit.: 3)
Marxism-Leninism made the Chinese intellectuals more open-minded 
and internationalized. It offered them a great source of inspiration to take 
positions and to analyze the world from different perspectives. China, as 
they saw it, was no longer an isolated “Middle Kingdom”, the center of 
globe surrounded by barbarians, but a part of the world full of different 
forces and ideas. Since the establishment of CCP in 1921, the Chinese 
contribution to both transforming and strengthening Marxism-Leninism was 
equally important. The Chinese view on its role in the international affairs 
had changed from regarding itself as the center of the world and a universal 
authority, to seeing that China’s problem was part of the world’s problems 
and the Chinese Revolution was relevant for the outside world.
It was the Russian Revolution that finally dramatized for Chinese intellec-
tuals the significance of Marxism as a global ideology of revolution and 
encouraged them to excite their revolutionary imagination. Mao said,
“For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster- 
ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives ... in quest of 
the truth that would save the country and the people ... But it was 
only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we 
found Marxism-Leninism that best of truths, the best of weapons 
for liberating our nation. And the Communist Party of China has 
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been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this 
weapon.” (Mao cf Chi 1986: 271)
Although the Russian political system was perceived as non-democratic, 
there were of course explanations and justifications for the Russian polit-
ical system. European democracy was identified and criticized as being a 
kind of bourgeois democracy in essence, not a democracy for the common 
people. In Western capitalist countries, political democracy was promoted 
at the expense of economic democracy, while in Russia, there was eco-
nomic democracy but at the expense of certain political rights in relation 
to state authority. However, this did not contradict the Chinese traditional 
patriotism of sacrificing personal rights for the interests of the state. After 
1917, the Russians called the Chinese to join with them and other people 
in the cause that they claimed to be a new international order of economic, 
social, and political justice which was to be founded on the premise of com-
plete equality among all nations and races. Such a position conformed to the 
spirit not only of China’s on-going struggle, but also to the ancient humani-
tarian and cosmopolitan doctrines of Confucianism. 
In his late years, China’s revolutionary pioneer Dr. Sun Yat-sen was 
deeply impressed by the fact that, among all the Western powers, only 
Soviet Russia represented itself as being willing to cooperate with China on 
an equal basis. Sun showed a great admiration of the Russian Revolution in 
his popular essay Three Principles of the People:
“Another great change was brought about by the Revolution of 1917: 
it was the complete turnover of a great military autocracy into a new 
socialistic state. During the last six years internal reforms have been 
instituted in Russia and a new policy of peace has replaced the old 
militarism. The Russians have set out as pioneers in the movement 
for helping the oppressed by curbing the strong.
Now again the big Powers are alarmed by Russia; they are more 
afraid of her than ever, and with good reason; for the new policy of 
Russia will destroy not only Russian imperialism, but world imperi-
alism; it will destroy not only world imperialism, but also the entire 
capitalistic system of the nations … The new policy of Russia, I 
believe, will breakdown this monopoly; and so all capitalists of the 
world are much alarmed. The world is facing a serious crisis; and 
as a result of this crisis, great changes will take place.” (Sun 1923)
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As a result of his appreciation of the Russian revolutionary achievement, “to 
unite with Russia, to unite with Chinese Communists and to rely on workers 
and peasants” became the core idea underlined Sun Yat-sen’s key national 
policy in his later years. 
Furthermore, numerous Russians were educated in the Chinese language, 
history, and culture, and prepared to operate in China with effectiveness. 
Many Chinese people were invited to Russia and trained in communist doc-
trine and tactics at the expense of the Soviet government. It is well-known 
that the majority of the Chinese Communist Politburo members had studied 
in Russia. With regard to China’s social reality, it was obvious that Western 
political democracy appeared to address less urgent social problems, while 
the Soviet economic democracy seemed to be more relevant. The later split 
between the Soviet Union and China should not alter the influence and con-
tribution which the Russian Revolution made on the course of development 
of China.
For almost a whole century, many Chinese people felt China to be at a dis-
advantage, and some of them even were ready to admit that its culture was 
inferior to that of the West. But, with the rise of communism, this view was 
changed. Many indeed believed that the Communist Party represented the 
progressive side of contemporary human society. Although it was a fact 
that not all Chinese people supported the Communist Party – some were 
even strongly anti-communist – they could not avoid being gratified by the 
achievements the CCP had made, and that China once again started to wield 
an unignorable influence in world affairs which it had not enjoyed for many, 
many years. Some Chinese people might wish that such a result had not 
come about under communist leadership, but whatever they might prefer 
they could not but admire the result.
Nevertheless, whatever political discourse might be more suitable to China, 
it was Mao who was able to combine both learning and statesmanship and 
combine Marxism-Leninism with China’s reality. No matter how significant 
Marxism and Leninism are, without the combination of them with China’s 
reality by Mao Zedong, a peasant intellectual, Marxism-Leninism would 
probably have aroused only a few rebels. Mao once stated that everything 
else had been tried and all failed. Scholars nowadays may argue about 
whether every possible means had really been tried. But, in a sense, Mao 
was right in indicating that all the democratic and literal ideals of different 
scholars had failed, except the communist way of addressing and solving 
the deep-rooted social problems. Although communist historians maintain 
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that it is the people who create history and reject the great-man theory of 
history, there is no doubt that without Mao’s contribution, Chinese history 
would have run a different course (Chi 1986: 296).
Concluding Remarks
The chapter explains that the victory of Chinese Communist Revolution 
was organically connected with the effect and result of World War 1, and it 
was a landmark in modern Chinese history. China was one of the primary 
victims of World War 1, despite the fact it was on the winner’s side, while 
Japan was one of the leading beneficiaries and began to extend its military 
power in Asia.  Many Europeans might not know of the Chinese 1919 May 
Fourth Movement, and therefore might now realize that this movement, as 
a direct consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, became a major foundation 
for Chinese nationalism and communism in the twentieth century. The les-
son that China learned from World War 1 was that achieving a strong na-
tion state status was essential for its place in the international system. As a 
result, China shifted its position from internationalism (joining the War) to 
self-determining nationalism (He 2016), and furthermore, to international 
communism.
The chapter also analyses how China’s socio-political and socio- 
cultural transformations coincided with the course of World War 1, leading 
the country towards a century-long revolution. As one scholar highlights 
the impact of World War 1 on China’s history as “the end of an age and 
beginning of the new one” (James Joll cf Xu 2011), nevertheless, the his-
torical role and significance of the Chinese Communist Revolution is being 
rewritten and reinterpreted. After the Cold War, many politically-motivated 
opinion-makers, as well as academics, attempted to challenge the legiti-
macy of the Chinese Communist Revolution and dismissed the history of 
which it was an outcome and in which it had played such an important role. 
There are people inside and outside China who suspect the historical neces-
sity for the Chinese Communist Revolution and who claim that, if China 
had not adopted the Marxist theory, had not gone through revolutions, and 
had not taken the socialist road, China would have developed more rapidly 
into a “normal” power, and it could also be possible that China might have 
developed into an advanced nation possessing some of the characteristics 
of Western democracy. Unfortunately, history did not grant the time and 
opportunity which China needed. World War 1, World War 2, and the 
Chinese Civil War totally altered the course of Chinese development.
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Therefore, to understand the contemporary transformations taking place 
in China, one has to understand the historical background and foundation 
of the Chinese Communist Revolution and its entire discourse. If national 
identity is agreed to be a useful tool to understand the transformation of a 
country’s development trajectory, then World War 1 can be argued to pro-
vide China the momentum and opportunity to rethink the identity questions 
and to redefine its international relations (Xu 2011).
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Endnotes
1 The notion of “century of humiliation” refers to the period between the 
first Sino-British Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil 
War (1949), during which the political incursion, economic exploita-
tion, and military aggression by Western imperialist countries are  
regarded as the key external factors that undermined the historical  
glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation.
2 The “Xin Hai Revolution” refers to the “Republican Revolution of 
1911” led by Sun Yat-sen, which overthrew China’s last Qing Dynasty 
and turned China into a republic. It is also called Xinhai Revolution in 
Chinese, because the year 1911 was a Xinhai Year in the sexagenary 
cycle of the Chinese calendar.
3 It was also disclosed that China had also agreed to this arrangement, 
whereas Wellington Kuo ( ), China’s ambassador to France,  
refused to sign his name to it.
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Chapter 13
The First World War:   Tracing its impacts
Søren Dosenrode
Introduction
Admittedly, there is a certain ‘what if’ connotation to embarking on this 
part of the book. Certain developments were present before the war but 
were accelerated by it, like modernism in literature or aviation in techno-
logy; with others it is hard to establish a causality, like aspects of scientific 
inventions. And, in cases where it is possible – like the borders drawn up in 
the Middle East – the next question arises: for how long a time is it right to 
consider a development to be an implication of World War 1 rather than that 
of other developments and inventions and so forth. Bearing this in mind, 
the contributors to this volume have tried to identify impacts of the Great 
War, and they will be collected and extended in this chapter. It goes without 
saying that the impact in many cases was strongest in the interbellum, then 
lost strength and faded away like ripples caused by a stone thrown into the 
water of a quiet lake1. 
The first part of this book was dedicated to the war itself and to the Peace 
of Versailles. Then followed a series of in-depth analyses of central fields 
of interest. On the basis of the previous chapters, but also much extended, 
this chapter aims at giving a condensed but broad overview and analysis of 
the impact of World War 1. Concretely, it will look at World War 1’s impact 
on culture, politics (domestic and foreign relations), economy, and lastly on 
science, technology, and medicine.
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Culture and literature 
James Winders formulates the impact of World War 1 on culture2 3 like this 
(2001: 99):
“It is difficult not to conclude that the Great War of 1914 to 1918 
set in motion many of the violent forces and much of the cultural 
despair that bedevilled the remainder of the twentieth century. The 
war shattered the confident ideals of an entire generation, many of 
whom in their disillusioned state would succumb to the lure of the 
apocalyptic politics of fascism.” 
Yet there was another, perhaps more surprising, aspect to the war experi-
ence too. In his article, Mosse (1986: 494) refers to an analysis made by Bill 
Gammage, who concludes, 
“Veterans tried to forget the tragic years of the war as quickly as possible, 
and yet, as they resumed civilian life, they remembered the security, pur-
posefulness and companionship of the war. Many veterans considered the 
war years in retrospect as the happiest years of their lives.4” [My emphasis, 
SD]. 
Thus, there was an ambivalence to be found, and it spilled over into culture, 
into its prism: literature5. 
This section will begin with general thoughts on the war’s impact on cul-
ture, before we look into its impact on literature in Germany, the Anglo-
Saxon countries, France, and Denmark. The focus on literature is because 
of its ability to absorb and amplify less tangible feelings and emotions and, 
if it succeeds in ‘hitting a nerve’, it will reach a big audience and thus con-
tribute to ‘framing’ a period.
General remarks
Looking at the cultural scene, a number of developments have roots in the 
war or before it, others were new6. According to Winders (2001) one of the 
attitudes of the cultural response to the Great War among writers and paint-
ers was escapism, physically (for example, the Americans going to Paris like 
Ernest Hemingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald) or intellectually. Other respons-
es were cultural pessimism and despair (e.g. Sigmund Freud and Oswald 
Spengler). This pessimism and despair in pre-war ideals was expressed by 
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Ernest Hemingway in his A Farwell to Arms (1929: 196):
“There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally 
only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the 
same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places 
were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract 
words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside 
the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of 
rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.” 
Of course, there were more positive approaches, too: those who saw the war 
and its atrocities as some kind of purification – an apocalypse – after which 
one might find hope, for example Hermann Hesse’s Demian or T.S. Eliot’s 
poem The Waste Land from 1922. 
The realisation that shellshock could be more than cowardice (Jones et. al 
2006), (Thomas and Ironside 2006) helped pave the way for psychology as 
Sigmund Freud would recognise it as a diagnosis. Freud himself further de-
veloped his psychoanalysis and dream studies, and Carl Jung’s idea of arche-
types both left traces in the literature (for examples see August Strindberg 
and George Bernard Shaw). Winders (2001) argues that the authors of mod-
ernism had to undertake a journey within as a result of the ‘ruins of the 
postwar world around them.’ The experiences of the war were immanent, 
and some lamented the lost world of pre-war Europe, for example Marcel 
Proust A la recherché du temps perdue (In Search of Lost Time). Hermann 
Hesse, among others expresses, the disillusion of the (German) youth in 
the post-war era; and Erich Maria Remarque, in his iconic Im Westen nicht 
Neues (All Quiet on the Western Front, 1928) went a step further, not be-
ing able to extort anything positive from war’s rage. Of course, the war 
also affected art (for examples, see Max Beckmann and William Orpen) 
and music (see Vaughan Williams and Paul Hindemith). The experiences of 
the war were carried on until and through the next one, which began only 
twenty-two years after the first one had ended, thus making it possible for a 
woman first to lose the father of her son in the First World War and then the 
child, now a grownup soldier, in the next – in other words, the personally 
felt, direct impact of war.
In the next part, we will reflect on the impact the war made on literature 
in the main antagonist states: Germany, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
France, and in a neutral state, Denmark.
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Impact on German literature
According to Schlosser (Chapter 6), the majority of German and Austrian 
intellectuals looked positively on World War 1 in 1914. The war was seen as 
a potential purification, as a possibility to revitalise culture. Ernst Jünger’s 
war diary In Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel) was one such a glorification of 
war, and a radical violation of humanistic ideals. The book was re-printed 
both during the 1920s and 1930s, where it aimed at ‘setting things right’ af-
ter Versailles, and it was a useful tool for the growing militarism of German 
society. After the war, the book has been republished again (most recently 
in 2007), but Schlosser notes the change in the newer editions towards a 
less war-glorifying style, suiting the Bundesrepublik. Contrary to Jünger, 
Hermann Hesse looks inwards, towards the inner universe of each individ-
ual. This escapism, looking a lot like pacifism (cf. Schlosser Chapter 6), was 
not popular with the Nazi-regime, and from 1942 Hesse was not allowed to 
publish his works. After World War 2, Hesse has remained an inspiration to 
very diverse groups, ranging from hippies and environmentalists, to young 
Chinese and Japanese people today. In general, World War 1 still fills the 
literary landscape in Germany, be it in the form of new books like Florian 
Illies’ book 1913 Der Sommer des Jahrhunderts (1913 The Summer of the 
Century) from 2012, or the re-publishing of Erich Maria Remarque’s classic 
Im Westen nicht Neues. 
World War 1 was reflected on from different points of view in German 
literature in the years between World War 1 and World War 2. World War 
1 was the manifestation of the modernisation and industrialisation of life. 
Nationalists, especially, (see Spengler and Jünger) reflected the relation be-
tween man and machine. The killing of millions in World War 1 destroyed 
the value of individual life. But, the individual also felt threatened (Alfred 
Döblin) and alienated (Franz Kafka) in the modern metropolis after World 
War 1. Hermann Broch presented a review of the era 1888-1918 in the novel 
Die Schlafwandler (The Sleepwalkers) (1931-1932). The modernist Broch 
analysed the degeneration of moral and all values in favor of functionality. 
Joseph Roth, on the other hand, looked back at the period before World War 
1 with nostalgia in his novel Radetzkymarsch (Radetzky March) (1932). For 
him, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the only possible bulwark against 
the growing Nazism.
Impact on Anglo-Saxon literature
Chapter 7 focuses on ‘the impact of World War I on Anglophone literature’. 
Bent Sørensen argues that World War 1 gave rise to a number of phenom-
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ena of lasting interest to historians and scholars of literature and culture in 
the Anglophone world. English literature already had a long tradition of 
reflecting on wars and their impact on soldiers in the frontline, as well as 
the civilians on the home front, but with the brutal witness-based poetry of 
the trenches of World War 1, the awareness of the psychological effects of 
war and of trauma discourses and behaviours became foregrounded in new 
ways. The term the ‘Lost Generation’ was coined as a way of discoursing 
the national and personal trauma of losing upwards of one million British 
citizens to military or civilian deaths directly attributable to the Great War. 
The generational metaphor is of particular interest as a reservoir of cultural 
memory of the losses connected with the war. While the USA lost relatively 
few soldiers in combat (approximately 117.000), the aftermath of the Great 
War was of great cultural significance as the Lost Generation identity po-
sition became widely disseminated to apply to many groups that had not 
directly been involved in the war. In fact, the Lost Generation became only 
the first of a number of American literary generations whose auto-image 
incorporated absence and negation in its label. It is, in other words, possible 
to trace the effect of World War 1 through the cultural and literary gener-
ational constructs of the entire twentieth century in the American context.
Impact on French literature
Concerning France, Bille Jørgensen (Chapter 8) refers to Pierre Nora who 
speaks of Lieux de mémoire, remarks that it is not surprising that an abun-
dant literature on different aspects of World War 1 has marked the literary 
history of the twentieth century, and approvingly quotes Laurence Campa 
as saying: “La Grande guerre a nourri la littérature durant un siècle”.
The impact of w World War 1 as very important in the French entre-deux-
guerres. With his essay Témoin, published in 1929, Jean-Norton Cru presents 
a critical analysis of testimony writings from the period 1915-1929. Thus, 
it becomes clear that the psychological and social consequences of the war 
took on various generic forms (letters, novels, and essays, among others). 
This témoignage tendency implies very important personal and existential 
concerns, but also reflections on language and style between popular patois 
expressions and more radical modernist tendencies (like Louis Aragon and 
Céline). Though patriotism is present, it is worth noting the explicitly criti-
cal view of the war that can be seen in journals like the satirical Le Canard 
enchaîné, founded in 1916 and which still exists, but also the pacifist Le 
Populaire founded in 1918 with Henri Barbusse as its Editor-in-Chief.
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Perhaps nowhere has World War 1 left as deep an impact as in France, and 
Jørgensen remind us that, not only culturally and politically but also geo-
graphically, the war has left clearly visible imprints in the form of devas-
tated battlefields, graveyards, and monuments. World War 1 has certainly 
left its mark on the French culture. 
Impact on Danish literature
In Denmark, the direct impact of the war on Danish literature was clear, 
according to Gemzøe, although Denmark was neutral (Chapter 9). One im-
portant author, Georg Brandes, was critical towards the war and the blood-
shed, and he continued to foresee revanchism from Germany due to the hard 
terms for peace after the war. In general, one finds the same two tenden-
cies in Danish literature during and after the war as in other European na-
tions; that is a pacifist and a more supportive one, the latter often believing 
in or hoping for a moral purification (for example, Helge Rode). Gemzøe 
demonstrates that the literary scene in Denmark was inspired by what hap-
pened in Europe (modernism, cubism, futurism, and expressionism), and in 
that way was influenced by the war. After for example Emil Bønnelycke’s 
Spartanerne (The Spartans) (1919) and Rudolf Broby-Johansen’s and Tom 
Kristensen’s poetry from the last years of the war and the years immediately 
afterwards, the war as a central topic fades out. Still, there are important, 
contributions every now and then where the War is important like Thomas 
Dienesen’s No Man’s Land from 1929, describing his war experiences at the 
Western Front, and also – but less prominently – in the autobiography of the 
dramatist and priest Kaj Munk from 1943, where he explains how the war 
and the fall of empires influenced his worldview. 
When explaining why World War 1 does not have a prominent place in Danish 
culture and literature today, two reasons spring to mind: first, Denmark was 
neutral and profited greatly from the war. And second, Denmark and the 
Danes did not suffer much from the war. There were Danes participating in 
the war – as German conscripts from Southern Slesvig – but as the majority 
of Danes sided with the Entente Powers, their history has largely been ne-
glected.7 The war which impacted most on Danish literature and culture is 
World War 2, where Denmark was occupied by Germany.
Summing up
It seems clear, and by no means surprising, that left World War 1 a direct 
impact on culture, including literature. Of the states we have looked at, the 
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impact was strongest in the European states which fought in the war and it 
was strongest in the interbellum period. This is not surprising, as the war 
destroyed the value of individual life, and the moral standards and ideals the 
world had been built upon. For some, perhaps more surprising, is the lasting 
impact the war has had up until today, as is manifested in the sheer number 
of books, articles, broadcasts, parades, exhibitions, and ceremonies being 
launched around the centenary of the outbreak of World War 1, and contin-
uing with the centenaries of the battles of Verdun, Somme, Passchendaele 
(also known as the Third Battle of Ypres), and onwards. These events 
clearly show the importance of the memory, as well as the interest in the war 
more than a hundred years after its outbreak. A tendency not to be forgotten 
is that of the two strands in literature and culture, 1) the dissociation from 
the war’s terror and cruelty and 2) seeing the war as something good, puri-
fication, and so on; the former prevails today. 
Political impact
A situation where a generation of young men are mobilised, drawn away 
from family and indeed from civil society, of which many are killed (eight 
to eleven million soldiers) or wounded (twenty-one million soldiers), is 
bound to create holes in societies’ fabrics, and result in a press for changes. 
Millions of families lost a husband, a father, a brother. Adding to the mili-
tary losses, the civilian losses were tremendous, too: seven million killed. 
On top of this suffering, there was the physical damage: a belt of devastation 
along the Western Front, landscapes rendered barren rundown factories and 
infrastructure, and so on. In the international realm empires and kingdoms 
had fallen, and fallen apart. The impact was clear and easy to see. In this 
section, we will look first at some of the domestic impacts, and then the 
international ones, although the borders between the two are often blurred. 
Domestic impacts: Revolutions, bloody and less so
The war was bound to have an impact domestically. Democracy was one of 
the reasons why the US went to war, as was clear from Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points (Wilson 1918), and it worked in the beginning. Related to democracy 
was the question of universal suffrage: taking millions of men away and 
leaving their tasks to women fuelled the demand for more equal rights, for 
democratic rights. After the war, the traditional family structure and gender 
specific roles were questioned. The states themselves, their organisation, 
had been changed due to the war effort, and this, too, had consequences in 
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the form of growing bureaucratisation. Thus, the following section will be 
focused on the following three impacts: the spread of democracy, women’s 
rights and family structures, and the bureaucratisation of the state.
Spread and fall of democracy
The end of the war meant the fall of a number of autocratic regimes, where 
a monarch had had a decisive influence on politics and minorities were of-
ten discriminated against (for example, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and 
Russia). The peace treaties, leaning on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, insisted on 
full democracy in the new states of Europe. But democracy did not last long 
as the right way to govern in Europe. During the 1920s and 1930s, the follow-
ing countries turned either into dictatorships or became autocratic: Russia in 
1918; Hungary in 1920; Italy in 1922, Bulgaria in 1923; Spain in 1923 (and 
again in 1936); Turkey in 1923; Albania in 1925; Poland in 1926; Portugal in 
1926; Lithuania in 1926; Yugoslavia in 1929; Rumania in 1930; Germany in 
1933; Austria in 1933; Estonia in 1934; Latvia in 1934; and Greece in 1934. 
Thus, at the end of the 1930s, only a minority of European states remained 
democratic, notably France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. A story goes 
that the wife of the Danish foreign minister, Emma Scavenius, attended a 
dinner and was seated next to an American ambassador. Being polite, he 
asked about her country, Denmark. She explained that it was a democracy, 
that it had had a majority government for years, and was stable. The am-
bassador, smiled at her and said, “Oh, I see. Denmark is a dictatorship!” 
Denmark was in fact a democracy but, as the majority of European countries 
were not, one cannot blame him. How did this happen?
There is a variety of reasons for the decline in democracy: several of the 
states were not prepared for a new political system, and were vulnerable 
to small groups of communist revolutionaries (like the short revolutions in 
Germany and Hungary); some states did not have any tradition for democ-
racy, or only a weak and short one (for example, Bulgaria and Poland)8; 
in some states large parts of the populations felt cheated (Italy) or badly 
treated by the peace treaty (for example, Germany and Hungary), thus cre-
ating anger against the establishment; some had a bad economy in periods 
(Germany) and all were hit by the Depression; and importantly, the Soviet 
Russian internationalism – aiming at exporting revolution and dissolving 
capitalist states – unleashed counter-revolutionary forces. 
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Of the countries with autocratic or dictatorial leaders listed above, the worst 
– and seen from an international relations perspective, the most fateful – 
was Nazism’s rise in Germany9. When Hitler and the Nazi-party gained 
power in 1933 by promising jobs, a good economy, and revenge for the ‘hu-
miliations of Versailles’, a new war became more likely. Part of the ‘Nazi-
parcel’ was also discrimination against German Jews: first anti-Semitism, 
then discrimination, and later mass-murder (the Holocaust). How did it hap-
pen, that one of the world’s most civilized countries did this to its citizens?
The rise of Nazism has been explained in a number of ways10: by some as 
a unique historical phenomenon (Fischer 1995), or the old German striving 
for supremacy in Europe (Taylor 1944) and so on. Davidson (1977) names a 
number of factors: the German army had not been defeated in Germany and 
thus seemed unbeaten; the peace terms were harsh; Soviet-inspired interna-
tionalism was set against German nationalism, and lost; and then there was 
Germany’s bad economy which included huge unemployment (inflation 
followed by the Great Depression); behind all of this, loomed the spectre of 
World War 1. According to Davidson (1977) by the beginning of the 1930s 
a majority of those in society had been radicalised out of their tradition, and 
wanted change. This change is what Kershaw (2004) describes convinc-
ingly as ‘project of national salvation’ personified in Hitler, combined with 
the (2004: 241): “new, modern power-élite[’s]” acceptance and support of 
Nazism’s ideological goals (2004: 254): “operating alongside weakened old 
élites through the bureaucratic sophistication of a modern state.” 
Democracy was restored in Western Europe after the end of World War 2, 
but not in Eastern Europe until after the implosion of the Soviet Union. The 
end of the Cold War meant hopes for a peaceful and democratic world. This 
hope has not come true, as the annual reports from Freedom House states 
year after year (Freedom House 2017):
“Key Findings
•  With populist and nationalist forces making significant gains 
in democratic states, 2016 marked the 11th consecutive year of 
decline in global freedom.
•  There were setbacks in political rights, civil liberties, or both, 
in a number of countries rated “Free” by the report, includ-
ing Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, 
Poland, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tunisia, and 
the United States.
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•  Of the 195 countries assessed, 87 (45 percent) were rated Free, 
59 (30 percent) Partly Free, and 49 (25 percent) Not Free.
•  The Middle East and North Africa region had the worst ratings 
in the world in 2016, followed closely by Eurasia.”
Women’s rights
The place most radically questioning the traditional family and gender 
specific roles was Soviet Russia after the revolution11.
Within a month after seizing power, a new family law was passed in the 
Soviet Union (Goldman 2004: 1): “The code captured in law a revolu tionary 
vision of social relations based on women’s equality and the ‘withering 
away of the ‘family’.” The progressive gender policy of the Soviet Union 
was to last less than ten years, when substantial parts were rolled back by 
Joseph Stalin. 
However, gender equality was ‘in the air’ in most of Europe and North 
America, and had been already before the war; the undisputed role of the 
male as head of family, pater familias, was about to fall. During the war, 
woman had replaced men in factories, taken over many of the men’s roles in 
the home, and so on. They had contributed to the war effort and had proven 
that they could fulfil the same tasks as the men (Taylor 1966).The political 
result was that, during the first ten years after World War 1, universal suf-
frage was introduced in twenty European states and, in the 1930s, in five 
more states, to cover most of Europe. Outside Europe, women got voting 
rights in for example, Canada12 and the USA (New Zealand and Australia 
already had universal suffrage before the war) (see Sondhaus 2011; Ray 
1918). As mentioned, there was already a press for universal suffrage before 
the war, but the war accelerated the development. However, it is important 
to remember that this development left most of Asia and Africa untouched, 
and only developed very slowly in Latin America, where women in Ecuador 
first got a right to vote in 1961. 
Although universal suffrage became the ‘norm’ during the interbellum, it 
did not lead to, for example, equal pay, but it did strengthen the development 
towards women’s empowerment which had begun very modestly before 
the war13. Belonging to this development was a loosening up of the sexual 
morals which prevailed before the war. Going into war, with the possibility 
of dying, did not encourage young lovers to restrain themselves as before 
the war. When coming home from war, the more relaxed morals remained 
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in place, although peace had broken out (for example, the Roaring Twenties 
in the US). 
Bureaucratisation of the state 
A third important trend was that of centralisation in state government14. 
To win the war, the belligerent states needed to control and maximise the 
resources in their country, be that people, raw materials, or means of pro-
duction. The economy was directed to support the production. Food was 
rationed, and imports and exports were controlled. Added to this, normal 
police and secret police watched over internal security, and telephone ope-
ra tors listened in on your phone calls. Rationing, control, and so on also 
took place in the neutral countries, and nowhere did the state apparatus 
shrink to its pre-war size after the war had ended. 
Blum, Eloranta and Osinsky (2014) sum it up:
“The European nations, the primary belligerents in the conflict, 
under went massive transformations involving extensive state regu-
lation, the substitution of market mechanisms by an administration 
of state officials, and growth of the technocracy. These changes an-
ticipated the emergence of the state-directed economies of the com-
munist and fascist types, as well as plenty of new democracies, in 
the interwar period. When the war ended in 1918, the institutional 
design of the most European economies was drastically different in 
comparison to what had existed before the war.”
James Wilson looks specifically at the US, but his findings fit what hap-
pened in Europe as well (1975: 78): 
“The number of administrative agencies and employees grew slow-
ly but steadily during the 19th and early 20th centuries and then  
increased explosively on the occasion of World War I, the Depression, 
and World War II. It is difficult to say at what point in this process 
the administrative system became a distinct locus of power or an 
independent source of political initiatives and problems.”
Seemingly, this growth will continue (Meyer 1987: 215): “The facts of bu-
reaucratic growth are indisputable. By any measure, the size and influence 
of government have increased almost continuously to the present time.”
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Summing up
Looking at the domestic developments and impacts of World War 1, three 
developments were emphasised: the spread of democracy, only for it to be 
limited again until the fall of the Soviet Empire around 1990 and again 
a decline in recent years; the change in gender roles, as exemplified by 
women’s rights to vote (in some parts of the world); and the spread and 
growth of state-control and bureaucracy.
The interbellum clearly demonstrated that democracy was a fragile flower. 
The mixture of untamed nationalism, economic crises (partly due to the 
harsh demands of reparations), a feeling of having been ‘unjustly’ treated 
– in some cases combined with regions with a fairly low level of education 
– and a lack of genuine democratic experience prepared the soil for fascism, 
communism, and old-fashioned autocratic rule. Just before the outbreak of 
World War 2, less than half of European states were democratic, and after 
the end of World War 2, countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia would continue as dicta-
torships, and three states would be absorbed by the Soviet Union (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania). The large expectations for a Wilsonian ‘New World 
Order’ after the end of the Cold War has only come true to a limited degree.
“The rapid extension of the suffrage to women, not only in the United States 
but also in many foreign countries, may confidently be predicted as one 
of the important consequences of the great world war”, Ormay Ray wrote 
already in 1918 (p. 469), and he was right, insofar as the war clearly demon-
strated that women had taken their share in making the ‘home front’ work, 
replacing the men at war. The patriarchal worldview and order was bro-
ken, and democracy spread. World War 2 contributed to the development 
of women’s empowerment, which got its final breakthrough at the end of 
the 1960s.
The need for control and organisation brought a hitherto unseen growth of 
the state, of its bureaucracy. It expanded, and never returned to its pre-war 
size, thus laying a fundament for at least the Western bureaucratic states of 
today.
Foreign Political implications of World War 1 
In this section, the impact of the war on international relations will be ana-
lysed, beginning with Europe – the cradle of the conflict – proceeding to the 
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Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas, ending with a 
general summary of its impact on international relations.
Europe
The foreign political situation right after World War 1 was abnormal in Europe: 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were ‘on standby’; actually, Austria-
Hungary had fallen apart and never was to return as a great power. As the US-
Congress had refused to ratify the peace treaties and the people had elected an 
isolationist, Warren G. Harding, as Woodrow Wilson’s successor, the US had 
returned to its usual isolationism, leaving the playing field to France and the 
United Kingdom. However, although the US withdrew from treaty execution, 
her economic and financial interest in Europe remained strong and so did a 
certain political interest in brokering a revised peace. France and the United 
Kingdom were both worn out by the war, but did not realise this; they had 
emerged victorious and with their respective empires intact – even enlarged 
– by Germany’s colonies, now under ‘mandate’ from the League of Nations. 
Thus, the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s were relatively peaceful, a kind 
of Indian summer for the two imperial powers. 
As indicated in the list of autocracies and dictatorships above, the majority 
of Europe’s – and indeed the world’s – states were not democratic before 
the outbreak of World War 2. Two major powers, Germany and the Soviet 
Union, were totalitarian, driven by totalitarian ideologies and both strived 
for world dominance. The uprising of communism and fascism as ruling 
ideologies in two great powers had domestically caused millions of dreadful 
acts, disrupted lives, and suppression – ‘Holocaust’ and ‘Gulag’ says it all. 
The aggressive ideologies of Germany and Soviet Russia also caused the 
next European civil war, World War 2, again with horrible human losses 
(National WWII Museum): fifteen million dead soldiers, twenty-five mil-
lion wounded soldiers, and forty-five million dead civilians (a bit more than 
today’s population of Germany or of Iran).15 Added to this was the invention 
of nuclear weapons, the introduction of the ‘balance of terror’, letting the 
populations of the Eastern- and Western-Blocs live in anxiety for decades 
(annihilation by nuclear war was close at least during the Cuba missile crisis 
in 1962, the ‘Soviet nuclear false alarm incident’ in September 1983, and the 
NATO exercise ‘Abel Archer’ in November of the same year).
In the aftermath of the World War 2, one saw a world divided into a free 
world under US leadership, a communist world under Soviet dictate, a small 
group of neutral states, and large areas which were still colonies.16 The rise 
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of Nazism in Germany and Communism in Russia, and the resulting World 
War, must be seen as one of World War 1’s most massive impacts.
Back in 1921, Aristid Briand had argued that Europe had to unite, because 
soon it would find itself between a hammer (Soviet Russia) and an anvil 
(the USA). After World War 2, that situation came true; until World War 1, 
Europe had dominated the world; now, other powers were deciding its fate. 
In the subsections the following topics will be analysed: The Russian 
Revolution and the Soviet Union; The Cold War; and the Uniting for Europe. 
The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union
The war impacted on all societies in Europe and on a number outside – di-
rectly or indirectly. In few places was the direct consequence as tremendous 
as in Russia. The regime change in Russia was to impact on the world ‘ever 
after’, directly until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and indirectly until 
today. During the Soviet period, the communist ideas, weapons, and train-
ing of revolutionaries was exported to the ‘Third World’, where the ruling 
class still today profits from the support they got then like, for example, in 
Angola, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), or Laos. Basically, Soviet Russia 
became a country which had declared war on the capitalist world, adding a 
much stronger ideological flavour to international relations than Woodrow 
Wilson’s idealism.
In February 1917, Russia’s autocratic Tsar was forced to abdicate, and a 
Western style Provisory Government took over power, but it was chal-
lenged by Bolshevik forces launching the October Revolution, throwing the 
country into a civil war lasting until 1921. The immediate background for 
the revolution were irregularities in food supplies, lockouts, strikes, and 
demonstrations (Fitzpatrick 1994). One especially important cause of the 
revolution was the war (Kennan 1967: 1): “It [the old system] fell because 
the strains of conducting a prolonged major war, superimposed on more 
basic weaknesses and problems of adjustment, were simply too much for it.”
The overall aim of the communists was to make the Marxist-Leninist vision 
come true. It was by no means obvious that the Bolsheviks would win, but 
they did (Kennan 1967: 7): “The Bolsheviki came out ahead very largely 
because they were, in this maelstrom of poorly organized political forces, 
the only political force that had hardness, sharpness, disciplined drive and 
clearly defined purpose.”
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Read (2014) summarises: 
“The Russian Revolution was one of the most influential events 
to emerge from the furnace of the First World War. It transformed 
Russia and its Empire and firmly planted the flag of world revo-
lution at the centre of 20th century world history. The revolution 
was the outcome of a vast array of interacting forces, internal and 
external, long term and short-term, structural and accidental. The 
Great War did not create the forces of revolution, but it did set them 
in motion and fuel them.”
It is not an exaggeration to say that Soviet Russia challenged all capitalist 
states, in the sense that it wanted to destroy them through revolutions in 
their respective countries until a universal dictatorship of the proletariat was 
reached. With such an approach to international relations, and a belief in the 
inevitable breakdown of the capitalist system, normal international relations 
are hard, if not impossible to conduct (Morgenthau 1967). Soviet Russia 
was internationally isolated in the 1920s and 1930s, while on the other hand 
it supported revolutionary movements all over the world. Indeed (Kennan 
1967: 10), “It was in its exemplary effect beyond Russia’s borders that the 
Bolsheviki themselves saw the greatest importance of the Revolution.”
The communist dream of internationalism, under Soviet Russian leader-
ship, prompted nationalism and counterrevolutions which, outside Soviet 
Russia, proved the stronger power (Kennan 1967).
The polarisation between communists on the one side, and nationalists and 
fascists on the other side, brought about crisis in many European coun-
tries, as discussed above. The lack of success in exporting the revolution to 
Europe was countered by successful exports to Africa and Asia, thus accel-
erating the decline of the European colonial empires (Kennan 1967), as will 
be discussed further below.
As a sign of the dictatorships’ ruthlessness and lack of principles, Nazi-
Germany and Soviet Russia concluded a non-aggression treaty (The 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) in 1939. In a secret annex, the two states divided 
Eastern Europe between them, including a division of Poland. Poland was 
attacked by both states soon afterwards, thus igniting World War 2; two 
years later Germany attacked Soviet Russia, which then changed sides and 
became an ally of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
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Cold War
At the end of World War 2, Soviet Russia stood as one of the victorious 
powers alongside the USA, Great Britain and France; in reality, only Soviet 
Russia and the US mattered17. 
Seen from Soviet Russia’s point of view, nothing good came from the 
West; Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, in 1918 Russia was forced to 
cede large parts of her European lands to newly established states (the 
Brest-Litovsk Agreement), and in 1941, Hitler had broken his treaty with 
Stalin, and invaded Soviet Russia. To avoid this again, Stalin insisted on, 
and got Eastern Europe recognised as Soviet Russia’s sphere of influence 
at the Yalta-conference in February 1945, a kind of cordon sanitaire mark 
II. After its liberation from German occupation, Soviet Russia had kept 
her troops in Eastern Europe and within a few years had demolished any 
kind of democracy there, introducing one-party systems in all the coun-
tries there. As trust between the Western Allies (the US, United Kingdom, 
and France) and Soviet Russia deteriorated in the years after 1945, what 
Winston Churchill described as an ‘iron curtain’ divided Europe into a 
Western, democratic part, and an Eastern dictatorship. This led to tensions 
between the two blocs, and to increased rearmament. In 1949, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded as a Western defence-league, 
and in 1955 the Eastern bloc did the same under the name the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance – or the Warsaw Pact for 
short (Calvocoressi 2001). 
Until the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the two blocs competed for 
supremacy, exporting the European conflict to the rest of the world. 
Ideologically, the one bloc fought for freedom, democracy, and capitalism, 
whereas the other promoted Marxism-Leninism, one-party rule, and com-
mand economy. The competition took place all over the globe, where Soviet 
Russia and her alley China (their relations deteriorated from the end of the 
1960s) promoted and supported anti-colonial and anti-imperialist groupings 
in, for example, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Thus, 
they contributed to casting off the colonial yoke, but often just replaced it 
with an other exploitive elite now just called ‘progressive’ or ‘revolutionary’ 
(Dunbabin 1994 (a)). For Europe, the end of World War 2 clearly demon-
strated her new role as domineered, not dominating.
Sharp (2010: 4) mentions the impact of the Cold War: “The Cold War did 
freeze some of the persistent post-Versailles problems of the 1920s and the 
1930s but when first the Soviet Empire, and then the Soviet Union itself col-
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lapsed, many of these issues re-emerged.” Several of these problems were 
solved by the European Union, due to its policy of demanding that border 
disputes and minority problems be solved before a country could join the 
Union (see the discussion below).
After the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe was set free and oriented 
itself towards the West, joining both NATO and the European Union. This 
situation has left Russia much in the same situation as before World War 2, 
that is without a protective belt against ‘the West’. In general, Russia today 
has sunk from the status of one of the two superpowers to that of a great 
power, together with Brazil, China, the European Union, and India. 
When the Cold War ended, and a number of dictatorships in Europe, Africa, 
and Asia fell, it looked as if the ideas and values of the West (democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, and capitalism) had won a decisive victory and a 
new ‘era’ of peace and cooperation had dawned, as was expressed by Francis 
Fukuyama in his famous article from 1989, referred to above. Developments 
in the 2010s clearly show that this is not the case; one only has to look at, 
for example the number of not free states still existing (Freedom House 
Index, 2017) or at Russia’s increasing aggressive behaviour (the occupation 
of Crimea, destabilisation of Ukraine, interference in Syria, and so on) to 
see this. It is clear that Fukuyama’s liberal prophecy, The End of History, 
has not yet materialised.
The uniting of Europe18
To prevent a new war in Europe, and to end the century-old rivalry between 
Germany and France, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman sug-
gested the founding of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, only 
five years after the end of World War 2, inviting especially Germany, but 
all European states, to join.19 Key to this project was placing coal and steel 
production under a supra-national authority. Coal and steel were then the 
key components of arms production. The plan was to extend the coopera-
tion to other sectors, and over time create a European federation. Five states 
accepted the invitation, namely Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. The cooperation of ‘the Six’ was extended to include a 
common market (1957), and from 1987 an internal market and a European 
Political Cooperation (Dosenrode 2012). 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union was signed, 
and included the treaty establishing the Economic and Monetary Union. 
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By then, the EU had twelve member states. After various extensions and 
revisions, especially after the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the European Union 
mostly resembles a (weak) state of federal design (the EU had twenty-eight 
members in 2018) (Dosenrode 2012). The weakness of the Union’s construc-
tion was demonstrated by the economic crisis which hit the world in 2008-
2014; by its difficulties in managing the migrants trying to get to Europe 
(from approximately 2008 onwards);20 by the Syrian refugees (from 2015 
onwards); and by Britain leaving the EU (BREXIT). As regional integra-
tion is manmade and not automatic, one cannot say whether the uniting 
of Europe, as it looks at present, will be a serious attempt to bring Europe 
back to being a leading power but, according to Andrew Morawcsik (2010), 
Europe already is the second superpower. U.S President Donald Trump’s 
isolationistic foreign policy may force the Member States of the EU to move 
even closer together, as indicated by German chancellor Angela Merkel in 
spring 2017 (Handelsblatt 2017).
 
Not surprisingly, the impact of World War 1 on international relations 
was felt very strongly in Europe, as it created the possibility of World War 
2. World War 2 divided the continent in two hostile camps preparing for 
war, then after the collapse of the Soviet Empire the enhanced process 
of European unification, strengthening the process already begun by the 
founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. 
The Middle East21 
The impact of World War 1 has left its imprint clearly on the Middle East. 
The Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire which was on the losing 
side of the war. It was home to Arab tribes wanting to cast off the Ottoman 
yoke and have their own state (Pan-Arabism). This gave rise to a disgraceful 
example of the old-fashioned European power politics so hated by Woodrow 
Wilson. On the one hand, the United Kingdom made an agreement with the 
Arab leaders that they would gain independence if they ignited an uprising, 
which they did. On the other hand the United Kingdom, France, and Russia 
agreed on how to share the Middle East among them in 1915 and 1916, not 
granting the Arabs a united Arab state (the Sykes–Picot Agreement). In ad-
dition, in 1917 the British foreign secretary Balfour wrote Walter Rothschild, 
a leader of the British Jewish community, that the government supported the 
creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Dosenrode & Stubkjær 2002). 
After further negotiations, a border between Syria and Iraq was drawn; 
France received a mandate over the Northern part (today’s Syria, Lebanon, 
and parts of Southern Turkey) and the United Kingdom over the Southern 
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part (today’s Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and parts of Saudi-Arabia). Wright wrote 
(2016), “The new borders ultimately bore little resemblance to the original 
Sykes-Picot map, but their map is still viewed as the root cause of much that 
has happened ever since.” Until after World War 2, the region was fairly 
quiet due to the presence of the mandate powers. The reason for the 
unrest and instability which followed is, among other things, that the final 
borders were ‘made with a ruler’, not taking much note of the culture and 
his tory of the people inhibiting the area. For example, the Kurdish nation 
was spread over Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (and a bit of Armenia and Syria); and 
Iraq was ‘born’ with Kurds in the north, Sunni Muslims in the middle, and 
Shia Muslims in the South of Iraq, thus laying the foundation for today’s 
unrest in Iraq. 
After World War 1 Balfour’s promise of a homeland to the Jews was im-
plemented (although not in the way and form it was intended) and the state 
of Israel came into being; with it came seemingly unending conflicts with 
her Arab neighbours. During the Cold War, the Middle East conflicts were 
fuelled by the rivalry of Soviet Russia and the USA, itself an offspring of 
World War 1 and, after a break, this rivalry has been resurrected since 
President Putin took up leadership in Russia. 
Africa22 
Africa’s role in World War 1 tends to be ignored; perhaps because Africa 
was not itself an ‘important’ battlefield during World War 1 compared to, 
for example, the Western Front in Europe, but the war caused hundreds of 
thousands of deads in Africa.23 During the war, at least three developments 
are of interest: first, African soldiers fought for their colonial powers, espe-
cially France. Second, the war was used by the Entente Powers to attack and 
occupy the German colonies in Africa – taking them over by mandate after 
the war. And third, local people used the ‘distraction’ of the war to attack 
their colonial masters to gain freedom or better circumstances.
According to Lunn (2015) 502,600 Africans were soldiers in Europe, 
and 252,000 were war workers, thus contributing substantially to the war 
effort.24 Added to this, were 268,000 descendants of European settlers 
fighting with the Entente Powers (Koller 2014). Most of these came from 
France using indigenous soldiers in Europe. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom used them in Africa. According to Koller, it is clear 
that the French army used the indigenous soldiers for difficult tasks, and 
that their death rate was two and a half times that of Frenchmen. Added to 
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this, France introduced (Koller 2014) “forced conscription between 1914 
and 1917 that traumatised West African populations”.25 It was a French 
hope that the colonial soldiers would absorb the French civilization, and 
bring it back home with them. And, in many cases, this was done. Upon 
returning home, these soldiers acted as ‘go betweens’ between the colo-
nial administration and the local population, and they tended to settle in 
the cities (Koller 2014) but, although they were ready to ‘modernise’, their 
support was seldom honoured. These persons, the modernisers, were to 
be important in the struggle for independence, decades later (Rathbone 
1978). 
As also happened in Asia, the Entente Powers used the outbreak of the war 
as an excuse to seize German possessions, and to get rid of German compe-
tition in trade (Rathbone 1978). In some cases, the fights were short – like 
the Togoland Expedition lasting less than three weeks, where as in others 
they lasted longer, and one throughout the whole war (in Eastern Africa, 
where the German commander, major-general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck 
was able to use a ‘hit and run’ tactic, manoeuvring in the vast area of East 
Africa). These campaigns often left much of the country devastated and 
the people starving.26 After the war, Germany was ‘Out of Africa’, and the 
Entente Powers shared the spoils – the German colonies – in the form of 
League of Nations mandates.27 
In a number of cases, the war encouraged rebellions against the colonial 
powers (see examples in Balesi 1990). In North Africa there was, for ex-
ample, the Zaian War in Morocco, where the Zaian confederation of Berber 
tribes rebelled against the French between 1914 and 1921, and the Senussi 
Rebellion where the Senussis in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan rebelled against 
the Italians and British from 1915 to 1917. In South Africa, a number of 
Boers rebelled against the South African Union in the Maritz Rebellion, 
1914–1915, but they were quickly overrun. Basically, of these rebellions, 
none had success worth mentioning. Authaler and Michels (2014) argue 
that, “while the new international system provided different norms and 
rationalizations, as well as alternative opportunities for African actors in 
the colonies, continuity was nonetheless more commonly experienced and 
dominated societal currents more so than the shifts”.
In his famous Fourteen Points, President Wilson had demanded that (Wilson 
1918): 
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“A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that 
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable 
claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” 
Well, their participation in World War 1 did not bring the indigenous African 
soldiers new political rights, as was the case in India. The long-term conse-
quences of World War 1 were to be seen after World War 2, where various 
armed groupings fought against colonialism for the freedom of their coun-
tries, very often under the banner of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ and supported 
by Soviet Russia and China, a direct offspring of World War 1. This placed 
many of the ‘new’ African states in the ‘Eastern camp’ during the Cold War. 
As Marxism-Leninism is not prone to democracy, this was a factor which 
contributed to the delayed democratisation of Africa.
Asia28
Although comparatively little fighting took place in Asia and the Pacific 
during World War 1 (the Australians and the Japanese attacked and annexed 
German colonies there, and parts of the German fleet were operating in the 
Pacific), the war left its imprint on the region, too. Not only did Australia, 
French Indochina, India, and New Zealand send troops to fight in Europe 
and elsewhere (implying soldiers dying, coming back wounded, or ‘just’ 
with the experience), at least three important developments were directly 
or indirectly consequences of the war: Japan took up its international role 
and also diversified its industry; Soviet Russia exported its revolutionary 
ideology to China and Indochina; and Indian participation in the war – as 
well as in World War 2 – delivered her an important argument in her quest 
for democracy and independence.
Japan had gained the rank of a great power, at the latest when she won the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905, proving effectively how her strategy of open-
ing and modernisation, which begun in 1868 (see the Meiji Restoration), had 
succeeded. 
During World War 1, Japan sided with United Kingdom, and got a free 
hand in the Pacific. It declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary and 
occupied a number of German territories – including Shandong in China 
– and remained there, unilaterally announcing its claim to hegemony in 
China (Tooze and Fertik 2014). Although China later sided with the Entente 
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Powers, Japan’s claim to Shandong was confirmed in the Versailles Treaty 
of 1919 and caused strong popular dissatisfaction in China, leading to the 
May Fourth movement. 
Li Xing (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 269) explains Japan’s rise like this: 
“While the First World War forced the old European imperialists 
to concentrate on peace and security in Europe, the new emerging 
powers – Japan and the United States – speedily increased their in-
fluence in different parts of the world, particularly in Asia. Japan 
was able to position itself as an equal power along with the existing 
western hegemons as a result of the war while its ambition to control 
the whole Asia was foreseeable.”
As Japan was not involved in serious war operations, she was able to de-
velop and diversify her industry, and supply her allies with materials need-
ed, thus increasing her exports and transforming the country from a debtor 
to a creditor nation (Tooze and Fertik 2014). 
Based on its World War 1 claims of hegemony over China, Japan invaded 
Manchuria in 1931, and in 1937 it tried an all-out invasion of China – in 
both cases the Japanese forces committing atrocities to the civilian popu-
lation, thus isolating Japan internationally. Additionally, Japan had trade 
disputes with Great Britain and the United States, thus pushing her further 
towards Germany. In September 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, 
which belonged to Vichy-France and which was a vassal state to Germany, 
and in the same month, Japan joined Germany and Italy in extending their 
‘Axis-alliance’. In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, thus 
pressing the US into World War 2. After the attack, Japan began a war of 
conquest, with the aim of making a Pacific empire. Japan finally capitu-
lated on 15 August 1945 after two nuclear bombs were detonated over two 
Japanese cities.
Following the capitulation, Japan was occupied, demilitarised, and demo-
cratised. Japan experienced a large economic growth from the 1950s until 
the end of Cold War.
As explained by Li Xing (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 269), the inspiration 
and success of Mao Zedong in China was much due to the support and in-
spiration of Soviet Russia. “The October Revolution of 1917 and the birth 
of a great Soviet Union was a source of inspiration for radical and revolu-
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tionary transformations and for freeing itself from the hold of the Western 
colonial powers.” And later, “the Russian victory presented an alternative 
model to China, where the new communist leaders promised to build a new, 
fairer and more efficient society.”
Li Xing also argues (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 275) that “there are two 
important impacts of the First World War to the contemporary Chinese 
history. The first is that the Versailles Treaty paved the foundation for the 
subsequent Japanese aggression [against China]’ and [...] ‘that the war fun-
damentally changed China’s worldview.” 
The success of the Soviet Russian and Chinese revolutions was an incen-
tive to promote and export Marxism-Leninism and thus put the West under 
pressure. As the Cold War developed, both Soviet Russia and China sup-
ported and encouraged revolutionary movements in Asia (and many other 
places, too). One example is Ho Chi Min, who was sent from Moscow to 
Canton in 1924 to form a resistance movement against French colonialism 
in Indochina. He was the co-founder of the Communist Party of Indochina, 
which was to develop into the Communist Party of Vietnam. One of its 
main purposes was to gain the country’s freedom from its colonial rulers 
and establish a socialist, one-party state. As is well known, this aim was 
accomplished in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and so on, but not 
without considerable bloodshed. The export of revolutions did not suc-
ceed everywhere, for example, not in Malaysia, Singapore, or South Korea 
(Dunbabin 1994 (a)).
India, contributed substantially to the British war effort, and got its first 
‘reward’ in the form of a 1917 promise from Edward Montagu, Secretary of 
State for India to introduce the principle of a dual mode of administration, 
where elected Indian legislators and appointed British officials would share 
power. This resulted in the Government of India Act of 1919 (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (1)). The implementation was done reluctantly and did not gra-
tify the National Congress and the Muslim League, leading to civil diso-
bedience over the next decade. The Government of India Act of 1935 led 
to provincial self-governance, but was not enough to satisfy the National 
Congress’ wishes either (Encyclopaedia Britannica (2)). When World War 
2 broke out, the Muslim League supported the British war effort, while 
the Indian National Congress demanded independence before it would help 
Britain, this leading to the imprisonment of the National Congress leaders. 
No solution was found until 1947, when India and Pakistan were declared 
independent states. Obviously, the Indian war effort in both world wars was 
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an important contribution to Indian and Pakistani independence (see, for 
example, Calvocoressi 2001).
So, even though World War 1 is often referred to as ‘the European War’ in 
China, it is quite clear that it has left its imprint in Asia, too.
The Americas
When war broke out, the United States remained neutral29, and did so until 
April 1917 when the country declared war on Germany and began to mo-
bilise itself in its war effort30. By mid-1918, the US had approxi mately one 
million soldiers in France, building this force much faster than had been 
expected by Germany. The US intervention was a decisive victory for the 
Entente Powers, worn out after the German ‘Spring Offensive’ (March-
July 1918), and US-troops played an important role in the ‘Hundred Days 
Offensive’ (August- November 1918), resulting in Germany’s defeat (see 
further discussions in Zank in Chapter 4 in this book; Dosenrode in Chapter 
5 in this book).
While it is possible to argue for a number of impacts of World War 1, in the 
following section, three will be looked into31: Domestically, the war pro-
moted women’s rights and created an awareness of racial problems; the US 
entered the world stage as a decisive power; and the war gave the US a 
leading economic role.
Domestically, World War 1, according to Keene (2014), gave women’s rights 
groups good arguments for demanding voting rights, and for Woodrow 
Wilson to be a true liberal. The right came with the Nineteenth Amendment 
in 1920. 
The mobilisation of the African American labour force, and the ‘Great 
Migration’, where about half a million African Americans from the South 
moved to the industrial centres of the North to fill gaps made by the con-
scripts, created an awareness that racism was not only a problem confined 
to the South, but had to be tackled nationwide, thus (Keene 2014) “the war 
was a transformative moment for the civil rights movement, a time when 
the black community acquired not just the motivation but also the means for 
launching assaults on Jim Crow.”32
According to the Monroe Doctrine33, there were separate spheres of influ-
ence for the Americas and for Europe. This implies not only that the US 
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would not tolerate outside interference in the Americas, but also that the 
US would not intervene outside them. This self-imposed isolationism was 
paused with US intervention in World War 1, but returned when Woodrow 
Wilson’s plans for a League of Nations was not endorsed by the Senate. 
After World War 2, the US has remained a global power (see above), and is 
today the world’s only superpower, although President Trump (inaugurated 
2017) seems to be withdrawing the US from world politics, at least partly.
When the World War 1 broke out, Britain and France individually financed 
the war effort. After a while, Britain took over the financing of the Allies 
until 1916, when it ran out of money and had to borrow from the United 
States. The US took over the financing of the Allies in 1917, but did so 
with loans that she insisted should be repaid after the war (Tooze & Fertik 
2014). When the question of Britain and France’s war debt was brought up, 
President Calvin Coolidge supposedly exclaimed, “They hired the money, 
didn’t they?” (Coolidge). This meant that the war changed the world’s eco-
nomic system, shifting the financial centre of gravity from London to New 
York (see below).
Canada, as one of the Dominions, joined Great Britain in the war in 1914, 
just as militarily unprepared as, the US would be three years later34. Canada 
lost more than a hundred thousand soldiers during the war. After initial 
enthusiasm among the English speakers of the country, the divide between 
the French and the English speaking populations became evident, especially 
about the question of conscription, when the government had to go back 
on its initial promise not to introduce it (Canada). The English speaking 
part accepted conscription, whereas the French speaking part did not. The 
French speaking community increasingly began to identify with Canada 
and North America, whereas the English speaking one in the beginning of 
the war was – in general – all in for the empire (MacKenzie 2015). During 
and after the war, the general trend – within both communities – towards 
being Canadian, in its own right, was to increase. 
Morton, much in accordance with MacKenzie, sums up the impact of World 
War 1 on Canada like this: 
“The great achievements of Canadian soldiers on battlefields such 
as Ypres, Vimy and Passchendaele, however, ignited a sense of  
national pride and a confidence that Canada could stand on its 
own, apart from the British Empire, on the world stage. The war 
also deepened the divide between French and English Canada, and 
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marked the beginning of widespread state intervention in society 
and the economy.” 
In other words, it resulted in independence internationally, and a split do-
mestically. MacKenzie (2015) added to this that “Canada emerged from the 
First World War an economically stronger and more autonomous nation 
with a greatly enhanced international reputation.”
The Dominions, loyally supporting Great Britain in its fight, insisted on 
– and got – their reward in the form of increased influence in the imperial 
foreign policy. One important achievement in this respect was Resolution 
IX of the Imperial Conference of 1917, which promised to recognise the 
Dominions as autonomous nations and give them a voice in the empire’s 
foreign policy, when the war was over (this was a prerogative until then 
jealously guarded by the government in London35). The Dominions were 
granted seats at the Peace Conference, much to France’s annoyance (see 
Nicolson 1964: 240). It is a general trend that World War 1 increased the 
Dominions’ and colonies’ influence according to racial or colour terms: 
most for the Dominions (‘White’), then India (‘Brown’), and then, hardly 
any the rest (‘Black’).
A consequence of the Dominions’ increasing independence was the foun-
dation of the British Commonwealth in 1926, with the Balfour Declaration. 
Great Britain and its Dominions agreed that they were ‘equal in status, in no 
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs’ (Imperial Conference 1929). This may be seen as the beginning of 
the winding up of the British Empire. Under the name Commonwealth of 
Nations, it still exists today as an intergovernmental organisation which has 
fifty-three members, of which sixteen are realms with the British Monarch 
as sovereign (Commonwealth).
The Latin American countries declared their neutrality at the outbreak of 
the war, and it lasted until 1917 when the US entered the war and a number 
of Latin American states followed, most notably Brazil. On the other hand, 
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico remained neutral (Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(3)), for example.
The war influenced the Latin American countries in two ways (cf. Rinke 
and Kriegesmann 2015): 1) as European investments dried out, US based 
business continued and expanded their investments in Latin America, thus 
increasing US dominance in the region, and 2) Europe and the European 
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civilization lost its role as an ‘ideal pattern’ for the elites in Latin America 
to copy.
Summing up foreign political implications of World War 1 
One central implication of World War 1 on foreign politics is a series of 
changes in the international system. In 1914, the international system was 
multipolar, centred on Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Germany, 
and Russia, followed by Italy. One might also consider the Ottoman Empire 
as some kind of ‘honorary power’, but she was already weak (however, 
still able to keep the Entente Powers away from the Dardanelles). Outside 
Europe, Japan had proven her power by beating Russia in the 1904-05 War. 
The United States was a power, but a dormant one. World War 1 left the sys-
tem very much changed: Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, 
and Russia were either dissolved or castrated, and the US had retired into 
isolation, thus leaving United Kingdom, France, and Japan (and to a lesser 
degree Italy), to tend to their empires. Until then, ideology had been fair-
ly unimportant in foreign relations. But President Wilson had introduced 
ideology (see further discussions in Chapter 5 in this book). His vision for 
a New World Order included the promotion of democracy, free trade, and 
collective security. He pushed for the League of Nations, an organisation of 
collective security, envisioned to be an organisation to prevent conflicts and 
stop them from evolving. Its Covenant was a part of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The US did not join it though, and its success rate was very moderate. The 
great powers continued to pursue power politics (read: national interests). 
However, the situation in the interbellum was unnatural and unstable; it was 
the swansong of the European empires and indeed of Europe. As already 
mentioned the interbellum passed, one witnessed the growth of Germany 
and the Soviet Union’s power: two ideological powers both striving for 
world hegemony, leading to World War 2. World War 2 changed the inter-
national system, and again the number of powers had diminished: Germany 
and Japan had lost and were occupied. Italy had lost, but managed to change 
sides just in time to come out with relatively small losses (her colonies, 
Dodecanese and Trieste). France and the United Kingdom were on the win-
ning side again. Again, the international society tried to create an organisa-
tion for collective security, the United Nations, which was founded in 1945 
(UN). In its charter, it has serious powers, but as the five permanent mem-
bers of its Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the 
US) each have veto-power and rarely agree, it has not lived up to the hopes 
which followed its inauguration. 
It became clear a few years after the end of the war that the world was now 
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ruled by two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. These 
two states fought for supremacy both ideologically and politically, and the 
struggle lasted until the Soviet Union imploded and dissolved itself on 26 
December 1991, thus ending a conflict which lasted from 1914 until 1991. 
After the Soviet Union’s implosion, the international system was left with 
one superpower. Potentially Brazil, China, the EU, India, and Russia could 
challenge US hegemony, but at the time of writing, 2018, that seems un-
likely, as the US is – by far – the stronger power. Thus, World War 1 has left 
a clear and lasting impact on world politics, just as important as the Peace 
of Westphalia.36
Economy
The Great War had serious implications for global and national economies, 
too. Before the war, the world was ‘globalised’, with a network of trade, 
capital movements, and migration; that stopped. Free trade was hampered, 
as the belligerent powers tried to block each other, leading to the German 
submarine blockade of the British Isles, and of the Royal Navy blockading 
Germany. 
War has to be financed, and this led to inflation during and after the war. 
But printing money and raising taxes does not work in the long run. Thus, 
states try to raise credit abroad, leading to deficits and dependence. In this 
section, we will look at: inflation during and after the war; the shift of eco-
nomic power, and its long-term impact.
Inflation
According to Hardach (2015),
“The methods of financial mobilization were basically the same in 
all belligerent countries. The government borrowed the money from 
the central bank to meet the rapidly rising expenses of the war […]. 
At regular intervals, the short-term debt was funded by issuing long-
term war loans. Only a small part of government expenditure was 
financed by taxes. The rapidly rising government deficit entailed in 
all countries wartime inflations of various dimensions, visible in 
rising prices and a deteriorating exchange rate of the currency.” 
Thus, one legacy of World War 1 was inflation; others were the perils of 
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resizing industry and changing products for peacetime consumption, what 
one might call ‘from guns to pots and pans’.
As mentioned by Hardach (2015), inflation hit during the war. Tooze and 
Fertik (2014: 255) comment that
“From the point of view of the combatants, the inflation was a neces-
sary evil in the process of mobilization they were driving … What 
wartime inflation revealed was the possibility of the entire world 
expecting the same shock at the same time, and that this shock could 
be the product of conscious decisions.”
Inflation was especially bad in Germany, resulting in hyperinflation 1921-
1924 as feared by Keynes (see the discussion in Chapter 10 in this book). 
The German government financed the war through loans, expecting to win 
the war and thus to be able to claim reparations. The result was obviously 
the opposite: Germany lost, and was left with a high debt and also had to 
pay reparations. However, the reparations ‘only’ amounted to one-third of 
the German deficit, and the inflation would have come anyway Bresciani-
Turroni 1931: 94-95, because (Bresciani-Turroni 1931: 98):
“The German Government bought foreign exchange with paper 
money which was not purchasing power collected from German  
citizens by taxes, but new purchasing power created by the dis-
counting of Treasury bills at the Reichsbank, that is by the increase 
of note-issues.”
Still, the debt accumulated was due to the way the war had been financed, 
and the war did have economic consequences. 
Shift of economic power away from Europe
After the war, the traditional economic order had changed (Tooze and Fertik 
2014: 235): 
“What emerged from the war, […], was not a shrunken global trad-
ing system, but one characterized by even larger bilateral imbal-
ances, which were no longer offset by Britain’s robust balance of 
payments. It was not so much a deglobalization as a decentering of 
Europe.” 
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The US and Japan were the great winners.
Olesen agrees that the global consequences of the war were bad (Chapter 10 
in this book):
“Somehow, the Versailles Treaty signalled the coming of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Likewise, from now on, Great Britain was 
no longer the world’s most powerful Empire economically as well as 
politically. Her position was overtaken by the USA, which to a large 
degree had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both Great 
Britain and France.37”
This transfer of the financial power from Europe to the US is central to the 
power structure of international relations, and it signalled how hollow the 
‘power’ of France and the United Kingdom in reality was after the war. Also 
important was that the ‘globalisation’ which existed before the war was not 
restored afterwards. Devastation as consequence of the war, rising debts, and 
inflation all contributed to prevent a working international economic system.
Long-term consequences
Olesen (in Chapter 10 in this book) isolates a number of long-term effects 
of World War 1:
1)  Unemployment from the beginning of the 1920s followed by 
recession in the 1930s (leading to social unrest, nationalism and 
eventually World War 2);
2)  For most European states they first fully recovered economi-
cally in the 1960s;
3)  And, as mentioned above, both Britain and France lost their 
economic, financial and political power and the US emerged as 
an economic and financial power, outshining all others.
The economic consequences of World War 1 were huge and long-felt, leav-
ing their imprint clearly on today’s economic and political system.
Science, technology, and medicine 
World War 1 was a technological war, and although for example, the British 
military felt it was ‘moral and the human quality’, which secured the vic-
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tory, science and technology had become crucial to warfare (Palazzo 2002: 
4).38 World War 1 accelerated and refined innovations already made before 
the war for example, aeroplanes were refined, x-ray machines made mobile 
and so on, and it did lead to new innovations (such as tanks, flame throwers, 
poison gas, and two-way radio transmitters). The use of existing technology 
– in form of, for example, machine guns – made traditional frontal assaults 
suicidal (although this did not stop them, with hundred thousands of deaths 
and people wounded as a result). Machine guns gave the defender the upper 
hand, and promoted thoughts on how to break this, resulting, for example, 
in tanks and poison gas. U-boats sinking ships with reinforcements trying 
to cross the Atlantic led to depth charges and hydrophones, and so on. In 
this section we will first look at its impact on science and technology, and 
then the impact of the war on medicine.
Impact on science and technology
It is commonly contended that the war lead to a huge leap forward con-
cerning science and technology, but that equation is not quite so simple, as 
Roland explains (1985/262): 
“First, it was a war of industrial production. Germans were never 
really defeated in that field […] Second, the machinegun and the 
submarine were critical technologies. […] Third, some new technol-
ogies proved less efficient on the battlefield than they might have 
because their potential was never fully exploited.” 
When it comes to, for example, the use of aircraft and tanks, these were 
developed during the 1930s, building on experiences from the Great War39. 
In this sense, science and technology not only gave some ‘here and now’ 
advantages, but also made an impact on future wars. The German develop-
ment of tanks and aeroplanes and their use contributed to the quick German 
victories over Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France in World War 
2, with severe political consequences. 
Returning to the question of the war’s implications on technology and sci-
ence, Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11 in this book), analyses the 
commonly-held assumption that the war sped up the invention and diffusion 
of technology. Trying to assess the impact of the war on everyday techno-
logy (looking at transport and communication), she focuses especially on 
radio, trucks, and aeroplanes. The conclusion is that there is no clear-cut an-
swer to the question. If one looks at radio, the war advanced ‘point-to-point’ 
322
technology, but not broadcasting in a wider sense. On the contrary, civil-
ian experiments were normally prohibited during the war. Trucks had been 
invented before the war, but Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11 in this book) notes 
that the reliability of motor vehicles was untested under battle conditions 
and, in general, their use was hampered by a lack of standardisation which 
made repairs difficult. There were no great innovations in that field, but 
production capacity was increased dramatically. Aeroplanes are a marked 
difference. At the beginning of the war, they were still very much in their 
infancy. During the war, they were developed and refined (recognisance 
planes, fighter planes, and bomber planes). But Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11, 
p. 249 in this book) maintains that they did not play a decisive role in the 
war, but were “a new and spectacular technology … very visible and full of 
symbolic meaning.”
Skyggebjerg made an interesting observation concerning radio and trucks: 
yes, they did contribute to the war effort, but cable communication was far 
more common than radio, and trains, horses, and mules much more impor-
tant than trucks. 
Regarding the trucks and aeroplanes Skyggebjerg mentions, the armistice 
meant that hundreds if not thousands of each category were no longer 
needed and were sold for civilian purposes, thus helping to mechanise trans-
portation – one example is that all but one aeroplane of the newly-founded 
Danish Aviation Company were old planes from the war.
The impact on medicine
Machine guns and hitherto unseen amounts of artillery inflicted not only 
deaths but also wounds, wounded soldiers who had to be treated. Dolev 
(2007: 5) quotes T. H. Goodwin’s statement from 1917 on the objectives of 
military surgery: “The whole object of medical service in war is to provide 
men for the fighting line, to keep then fit, and if sick or wounded, to make 
them fit and ready for further fighting as soon as possible.” New types of 
wounds made by fragments of shrapnel, poison gas, and burns from flame-
throwers challenged military surgery and new techniques and cures had to 
be invented40, new organisations of military field hospitals and transporta-
tion had to be made, rehabilitation and – for some – artificial limbs had to 
be made, and were made.
Dr Lars P. Nielsen has provided the following four paragraphs on 
the relationship between medicine and war: 
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“The medical field was in a transition state in the beginning of World 
War 1 (WW1). During the war the medical profession expanded and 
developed many novel methods, which later were used in the daily 
clinic. The war was later called “an efficient schoolmaster” as many 
trials using novel procedures and modalities were performed as the 
war resulted in urgent need for fighting war related diseases and 
consequences. 
Louis Pasteur died in 1895 and his ideas was slowly changing the 
view on infectious diseases as being caused by microorganism. 
During the World War 1 vaccination for typhoid fever reduced the 
fatality rate of this severe infection. Furthermore, the treatment for 
tetanus in the form of vaccines, anti-toxins and not at least improved 
surgical skills reduced the number of tetanus cases during the years 
of war. The invention and use of Thomas’ splint was also impor-
tant in reducing soft tissue injury and immobilizing fractures- a 
concept still in use today. The many injuries highlighted the need 
for rehabilita tion and special hospitals for such purposes was intro-
duced and due to its success a need for bringing the preventive and 
curative medicine together was envisioned.
Bomb shelling resulted in severe psychological problems (shell 
shock) and the diagnostic capabilities were indeed developed as a 
consequence of the many victims of bombs. This new symptom 
complex was a consequence of more efficient weapons and war ma-
chinery. 
Despite the rapid improvement in many medical areas, the Spanish 
pandemic influenza hit both the military personnel and young civili-
ans hard. The global infection caused an estimated 50-100 million 
human fatalities in just 9 months.
However, with World War I a new era of relations between technical 
war and disease had begun.”
Summing up
Trying to sum up, it is obvious that World War 1 did have an impact on 
science, technology, and medicine, and World War 1 was a technological 
war but, as Skyggebjerg noted in this volume (p. 247), some of the new 
inventions did not win the war – like aeroplanes, poison gas, and tanks. 
324
Much military equipment developed during the war was further developed 
(for example, tanks and aeroplanes). Poison gas is still a threat to people, 
soldiers and civilians alike. Soldiers in modern armies all have gasmasks as 
part of their equipment, giving them a kind of protection, a protection that 
the civilians in Iraq and Syria did not enjoy when poison gas was used on 
them by dictators Saddam Hussein and Bashar Hafez al-Assad respectively, 
and poison gas in the hands of terrorist groups belong to today’s nightmares 
– one just has to think of the Tokyo subway sarin attack in March 1995.
Much of the knowledge gained treating the wounded has helped medicine 
progress, as is the case with, for example, orthopaedic surgery (Schoenfeld 
2011: 691) or the experiences of the Spanish Flu do for the prevention of pan-
demics (Clarke 2016: 941-942).41 The war was indeed a rough schoolmaster.
Concluding remarks
What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had not changed 
the route of his cortege that fateful day in August 1914 in Sarajevo, and had 
not passed by the assassin Gavrilo Princip? Perhaps World War 1 would not 
have happened, and thus no Russian Revolution, no Fascism or Nazism, no 
Holocaust, no World War 2, no Pearl Harbor, no nuclear bombs, no Cold War, 
no Chinese Revolution, no…? This is an interesting but unanswerable ‘what 
if’ in history. The fact is that World War 1 did happen, the Urkatastrofe of 
the twentieth century, and that it has influenced and shaped our present day 
world culturally, politically, socially, economically, scientifically, and tech-
nologically. World War 1 changed Europe, from the continent projecting 
power to the rest of the world, to being a chess piece in the game of larger 
powers (first the US and Russia, today only the US). 
In this chapter, the results and conclusions of the previous chapters have 
been accumulated and analysed, and there were many impacts, which raises 
the question: which were the most important ones? Using the criterion of fo-
cusing on the stability of the international system, three important impacts 
will be emphasised42: 
•  The Russian Revolution resulted in a different societal model. It 
also led to millions of people’s deaths and suffering. It aimed at 
fundamentally changing the world, and challenging the capital-
ist system. Its antagonism to capitalist states and its militant an-
ti-colonialism laid the foundation for the Cold War (1947 – 1991). 
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Additionally the Soviet Union exported the revolution to China.
•  In the decades before World War 1, the economic system had 
been stable and the centre of it was Europe. After the war, the 
system was not re-stabilised, the centre of gravity had moved 
to New York, and it lasted until the 1960s before most (West-) 
European states had recovered economically.
•  The rise of fascism – especially in Germany – as a result of 
World War 1, led to industrialised genocide, as well as to the 
outbreak of World War 2.
In other words, the impact of World War 1 has been enormous, and the war 
has shaped the world we live in today.
In this book, we have tried to approach World War 1 in an interdisciplinary 
way. In the first part of the book, we analysed the motivation of young men 
to go to war, using a psychological approach; then we looked at the causes 
and the course of the war using a historical approach combined with inter-
national relations theory. In the second part, we searched for the impacts, 
traces of the war in literature, in politics, in economy, and in science and 
technology, and summed up the impacts in the concluding chapter using the 
respective disciplines’ histories often combined with insights from political 
science and international relations. By doing so, we have gained a more 
nuanced understanding of the Great War’s importance. 
That the War left impacts in all the fields of society and human activities 
we looked into is not surprising. What is surprising, is that the impacts are 
still felt it today’s world – not ‘only’ in literature, but also in politics (for 
example, universal suffrage in some parts of the world, but not all), interna-
tional relations (for example the United Nations, a descendent of the League 
of Nations), in conflicts (for example, Iraq) and in cooperation (the EU, for 
example), in psychology (for instance, psychoanalysis and the recognition 
of shell shock), in economy (such as the rise of the US as the greatest eco-
nomic power), in technology and science (like poison gas, but also better 
aeroplanes and better radio transmission), and in medicine (for example, 
the prevention of pandemics). One finds the impacts of the war in many 
places. The war was a brutal schoolmaster, and it caused enormous suf-
fering (among which are Hitler’s, Mao’s, and Stalin’s campaigns of perse-
cution). Trying to understand today’s very complex world requires knowing 
and understanding World War 1 and its impacts.
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Endnotes
1 It goes without saying that we do not claim to capture all develop-
ments, but we do try to identify the most important ones.
2 A good overview of European culture, including the timespan from 
World War 1 until the year 2000, is found in James Winders’ book 
(2001).
3 Culture is a central concept, and in the words of David Landes, (2000: 2) 
it makes “almost all the difference”. Geert Hofstede makes a very simple 
but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it into ‘Culture 
one’ and ‘Culture two’ (1991). ‘Culture one’ is culture in the classical 
meaning of the word, that is education, refinement, art etc. ‘Culture 
two’ includes the activities in ‘Culture one’ but is broader – very much 
broader -, including everyday work and routines like greeting, eating etc. 
Culture in this book is concerned mainly with ‘Culture one’.
4 This ‘Myth of the War Experience’ was not revived after World War 2; 
it was unique to World War 1 (cf. Mosse 1986).
5 I previously referred to Donna Baker’s (1975) use of this method.
6 Of the latter, one could mention ‘Dadaism’, which originated in Zürich 
during the war.
7 A memorial monument was erected in Marselisborg, Århus, for the 
4000+ Danes who fell in the war, but the war has, generally speaking, 
been forgotten. Claus Bundgård Christen tells the story of the Danes 
forced to fight for Germany on the Western Front. They belonged to a 
group of persons who defined themselves as Danish, but were living 
in Germany after Denmark had lost the war against Prussia, as well as 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 
8 History demonstrates several examples of how long time it takes to 
create a full, stable democracy. For example, in Great Britain, it took 
from the Reform Act of 1832 until 1928 for universal suffrage to be 
achieved, in France, the period lasted from the Revolution in 1789 until 
the present constitution was created in 1958. In Denmark the period 
lasted from 1849 until universal suffrage was introduced in 1915.
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9 Nazism is seen as a variation of fascism. See Kedshaw 2004: 241.
10 Kershaw (2004) gives an overview of the different approaches to un-
derstanding how Nazism rose in Germany.
11 For an analysis of the revolution, see further below. Among the hun-
dreds of descriptions and analyses of the Russian Revolution and the 
history of the Soviet Union, Edward Acton (1995) is recommendable.
12 In Canada, the Wartime Elections Act from 1917 gave the right to vote 
to the wives, widows, mothers, and sisters of soldiers serving overseas, 
opening for universal suffrage in 1918, thus marking a direct link be-
tween the war and the beginning of the emancipation of women in that 
country.
13 This pattern was repeated when World War 2 broke out.
14 Blum, Eloranta, and Osinsky (2014) deliver an excellent analysis of the 
‘Organization of War Economies’ in their article of the same name. 
15 It is worth remembering that during the interbellum there were large 
proportions of the people, and also the elites, who were not interested 
in a new war. Mosse (1986: 494) wrote “The Myth of War Experience 
could disguise but never eliminate accurate memories of the past, as 
manifested in the reluctance of most men and women to wage war 
again.” And the same reluctance, this time in the British parliament 
specifically, has been described by Martin Gilbert (2012).
16 See for example. J. P. D. Dunbabin 1994 (a) for a detailed overview of 
international relations from World War 2 until the beginning of the 
1990s. 
17 See e.g. J. P. D. Dunbabin 1994 (b) for a detailed overview of inter-
national relations from World War 2 until the beginning of the 1990s. 
The first chapter gives a short overview.
18 This headline was also the title of Ernst Haas’ famous book from 1958 
establishing the neo-functionalist school, within theory of regional 
integration.
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19 See, for example, Dosenrode 2012, Chapter 2 for an introduction to 
Europe’s unification.
20 For a discussion of the EU’s answer to the economic crisis see, for ex-
ample, Zank (2015a).
21 For an introduction to the Middle East, see Dosenrode & Stubkjær 
(2002: 35-51) for a short introduction, or Kamrava (2013) for a detailed 
analysis. Zank (2015b) analyses the Middle East with regard to region-
al integration, or the lack of it, and there also analyses the conflicts of 
the region.
22 A solid overview is found in Nasson (2014).
23 Perhaps a hint of another reason for ignoring Africa is found in 
Clemenceau’s speech delivered to the French Senate on 20 February 
1918, in which he stated: “We are going to offer civilisation to the 
Blacks. They will have to pay for that [...] I would prefer that ten 
Blacks are killed rather than one Frenchman!” (quoted by Koller).
24 Koller (2014) estimates that around 708,000 indigenous Africans were 
either soldiers (440,000) or war workers (268,000), but his figures 
seem a bit inaccurate, as he writes a bit further on that France (alone) 
used 450,000 indigenous troops. The important thing being that the 
amount was large, implying that many African families, especially in 
French colonies, were affected by having a son, a brother, or a father in 
the war.
25 See also Balesi 1990: 186-187.
26 Lunn (2015) has estimated that around 708,000 civilians died in Africa 
due to the war.
27 The last large mandate of the League of Nations was Namibia, which 
gained independence in 1990 after years of resistance to the South 
African occupation.
28 For a detailed introduction, seen Calvocoressi (2001: 92-149, 499-586).
29 Clements (2005) argues that the crucial decision leading to the USA 
entering the war was made already in 1914-1915 by a number of nei-
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ther well-considered nor rational answers to a number of occurrences. 
He also points to the sinking of the Lusitania as a crucial factor. Frank 
Trommler (2009) analyses the effect of the sinking of the Lusitania not 
only on the American public, but also on the search for an American 
unity for the American nation, a cultural independence, and the hyste-
ria against socialists.
30 Showalter (2002) has made a good overview of the literature on the US 
in World War 1.
31 David R. Mayhew has isolated eight domestic policy changes attribut-
ed to World War 1 (2005: 477-448): Progressive taxation; a record high 
protective tariff; a national budgeting system; prohibition; women’s 
suffrage; immigration restrictions; domestic intelligence; and the car-
telization of the railroads under tight government management.
32 ‘Jim Crow’ was a nickname for the segregationist laws dividing whites 
and blacks, first finally abolished in 1965. 
33 Declaration made by US President James Monroe 1823 on US’ foreign 
relations. For an analysis of the doctrine, see ‘Monroe Doctrine, 1823’.
34 Technically, the whole empire joined the war when Britain declared 
war on 4 August. One of the features of the War was that it increased 
national self-awareness in the constituent parts of the empire. In 1919, 
George V could have ratified the Treaty simply upon the advice of the 
Westminster Parliament, but instead the government chose to wait un-
til all the Dominion parliaments had approved the treaty.
35 For further discussion of this, see McManus 1992: 2
36 The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the 30-Years War in 1648, and 
created a system of sovereign states in Europe.
37 Olesen’s word ’somehow’ is important, as the Great Depression is nor-
mally not attributed to World War 1. Tooze and Fertik (2014: 237) write 
that “The economic confusion of the moment [the Depression] were as 
much due to the supersession of competitive markets by oligopolistic 
firms and the new significance of materials found only in far-flung 
parts of the world as they were to the war and nationalism.”
336
38 This also spilled over to human life in the form of the modernisation 
and industrialisation of life itself, destroying the value of individual 
life, as mentioned above.
39 The most important German tank-tactics developer was General Heinz 
Guderian. In France general Charles de Gaulle pleaded for the use of 
tanks, too, but in wain. 
40 Dolev (2007:10-11) tells how British military surgeons used to operate 
on soldiers wounded in their abdomens at once, until they realized that 
those not undergoing surgery survived at a higher rate than those having 
immediate surgery; then the technique was reconsidered and changed. 
41 It goes without saying that the author of these lines does not in any 
way try to justify the unnecessary bloodshed and suffering arising 
from the war.
42 Sharp, in his excellent monograph from 2010, emphasises the German 
question, the League of Nations, developments in minority rights and 
international public law, and the rise of the US as the important legacies.
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World War 1
The Great War and its Impact
The Great War belongs to one of modern world history’s most important periods, rivaled  
only by the Thirty Years’ War and its peace agreement in Westphalia in 1648. The results  
of the Great War left their impact on the whole world, including:
•	 	the	move	of	economic	power	from	Europe	to	the	United	States	of	America	
•	 	the	construction	of	the	Middle	East	after	the	fall	of	the	Ottoman	Empire
•	 	the	transferal	of	German	colonies	to	the	victorious	powers	via	the	League	 
of Nations
•	 	the	Russian	Revolution,	and
•	 	the	developments	in	inter alia Germany smoothing the path for World War 2  
and the Cold War. 
The traces of the War can be followed well into the twenty-first century, too. 
In this book, we will analyze the War itself and trace its impacts. This will be done using  
an interdisciplinary approach: the best way to get a broad understanding of the War as the 
book’s aim is to do a comprehensive ‘360 degree’ analysis of the impacts, finding them in  
culture, economy, politics, and technology.
This book gives a comprehensive introduction to World War 1, and it is an essential  
companion for students studying World War 1 or aspects of it.
This wide-ranging and valuable interdisciplinary examination of World War 1 offers insights 
that reach beyond  conventional military, economic, and diplomatic studies of the war and 
its impact, though these are addressed. It assesses the psychological, cultural, medical, and 
technological changes influenced or brought about by the conflict, both at the time and sub-
sequently, and analyses the role played by that war in long-term developments in China.  
The information on the impact of the War on neutral Denmark gives it an interesting and  
rewarding perspective. Together, these essays  add much to our knowledge and understanding 
of  the wide-ranging legacy of what was, undoubtedly, the single most important event of the 
twentieth century – the Great War.
Alan	Sharp.	Emeritus	Professor	of	International	History,	University	of	Ulster
Highly	relevant	and	highly	welcomed	focus	on	the	long	shadow	of	the	First	World	War.
This	is	a	book	reminding	us	about	the	fact	that	the	Second	World	War	was	not	the	only	 
motivating	factor	behind	the	process	of	creating	the	institutionalized	European	Cooperation	 
in the second half of the twentieth century. It also gives us valuable insight into the problems 
of meeting the challenges and threats of the perception of the nation state as the sole actor in 
an already then somewhat globalized world. The book is also valuable because it gives us 
such a multifaceted exposure of the period.
The	book	is	a	well	written	and	rich	source	for	insight.	Professor	Dosenrode	deserves	praise	
for making this important contribution to our understanding of a period of which many have 
probably lost track.
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Former	Danish	Minister	(S)	of	Energy	and	of	Development	Cooperation
Honorary	Professor	af	the	University	of	Aalborg	
